Reduction, stasis, and expansion of budgets in advanced democracies

Comparative Political Studies

Volumn 44, Issue 8, 2011, Pages 1060-1088

  Breunig, Christian ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO   (Canada)

Author keywords

agenda setting; budgets; comparative political economy; public policy

Indexed keywords

EID: 79960596529     PISSN: 00104140     EISSN: 15523829     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0010414011405169     Document Type: Article

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