Budgetary politics and veto players

Swiss Political Science Review

Volumn 11, Issue 4, 2005, Pages 47-75

  Koenig, Thomas ^a   Troeger, Vera E ^b  

^a Deutsche Universität für Verwaltungswissenschaften Speyer   (Germany)

^b UNIVERSITY OF EXETER   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Budgetary politics; Germany; Veto players

Indexed keywords

EID: 33749004046     PISSN: 14247755     EISSN: 16626370     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/j.1662-6370.2005.tb00370.x     Document Type: Article

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