Government responsiveness and political competition in comparative perspective

Comparative Political Studies

Volumn 41, Issue 3, 2008, Pages 309-337

  Hobolt, Sara Binzer ^a   Klemmensen, Robert ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN DENMARK   (Denmark)

Author keywords

Budget; Competition; Representation; Responsiveness; Speeches

Indexed keywords

EID: 38549168331     PISSN: 00104140     EISSN: 15523829     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0010414006297169     Document Type: Article

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