Governing the commons: Learning from field and laboratory experiments

Ecological Economics

Volumn 70, Issue 9, 2011, Pages 1569-1570

  Janssen, Marco A ^a   Anderies, John M ^a  

^a ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 79958261204     PISSN: 09218009     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ecolecon.2011.03.023     Document Type: Editorial

References (19)

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