Head-enders as stationary bandits in asymmetric commons: Comparing irrigation experiments in the laboratory and the field

Ecological Economics

Volumn 70, Issue 9, 2011, Pages 1590-1598

  Janssen, Marco A ^a   Anderies, John M ^a   Cardenas, Juan Camilo ^b  

^a ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSIDAD DE LOS ANDES   (Colombia)

Author keywords

Asymmetry; Common pool resources; Experimental economics; Irrigation

Indexed keywords

ASYMMETRY; COMPARATIVE STUDY; DECISION MAKING; EMERGENCE; ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS; INFRASTRUCTURE PLANNING; IRRIGATION SYSTEM; PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP; RESEARCH WORK; VILLAGE;

COLOMBIA; THAILAND;

EID: 79958259479     PISSN: 09218009     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ecolecon.2011.01.006     Document Type: Article

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