Reprint of: A common-pool resource experiment with postgraduate subjects from 41 countries

Ecological Economics

Volumn 70, Issue 9, 2011, Pages 1580-1589

  Ahn, T K ^a   Ostrom, Elinor ^b   Walker, James ^c  

^a Seoul National University   (South Korea)

^b ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c INDIANA UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Common pool resources; Face to face communication; Self selection

Indexed keywords

COMMUNICATION; ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE; ENVIRONMENTAL PLANNING; INSTITUTIONAL REFORM; STUDENT;

EID: 79958244249     PISSN: 09218009     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ecolecon.2010.12.002     Document Type: Article

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