Institutions, organizations, impersonality, and interests: The dynamics of institutions

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 79, Issue 1-2, 2011, Pages 48-64

  Wallis, John Joseph ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 79958259183     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2011.02.002     Document Type: Article

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