ASQ forum taking coase seriously

Administrative Science Quarterly

Volumn 44, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 145-157

  Gibbons, Robert ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0033096454     PISSN: 00018392     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2667034     Document Type: Review

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