Organizing violence

Journal of Conflict Resolution

Volumn 46, Issue 5, 2002, Pages 599-628

  Bates, Robert ^a   Greif, Avner ^b   Singh, Smita ^a  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036388351     PISSN: 00220027     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/002200202236166     Document Type: Article

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