Political labor market, government policy, and stability of a non-democratic regime

Journal of Comparative Economics

Volumn 35, Issue 3, 2007, Pages 546-563

  Lazarev, Valery ^a,b  

^a STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF HOUSTON CLEAR LAKE   (United States)

Author keywords

Hierarchy; Implicit contract; Non democracy; Political rents; Promotion incentives

Indexed keywords

EID: 34548125230     PISSN: 01475967     EISSN: 10957227     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jce.2007.03.004     Document Type: Article

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