Capital and growth with oligarchic property rights

Review of Economic Dynamics

Volumn 10, Issue 4, 2007, Pages 676-704

  Braguinsky, Serguey ^a,b   Myerson, Roger B ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY AT BUFFALO   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO   (United States)

Author keywords

Capital; Growth; Imperfect property rights; Oligarchs; Political risk

Indexed keywords

EID: 33846366374     PISSN: 10942025     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.red.2007.02.006     Document Type: Article

References (19)

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