International climate change negotiations: Lessons from theory

Climate Change Policies: Global Challenges and Future Prospects

Volumn , Issue , 2010, Pages 153-177

  Carraro, Carlo ^a   Massetti, Emanuele ^b  

^a CA' FOSCARI UNIVERSITY OF VENICE   (Italy)

^b FONDAZIONE ENI ENRICO MATTEI   (Italy)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 79957582195     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.4337/9781781000885.00022     Document Type: Chapter

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