Can equity enhance efficiency? Some lessons from climate negotiations

Game Practice and the Environment

Volumn , Issue , 2004, Pages 37-64

  Bosello, Francesco ^a,b   Buchner, Barbara ^a   Carraro, Carlo ^a,c   Raggi, Davide ^d,e  

^a FONDAZIONE ENI ENRICO MATTEI   (Italy)

^b ABDUS SALAM INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR THEORETICAL PHYSICS   (Italy)

^c CA' FOSCARI UNIVERSITY OF VENICE   (Italy)

^d UNIVERSITY OF PADOVA   (Italy)

^e DUKE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84896238945     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.4337/9781845421441.00008     Document Type: Chapter

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