Trust and trustworthiness reputations in an investment game

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 72, Issue 2, 2011, Pages 361-375

  Charness, Gary ^a   Du, Ninghua ^b   Yang, Chun Lei ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b SHANGHAI UNIVERSITY OF FINANCE AND ECONOMICS   (China)

^c RESEARCH CENTER FOR HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES   (Taiwan)

Author keywords

Experiment; Indirect reciprocity; Reputation systems; Trust

Indexed keywords

EID: 79956337576     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2010.09.002     Document Type: Article

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