How international law works: Introduction

International Theory

Volumn 1, Issue 2, 2009, Pages 285-293

  Guzman, Andrew T ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 79956248153     PISSN: 17529719     EISSN: 17529727     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S1752971909990042     Document Type: Article

References (25)

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