Proliferation implications of civil nuclear cooperation: Theory and a case study of Tito's Yugoslavia

Security Studies

Volumn 20, Issue 1, 2011, Pages 73-104

  Hymans, Jacques E C ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA   (United States)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 79952805435     PISSN: 09636412     EISSN: 15561852     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/09636412.2011.549013     Document Type: Article

References (152)

1. In this article I use the term "Atoms for Peace" not just to indicate Eisenhower's specific policy initiative but as a shorthand referring to all aboveboard international civil nuclear technology cooperation activities. This is in keeping with standard usage; for instance, the IAEA still today labels itself the "Atoms for Peace agency." See http://www.iaea.org/About/index.html.
2. Steven E. Miller and Scott D. Sagan, "Nuclear Power Without Nuclear Proliferation?" Daedalus 138, no. 4 (Fall 2009): 7-18.
3. See Henry S. Rowen, "How He Worked," in Nuclear Heuristics: Selected Writings of Albert and Roberta Wohlstetter, eds., Robert Zarate and Henry Sokolski (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2009), 111, complete text available online at http://www.albertwohlstetter.com/.
4. Leonard Beaton, Must the Bomb Spread? (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1966), 88-89.
5. Thomas C. Reed and Danny B. Stillman, The Nuclear Express: A Political History of the Bomb and Its Proliferation (Minneapolis, MN: Zenith Press, 2009), 56.
6. Henry Sokolski, Best of Intentions: America's Campaign Against Strategic Weapons Proliferation (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001), 105.
7. Zia Mian and Alexander Glaser, "A Frightening Nuclear Legacy," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 64, no. 4 (September/October 2008): 42, 47.
8. For a similar verdict, see also Leonard Weiss, "Atoms for Peace," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 59, no. 6 (November/December 2003): 34.
9. Joseph Cirincione quoted in Laura Myers, "Nuke Rivalry Fuels Pakistan, India," Associated Press report reprinted in Nautilus Institute Northeast Asia Peace and Security Network Daily Report, May 28, 1998, at http://www.nautilus.org/archives/pub/ftp/napsnet/daily reports/1998/05-98-May/MAY28.txt.
10. Alisa Carrigan, "Learning to Build the Bomb," Physics Today (December 2007): 54-55;
11. Alisa Carrigan, "A Peripheral Threat? Addressing Dissemination of Human Capital in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime" (paper presented at the International Studies Association annual meeting, March 2005), at http://www.allacademic.com//meta/p mla apa research citation/0/6/9/8/5/pages69859/p69859-1.php.
12. Joseph F. Pilat, ed., with foreword by Mohammed ElBaradei, Atoms for Peace: A Future After Fifty Years? (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2007).
13. Michael M. May and Tom Isaacs, "Stronger Measures Needed to Prevent Proliferation," Issues in Science and Technology 20, no. 3 (Spring 2004), at http://www.issues.org/20.3/may.html.
14. For a broadly parallel view see Peter R. Lavoy, "The Enduring Effects of Atoms for Peace," Arms Control Today (December 2003), at http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003 12/Lavoy.
15. Matthew Kroenig, Exporting the Bomb: Technology Transfer and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2010);
16. and Matthew Fuhrmann, "Spreading Temptation: Proliferation and Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Agreements," International Security 34, no. 1 (Summer 2009): 7-41.
17. See also Erik Gartzke and Matthew Kroenig, "A Strategic Approach to Nuclear Proliferation," Journal of Conflict Resolution 53, no. 2 (April 2009): 151-60.
18. Kroenig, Exporting the Bomb, esp. 10-14.
19. Fuhrmann, "Spreading Temptation," 40.
20. Philipp C. Bleek, "Why Do States Proliferate? Quantitative Analysis of the Exploration, Pursuit, and Acquisition of Nuclear Weapons," in Forecasting Nuclear Proliferation in the 21st Century, Vol. 1: The Role of Theory, eds., William C. Potter and Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010), 173 and 272-73, n49.
21. Alexander Montgomery gets a similar result and is more receptive to it. See Alexander Montgomery, "Stop Helping Me: Why Nuclear Assistance Impedes Nuclear Programs," unpublished manuscript, Reed College, Portland, OR, February 2010. I discuss Montgomery's work more fully in the next section of the article.
22. See "The Global Elimination of Civilian Use of Highly Enriched Uranium," special issue, Nonproliferation Review 15, no. 2 (July 2008).
23. A tendency strongly criticized in Scott D. Sagan, "Nuclear Latency and Nuclear Proliferation," in Forecasting Nuclear Proliferation in the 21st Century, 80-101.
24. Albert Wohlstetter, "Spreading the Bomb Without Quite Breaking the Rules," Foreign Policy 25 (Winter 1976), reprinted in Sokolski and Zarate, eds., Nuclear Heuristics, 304.
25. Nuclear historians have demonstrated much better intuitions. See, for example, John Lewis and Xue Litai, China Builds the Bomb (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991), esp. 232-36.
26. See, for example, Scott D. Sagan, "Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb," International Security 21, no. 3 (Winter 1996/67): 54-86;
27. Jim Walsh, "Bombs Unbuilt: Power, Ideas, and Institutions in International Politics" (PhD diss., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2001);
28. Jim Walsh, "Learning from Past Success: The NPT and the Future of Non-Proliferation" (paper prepared for the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, Stockholm, Sweden, October 2005);
29. and Peter R. Lavoy, "Nuclear Proliferation over the Next Decade: Causes, Warning Signs, and Policy Responses," Nonproliferation Review 13, no. 3 (November 2006): 433-54.
30. A more nuanced but as-yet undeveloped bureaucratic politics hypothesis is broached in Steven E. Miller and Scott D. Sagan, "Alternative Nuclear Futures," Daedalus 139, no. 1 (Winter 2010): 132-33.
31. On "science for development," see Gili S. Drori et al., Science in the Modern World Polity: Institutionalization and Globalization (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003), esp. chap. 4.
32. For a general introduction, see Bruce E. Seely, "Historical Patterns in the Scholarship of Technology Transfer," Comparative Technology Transfer and Society 1, no. 1 (April 2003): 7-48.
33. Alexander Montgomery, "Ringing in Proliferation: How to Dismantle an Atomic Bomb Network," International Security 30, no. 2 (Fall 2005): 153-87;
34. and Montgomery, "Stop Helping Me."
35. Montgomery, "Ringing in Proliferation," 175-79. Kroenig accepts Montgomery's point about the importance of tacit knowledge but retorts that this is yet another reason to fear sensitive nuclear assistance.
36. Kroenig, Exporting the Bomb, 154-56.
37. Liu Yanqiong and Liu Jifeng, "Analysis of Soviet Technology Transfer in China's Development of Nuclear Weapons," Comparative Technology Transfer and Society 7, no. 1 (April 2009): 66-110.
38. Also known as "adsorptive capacity." Jonathan D. Hagood, "Why Does Technology Transfer Fail? Two Technology Transfer Projects from Peronist Argentina," Comparative Technology Transfer and Society 4, no. 1 (April 2006): 73-98.
39. Montgomery, "Stop Helping Me."
40. See, for example, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, The Reverse Transfer of Technology: A Survey of Its Main Features, Causes and Policy Implications (New York: United Nations, 1979).
41. A recent example of the genre is Deborah Yarsike Ball and Theodore P. Gerber, "Russian Scientists and Rogue States: Does Western Assistance Reduce the Proliferation Threat?" International Security 29, no. 4 (Spring 2005): 50-77.
42. Jacques Gaillard and Anne Marie Gaillard, "Introduction: The International Mobility of Brains: Exodus or Circulation?" Science, Technology & Society 2, no. 2 (September 1997): 203.
43. Here I am thinking primarily of the effects of Western states' Atoms for Peace programs. It would be interesting to explore the hypothesis that the Atoms for Peace program of the totalitarian Soviet Union generated less brain drain.
44. These arguments are all well summarized in Louise Ackers and Bryony Gill, Moving People and Knowledge: Scientific Mobility in an Enlarging European Union (Cheltenham, Glos, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing 2008), chap. 8.
45. These arguments are all well summarized in Louise Ackers and Bryony Gill, Moving People and Knowledge: Scientific Mobility in an Enlarging European Union (Cheltenham, Glos, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing 2008), chap. 8, 224-25.
46. Devesh Kapur and John McHale, Give Us Your Best and Brightest: The Global Hunt for Talent and its Impact on the Developing World (Washington, DC: Center for Global Development and Brookings Institution, 2005), esp. 178-79;
47. and Jacques Gaillard, "Measuring Research and Development in Developing Countries: Main Characteristics and Implications for the Frascati Manual," Science, Technology and Society 15, no. 1 (March 2010): 77-111.
48. For a brief description see Miller and Sagan, "Alternative Nuclear Futures," 127-28.
49. Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970).
50. Hirschman himself elaborates on the linkage between his theory and the brain drain literature in his "Exit, Voice, and the Fate of the German Democratic Republic," World Politics 45, no. 2 (January 1993): 173-202.
51. Since Hirschman's original formulation an enormous literature has grown up around it: for a critical review, see Keith Dowding et al., "Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Analytic and Empirical Developments," European Journal of Political Research 37, no. 4 (June 2000): 469-95.
52. It takes an intense resocialization process to counteract the power of these international scientific community norms. See Hugh Gusterson, Nuclear Rites: A Weapons Laboratory at the End of the Cold War (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), esp. chap. 3.
53. The tendency to distrust even loyal agents has been amply explored in rational choice signaling models of delegation. See J. Bendor, A. Glazer, and T. Hammond, "Theories of Delegation," Annual Review of Political Science 4 (2001): 249-51.
54. For the general point see J. Richard Hackman, Leading Teams: Setting the Stage for Great Performances (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 2002).
55. Hirschman, "Exit, Voice, and the Fate of the German Democratic Republic," 194.
56. Admittedly a scientist's "exit" should not be seen as absolutely definitive. The most spectacular example of "exit" followed by dangerous "return" in the realm of proliferation is the career path of the Pakistani metallurgist Abdul Qadeer Khan. To say that Khan's activities encouraged proliferation is an understatement, but at the same time it is clear that if his Dutch employers had simply followed the rudimentary security precautions they already had on the books circa 1975, his career as a nuclear spy would have ended almost as soon as it began. See David Albright, Peddling Peril: How The Secret Nuclear Trade Arms America's Enemies (New York: Free Press, 2010), esp. 16-24.
57. In principle, a quantitative social network analysis of the international ties of nuclear program scientists and engineers might provide a more systematic test than the qualitative approach employed here, but the data requirements for such a study would be prodigious.
58. Standard English spellings of Yugoslav names have varied over the years. In this article I generally try to follow today's norms, but I do not "update" the spellings used in documents or publications or those adopted by Yugoslav emigrants to the United States or other countries.
59. Carl-Ulrik Schierup, Migration, Socialism, and the International Division of Labour: The Yugoslavian Experience (Aldershot, UK: Avebury, 1990), 205.
60. Russell Murray (U.S. Department of State), "Problems of Nuclear Proliferation Outside Europe," note marked "Secret," December 7, 1964, DDRS Document no. CK3100281620.
61. Document also cited in Francis J. Gavin, "Same As It Ever Was: Nuclear Alarmism, Proliferation, and the Cold War," International Security 34, no. 3 (Winter 2009/10): 17.
62. William C. Potter, Djuro Miljanic, and Ivo Slaus, "Tito's Nuclear Legacy," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 56, no. 2 (March/April 2000): 63-70.
63. As of 1981 Yugoslavia also ranked seventh in terms of cumulative historical IAEA technical assistance. See Jonathan Schiff, International Nuclear Technology Transfer: Dilemmas of Dissemination and Control (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Allanheld, 1984), 194.
64. Daniel B. Poneman, "A New Bargain," in Pilat, ed. Atoms for Peace: A Future After Fifty Years? 177.
65. Harald Müller and Andreas Schmidt, "The Little Known Story of De-Proliferation: Why States Give Up Nuclear Weapon Activities," in Forecasting Nuclear Proliferation in the 21st Century, 157;
66. Bleek, "Why Do States Proliferate?" in Forecasting Nuclear Proliferation in the 21st Century, 169;
67. Dong-Joon Jo and Erik Gartzke, "Determinants of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation," Journal of Conflict Resolution 51, no. 1 (February 2007): 189 n17, data and codebook at http://dss.ucsd.edu/~egartzke/;
68. and Sonali Singh and Christopher R. Way, "The Correlates of Nuclear Proliferation: A Quantitative Test," Journal of Conflict Resolution 48, no. 6 (December 2004): 872 n21, at http://falcon.arts.cornell.edu/crw12/.
69. Alexander H. Montgomery and Scott D. Sagan, "The Perils of Predicting Proliferation," Journal of Conflict Resolution 53, no. 2 (April 2009): 302-28.
70. Potter et al., "Tito's Nuclear Legacy";
71. Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova, "Nuclear Weapons in the Balkans: Why Yugoslavia Tried and Serbia Will Not," in Forecasting Nuclear Proliferation in the 21st Century, vol. 2: A Comparative Perspective, eds., Potter and Mukhatzhanova (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010), esp. 206-9.
72. Dušan Ražem, "Radiation Processing in the Former Yugoslavia, 1947-1966: From 'Big Science' to Nullity," Minerva 32, no. 3 (Autumn 1994): 309-26.
73. Jean-Jacques Salomon, "The Internationale of Science," Science Studies 1, no. 1 (January 1971): 23-42.
74. Glenn T. Seaborg, "Discovery of Fission and the Transuranium Elements," in Collection of Papers Devoted to Pavle Savić on the Occasion of his Seventieth Birthday, ed. Academician Milutin Garasanin (Belgrade: Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, 1980), 40.
75. Walen had Communist leanings, and his wife was Serbian. See "Archives Frédéric Curie," Folder F154, docs. 272 and 273, in Archives Historiques du Musée Curie, Paris, France.
76. Gunnar Randers, Lysår (Oslo: Gyldendal, 1975), 180-83.
77. The budget increased every year from 1947 to 1961. Slobodan Nakićenović, Nuclear Energy in Yugoslavia (Belgrade: Export Press, 1961), 22.
78. Eisenhower explicitly made this point in his December 1953 "Atoms for Peace" speech at the UN, at http://www.atomicarchive.com/Docs/Deterrence/Atomsforpeace.shtml.
79. John Krige, American Hegemony and the Postwar Reconstruction of Science in Western Europe (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006), 67.
80. Schiff, International Nuclear Technology Transfer, 194.
81. John. A. Hall and Louis H. Roddis, U.S. Army Environmental Command (USAEC), memorandum for the Department of State, "Yugoslavia Atomic Energy Program," June 17, 1957, document provided by William Potter.
82. A. A. Wells (USAEC), memorandum for Philip J. Farley, Department of State, "Equipment Grant for Yugoslavia," 27 June 1960. Document provided by William Potter.
83. Interview with Bjørn Gaudernack, Norwegian nuclear engineer who personally instructed the Yugoslavs in fuel reprocessing techniques, Oslo, October 2008.
84. Potter et al., "Tito's Nuclear Legacy."
85. Potter et al., "Tito's Nuclear Legacy."
86. This is not to ignore the ongoing construction at that time of the turnkey nuclear power plant at Krško, on the Croatia-Slovenia border. This was a major, and ultimately successful, joint undertaking by the republics of Croatia and Slovenia, exercising their greater autonomy under the new constitution. Indeed for this very reason Krško should be seen not as an advance for the "Yugoslav" nuclear program, but rather as a sign of its lack of progress and indeed regional splintering.
87. I have written a draft manuscript paper on this subject, "Neither Duck Nor Chicken: Yugoslavia's Botched Nuclear Program" (May 2010), available upon request.
88. Drasko Jovanovic, son of Dragoljub Jovanović, email communication, 10 April 2009.
89. Stanka Jovanovic, ed., Yugo Reunions 1956-2003: Eleven Friends and their Life Stories (Urbana, IL: DJ Publishing, 2006).
90. Dubravko Tadić, "Ivan Supek and Theoretical Physics in Zagreb," Fizika A 1, no. 1 (1992): 7-10.
91. Though this was not the main reason, which had to do with financing issues. Letter from Victor F. Weisskopf, CERN Director, to Jean Willems, President of the CERN Council, 11 December 1961, CERN/7464, DG-F02, CERN Library and Archives, Geneva, Switzerland.
92. Interview with Jovan Jovanovich, Toronto, Canada, 7 September 2009.
93. Schierup, Migration, Socialism, and the International Division of Labour, 264.
94. Nakićenović, Nuclear Energy in Yugoslavia, 123. Nakićenović notes that another 152 left for specialized training in the year 1960.
95. Email communication with Črtomir Zupančič, 14 October 2009. Zupančič himself returned despite having international job opportunities. But he left the nuclear program in 1959, not long after mounting a protest against work conditions in the Jožef Stefan Institute. He left the country permanently in 1966.
96. Richard Harmstone (State Department) to Political Section, Department of State, "Boris Kidric Institute for Atomic Physics at Vinca," marked "Secret," 20 September 1954, document provided by William Potter.
97. Telephone interview with Dragoslav Popović, 25 January 2009.
98. Dragoslav Popović, "Validity of the Inverse Velocity Law for the Fission Cross Section of U-235," Physica 20, no. 6 (1954): 406-12.
99. Potter et al., "Tito's Nuclear Legacy," Nuclear Threat Initiative website, at http://www.nti.org/ e research/profiles/Yugoslavia/Nuclear/chronology.html.
100. "Yugoslav Scientist in Charge of IAEA's Safeguards Division," IAEA Press Release PR 61/13, 15 March 1961, accessed at IAEA Archives, Vienna, Austria.
101. David Fischer, History of the International Atomic Energy Agency: The First Forty Years (Vienna: IAEA, 1997), 248.
102. "IAEA Appoints First Inspector General," IAEA Press Release PR 64/37, 3 August 1964, accessed at IAEA Archives, Vienna, Austria.
103. Interview with Popović, 22 January 2009.
104. Stevan Dedijer, "Research and Freedom in Undeveloped Countries," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 13, no. 7 (September 1957): 238-42.
105. Stevan Dedijer, "Birth and Death of a Myth," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 14, no. 5 (May 1958): 164-68.
106. Stevan Dedijer, "Scientific Research and Development: A Comparative Study," Nature 187, no. 4736 (6 August 1960): 458-61.
107. See letters regarding Dedijer's situation in Niels Bohr General Correspondence, folder "Stevan Dedijer," Niels Bohr archive, Niels Bohr Institute, Copenhagen, Denmark.
108. Jan Annerstedt and Andrew Jamison, "Stevan Dedijer: An 'Elitist Egalitarian,' " in From Research Policy to Social Intelligence: Essays for Stevan Dedijer, eds., Annerstedt and Jamison (London: Macmillan, 1988), 3.
109. On the Gustafson-Erlander relationship, see "Torsten Gustafson 1904-1987," CERN Courier, September 1987.
110. All the information in this paragraph comes from Peterlin, "My Scientific Life."
111. Email communication with Bogdan Povh, 12 February 2009.
112. CEA Direction des Productions, Recherches et Exploitations Minières, "Rapport de la mission effectu ée en Yougoslavie du 25 juin au 8 juillet 1961," CEA Archives, Fontenay-aux-Roses, France, dossier 2006-119-100/1961.
113. Ivan Supek, "Notes from the Biography of Rudjer Bošković," in Supek, Opstati Usprkos (Zagreb: Skolska Knjiga, 1972), 73-81.
114. Dorde Licina and Vlado Rajic, "Dr. Ivan Supek: An Evening with Heisenberg," Vjesnik, 5 February 1990, translation. Document provided by William Potter.
115. Tadić, "Ivan Supek and Theoretical Physics in Zagreb," 9.
116. Peterlin, "My Scientific Life."
117. Ivan Supek interview in Georges Ripka, ed., Vivre savant sous le Communisme (Paris: Belin, 2002), 162.
118. As noted in Weisskopf, letter to Willems, 11 December 1961.
119. Alexis de Greiff, "The Tale of Two Peripheries: The Creation of the International Centre for Theoretical Physics in Trieste," Historical Studies in the Physical and Biological Sciences 33, pt. I (2002): 33-59.
120. Supek interview in Ripka, Vivre savant sous le Communisme, 168.
121. Supek, "Post-Scriptum," in Opstati Usprkos, 81-101.
122. Vladimir Knapp interview in Ripka, Vivre savant sous le Communisme, 173-74.
123. Note de l'Ambassadeur de France en Yougoslavie, Belgrade, à Monsieur le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, Paris, 22 December 1966, archives of the Commissariat à l'Energie Atomique, Fontenay-aux- Roses, France, dossier 2006-119-260.
124. On the accident, see Milan Pešić, "Review of Accident Analyses of RB Experimental Reactor," Nuclear Technology and Radiation Protection 18, no. 1 (2003): 3-15.
125. Interview with Dragoslav Popović, 22 January 2009.
126. Interview with Nebojsa Nakićenović, son of Slobodan Nakićenović, Vienna, Austria, 4 October 2008.
127. Anton Moljk, Jordan Pop-Jordanov, and Slavko Vrhovac, "The Bases of Future Work in Nuclear Energy," Nuklearna Energija no. 4 (1967);
128. Joint Publications Research Service translation no. 44, 180 (30 January 1968): 3, available in Readex Microprint Corporation, U.S. Government Publications (Non-Depository): no. 1968-5208. Thanks to Molly Molloy and the Media and Microtext staff at Stanford University Library for their help in locating this document.
129. Vera Rich, "Yugoslavia: Brain Drain," Nature 312, no. 29 (November 1984): 395.
130. See Schierup, Migration, Socialism, and the International Division of Labour, 124-25.
131. Report "Mission en Yougoslavie de MM. Debiesse, Doireau, Weill: 20-25 Septembre 1968," CEA Archives, Fontenay-aux-Roses, France, dossier 2006-119-73.
132. Interview with Jacky Weill, Paris, 13 September 2008. Weill made several visits to Vinča on behalf of the French CEA over the course of the 1960s.
133. Schierup, Migration, Socialism, and the International Division of Labor, 109.
134. Etel Solingen, Nuclear Logics: Contrasting Paths in East Asia and the Middle East (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 43.
135. Note that despite Tito's 1974 decision, Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova finds that Solingen's argument about the impact of liberalizing political coalition interests on regimes' nuclear intentions generally fits the Yugoslav case pretty well. See Mukhatzhanova, "Nuclear Weapons in the Balkans," esp. 213-15.
136. Potter et al., "Tito's Nuclear Legacy."
137. Email communication with Slaus, 6 October 2009.
138. Email communication with Slaus, 13 October 2009.
139. Potter et al., "Tito's Nuclear Legacy."
140. Email communication with Slaus, 6 October 2009.
141. See Philipp C. Bleek, "Project Vinca: Lessons for Securing Civil Nuclear Material Stockpiles," Nonproliferation Review 10, no. 3 (Fall-Winter 2003): 1-23.
142. Kapur and McHale, Give Us Your Best and Brightest, 178-79.
143. See, for example, Martin Van Creveld, The Rise andDecline of the State (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 330-31;
144. Bimal Jalan, "Economics, Politics, and Governance" (convocation address to the Indian Institute of Management, 3 April 2004), in India in a Globalising World: Some Aspects of Macroeconomy, Agriculture, and Poverty, eds., R. Radhakrishna et al. (New Delhi: Academic Foundation, 2006), esp. 125-26.
145. See George Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999).
146. An anonymous reviewer of this article suggested that we should consider whether, contrary to the general presumption of the proliferation literature, proliferant states often pare back their international civil nuclear cooperation efforts in order to avoid creating complications for their nuclear weapons ambitions. This is an important question for further research. In the case of Yugoslavia the evidence for such behavior is mixed.
147. Kapur and McHale, Give Us Your Best and Brightest, 2.
148. Kapur and McHale, Give Us Your Best and Brightest, 179-88.
149. Yudhijit Bhattacharjee, "Prominent Iranian Scientist Blocked From Attending Physics Meeting," Science 327, no. 5968 (19 February 2010): 933;
150. Yudhijit Bhattacharjee, "ACS [American Chemical Society] Drops Iranian Members, Citing Embargo," Science 315, no. 5820 (30 March 2007): 1,777;
151. Yudhijit Bhattacharjee, "Society [American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics] Bars Papers from Iranian Authors," Science 308, no. 5729 (17 June 2005);
152. and Yudhijit Bhattacharjee, "U.S. Trade Policy Creates Confusion over Co-Authorship," Science 304, no. 5676 (4 June 2004): 1,422.