Same as it ever was. Nuclear Alarmism, Proliferation, and the Cold War

International Security

Volumn 34, Issue 3, 2009, Pages 7-37

  Gavin, Francis J ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN   (United States)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 77449108178     PISSN: 01622889     EISSN: 15314804     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/isec.2010.34.3.7     Document Type: Article

References (134)

1. Craig Gilbert, "Nuclear Threat Seen as Top Issue for Nation," Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, October 10, 2004.
2. John McCain, "Remarks by John McCain on Nuclear Security," University of Denver, Colorado, May 27, 2008, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa_view&id_20163&prog_zgp&proj_znpp.
3. "The Democratic Debate in New Hampshire," transcript, New York Times, January 5, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/05/us/politics/05text-ddebate.html?pagewanted_all.
4. Richard G. Lugar, "The Lugar Survey on Proliferation Threats and Responses" (Washington, D.C.: Office of Richard Lugar, June 2005), http://lugar.senate.gov/reports/NPSurvey.pdf.
5. William C. Potter and Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova, "Divining Nuclear Intentions: A Review Essay," International Security, Vol. 33, No. 1 (Summer 2008), p. 159.
6. David Von Drehle, "The Yikes Years: Life as the World's Lone Superpower Is Beginning to Make the Cold War Look Easy," Washington Post Magazine, November 21, 2004
7. Derek D. Smith, Deterring America: Rogue States and the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 10.
8. Abraham Denmark, quoted in Matthew B. Stannard, "Tauscher in Hot Seat for Key State Dept. Post," San Francisco Chronicle, June 9, 2009.
9. George P. Schultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger, and Sam Nunn, "A World Free of Nuclear Weapons," Wall Street Journal, January 4, 2007.
10. David Ignatius, "New World Disorder," Washington Post, May 4, 2007
11. For an optimistic view of the effects of nuclear proliferation on peace and stability, see Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better, Adelphi Papers, No. 171 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981).
12. Most analysts agree that "the second nuclear age began in 1991." Michael Krepon, Better Safe Than Sorry: The Ironies of Living with the Bomb (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2009), p. 94.
13. Paul Bracken, however, suggests that it began with India's 1974 "peaceful" nuclear explosion. Bracken, Fire in the East: The Rise of Asian Military Power and the Second Nuclear Age (New York: HarperCollins, 1999), p. 109.
14. Ignatius, "New World Disorder."
15. Benjamin Frankel, "The Brooding Shadow: Systemic Incentives and NuclearWeapons Proliferation," in Zachary S. Davis and Frankel, eds., The Proliferation Puzzle: Why Nuclear Weapons Spread (London: Frank Cass, 1993), p. 36.
16. Joe Palca with Stephen D. Rosen, "North Korea and Nuclear Proliferation," Talk of the Nation, transcript, National Public Radio, October 9, 2006, p. 6.
17. Greg Sheridan, "Nuclear-Armed Iran Changes World," Australian, July 3, 2008, http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,25197,23959567-7583,00.html.
18. Ariel E. Levite, "Never Say Never Again: Nuclear Reversal Revisited," International Security, Vol. 27, No. 3 (Winter 2002/03), pp. 69-73.
19. Mitchell B. Reiss, "The Nuclear Tipping Point: Prospects for a World of Many Nuclear Weapons States," in Kurt M. Campbell, Robert J. Einhorn, and Reiss, eds., The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2004), p. 4.
20. George Perkovich, Jessica T. Mathews, Joseph Cirincione, Rose Gottemoeller, and Jon B. Wolfsthal, "Universal Compliance: A Strategy for Nuclear Security" (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 2005), p. 19, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/UC2.FINAL3.pdf.
21. Michael Crowley, "The Stuff Sam Nunn's Nightmares Are Made Of," New York Times, February 25, 2007
22. Bill Keller, "The Thinkable," New York Times Magazine, May 4, 2003
23. John Lewis Gaddis, "The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Postwar International System," in Gaddis, The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 215-246
24. John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War," International Security, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Summer 1990), pp. 5-56.
25. Michael Dobbs, "The World's Most Terrifying Danger, Then and Now," Washington Post, October 17, 2004
26. Thomas L. Friedman, "The Post-Post-Cold War," New York Times, May 10, 2006, http://select.nytimes.com/2006/05/10/opinion/10friedman.html?_r_1.
27. Dobbs, "The World's Most Terrifying Danger."
28. Sheridan, "Nuclear-Armed Iran Changes World."
29. Keith B. Payne, "Nuclear Deterrence for a New Century," Journal of International Security Affairs, No. 10 (Spring 2006), p. 53.
30. Ashton B. Carter and William J. Perry, "If Necessary, Strike and Destroy: North Korea Cannot Be Allowed to Test This Missile," Washington Post, June 22, 2006.
31. Fred C. Iklé, "Possible Consequences of a Further Spread of Nuclear Weapons," January 2, 1965, Lyndon Baines Johnson Presidential Library, National Security File (NSF), Committee File, Committee on Nuclear Proliferation, Box 7.
32. Moeed Yusuf, "Predicting Proliferation: The History of the Future of Nuclear Weapons," Brookings Institution Foreign Policy Paper Series, No. 11 (Washington D.C.: Brookings, January 2009), p. 25.
33. Ibid., p. 47.
34. See Marc Trachtenberg, "A 'Wasting Asset': American Strategy and the Shifting Nuclear Balance, 1949-1954," in Trachtenberg, History and Strategy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1991), pp. 100-152.
35. Francis J. Gavin, "Blasts from the Past: Proliferation Lessons from the 1960s," International Security, Vol. 29, No. 3 (Winter 2004/05), pp. 100-135.
36. See Jeffrey Lewis, The Minimum Means of Reprisal: China's Search for Security in the Nuclear Age (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2007), especially pp. 1-25.
37. Shahram Chubin, Iran's Nuclear Ambitions (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006), p. 44.
38. Frank Procida, "Overblown: Why an Iranian Nuclear Bomb Is Not the End of the World," Foreign Affairs Snapshots, June 9, 2009, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65127/frank-procida/overblown.
39. Iran's desire for a nuclear deterrent likely increased after the surprise and devastation of the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War, which included an Iraqi chemical weapons attack. The overwhelming victory of U.S. forces against Iraq in the 1991 Persian Gulf War has no doubt fueled this desire. Iran, a Persian and Shiite state, is viewed with suspicion and even hostility by many of its Arab Sunni neighbors. And like France and India, for example, Iran takes great pride in its independence and in demonstrating its scientific prowess. Iran's interest in a nuclear deterrent was obviously heightened after 2002 by the increased presence of the United States in the region, as a result of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. There is a broad consensus among Iranian political elites that the United States is a revolutionary state implacably hostile to its regime. Even though Iran and the United States are foes, they share important overlapping interests, including a desire to see a stable Afghanistan rid of the Taliban and a stable, unified, democratic Iraq (ruled by the Shiite majority). There is some evidence that Iran's abhorrent rhetoric toward Israel and its support for Palestinian extremists is partly driven by domestic politics and a desire to gain influence in the region by outflanking its Arab Sunni rivals. Few in Iran see the Palestinian question as a core Iranian national interest. Finally, Iran has likely learned a valuable lesson in observing two decades of failed international efforts to keep North Korea nonnuclear while it considers its own strategy vis-à-vis both the United States and the international community. See Chubin, Iran's Nuclear Ambitions; and Procida, "Overblown." None of these facts should prevent the creation of a realistic strategy of how to deal with Iran, but few have been incorporated into the failed alarmist perspective.
40. Ronald Koven, "Many Nations Ready to Break into Nuclear Club," Washington Post, June 15, 1981
41. Henry Rowen, "India's Nuclear Problem," memorandum, December 24, 1964, Declassified Documents Reference System (DDRS), Doc. No. CK3100154493, p. 6.
42. R. Murray, "Problems of Nuclear Proliferation outside Europe," December 7, 1964, DDRS, Doc. No. CK3100281620, p. 1.
43. Prevention of the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Digital National Security Archives, No. NP01103, National Security Action Memorandum, January 21, 1965, Collection: Nuclear Non-Proliferation, p. 1.
44. See National Intelligence Council, "The Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation: Balance of Incentives and Constraints," September 1985, http://www.foia.cia.gov/docs/DOC_0000453458/0000453458_0001.gif.
45. Yusuf, "Predicting Proliferation," p. 61.
46. Potter and Mukhatzhanova, "Divining Nuclear Intentions," p. 166. See also p. 159 n. 42, where they catalogue works that discuss tipping points and chain reactions.
47. Figures taken from Perkovich et al., "Universal Compliance," pp. 19-20.
48. There is uncertainty about the nature and timeline of nuclear research in Syria. See "Nuclear Weapons Programs," GlobalSecurity.org, http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/syria/nuke.htm.
49. Yusuf, "Predicting Proliferation," p. 49. Much of the nuclear terrorism literature is alarmist. A good if unduly pessimistic assessment, which evaluates past actions and recommends further measures, is Matthew Bunn, Securing the Bomb, 2008 (Cambridge, Mass., and Washington, D.C.: Project on Managing the Atom, Harvard University, and Nuclear Threat Initiative, September 2008), http://www.nti.org/securingthebomb.
50. Although the Khan case is disturbing, the network did not aid nonstate actors and was ultimately discovered and shut down. Michael Levi notes that Khan's trade did not involve nuclear weapons or explosive materials, the most sensitive part of the Pakistani nuclear program. See Levi, On Nuclear Terrorism (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2007), p. 24.
51. Adam Garfinkle, "Does Nuclear Deterrence Apply in the Age of Terrorism?" Footnotes, Vol. 14, No. 10 (May 2009), http://www.fpri.org/footnotes/1410.200905.garfinkle.nucleardeterrenceterrorism.html.
52. Robin M. Frost, Nuclear Terrorism after 9/11, Adelphi Papers, No. 378 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, December 2005)
53. Garfinkle, "Does Nuclear Deterrence Apply in the Age of Terrorism?"
54. See also William Langewiesche, "How to Get a Nuclear Bomb," Atlantic Monthly, December 2006, pp. 80-98, http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200612/langewieschenukes. Langewiesche writes, "In the end, if you wanted a bomb and calculated the odds, you would have to admit that they were stacked against you, simply because of how the world works.... [For example,] the existence of suitcase bombs has never been proved, and there has never been a single verified case, anywhere, of the theft of any sort of nuclear weapon." Like Levi, Langewiesche shows the difficulty that terrorists have at each stage in acquiring the needed nuclear materials, then assembling, transporting, delivering, and detonating a bomb in the United States.
55. Joseph Cirincione, Bomb Scare: The History and Future of Nuclear Weapons (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), p. 91.
56. Chubin, Iran's Nuclear Ambitions, p. 52.
57. Levi, On Nuclear Terrorism, p. 141. The earlier quotes were taken from pages 144 and 151-152.
58. Anne Stenersen, Al-Qaida's Quest for Weapons of Mass Destruction: The History behind the Hype (Saarbrücken, Germany: VDM Verlag Dr. Müller Aktiengesellschaft, 2008), p. 89.
59. Ibid., p. 84.
60. Ibid., p. 69. Al-Qaida may also have had less money than is commonly thought, both before and after the September 11 terrorist attacks. See John Roth, Douglas Greenburg, and Serena Wille, for the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, Monograph on Terrorist Financing: Staff Report to the Commission, http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/staff_statements/911_TerrFin_Monograph.pdf
61. Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006), pp. 194-197.
62. Levi, On Nuclear Terrorism, p. 11.
63. Frost, "Nuclear Terrorism after 9/11," p. 7.
64. Edward U. Condon, "The New Technique of Private War," in Dexter Masters and Katharine Way, eds., One World or None: A Report to the Public on the Full Meaning of the Atomic Bomb (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1946), quoted in Dan Stober, "No Experience Necessary," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 59, No. 2 (March/April 2003), pp. 56-63, at p. 63.
65. Central Intelligence Agency, "Capabilities of the USSR to Employ Unconventional Attack Involving the Smuggling of Atomic Weapons into the United States," January 19, 1950, DDRS, Doc. No. CK3100165674, p. 1.
66. "A Report on Strategic Developments over the Next Decade for the Interagency Panel," October 1962, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, NSF, Box 376, pp. 51-53.
67. Richard T. Kennedy, "Status of USG Actions against Terrorism," memo for Henry Kissinger, November 25, 1972, DDRS, Doc. No. CK3100525361, p. 1.
68. Will Kriegsman to Peter Flanigan, "Saboteur or Terrorist Actions against Nuclear Installations," October 23, 1970, National Security Council Institutional Files, National Security Decision Memorandum, Box H-180, Nixon Presidential Materials, U.S. National Archives, College Park, Maryland.
69. For a sense of the angered U.S. response to this scenario-including an extraordinary threat by U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk against France-see Marc Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999), p. 338 n. 193.
70. See Trachtenberg, History and Strategy, p. 274.
71. As Dale C. Copeland argues, "To make a theory of major war relevant to the nuclear era, as well as to the pre-nuclear era, we must explain why states would move from peaceful engagement to a destabilizing cold war rivalry, or from such a rivalry into crises with the types of risks witnessed in the Cuban missile crisis." Copeland, The Origins of Major War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2000), p. 3.
72. As Keir A. Lieber explains, "The logic of extended deterrence required a first-strike capability." Lieber, War and the Engineers: The Primacy of Politics over Technology (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2005), p. 145.
73. Joseph S. Nye Jr., "Soft Power," Foreign Policy, No. 80 (Fall 1990), pp. 153-171.
74. See William Burr and Jeffrey T. Richelson's excellent account in "Whether to 'Strangle the Baby in the Cradle': The United States and the Chinese Nuclear Program, 1960-64," International Security, Vol. 25, No. 3 (Winter 2000/01), pp. 54-99.
75. Marc Trachtenberg, "The Nuclearization of NATO," in Trachtenberg, History and Strategy, p. 162.
76. Lieber, War and the Engineers, pp. 140-148.
77. Marc Trachtenberg, "Waltzing to Armageddon?" National Interest, No. 69 (Fall 2002), pp. 144-152, at p. 149. Robert Jervis and other defensive realists acknowledge that balance of resolve considerations were paramount during these nuclear crises, but they do not see this fact as destabilizing.
78. See Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1989), p. 38
79. Stephen Van Evera, The Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1999), p. 245.
80. But as Trachtenberg points out, "Why would anyone think that a world of that sort, where political outcomes are up for grabs and victory goes to the side with the strongest nerves, would be particularly stable?" Trachtenberg, "Waltzing to Armageddon?" p. 149.
81. See Thomas C. Schelling, "The Manipulation of Risk," in Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 92-125.
82. Nor did the Soviet Union mobilize its strategic nuclear forces, despite the United States having done so. Daryl G. Press, Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threats (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2005), p. 193 n. 37.
83. Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, Khrushchev's Cold War: The Inside Story of an American Adversary (New York: W.W. Norton, 2006), p. 6.
84. For details of how U.S. policymakers came to this belief, see Fred Kaplan, "JFK's First-Strike Plan," Atlantic Monthly, October 2001, pp. 81-86.
85. Fursenko and Naftali reveal that the Soviet premier believed, incorrectly, that the United States and its Western allies had backed down during the Suez crisis in 1956 and in Iraq in 1958 because of Khrushchev's successful nuclear brinksmanship
86. Fursenko and Naftali, Krushchev's Cold War, pp. 243-244.
87. Meeting of the Interdepartmental Coordinating Group on Berlin Contingency Planning, Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1961-1963, Vol. 14, p. 121.
88. Western foreign ministers' meeting, December 11, 1961, United States Department of State, FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. 14, p. 656.
89. For example, Kennedy would have publicly agreed to remove U.S. missiles from Turkey and may not even have responded if the Soviets attacked them. Philip Nash, The Other Missiles of October: Eisenhower, Kennedy, and the Jupiters, 1957-1963 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997), pp. 126-127.
90. Fursenko and Naftali, Khrushchev's Cold War, p. 6.
91. See Scott D. Sagan and Jeremi Suri, "The Madman Nuclear Alert: Secrecy, Signaling, and Safety in October 1969," International Security, Vol. 27, No. 4 (Spring 2003), pp. 150-183
92. Francis J. Gavin, "Nuclear Nixon: Ironies, Puzzles, and the Triumph of Realpolitik," in Fredrik Logevall and Andrew Preston, eds., Nixon in the World: American Foreign Relations, 1969-1977 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 126-145.
93. Eisenhower thought that it "had been a terrible mistake at the end of the war to create Berlin as a western island in the Soviet zone," and he was eager to work out a political compromise with the Soviets. Trachtenberg, History and Strategy, p. 204. For further evidence of Eisenhower's and Kennedy's lack of enthusiasm for the U.S. commitment to Berlin, see Campbell Craig's fascinating account in Destroying the Village: Eisenhower and Thermonuclear War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998).
94. For example, the major realist intellectuals of the postwar period-George Kennan, Hans Morgenthau, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Kenneth Waltz-were against the U.S. military intervention in South Vietnam; none believed its loss would affect the balance of power vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. See Campbell Craig, Glimmer of a New Leviathan: Total War in the Realism of Niebuhr, Morgenthau, and Waltz (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003).
95. According to Jervis, the nuclear revolution means that "small issues will often loom large, not because of their intrinsic importance, but because they are taken as tests of resolve." What happens "in peripheral areas... is not important; whether the United States and the Soviet Union are seen as having lived up to their commitments in these disputes may be crucial." See Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution, p. 39. Jervis is correct, although it is hard to understand how this focus on resolve and credibility over material and geopolitical interests makes for a more stable, less crisis-prone, and peaceful world order.
96. In a nonnuclear world, how could the United States protect a city deep in enemy territory, facing an adversary with substantial conventional superiority? And in the absence of nuclear weapons, the United States could have quickly and easily eliminated a Soviet military presence in Cuba
97. For the importance of security guarantees in dampening proliferation, see Makreeta Lahti, "Security Cooperation as a Way to Stop the Spread of Nuclear Weapons? Nuclear Nonproliferation Policies of the United States towards the Federal Republic of Germany and Israel, 1945-1968," University of Potsdam, 2008
98. Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2 (January 1978), pp. 167-214. Interestingly, Jervis no longer believes that the Cold War is an example of a security dilemma.
99. See Robert Jervis, "Was the Cold War a Security Dilemma?" Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Winter 2001), pp. 36-60.
100. For a summary of this view, see Copeland, The Origins of Major War, p. 147.
101. See also Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1992).
102. Francis J. Gavin, "Wrestling with Parity: The Nuclear Revolution Revisited," in Niall Ferguson, Charles Maier, Erez Manela, and Daniel Sargent, eds., The Shock of the Global: The International History of the 1970s (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, forthcoming).
103. See Lieber, War and the Engineers, pp. 143-148.
104. Trachtenberg, "A 'Wasting Asset.'" See also Francis J. Gavin, "Politics, Power, and U.S. Policy in Iran, 1950-1953," Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Winter 1999), pp. 56-89.
105. See Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace; and Gavin, "Blasts from the Past." 96. See Fursenko and Naftali, Khrushchev's Cold War.
106. Jervis argues that the side defending the status quo enjoys the advantage in a nuclear crisis. See Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution, pp. 29-35. But in Berlin, it was not always clear who was defending and who was challenging the status quo: the Soviets, who wanted to end the West's legal rights in the city, or the United States, who appeared to be looking the other way as West Germany sought an independent nuclear capability. Furthermore, maintaining a defenseless city within your enemy's territory hardly seems an obvious definition of the status quo, nor is it clear what would be defined as moving first in a Berlin crisis.
107. Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace. See also Georges-Henri Soutou, L'alliance incertaine: Les rapports politico-stratégiques franco-allemands, 1954-1996 (Paris: Fayard, 1996), pp. 203-265
108. Hans-Peter Schwarz, Konrad Adenauer: A German Politician and Statesman in a Period of War, Revolution, and Reconstruction, trans. Louise Willmot (Providence: Berghahn, 1997), pp. 513-712.
109. For an excellent account of President Lyndon B. Johnson's efforts to achieve détente with the Soviets, see Thomas A. Schwartz, Lyndon Johnson and Europe: In the Shadow of Vietnam (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2003).
110. Jervis, "Was the Cold War a Security Dilemma?"
111. Ernest R. May, John D. Steinbruner, and ThomasW.Wolfe, History of the Strategic Arms Competition, 1945-1972, Pt. 2, ed. Alfred Goldberg (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, Historical Office, March 1981), Department of Defense-Freedom of Information Act, p. 810.
112. Ibid., p. 828.
113. Marc Trachtenberg, "The Past and Future of Arms Control," Daedalus, Vol. 120, No. 1 (Winter 1991), pp. 203-216
114. Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution, p. 88.
115. Yusuf, "Predicting Proliferation," p. 35.
116. Lewis, The Minimum Means of Reprisal, p. 206.
117. Yusuf, "Predicting Proliferation," p. 45. According to Yusuf, "For instance, K. Subrahmanyam, India's most prominent strategic thinker, argued that the 'main purpose of a third world arsenal is deterrence against blackmail,' and that new nuclear powers had the benefit of learning from the 'highly risky and totally non-viable policies' of the superpowers and would not repeat their mistakes."
118. "A Report on Strategic Developments over the Next Decade for the Interagency Panel" (Camp David, Md.: October 1962), p. 51.
119. For one of the first and still best arguments for diplomatic historians to go beyond the "Cold War lens," see Matthew Connelly, A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria's Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post-Cold War Era (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002)
120. See also Akira Iriye, Cultural Internationalism and World Order (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997); and the relevant chapters in Anthony G. Hopkins, ed., Global History: Interactions between the Universal and the Local (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006). For a slightly different argument-that Cold War scholarship should be "de-centered" and focus on nonsuperpower actors-see Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
121. Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution, p. 34.
122. Palca and Rosen, "North Korea and Nuclear Proliferation," p. 7.
123. Maurice Vaisse, La France et l'atomique Française, 1945-1958 (Bruxelles: Bruylant, 1994)
124. Jacques E.C. Hymans, The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation: Identity, Emotions, and Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), especially pp. 85-113
125. Susanna Schrafstetter and Stephen Twigge, Avoiding Armageddon: Europe, the United States, and the Struggle for Nuclear Nonproliferation, 1945-1970 (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2004)
126. Lorna Arnold and Mark Smith, Britain, Australia, and the Bomb: The Nuclear Tests and Their Aftermath (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006)
127. Palca and Rosen, "North Korea and Nuclear Proliferation," p. 7.
128. For a comparison of Iran to France in the 1950s and 1960s, see Serre Lodgaard, "Challenge from Within: The Case of Iran," p. 7 n. 18, presented at the "Nobel Symposium: Peace, Stability, and Nuclear Order: Theoretical Assumptions, Historical Experiences, and Future Challenges," Drøbak, Norway, June 25-27, 2009.
129. Richard K. Betts, Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1987), p. 11.
130. This is one of the key points in John Mueller's trenchant analysis in Overblown: How Politicians and the Terrorism Industry Inflate National Security Threats and Why We Believe Them (New York: Free Press, 2006)
131. Richard Betts, summarized in Smith, Deterring America, p. 157.
132. Yusuf, "Predicting Proliferation," p. 68.
133. Alan Cullison, "Inside Al-Qaeda's Hard Drive," Atlantic Monthly, September 2004, pp. 55-70, http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200409/cullison. See also the discussion of U.S. Secretary of Defense William Cohen's bag of sugar (anthrax) speech in Martin C. Libicki, Peter Chalk, and Melanie Sisson, Exploring Terrorist Targeting Preferences (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2006), p. 54.