Distorted performance measures and dynamic incentives

Journal of Economics and Management Strategy

Volumn 17, Issue 1, 2008, Pages 149-183

  Kaarbøe, Oddvar M ^a   Olsen, Trond E ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BERGEN   (Norway)

^b NORWEGIAN SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (Norway)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 38749139759     PISSN: 10586407     EISSN: 15309134     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1530-9134.2008.00174.x     Document Type: Article

References (20)

1. Baker, G., 1992 Incentives Contracts and Performance Measurement Journal of Political Economy, 100 (3 598 614.
2. Baker, G. 2002 Distortion and Risk in Optimal Incentive Contracts Journal of Human Resources, 37 (3 728 751.
3. Banker, R.D., G. Potter, and D. Srinivasan, 2000 An Empirical Investigation of an Incentive Plan that Includes Nonfinancial Performance Measures The Accounting Review, 75 (1 65 92.
4. Datar, S., S. Kulp, and R. Lambert, 2001 Balancing Performance Measures Journal of Accounting Research, 39 (1 75 92.
5. DeGroot, M.H., 1970, Optimal Statistical Decisions, New York : McGraw-Hill.
6. Fama, E.F., 1980 Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm Journal of Political Economy, 88, 288 307.
7. Feltham, G. and J. Xie, 1994 Performance Measure Congruity and Diversity in Multitask/Agent Relations The Accountion Review, 69 (3 429 453.
8. Gibbons, R., 1987 Piece-Rate Incentives Schemes Journal of Labor Economics, 5, 413 429.
9. Gibbons, R. and K.J. Murphy, 1992 Optimal Incentives in the Presence of Career Concerns: Theory and Evidence Journal of Political Economy, 100, 468 505.
10. Holmstrom, B., 1982 Managerial Incentive Schemes - A Dynamic Perspective in Essays in Economics and Management in Honour of Lars Wahlbeck. Svenska Handelshogskolan, Helsinki.
11. Holmstrom, B. and P. Milgrom, 1987 Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives Econometrica, 55, 303 328.
12. Holmstrom, B. and P. Milgrom, 1991 Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 7, 24 52.
13. Huges, J.J., L. Zhang, and J.-Z. J. Xie, 2005 Production Externalities, Congruity of Aggregate Signals, and Optimal Task Assignment Contemporary Accounting Research, 22, 393 408.
14. Ittner, C., D. Larcker, and M. Meyer, 2003 Subjectivity and the Weighting of Performance Measures: Evidence from a Balanced Scorcard The Accounting Review, 78 (3 725 758.
15. Kaarbøe, O. and T. Olsen, 2006 Career Concerns, Monetary Incentives, and Job Design Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 108 (2 299 316.
16. Kerr, S., 1975 On the Folly of Rewarding for A while Hoping for B Academy of Management Journal, 18 (4 769 783.
17. Meyer, M.A., T.E. Olsen, and G. Torsvik, 1996 Limited Intertemporal Commitment and Job Design Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 31, 401 417.
18. Milgrom, P. and J. Roberts, 1988 An Economic Approach to Influence in Organizations The American Journal of Sociology, 94, S154 S179.
19. Prendergast, C., 1999 The Provision of Incentives in Firms Journal of Economics Literature, 37, 7 63.
20. Weitzman, M., 1976 The Ratchet Principle and Performance Incentives Bell Journal of Economics, 11, 302 308.