Tournaments and managerial incentives in China's listed firms: New evidence

China Economic Review

Volumn 22, Issue 1, 2011, Pages 1-10

  Kato, Takao ^a,b,c,d,e   Long, Cheryl ^a  

^a Assistant Professor in the University Libraries   (United States)

^b IZA   (Germany)

^c The Sanford C Bernstein Co Center for Leadership and Ethics   (United States)

^d AARHUS SCHOOL OF BUSINESS   (Denmark)

^e UNIVERSITY OF TOKYO   (Japan)

Author keywords

China; Managerial incentives; Ownership structure; Tournaments; Transition economies

Indexed keywords

EID: 79951681016     PISSN: 1043951X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.chieco.2010.08.001     Document Type: Article

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