A theory fo contracy and ownership choice in public enterprises under reformed socialism: The case of China's TVEs

China Economic Review

Volumn 9, Issue 1, 1998, Pages 59-71

  Tian, Zhu ^a  

^a HONG KONG UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY   (Hong Kong)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0032014441     PISSN: 1043951X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/s1043-951x(99)80004-2     Document Type: Article

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