Progressive and merging-proof taxation

International Journal of Game Theory

Volumn 40, Issue 1, 2011, Pages 43-62

  Ju, Biung Ghi ^a   Moreno Ternero, Juan D ^b,c,d  

^a Korea University   (South Korea)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MÁLAGA   (Spain)

^c UNIVERSIDAD PABLO DE OLAVIDE   (Spain)

^d UNIVERSITÉ CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN   (Belgium)

Author keywords

Consistency; Merging proofness; Operators; Progressivity; Taxation

Indexed keywords

EID: 79551579335     PISSN: 00207276     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00182-010-0228-8     Document Type: Article

References (26)

1. Chambers CP, Thomson W (2002) Group order preservation and the proportional rule for the adjudication of conflicting claims. Math Soc Sci 44: 235-252.
2. de Frutos MA (1999) Coalitional manipulations in a bankruptcy problem. Rev Econ Des 4: 255-272.
3. Eichhorn W, Funke H, Richter WF (1984) Tax progression and inequality of income distribution. J Math Econ 13: 127-131.
4. Fellman J (1976) The effect of transformations on Lorenz curves. Econometrica 44: 823-824.
5. Fleurbaey M, Maniquet F (2006) Fair income tax. Rev Econ Stud 73: 55-83.
6. Herrero C, Villar A (2001) The three musketeers: four classical solutions to bankruptcy problems. Math Soc Sci 42: 307-328.
7. Hokari T, Thomson W (2008) On properties of division rules lifted by bilateral consistency. J Math Econ 44: 1057-1071.
8. Jakobsson U (1976) On the measurement of the degree of progression. J Public Econ 5: 161-168.
9. Ju B-G (2003) Manipulation via merging and splitting in claims problems. Rev Econ Des 8: 205-215.
10. Ju B-G, Moreno-Ternero JD (2008) On the equivalence between progressivity and inequality reduction in taxation. Soc Choice Welf 30: 561-569.
11. Ju B-G, Miyagawa E, Sakai T (2007) Non-manipulable division rules in claim problems and generalizations. J Econ Theory 132: 1-26.
12. Mirrlees J (1971) An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation. Rev Econ Stud 38: 175-208.
13. Moreno-Ternero JD (2006) Composition, securement, and concede-and-divide. Span Econ Rev 8: 227-237.
14. Moreno-Ternero JD (2007) Bankruptcy rules and coalitional manipulation. Int Game Theory Rev 9: 411-424.
15. Moreno-Ternero JD, Villar A (2006) New characterizations of a classical bankruptcy rule. Rev Econ Des 10: 73-84.
16. Moulin H (2002) Axiomatic cost and surplus-sharing. In: Arrow K, Sen A, Suzumura K (eds) The Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, vol 1. North-Holland, Amsterdam, pp 289-357.
17. Moulin H (2008) Proportional scheduling, split-proofness, and merge-proofness. Games Econ Behav 63: 567-587.
18. Musgrave RA, Thin T (1948) Income tax progression. J Polit Econ 56: 498-514.
19. O'Neill B (1982) A problem of rights arbitration from the Talmud. Math Soc Sci 2: 345-371.
20. Sprumont Y (2005) On the discrete version of the Aumann-Shapley cost-sharing method. Econometrica 73: 1693-1712.
21. Thomson W (2003) Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: a survey. Math Soc Sci 45: 249-297.
22. Thomson W (2006) How to divide when there isn't enough: From the Talmud to game theory, Manuscript. University of Rochester, Rochester.
23. Thomson W, Yeh C-H (2008) Operators for the adjudication of conflicting claims. J Econ Theory 143: 177-198.
24. Young P (1987) On dividing an amount according to individual claims or liabilities. Math Oper Res 12: 398-414.
25. Young P (1988) Distributive justice in taxation. J Econ Theory 44: 321-335.
26. Young P (1994) Equity. Princeton University Press, Princeton.