Non-manipulable division rules in claim problems and generalizations

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 132, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 1-26

  Ju, Biung Ghi ^a   Miyagawa, Eiichi ^b   Sakai, Toyotaka ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF KANSAS   (United States)

^b Och Spine at New York Presbyterian Hospitals   (United States)

^c YOKOHAMA CITY UNIVERSITY   (Japan)

Author keywords

Bankruptcy problem; Bayes rule; Flat tax; Linear opinion pool; Manipulation via merging or splitting; No advantageous reallocation; Proportional rule; Reallocation proofness

Indexed keywords

EID: 33845591945     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: 10957235     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2005.08.003     Document Type: Article

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