Manipulation via merging and splitting in claims problems

Review of Economic Design

Volumn 8, Issue 2, 2003, Pages 205-215

  Ju, Biung Ghi ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF KANSAS   (United States)

Author keywords

Claims problem; Non manipulability via pairwise merging; Non manipulability via pairwise splitting

Indexed keywords

EID: 1542398756     PISSN: 14344742     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10058-003-0097-8     Document Type: Article

References (9)

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