Proportional scheduling, split-proofness, and merge-proofness

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 63, Issue 2, 2008, Pages 567-587

  Moulin, Hervé ^a  

^a RICE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Merging; Probabilistic scheduling; Proportional rule; Splitting

Indexed keywords

EID: 44649179291     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2006.09.002     Document Type: Article

References (33)

1. Banker R. Equity consideration in traditional full-cost allocation practices: An axiomatic perspective. In: Moriarty S. (Ed). Joint Cost Allocations (1981), University of Oklahoma, Norman
2. Cheng, A., Friedman, E., 2005. Sybilproof reputation mechanisms. In: SIGCOMM'05 Workshops, August 22-26, Philadelphia, USA
3. Chun Y. Agreement, separability, and other axioms for quasi-linear social choice problems. Soc. Choice Welfare 17 (2000) 507-521
4. Chun, Y., 2004. Consistency and monotonicity in sequencing problems. Mimeo. Seoul National University
5. Chun Y. A pessimistic approach to the queuing problem. Math. Soc. Sci. 51 2 (2006) 171-181
6. De Frutos M.A. Coalitional manipulations in a bankruptcy problem. Rev. Econ. Design 4 (1999) 255-272
7. Dolan R. Incentive mechanisms for priority queuing problems. Bell J. Econ. 9 (1978) 421-436
8. Douceur J. The Sybil Attack. Proceedings of the 1st International Workshop on Peer-to-Peer Systems. IPTPS 2002 (2002), LNCS 2429 251-260
9. Fishburn P. Induced binary probabilities and the linear ordering polytope: A status report. Math. Soc. Sci. 23 (1992) 67-80
10. Friedman E.J., and Henderson S.G. Fairness and efficiency in web server protocols. Proceedings of the 2003 ACM SIGMETRICS International Conference on Measurement and Modeling of Computer Systems (2003), ACM Press 229-237
11. Hain R., and Mitra M. Simple sequencing problems with interdependent costs. Games Econ. Behav. 48 (2004) 271-291
12. Ju B.G. Manipulations via merging and splitting in claim problems. Rev. Econ. Design 8 (2003) 205-215
13. Ju, B.G., Miyagawa, E., Sakai, T., 2005. Non-manipulable division rules in claim problems and generalizations. J. Econ. Theory. In press
14. Kittsteiner, T., Moldovanu, B., 2003. Auction-based queue disciplines. Mimeo. University of Bonn
15. Kittsteiner T., and Moldovanu B. Priority auctions and queue disciplines that depend on processing time. Manage. Sci. 51 2 (2005) 236-248
16. Lawler E., Lenstra J.K., Rinnooy K.A., and Shmoys D. Sequencing and scheduling: Algorithms and complexity. Chapter 9 in:. Handbooks in Operations Research and Management Science, vol. 4 (1993), Elsevier
17. Maniquet F. A characterization of the Shapley value in queuing problems. J. Econ. Theory 109 1 (2003) 90-103
18. Mitra M. Mechanism design in queuing problems. Econ. Theory 17 (2001) 277-305
19. Mitra M. Achieving the first best in sequencing problems. Rev. Econ. Design 7 (2002) 75-91
20. Moulin H. Egalitarianism and utilitarianism in quasi-linear bargaining. Econometrica 53 1 (1985) 49-67
21. Moulin H. Equal or proportional division of a surplus, and other methods. Int. J. Game Theory 16 3 (1987) 161-186
22. Moulin H. The proportional random allocation of indivisible units. Soc. Choice Welfare 19 2 (2002) 381-413
23. Moulin, H., 2004. On scheduling fees to prevent merging, splitting and transferring jobs. Math. Operations Res. In press
24. Moulin, H., 2005. Minimizing the worst slowdown: Offline, online. Operations Res. In press
25. Moulin H., and Sprumont Y. On demand responsiveness in additive cost sharing. J. Econ. Theory 125 (2005) 1-35
26. Moulin H., and Stong R. Fair queuing and other probabilistic allocation methods. Math. Operations Res. 27 1 (2002) 1-31
27. Moulin H., and Stong R. Filling a multicolor urn: An axiomatic analysis. Games Econ. Behav. 45 (2003) 242-269
28. Ozsoy, H., 2005. Coordinated splitting in probabilistic scheduling. Mimeo. Rice University
29. Queyranne M. Structure of a simple scheduling polyhedron. Math. Programming 58 (1993) 263-285
30. Shapley L.S. Core of convex games. Int. J. Game Theory 1 (1971) 11-26
31. Sprumont Y. On the discrete version of the Aumann-Shapley cost-sharing method. Econometrica 73 (2005) 1693-1712
32. Suijs J. On incentive compatibility and budget balancedness in public decision making. Econ. Design 2 (1996) 193-209
33. Wierman A., and Harchol-Balter M. Classifying scheduling policies with respect to unfairness in an M/GI/1. Proceedings of ACM Sigmetrics Conference on Measurement and Modeling of Computer Systems (2003), ACM Press