Chapter 6 Axiomatic cost and surplus sharing

Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare

Volumn 1, Issue , 2002, Pages 289-357

  Moulin, Hervé ^a  

^a RICE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

additivity; axiomatic; cost sharing; rationing; Shapley value

Indexed keywords

EID: 67649361710     PISSN: 15740110     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1016/S1574-0110(02)80010-8     Document Type: Review

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