The firm as a socialization device

Management Science

Volumn 56, Issue 12, 2010, Pages 2191-2206

  Ramalingam, Abhijit ^a   Rauh, Michael T ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF EAST ANGLIA   (United Kingdom)

^b INDIANA UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Embeddedness; Endogenous preferences; Institutions; Multitasking; Norms; Principal agent theory; Theory of the firm; Trust

Indexed keywords

EMBEDDEDNESS; ENDOGENOUS PREFERENCES; INSTITUTIONS; NORMS; PRINCIPAL-AGENT THEORY; THEORY OF THE FIRM; TRUST;

COMMERCE; MOTIVATION; MULTITASKING;

INDUSTRY;

EID: 78650385664     PISSN: 00251909     EISSN: 15265501     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.1100.1239     Document Type: Article

References (64)

1. Akerlof, G. A. 1982. Labor contracts as partial gift exchange. Quart. J. Econom. 97(4) 543-569.
2. Akerlof, G. A. 1983. Loyalty filters. Amer. Econom. Rev. 73(1) 54-63.
3. Akerlof, G. A., R. E. Kranton. 2005. Identity and the economics of organizations. J. Econom. Perspect. 19(1) 9-32.
4. Akerlof, G. A., R. E. Kranton. 2008. Identity, supervision, and workgroups. Amer. Econom. Rev. 98(2) 212-217.
5. Akerlof, G. A., R. E. Kranton. 2010. Identity Economics. How Our Identities Shape Our Work, Wages, and Well-Being. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.
6. Alchian, A. A., H. Demsetz. 1972. Production, information costs, and economic organization. Amer. Econom. Rev. 62(5) 777-795.
7. Baker, G., R. Gibbons, K. J. Murphy. 2002. Relational contracts and the theory of the firm. Quart. J. Econom. 117(1) 39-84.
8. Barnard, C. I. 1968. The Functions of the Executive. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
9. Bolton, G. E., A. Ockenfels. 2000. ERC: A theory of equity, reciprocity, and competition. Amer. Econom. Rev. 90(1) 166-193.
10. Bolton, P., M. Dewatripont. 2005. Contract Theory. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
11. Bowles, S. 1998. Endogenous preferences: The cultural consequences of markets and other economic institutions. J. Econom. Literature 36(1) 75-111.
12. Callon, M. 1998. Introduction: The embeddedness of economic markets in economics. M. Callon, ed. The Laws of the Markets. Wiley-Blackwell, Malden, MA, 1-57.
13. Casadesus-Masanell, R. 2004. Trust in agency. J. Econom. Management Strategy 13(3) 375-404.
14. Coase, R. H. 1937. The nature of the firm. Economica 4(16) 386-405.
15. Dal Bó, P. 2005. Cooperation under the shadow of the future: Experimental evidence from infinitely repeated games. Amer. Econom. Rev. 95(5) 1591-1604.
16. Dufwenberg, M., P. Heidhues, G. Kirchsteiger, F. Riedel, J. Sobel. 2008. Other-regarding preferences in general equilibrium. Working paper, Department of Economics, University of California, San Diego.
17. Durkheim, E. 1984. The Division of Labor in Society. Free Press, New York.
18. Eccles, R. G. 1981. The quasifirm in the construction industry. J. Econom. Behav. Organ. 2(4) 335-357.
19. Falk, A., U. Fischbacher. 2006. A theory of reciprocity. Games Econom. Behav. 54(2) 293-315.
20. Fehr, E., U. Fischbacher. 2002. Why social preferences matter-The impact of non-selfish motives on competition, cooperation, and incentives. Econom. J. 112(478) C1-C33.
21. Fehr, E., S. Gächter. 2000. Fairness and retaliation: The economics of reciprocity. J. Econom. Perspect. 14(3) 159-181.
22. Fehr, E., K. M. Schmidt. 1999. A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation. Quart. J. Econom. 114(3) 817-68.
23. Fehr, E., K. M. Schmidt. 2004. Fairness and incentives in a multitask principal-agent model. Scand. J. Econom. 106(3) 453-474.
24. Fehr, E., A. Klein, K. M. Schmidt. 2007. Fairness and contract design. Econometrica 75(1) 121-154.
25. Frank, R. H. 1987. If homo economicus could choose his own utility function, would he want one with a conscience? Amer. Econom. Rev. 77(4) 593-604.
26. Frank, R. H., T. Gilovich, D. T. Regan. 1993. Does studying economics inhibit cooperation? J. Econom. Perspect. 7(2) 159-171.
27. Giddens, A. 1971. Capitalism and Modern Social Theory: An Analysis of the Writings of Marx, Durkheim, and Max Weber. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
28. Granovetter, M. 1985. Economic action and social structure: The problem of embeddedness. Amer. J. Sociol. 91(3) 481-510.
29. Granovetter, M. 2005. The impact of social structure on economic outcomes. J. Econom. Perspect. 19(1) 33-50.
30. Grossman, S. J., O. D. Hart. 1986. The costs and benefits of ownership: A theory of vertical and lateral integration. J. Polit. Econom. 94(4) 691-719.
31. Harrison, J. R., G. R. Carroll. 2002. The dynamics of cultural influence networks. Comput. Math. Organ. Theory 8(1) 5-30.
32. Hart, O., J. Moore. 1990. Property rights and the nature of the firm. J. Polit. Econom. 98(6) 1119-1158.
33. Henderson, R. 2008. What do managers do (to build competitive advantage)? The development of relational contracts and the origins of organizational capability. Working paper, Harvard Business School, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA.
34. Holmström, B. 1982. Moral hazard in teams. Bell J. Econom. 13(2) 324-340.
35. Holmström, B., P. Milgrom. 1987. Aggregation and linearity in the provision of intertemporal incentives. Econometrica 55(2) 303-328.
36. Holmström, B., P. Milgrom. 1991. Multitask principal-agent analyses: Incentive contracts, asset ownership, and job design. J. Law, Econom., Organ. 7(1) 24-52.
37. Holmström, B., P. Milgrom. 1994. The firm as an incentive system. Amer. Econom. Rev. 84(4) 972-991.
38. Hursthouse, R. 1999. On Virtue Ethics. Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK.
39. Kalleberg, A. L., T. Reve. 1993. Contracts and commitment: Economic and sociological perspectives on employment relations. Human Relations 45(9) 1103-1132.
40. Kandel, E., E. P. Lazear. 1992. Peer pressure and partnerships. J. Polit. Econom. 100(4) 801-817.
41. Muller, J. Z. 2003. The Mind and the Market: Capitalism in Western Thought. Anchor Books, New York.
42. Ostrom, E., J. Walker. 2007. Trust and reciprocity as foundations for cooperation: Individuals, institutions, and context. Working Paper W07-3, Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington.
43. Ouchi, W. G. 1980. Markets, bureaucracies, and clans. Admin. Sci. Quart. 25(1) 129-141.
44. Podsakoff, P. M., S. B. MacKenzie, J. B. Paine, D. G. Bachrach. 2000. Organizational citizenship behaviors: A critical review of the theoretical and empirical literature and suggestions for future research. J. Management 26(3) 513-563.
45. Polanyi, K. 2001. The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time. Beacon Press, Boston.
46. Rabin, M. 1993. Incorporating fairness into game theory and economics. Amer. Econom. Rev. 83(5) 1281-1302.
47. Raub, W. 1990. A general game-theoretic model of preference adaptations in problematic social situations. Rationality Soc. 2(1) 67-93.
48. Rob, R., P. Zemsky. 2002. Social capital, corporate culture, and incentive intensity. RAND J. Econom. 33(2) 243-257.
49. Roberts, J. 2004. The Modern Firm: Organizational Design for Performance and Growth. Oxford University Press, New York.
50. Rotemberg, J. J. 1994. Human relations in the workplace. J. Polit. Econom. 102(4) 684-717.
51. Rotemberg, J. J. 2006. Endogenous altruism in buyer-seller relations and its implications for vertical integration. Working paper, Harvard Business School, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA.
52. Seabright, P. 2004. The Company of Strangers: A Natural History of Economic Life. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.
53. Simon, H. A. 1951. A formal theory of the employment relationship. Econometrica 19(3) 293-305.
54. Simon, H. A. 1991. Organizations and markets. J. Econom. Perspect. 5(2) 25-44.
55. Smith, A. 2010. The Theory of Moral Sentiments. Penguin Group, New York.
56. Sobel, J. 2005. Interdependent preferences and reciprocity. J. Econom. Literature 43(2) 392-436.
57. Sobel, J. 2008. Markets make people appear selfish. Working paper, Department of Economics, University of California, San Diego.
58. Tabellini, G. 2008. The scope of cooperation: Values and incentives. Quart. J. Econom. 123(3) 905-950.
59. Van den Steen, E. 2010. Interpersonal authority in a theory of the firm. Amer. Econom. Rev. 100(1) 466-490.
60. Vohs, K. D., N. L. Mead, M. R. Goode. 2006. The psychological consequences of money. Science 314(5802) 1154-1156.
61. Weber, M. 1978. Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology. G. Roth, C. Wittich, eds. University of California Press, Berkeley.
62. Williamson, O. E. 1975. Markets and Hierarchies. Free Press, New York.
63. Williamson, O. E. 1981. The economics of organization: The transaction cost approach. Amer. J. Soc. 87(3) 548-577.
64. Williamson, O. E. 1985. The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. Free Press, New York.