Financing and corporate growth under repeated moral hazard

Journal of Financial Intermediation

Volumn 20, Issue 1, 2011, Pages 1-24

  Anderson, Ronald W ^a,c   Nyborg, Kjell G ^b,c,d  

^a LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ZURICH   (Switzerland)

^c CEPR   (United Kingdom)

^d SWISS FINANCE INSTITUTE   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

Control rights; Dynamic capital structure; Financing; Growth; Hold up; Internal and external equity; Leverage; Moral hazard

Indexed keywords

EID: 78649516573     PISSN: 10429573     EISSN: 10960473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jfi.2009.12.001     Document Type: Article

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