Presidential Address, Committing to Commit: Short-term Debt When Enforcement Is Costly

Journal of Finance

Volumn 59, Issue 4, 2004, Pages 1447-1479

  Diamond, Douglas W ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84944074311     PISSN: 00221082     EISSN: 15406261     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2004.00669.x     Document Type: Article

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