Consumerism versus producerism: A study in comparative law

Yale Law Journal

Volumn 117, Issue 3, 2007, Pages 340-406

  Whitman, James Q ^a  

^a YALE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 37449009027     PISSN: 00440094     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/20455797     Document Type: Review

References (243)

1. LAWRENCE B. GLICKMAN, A LIVING WAGE: AMERICAN WORKERS AND THE MAKING OF CONSUMER SOCIETY 156 (1997).
2. Associated Press, Consumerism Threatens Globe: Chavez, HINDU (Chennai), Jan. 28, 2006, at 18, available at http://www.thehindu.com/2006/01/28/stories/2006012802941400.htm.
3. Id.
4. Sonia Devillers & Pierre-Olivier Julien, Ces jeunes qui aiment Nike mais pas l'Amérique [These Young People who Like Nike, but Not America], FIGARO (Fr.), Aug. 1, 2002, Économie, at VIII.
5. Sandel has campaigned vigorously against the culture of consumerism that he associates with chain stores like Wal-Mart. Consumerist law, for Sandel, is the enemy of republican self-government: when the law reduces us all to consumers, Sandel argues, it robs us of our connection to self-governing producer institutions like small businesses and unions, leaving us dependent on the large enterprises that supply us with the consumer goods we crave. MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 221-49 (1996).
6. John Rawls & Philippe Van Parijs, Three Letters on The Law of Peoples and the European Union, 7 REVUE DE PHILOSOPHIE ÉCONOMIQUE [REVIEW OF ECONOMIC PHILOSOPHY] 7 (2003) (Fr.), available at http://www.uclouvain. be/cps/ucl/doc/etes/documents/RawlsVanParijs1.Rev.phil.Econ.pdf.
7. LIZABETH COHEN, A CONSUMERS' REPUBLIC: THE POLITICS OF MASS CONSUMPTION IN POSTWAR AMERICA 18-51 (2003).
8. ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 51 (1978).
9. LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN & WARREN S. GRIMES, THE LAW OF ANTITRUST: AN INTEGRATED HANDBOOK 2-3 (2d ed. 2006) ("In a world in which the most competitively fit enterprise survives and thrives, a nation with vigorously enforced competition laws may have a comparative advantage over other nations. That nation's enterprises, honed by competition in the home market, may be better equipped to compete in global markets.").
10. Ann Mettler, Editorial, Meet the European Consumer, WALL ST. J. EUR., Jan. 29, 2007, at 15.
11. The classic statement is ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW (1974).
12. Tom Hundley, Germany: Now Open Sundays? Country's Culture of Shopping Slowly Changing, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 28, 2007, at 13.
13. See infra Part II.
14. BENJAMIN R. BARBER, CON$UMED: HOW MARKETS CORRUPT CHILDREN, INFANTILIZE ADULTS, AND SWALLOW CITIZENS WHOLE 177 (2007).
15. Id. at 9.
16. Mettler, supra note 10.
17. GLICKMAN, supra note 1, at 156.
18. To be sure, the leading treatments bring great sophistication to their discussion of these familiar categories. For a number of valuable insights, see, for example, RENÉ DAVID, LES GRANDS SYSTÈMES DE DROIT CONTEMPORAINS [MAJOR CONTEMPORARY LEGAL SYSTEMS] (8th ed. 1982);
19. and KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KÖTZ, INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW (Tony Weir trans., 3d ed. 1998). Nevertheless, it is striking that these authors continue to classify legal systems in the traditional source-oriented way, even while offering analytic observations that have nothing to do with that style of classification.
20. For a critique, see Ugo Mattei, Three Patterns of Law: Taxonomy and Change in the World's Legal Systems, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 5 (1997);
21. and Mark Van Hoecke & Mark Warrington, Legal Cultures, Legal Paradigms and Legal Doctrine: Towards a New Model for Comparative Law, 47 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 495 (1998).
22. See, e.g., MIRJAN R. DAMAŠKA, EVIDENCE LAW ADRIFT (1997);
23. MIRJAN R. DAMAŠKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO THE LEGAL PROCESS (1986) [hereinafter DAMAŠKA, FACES OF JUSTICE].
24. See Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113 (1998).
25. For other work along these lines, see Edward Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, Legal Origins, 117 Q.J. ECON. 1193 (2002);
26. and Paul G. Mahoney, The Common Law and Economic Growth: Hayek Might Be Right, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 503 (2001).
27. See, e.g., Daniel Berkowitz, Katharina Pistor & Jean-Francois Richard, The Transplant Effect, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 163, 167 (2003) ("[T]he way in which a country received its formal law is a much more important determinant of the current effectiveness of its legal institutions than the particular legal family that it adopted."). In general, when the literature cited above, see supra note 20, makes important observations, those observations involve some factor other than the particular legal family in question. Mahoney, for example, points to the "association" of the common law with limited government. He mounts an interesting historical argument about the differing influence of "landed aristocrats and merchants" in England and France. Mahoney, supra note 20, at 504-05. This is a claim well worth discussing, but it is a claim about political economy, the force of which is blunted if we focus on the common law family as such. Oddly, the authors who work in this vein pay no attention to aspects of the common law tradition that arguably may have had some real importance for commercial development, notably the common law's suspiciousness toward just-price regulation.
28. The importance of this question is highlighted in John W. Cioffi, State of the Art: A Review Essay on Comparative Corporate Governance: The State of the Art and Emerging Research, 48 AM. J. COMP. L. 501, 506 (2000) (book review).
29. This is a theme in ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW (2001).
30. See id.
31. E.g., MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW (1987);
32. MARY ANN GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW: STATE, LAW, AND FAMILY IN THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE (1989).
33. For a recent example from Mattei's large output, see Ugo Mattei, A Theory of Imperial Law: A Study on U.S. Hegemony and the Latin Resistance, 10 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 383 (2003). For his useful effort to arrive at a system of classification independent of traditional categories, see Mattei, supra note 18. The latter article is unpersuasive to me, since it understates the difference in degree of professionalization between European and American traditions.
34. E.g., Mark J. Roe, Modern Politics and Ownership Separation, in CONVERGENCE AND PERSISTENCE IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 252 (Jeffrey N. Gordon & Mark J. Roe eds., 2004) [hereinafter Roe, Modern Politics];
35. Mark J. Roe, Some Differences in Corporate Structure in Germany, Japan, and the United States, 102 YALE L.J. 1927 (1993).
36. E.g., John Reitz, Political Economy and Contract Law, in NEW FEATURES IN CONTRACT LAW 247 (Reiner Schulze ed., 2007).
37. E.g., DAVID J. GERBER, LAW AND COMPETITION IN TWENTIETH CENTURY EUROPE: PROTECTING PROMETHEUS (1998).
38. E.g., Berkowitz et al., supra note 21.
39. For a taste of the liveliness of early-nineteenth-century comparative law, it is worth browsing the work of a once famous, now forgotten scholar, Charles Comte. As its title suggests, CHARLES COMTE, TRAITÉ DE LÉGISLATION, OU EXPOSITION DES LOIS GÉNÉRALES SUIVANT LESQUELLES LES PEUPLES PROSPÈRENT, DÉPÉRISSENT, OU RESTENT STATIONNAIRES [A TREATISE ON LEGISLATION, OR EXPOSITION OF THE GENERAL LAWS IN ACCORDANCE WITH WHICH NATIONS PROGRESS, DECLINE, OR REMAIN STABLE] (Paris, Félix Locquin 2d. ed. 1835) was concerned with the sorts of problems of comparative social organization that more recent comparative law has generally forgotten. Like his predecessors Montesquieu and John Millar, Comte had real learning and deep analytic insight.
40. 1 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE OF INTERPRETATIVE SOCIOLOGY 20-21 & n.5, 57-58 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., Ephraim Fischoff et al. trans., 1968).
41. See, e.g., DAMAŠKA, FACES OF JUSTICE, supra note 19, at 9.
42. KAGAN, supra note 23, at 11.
43. I hope the reader will accept this large proposition, which could easily be the subject of a book in itself, without full-scale discussion. The most important example in the common law literature may be The Case of Monopolies, (1603) 77 Eng. Rep. 1260 (K.B.). American authors sometimes like to treat this famous case as a ratification of the primacy of a consumer interest in competitive prices, but careful historians have shown that it involved the competing claims of a guild and the grantee of a royal monopoly.
44. See Jacob I. Corré, The Argument, Decision, and Reports of Darcy v. Allen, 45 EMORY L.J. 1261 (1996);
45. D. Seaborne Davies, Further Light on The Case of Monopolies, 48 LAW Q. REV. 394 (1932);
46. Barbara Malament, The "Economic Liberalism" of Sir Edward Coke, 76 YALE L.J. 1321, 1343-44 (1967).
47. For the broader history, especially with regard to guilds, see, for example, ANTONY BLACK, GUILDS AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN EUROPEAN POLITICAL THOUGHT FROM THE TWELFTH CENTURY TO THE PRESENT (1984).
48. For limited concern with implied warranties in particular, see S.F.C. MILSOM, STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 126-32 (1985);
49. Friedrich Kessler, The Protection of the Consumer Under Modern Sales Law: A Comparative Study (pt. 1), 74 YALE L.J. 262, 262-72 (1964).
50. Within a literature too vast to cite, see, for example, WILLIAM H. SEWELL, JR., WORK AND REVOLUTION IN FRANCE: THE LANGUAGE OF LABOR FROM THE OLD REGIME TO 1848 (1980).
51. EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOUR IN SOCIETY (W.D. Halls trans., MacMillan 1984) (1893);
52. JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT (C.B. Macpherson ed., Hackett 1980) (1690) (discussing the labor theory of property);
53. KARL MARX, CAPITAL: A CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY (Ben Fowkes trans., Penguin Books 1976) (1867).
54. Karl Marx, The German Ideology (1845), reprinted in THE MARX-ENGELS READER 146, 160 (Robert C. Tucker ed., 2d. ed. 1972).
55. RUDOLF HILFERDING, FINANCE CAPITAL: A STUDY OF THE LATEST PHASE OF CAPITALIST DEVELOPMENT 367-68 (Tom Bottomore ed., Morris Watnick & Sam Gordon trans., Routledge & Kegan Paul 1981) (1910);
56. ORGANISIERTER KAPITALISMUS: VORAUSSETZUNGEN UND ANFÄNGE [ORGANIZED CAPITALISM: CONDITIONS AND ORIGINS] (Heinrich August Winkler ed., 1974).
57. See James Q. Whitman, Early German Corporatism in America: Limits of the "Social" in the Land of Economics, in THE RECEPTION OF CONTINENTAL IDEAS IN THE COMMON LAW WORLD 1820-1920, at 229 (Mathias Reimann ed., 1993).
58. For a rapid survey, see CARL LANDAUER, CORPORATE STATE IDEOLOGIES: HISTORICAL ROOTS AND PHILOSOPHICAL ORIGINS 59-92 (1983).
59. For more in-depth treatments, see RALPH H. BOWEN, GERMAN THEORIES OF THE CORPORATIVE STATE, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE PERIOD 1870-1919 (1947);
60. MATTHEW H. ELBOW, FRENCH CORPORATIVE THEORY, 1789-1948: A CHAPTER IN THE HISTORY OF IDEAS (1953);
61. and HEINRICH HEFFTER, DIE DEUTSCHE SELBSTVERWALTUNG IM 19. JAHRHUNDERT: GESCHICHTE DER IDEEN UND INSTITUTIONEN [GERMAN SELF- GOVERNMENT IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY: A HISTORY OF IDEAS AND INSTITUTIONS] (1950).
62. See James Q. Whitman, Of Corporatism, Fascism, and the First New Deal, 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 747, 753-55 (1991).
63. The seminal article is Philippe C. Schmitter, Still the Century of Corporatism?, in THE NEW CORPORATISM: SOCIAL-POLITICAL STRUCTURES IN THE IBERIAN WORLD 85 (Frederick B. Pike & Thomas Stritch eds., 1974).
64. For recent literature on this theme, see KONZERTIERUNG, VERHANDLUNGSDEMOKRATIE UND REFORMPOLITIK IM WOHLFAHRTSSTAAT [CONCERTED ACTION, NEGOTIATED DEMOCRACY, AND REFORM POLITICS IN THE WELFARE STATE] (Sven Jochem & Nico A. Siegel eds., 2003);
65. HOWARD J. WIARDA, CORPORATISM AND COMPARATIVE POLITICS 74-75 (1997).
66. For France, see id. at 75-76; and LA FRANCE, MALADE DU CORPORATISME? [FRANCE: AILING FROM CORPORATISM?] (Steven L. Kaplan & Philippe Minard eds., 2004).
67. On the European level, see Hugh Compston & Justin Greenwood, Social Partnership in the European Union, in SOCIAL PARTNERSHIP IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 154 (Hugh Compston & Justin Greenwood eds., 2001).
68. More generally on Europe, see THE CORPORATE STATE: CORPORATISM AND THE STATE TRADITION IN WESTERN EUROPE (Andrew Cox & Noel O'Sullivan eds., 1988).
69. Whitman, supra note 43, at 756-61.
70. E.g., TIMOTHY W. MASON, SOCIAL POLICY IN THE THIRD REICH: THE WORKING CLASS AND THE "NATIONAL COMMUNITY" (Jane Caplan ed., John Broadwin trans., Berg Publishers 1993) (1977).
71. The European treatment of cartels has a complex intellectual history that I leave to the side here. See GERBER, supra note 29, at 51-62, 132-48.
72. E.g., AVRAHAM BARKAI, NAZI ECONOMICS: IDEOLOGY, THEORY, AND POLICY 188-89 (Ruth Hadass-Vashitz trans., 1990).
73. LION FEUCHTWANGER, THE OPPERMANNS (Viking Press 1934) (1933).
74. Id. at 18.
75. This was Point Sixteen of the Nazi Party Program. For a fuller discussion, see HEINRICH UHLIG, DIE WARENHÄUSER IM DRITTEN REICH [DEPARTMENT STORES IN THE THIRD REICH] 88 & passim (1956).
76. See VICTORIA DE GRAZIA, IRRESISTIBLE EMPIRE: AMERICA'S ADVANCE THROUGH TWENTIETH-CENTURY EUROPE 135-37 (2005).
77. PIERRE ARLET, LA CONSOMMATION: L'ÉDUCATION DU CONSOMMATEUR [CONSUMPTION: EDUCATION OF THE CONSUMER] 143 (1939),
78. quoted in Victoria de Grazia, Changing Consumption Regimes in Europe, 1930-1970: Comparative Perspectives on the Distribution Problem, in GETTING AND SPENDING: EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN CONSUMER SOCIETIES IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 59, 78 (Susan Strasser et al. eds., 1998).
79. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). The corporatist character of the NRA, and its sources in Italian corporativism in particular, are discussed in Whitman, supra note 43.
80. 15 U.S.C. § 13 (2000); see Richard C. Schragger, The Anti-Chain Store Movement, Localist Ideology, and the Remnants of the Progressive Constitution, 1920-1940, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1011, 1060-64 (2005).
81. John R. Commons, American Shoemakers, 1648-1895: A Sketch of Industrial Evolution, 24 Q.J. ECON. 39 (1909).
82. Id. at 73-75. One also finds American authors who echoed the dark anti-Semitism of many European anticonsumerists. See, e.g., LEON SAMSON, THE AMERICAN MIND: A STUDY IN SOCIO-ANALYSIS 38-39, 182-83 (1932) (claiming that the American, like the Jew, is "an alien to art," and that American consumerism prevents Americans from seeing the truth of class conflict).
83. Even the Robinson-Patman Act itself focused, in a characteristically American way, on price discrimination. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-13a (2000). There is nothing comparable in European law. Moreover, even the most aggressively corporatist of American public figures still spoke in consumerist terms. See the discussion of Donald Richberg in Whitman, supra note 43, at 768. For the early rise of a culture of consumer sovereignty in the United States, also see DE GRAZIA, supra note 52, at 103.
84. See, e.g., NEIL MCKENDRICK, JOHN BREWER & J.H. PLUMB, THE BIRTH OF A CONSUMER SOCIETY: THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND (1982).
85. GLICKMAN, supra note 1, at xiii.
86. WALTER LIPPMAN, DRIFT AND MASTERY 54-55 (1914), quoted in SANDEL, supra note 5, at 222.
87. WALTER E. WEYL, THE NEW DEMOCRACY: AN ESSAY ON CERTAIN POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC TENDENCIES IN THE UNITED STATES 250 (Harper & Row 1964) (1912).
88. Id. at 250-51.
89. See LIZABETH COHEN, MAKING A NEW DEAL: INDUSTRIAL WORKERS IN CHICAGO, 1919-1939, at 101 (1990)
90. (quoting 2 TRUE STORY MAGAZINE, THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC EVOLUTION 32-34, 67 (1930)).
91. See GLICKMAN, supra note 1, at 156 (quoting Franklin Delano Roosevelt).
92. See SANDEL, supra note 5, at 221-27.
93. See id. at 211-212 (discussing the vision of Brandeis).
94. The great exception is the National Recovery Administration. See generally SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 9, at 7 (discussing U.S. cartel law).
95. I will not enter into the debate over Robert Bork's claims, now generally rejected, that early American antitrust law already took consumer welfare as the primary goal. See id. at 6.
96. SANDEL, supra note 5, at 231-49 (summarizing the familiar history of antitrust).
97. Id. at 227-31; see also Schragger, supra note 55.
98. SANDEL, supra note 5, at 201-03.
99. BARBER, supra note 14; JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE AFFLUENT SOCIETY (3d ed. 1976).
100. For her rejection of Sandel, see COHEN, supra note 7, at 409.
101. See the literature discussed in GLICKMAN, supra note 1, at 155-56. Glickman himself pushes the transformation back to the later nineteenth century. Id. at 156.
102. COHEN, supra note 7, at 22, 31-53.
103. As one of her chapter titles runs, her book is the history of "The Consumer-Citizen: How Europeans Traded Rights for Goods." DE GRAZIA, supra note 52, at 336-75.
104. Id. at 376-415.
105. Europa: Activities of the European Union-Competition, http://europa.eu/pol/comp/index_en.htm (last visited Nov. 9, 2007).
106. For current activities of the European Commission and the European Union, see Europa, http://europa.eu/press_room/index_en.htm (last visited Nov. 9, 2007).
107. See LISA MURACH-BRAND, ANTITRUST AUF DEUTSCH: DER EINFLUß DER AMERIKANISCHEN ALIIERTEN AUF DAS GESETZ GEGEN WETTBEWERBSBESCHRÄNKUNGEN (GWB) NACH 1945 [ANTITRUST AUF DEUTSCH: THE INFLUENCE OF THE AMERICAN ALLIES ON THE LAW AGAINST RESTRAINTS ON COMPETITION AFTER 1945] (2004).
108. CHRISTOPHER HARDING & JULIAN JOSHUA, REGULATING CARTELS IN EUROPE: A STUDY OF LEGAL CONTROL OF CORPORATE DELINQUENCY 117-142 (2003).
109. See infra Parts IV & V.
110. See WEYL, supra note 62.
111. See supra Part II.
112. WEYL, supra note 62.
113. Europa: Activities of the European Union - Competition, supra note 79.
114. For these widely leveled charges, see, for example, George S. McGovern, The End of 'More,' L.A. TIMES, May 22, 2006, at B11;
115. and Andrew Ratner, United States of Wal-Mart: What Is the True Cost of Those Low Prices?, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Mar. 12, 2006, at H-6.
116. For an example from the Ralph Nader stable, see Peter MacFarland, Consumer Power: North American Style, NEW INTERNATIONALIST, May 1985, at 26, 26, available at http://www.newint.org/issue147/ north.htm ("The new wave will have consumers banding together to take the price-setting initiative away from the producers.").
117. Mettler, supra note 10.
118. Adam Nagourney & Michael Barbaro, Eye on Election, Democrats Run as Wal-Mart Foe, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 2006, at A1.
119. Wal-Mart's Welcome to India Includes Demonstrations, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2007, at C3.
120. Nargourney & Barbaro, supra note 91.
121. The same is true in Europe, where, as de Grazia observes, the conflict is one between "the European vision of the social citizen and the American notion of the sovereign consumer." DE GRAZIA, supra note 52, at 342.
122. See GLICKMAN, supra note 1, at 156 (emphasis added).
123. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2715 (2007) (noting that resale price maintenance may give consumers more options).
124. E.g., IRVING SCHER, ANTITRUST ADVISER 1-2, 1-3 (4th ed. 2005) (claiming that the purpose of antitrust law is to protect "consumers of goods and services").
125. For a survey of the two regulatory schemes, see Douglas H. Ginsburg, Comparing Antitrust Enforcement in the United States and Europe, 1 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 427 (2005).
126. For recent examples of firms facing regulatory authorities on both sides of the Atlantic, see, for example, Grant Robertson & Eric Reguly, Thomson-Reuters Merger a Balancing Act, GLOBE & MAIL (Can.), May 16, 2007, at B3;
127. and Paul Wilson, Deal Would Vault Hexion to Top 5, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, July 13, 2007, at 8C. For contact between specialists, see, for example, Neelie Kroes, Member of the European Comm'n in Charge of Competition Policy, Speech at the Fordham Corporate Law Institute: Preliminary Thoughts on Policy Review of Article 82, at 2 (Sept. 23, 2005) (on file with the author).
128. Eleanor M. Fox, "We Protect Competition, You Protect Competitors," 26 WORLD COMPETITION L. & ECON. REV. 149, 149 (2003).
129. Aditi Bagchi, The Political Economy of Merger Regulation, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 4-5 (2005)
130. (quoting Eleanor Fox, Global Markets, National Law, and the Regulation of Business: A View from the Top, 75 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 383, 395 (2001);
131. Michael Jacobs, Mergers and Acquisitions in a Global Economy: Perspectives from Law, Politics, and Business, 13 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 1, 7 (2000)) (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
132. Kroes, supra note 98.
133. E.g., ULRICH LOEWENHEIM, KARL M. MEESSEN & ALEXANDER RIESENKAMPFF, 1 KARTELLRECHT [CARTEL LAW] 6 (2005) (arguing that consumers are beneficiaries of cartel regulation);
134. BARRY J. RODGER & ANGUS MACCULLOCH, COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY IN THE EC AND UK 153 (3d ed. 2004) (arguing that consumers must receive pass-on of benefits from restrictions on competition).
135. For current activities of the European Commission, see, for example, Press Release, European Commission, Competition: Commission Fines Members of Lifts and Escalators Cartels over €990 Million (Feb. 21, 2007), http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction .do?reference=IP/07/209. For the broader European Union, see Europa: Activities of the European Union-Competition, supra note 79.
136. See Keith Johnson, Electric Attraction: For Europe's Utilities, a Frenzied Power Grab: As Deregulation Nears, Bids Top $100 Billion; Will Consumers Benefit?, WALL ST. J., Apr. 11, 2007, at A1.
137. For Germany, see Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb [Statute Against Unfair Competition], July 3, 2004, BGBl. I at 1414, § 1 (F.R.G.) ("Dieses Gesetz dient dem Schutz der Mitbewerber, der Verbraucherinnen und der Verbraucher . . . ." (This law serves to protect competitors and consumers)). For the previous history, see HELMUT KÖHLER & JOACHIM BORNKAMM, WETTBEWERBSRECHT [COMPETITION LAW] 39-40, 545-55 (24th ed. 2006).
138. The Economist, for example, thinks it can detect a "subtle but discernible shift in competition policy" toward favoring lower consumer prices in the retail sector, at least in Britain. Competition Policy in the EU: Big Chains Enjoy a Buyer's Market, ECONOMIST, Feb. 15, 2007, at 78.
139. Honor Mahony, Sarkozy Claims 'Competition' Victory at Summit, EUOBSERVER.COM, June 25, 2007, available at http://www.ezilon. com/information/article_18148.shtml.
140. Id.
141. Eleanor M. Fox, Monopolization, Abuse of Dominance, and the Indeterminacy of Economics: The U.S./E.U. Divide, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 725, 740.
142. Id.
143. For the continuing truth of this observation, see Stephanie Kirchgaessner, Intellectual Property Line Highlights an Atlantic Rift, FIN. TIMES (London), Nov. 3, 2006, at 24.
144. Cf. Amanda Cohen, Surveying the Microsoft Antitrust Universe, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 333, 354 (2004).
145. Neelie Kroes, European Comm'r for Competition Policy, Introductory Remarks at Press Conference on Imposing Penalty Payments on Microsoft (July 12, 2006) (emphasis added), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/ pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/06/452.
146. See id.
147. Kevin J. Delaney & Robert A. Guth, Microsoft Rivals Gripe to U.S. About Its New Vista Software, WALL ST. J., Feb. 10, 2006, at B4.
148. Stephen Labaton, Microsoft Will Alter Vista System, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2007, at C1.
149. Ellen Nakashima, Extended Monitoring Sought for Microsoft; Google Asks Court To Lengthen '02 Antitrust Decree, WASH. POST, June 26, 2007, at D1 (quoting David C. Drummond, Senior Vice President and Chief Legal Officer, Google) (emphasis added).
150. Ann Zimmerman & Emily Nelson, With Profits Elusive, Wal-Mart To Exit Germany, WALL ST. J., July 29, 2006, at A1.
151. This strategy may be collapsing in the current market. See Gary McWilliams, Minding the Store: Analyzing Customers, Best Buy Decides Not All Are Welcome, WALL ST. J., Nov. 8, 2004, at A1.
152. See Schragger, supra note 55, at 1066-68; Francis M. Dougherty, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of State Statutory Provision Prohibiting Sales of Commodities Below Cost - Modern Cases, 41 A.L.R.4th 612 (1985).
153. See Dougherty, supra note 119; Schragger, supra note 55, at 1066-68.
154. E.g., SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 9, at 168-69.
155. Case C-267/91, Criminal Proceedings Against Keck and Mithouard, 1993 E.C.R. I-6097.
156. For example, the current German pricing ordinance, which went into effect in 2004, includes a four-page appendix of mathematical formulae. Verordnung zur Regelung der Preisangaben [Ordinance on the Regulation of Pricing], Mar. 14, 1985, BGBl. I at 582, § 6 (F.R.G.).
157. The dates for the sales seasons, tourists may wish to know, are set by Département, and may vary by a week or so in different parts of France. For the general law with further references, see DIDIER FERRIER, DROIT DE LA DISTRIBUTION [LAW OF DISTRIBUTION] § 458, at 254 (Litec 3d ed. 2002). Apart from les soldes, merchants may only put particular items already present in the shop on "promotion" - and even then subject to considerable regulation. Low-end goods are often offered on "promotion" - though here too there is quite a bit of regulation. For a guide aimed at the lay consumer, see AMICALE DES CADRES SUPÉRIEURS DES SERVICES EXTÉRIEURS ET DES LABORATOIRES DE LA DIRECTION DE LA CONCURRENCE, DE LA CONSOMMATION ET DE LA RÉPRESSION DES FRAUDES [ASSOCIATION OF SENIOR EXECUTIVES FOR EXTERNAL SERVICES AND FOR INVESTIGATIVE OFFICES CHARGED WITH THE MANAGEMENT OF COMPETITION, CONSUMER AFFAIRS, AND COMBATING FRAUD], GUIDE JURIDIQUE ET PRATIQUE DU CONSOMMATEUR [A LEGAL AND PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR THE CONSUMER] 83-87 (Emile Guchet ed., 2005).
158. See generally C. COM. arts. L310-1, L310-5 (Fr.) (limiting liquidation sales to a two-month period and subjecting violators to a fine).
159. Leroy, Ils font la chasse aux fraudeurs [They Hunt Down Defrauders], PARIS-NORMANDIE, Jan. 19, 2007.
160. For the previous history, see KÖHLER & BORNKAMM, supra note 105, at 39-40, 545-55 (discussing older laws regulating sales seasons).
161. KÖHLER & BORNKAMM, supra note 105, at 743-44.
162. In August 2005, France amended the Loi Galland of 1996, in order to lower prices so as to stimulate consumer demand. Law No. 96-588 of July 1, 1996, Journal Officiel de la République Française [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], July 3, 1996, p. 9983, modified by Law No. 2005-882 of Aug. 2, 2005, Journal Officiel de la République Française [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], Aug. 3, 2005, p. 2 sur 114. They did so, though, by forbidding distributors to pass onto consumers the full cost of the "marge arrière," a fee paid by the distributors of high-end goods to induce retailers to display their goods prominently. Studies showed that as much as thirty percent of the cost of goods was attributable to the marge arrière. The new law limited that to twenty percent. The French government did not choose to amend another law limiting large retail practices, Law No. 96-603 of July 5, 1996, Journal Officiel de la République Française [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], July 6, 1996, p. 10,199. This episode raises an important issue that I do not pursue here, but that was arguably of importance in Wal-Mart's German failure; in practice, European retailing treats high-end and low-end goods quite differently.
163. C. COM. art. L420-5 (Fr.).
164. See supra Part II.
165. Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb [Statute Against Unfair Competition], July 3, 2004, BGBl. I at 1414, § 3 (F.R.G.).
166. FERRIER, supra note 124, at 248 (translation by author) ("La promotion consiste à inciter à l'achat d'un produit ou à la demande d'une prestation de service. Elle préjudicie souvent au consommateur en le poussant par l'offre d'un avantage à réaliser des achats inopportuns . . . .") (citations omitted).
167. Id. at 249 (translation by author) ("La diminution du prix est un facteur très incitatif pour le consommateur.").
168. Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb [Statute Against Unfair Competition], July 3, 2004, BGBl. I at 1414, § 4 (F.R.G.) (translation by author) ("Unlauter im Sinne von § 3 handelt insbesondere, wer[:] 1. Wettbewerbshandlungen vornimmt, die geeignet sind, die Entscheidungsfreiheit der Verbraucher oder sonstiger Marktteilnehmer durch Ausübung von Druck, in menschenverachtender Weise oder durch sonstigen unangemessenen unsachlichen Einfluss zu beeinträchtigen . . . .").
169. Cf. JOSEF DREXL, DIE WIRTSCHAFTLICHE SELBSTBESTIMMUNG DES VERBRAUCHERS [ECONOMIC SELF-DETERMINATION FOR THE CONSUMER] (1998).
170. I discuss this concept, and the contrast with American ideas, more fully in James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty, 113 YALE L.J. 1151 (2004).
171. This is particularly true with regard to the law of comparative advertising, which has been in considerable flux. In the past, European law generally forbade comparative advertising. This is no longer true, but the law remains quite complex. For France, see RÉGIS FABRE ET AL., DROIT DE LA PUBLICITÉ ET DE LA PROMOTION DES VENTES [LAW OF ADVERTISING AND OF THE PROMOTION OF SALES] 148-51 (2d ed. 2002). For Germany, see KÖHLER & BORNKAMM, supra note 105, at 800-03 (discussing Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb [Statute Against Unfair Competition], July 3, 2004, BGBl. I at 1413, § 6, rdn. 1-5 (F.R.G.)).
172. See Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159 (2003).
173. It is particularly astonishing to see the language of "human dignity" in this context. Germans often claim that their law of "human dignity" grows out of a reaction against the horrors of Auschwitz. But in practice, the everyday German law of human dignity can have remarkably little to do with that terrifying experience. See James Q. Whitman, On Nazi 'Honour' and the New European 'Dignity,' in DARKER LEGACIES OF LAW IN EUROPE: THE SHADOW OF NATIONAL SOCIALISM AND FASCISM OVER EUROPE AND ITS LEGAL TRADITIONS 243-66 (Christian Joerges & Navraj Singh Ghaleigh eds., 2003).
174. For example, the sale of warranties in consumer electronics retailing, see supra note 118 and accompanying text, arguably preys on consumer irrationality in assessing risk, as well as on the absence of a developed secondary market for warranties.
175. Whitman, supra note 136, at 1190-92. My argument there has been challenged. See Jerry Kang & Benedikt Buchner, Privacy in Atlantis, 18 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 229, 258-59 (2004). Kang and Buchner misrepresent my claims. I certainly did not claim, as they imply, that there is no German credit reporting. Quite the contrary. I described it in detail, but focused on the differences in the practices and goals of German regulation.
176. E.g., Marcus Walker, Behind Slow Growth in Europe: Citizens' Tight Grip on Wallets, WALL ST. J., Dec. 10, 2004, at A1 (noting that Western Europeans have 0.27 credit cards per capita, as compared with 2.23 for Americans).
177. Steven Pearlstein, In Europe, One Size Fits None, WASH. POST, Dec. 7, 2005, at D1 (noting that there is no mortgage refinancing in Europe).
178. See, e.g., Gretchen Morgenson, More Home Foreclosures Loom as Owners Face Mortgage Maze, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2007, at A1.
179. See Whitman, supra note 136.
180. See, e.g., Jonathan Gruber & Daniel M. Hungerman, The Church vs. the Mall: What Happens When Religion Faces Increased Secular Competition? 2-4 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 12,410, 2006), available at http://www.usc.edu/schools/college/crcc/private/ierc/ Hungerman.pdf.
181. There are occasionally cases, to be sure, in which zoning authorities are concerned with limiting store hours, for example in order to avoid disruption in residential areas. See, e.g., Gratton v. Pellegrino, 348 A.2d 349, 351 (N.H. 1975). Nevertheless such concerns hardly match the role they play in continental Europe.
182. Gesetz über den Ladenschluß [Act Concerning Store Closing Times], Nov. 28, 1956, BGBl. I at 875 (F.R.G.). Comparable laws, and comparable debates, exist in France, though I will not discuss them. See generally C. TRAV. art. L221. The debate in France has been quite heated at times. See, e.g., Les documents de travail du Sénat [The Report of the French Senate], Les horaires d'ouverture des commerces de détail [Opening Hours of Retail Establishments] (Oct. 2003), available at http://www.senat.fr/lc/lc126/lc126.pdf.
183. Gesetz über den Ladenschluß [Act Concerning Store Closing Times], Nov. 28, 1956, BGBl. I at 875 (F.R.G.).
184. The shifts began in 1996 and continued in 2003. The lengthened hours were first intended to benefit "innovative boutique enterprises" ("innovative Einzelhandelsunternehmen") and were later extended. See DIRK NEUMANN, Commentary to § 3, Ladenschlussgesetz, in LADENSCHLUSSGESETZ: MIT ALLEN WICHTIGEN VERORDNUNGEN AUS BUND UND LÄNDERN [THE STORE CLOSING LAW: WITH IMPORTANT FEDERAL AND STATE REGULATIONS] 11 (4th ed. 2003).
185. Hundley, supra note 12.
186. Guy Raz, Closed on Sunday? Shopkeepers Rebel, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 12, 1999, at 8.
187. Cf. COHEN, supra note 7, at 31-41 (noting that the American focus on women's rights follows upon the rise of consumerism as an alternative to focus on workers' rights).
188. The German debate ignores in particular the possibility that after-hours clerks will be hired not from the ranks of older workers with families but rather from the ranks of entry-level jobseekers.
189. It is worth noting that store-closing laws in both Germany and France have been gradually loosening with the rise of convenience stores operated by minorities from the Maghreb and Turkey. It is possible that Europeans feel less need to protect workers of Maghrebi or Turkish origin.
190. Gesetz über den Ladenschluß [Act Concerning Store Closing Times], Nov. 28, 1956, BGBl. I at 747-48 (F.R.G.).
191. DE GRAZIA, supra note 52, at 130-83; see also Frank K. Upham, Privatized Regulation: Japanese Regulatory Style in Comparative and International Perspective, 20 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 396 (1997) (describing Japanese regulations).
192. France is a noteworthy exception. See sources cited infra note 161.
193. Mark Landler & Michael Barbaro, No, Not Always: Wal-Mart Discovers That Its Formula Doesn't Fit Every Culture, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2006, at C1 (quoting German union official Hans-Martin Poschmann).
194. See Titeuf: L'Arbitre: Mamette la mamie qui forge des bonnes manières! [The Referee: Granny Mamette Teaches Good Manners!], in TCHÔ! 100, LE NUMÉRO MÉGA SPÉCIAL 81 (2007) (cartoon frame showing Titeuf covered with glob lobbed at him by his baby sister, with dialogue line "la concurrence déloyale règne!" ("Unfair competition reigns!")). For the phrase "concurrence déloyale" ("unfair competition"), in competition law, see, for example, Concurrence Déloyale, http://www.lexinter.net/JP/ concurrencedeloyale.htm (last visited Nov. 9, 2007). It is remarkable what you can learn about a foreign culture by living in it with a child - and remarkable how much easier it is to explain French comic books to your nine-year old if you know some French law.
195. The Loi Raffarin of 1996, Law No. 96-603 of July 5, 1996, Journal Officiel de la République Française [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], July 6, 1996, p. 10,199, strikingly not repealed in 2006, requires that all stores of 300 square meters and larger obtain a special administrative authorization to open. Its stated purpose is to "defend" "le petit commerce contre les grands distributeurs" ("small businesses against large distributors"). See, for example, the discussion at Et La Loi Raffarin? [And the Law Raffarin?], http://www.libres.org/francais/actualite/ archives/actualit%E9_1004/raffarin_a6_4404.htm (last visited Nov. 9, 2007).
196. Le Conseil de la concurrence, Avis no 96-A-05 du 2 mai 1996, at 5 (May 2, 1996), http://www.conseil-concurrence.fr/pdf/avis/96a05.pdf.
197. Id. Perhaps we can see the Supreme Court of the United States accepting the same kind of reasoning in its recent decision of Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2714-15 (2007). Here again, the differences that are traced in this Article are relative and not absolute.
198. Georg Kojda, Freigabe von Arzneimitteln für die Selbstmedikation [Permissible Distribution of Medicinal Substances for Self-Medication], APOTHEKEN MAGAZIN [APOTHECARY MAGAZINE], Jan.-Feb. 2002, at 8, available at http://www.uni-duesseldorf.de/kojdapharmalehrbuch/apothekenmagazin/ Fortbildungsartikel/2002-01-02.pdf.
199. C. COM. art. L121-80 (Fr.), available at http://195.83.177.9/code/liste.phtml?lang=uk&c=61&r=2130.
200. This is done through what is called a "contrat de distribution sélective" between the distributor and the retail establishments. See RECUEIL DALLOZ, JURISPRUDENCE 66-70 (1964).
201. E.g., HAROLD JAMES, FAMILY CAPITALISM: WENDELS, HANIELS, FALCKS, AND THE CONTINENTAL EUROPEAN MODEL (2006); Roe, Modern Politics, supra note 27, at 252.
202. See supra Part II.
203. For an example, see the Web site of Lycée des métiers de l'hôtellerie Jean Drouant [Jean Drouant High School of Hotel Services], http://lyc-drouant.scola.ac-paris.fr/1histo.php (last visited Nov. 9, 2007).
204. DVD: L'Affaire Delnatte [The Delnatte Affair] (LA CINQ/VF Productions 1991) (on file with author).
205. 1 WEBER, supra note 32, at 141-42; 2 WEBER, supra note 32, at 932-33.
206. For this worthwhile piece of information about French pharmacies, see La Classification et sa Morphologie [Classification and Morphologie], http://www.universnature. com/dossiers/champignons-1.html (last visited Aug. 31, 2007) ("Au moindre doute, il est préférable, lors de la cueillette, de séparer les champignons douteux des autres et de les montrer à un professionnel (pharmacien ou mycologue professionnel)." ("In case of the slightest doubt it is preferable, at the time of collecting, to separate the doubtful mushrooms from the others and show them to a professional (pharmacist or professional mycologist).")).
207. See Handwerkskammer Münster: Friseurmeister stylen bis in die Spitzen [Artisanal Chamber of Münster: Master Hairdressers Style to the Last Strand], http://www.hwkmuenster. de:80/index.php?id= 60&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=242&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=1&cHash= 3cae673739 (last visited Nov. 9, 2007).
208. For the ensemble of regulations, see Dispositions Législatives et Réglementaires, http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/WAspad/RechercheSarde.jsp (search "fromage" and click "fromage") (last visited Nov. 9, 2007).
209. For the ensemble of regulations, see id. (search "vin" and click "vin").
210. Le Conseil de la concurrence, Avis no 96-A-05 du 2 mai 1996, at 5 (May 2, 1996), http://www.conseil-concurrence.fr/pdf/avis/96a05.pdf.
211. One notable figure is Jean-Pierre Raffarin, who was Minister of Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises in the mid-1990s. See, e.g., Le gouvernement instaure une Journée nationale du pain [The Government Institutes a National Day of Bread], LES ÉCHOS [THE ECHOS], Apr. 24, 1996, at 12.
212. See supra Part II.
213. COHEN, supra note 7, at 31-53.
214. See supra Part III.
215. See supra text accompanying notes 148-157.
216. See Craig S. Smith, French Unrest Reflects Old Faith in Quasi-Socialist Ideals, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2006, at A10.
217. See Richard Bernstein, Political Paralysis: Europe Stalls on Road to Economic Change, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 2006, at A8.
218. Landler & Barbaro, supra note 159.
219. Gabrielle S. Friedman & James Q. Whitman, The European Transformation of Harassment Law: Discrimination Versus Dignity, 9 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 241 (2003).
220. 1 WEBER, supra note 32, at 141-42; 2 WEBER, supra note 32, at 932-33.
221. MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE (1991).
222. Let me emphasize that this claim is made in comparative perspective. Of course I do not mean to make the obviously false claim that there are no protections against firing in American law. I claim only that those protections play a far lesser role in American law than they do in German or French law.
223. COHEN, supra note 7, at 31-53.
224. For an introduction for foreigners settling in Germany, see Lothar von Seltmann, Das deutsches Bildungswesen: Die Sekundarstufe II [The German Educational System: The Secondary School], http://www.derweg.org/deutschland/ bildungswesen/sekundaerstufe2.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2007).
225. MITCHEL DE S.-O.-L'E. LASSER, JUDICIAL DELIBERATIONS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL TRANSPARENCY AND LEGITIMACY 307-11 (2004).
226. Whitman, supra note 136, at 1189-95.
227. My thanks to Rochelle Dreyfuss and Annette Kur for making this observation to me.
228. See my fuller discussion in Whitman, supra note 136, at 1184-85.
229. See Cyrill P. Rigamonti, Deconstructing Moral Rights, 47 HARV. INT'L L.J. 353, 353-54 (2006).
230. Id. at 406; see also id. at 404-11.
231. See, e.g., REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 129 (2004).
232. WERNER SOMBART, WARUM GIBT ES IN DEN VEREINIGTEN STAATEN KEINEN SOZIALISMUS? [WHY IS THERE NO SOCIALISM IN THE UNITED STATES?] (1906).
233. Protectionist agricultural policies in both Europe and the United States recently led to the collapse of the Doha Round of free trade negotiations. See Steven R. Weisman & Alexei Barrionuevo, Failure of Global Trade Talks Is Traced to the Power of Farmers, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2006, at C1.
234. See, e.g., Thomas C. Fischer, Commentary, An American Looks at the European Union, 19 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 1489, 1506 (2005). James Salzman has expressed skepticism to me that the practical differences are all that great.
235. For the U.S./European conflict, see, for example, John Charles Kunich, Mother Frankenstein, Doctor Nature, and the Environmental Law of Genetic Engineering, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 807, 814 (2001).
236. BARRY EICHENGREEN, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMY SINCE 1945: COORDINATED CAPITALISM AND BEYOND 421 (2007).
237. E.g., France's Chance, ECONOMIST, Apr. 14, 2007, at 11.
238. E.g., Louis Uchitelle, Job Security, Too, May Have a Happy Medium, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2007, § 3, at 5.
239. DAVID RICARDO, THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND TAXATION 81-87 (1911).
240. On the success of German luxury cars, but expressing some doubts about their future, see The Big-Car Problem, ECONOMIST, Feb. 24, 2007, at 81.
241. Mark Landler, A Renaissance in Germany: A Tradition of Quality and Strong Brands Leads Export Growth, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2007, at C1.
242. Id.
243. Who Are the Champions?, ECONOMIST, Feb. 10, 2007, at 3.