A Neo-Chicago perspective on the law of product tying

American Business Law Journal

Volumn 44, Issue 3, 2007, Pages 521-570

  Devlin, Alan ^a  

^a TRINITY COLLEGE DUBLIN   (Ireland)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 34547652299     PISSN: 00027766     EISSN: 17441714     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1744-1714.2007.00045.x     Document Type: Article

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