Learning and approximating the optimal strategy to commit to

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

Volumn 5814 LNCS, Issue , 2009, Pages 250-262

  Letchford, Joshua ^a   Conitzer, Vincent ^a   Munagala, Kamesh ^a  

^a Duke University   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

BAYESIAN GAME; OPTIMAL STRATEGIES; PRIOR DISTRIBUTION; STACKELBERG;

COMPUTER SCIENCE; OPTIMIZATION;

GAME THEORY;

EID: 71549163155     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: 16113349     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-04645-2_23     Document Type: Conference Paper

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