Evidence for optimistic and pessimistic behavior in normal-form games

Economics Letters

Volumn 63, Issue 3, 1999, Pages 255-259

  Haruvy, Ernan ^a   Stahl, Dale O ^a   Wilson, Paul W ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0033245289     PISSN: 01651765     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/s0165-1765(99)00028-2     Document Type: Article

References (8)

1. Ben-Akiva M., Lerman S.R. Discrete Choice Analysis. 1985;The MIT Press, Cambridge.
2. Haruvy, E., D. Stahl, and P. Wilson, 1998, Modeling and testing for heterogeneity in observed strategic behavior, mimeo.
3. Stahl D., 1999. Evidence based rule learning in symmetric normal form games. International Journal of Game Theory, in press.
4. Stahl D., Wilson P. Experimental evidence of players' models of other players. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. 25:1994;309-327.
5. Stahl D., Wilson P. On players' models of other players: theory and experimental evidence. Games and Economic Behavior. 10:1995;213-254.
6. Simon H. A behavioral model of rational choice. Quarterly Journal of Economics. 69:1955;99-118.
7. Van Huyck J., Battalio R., Beil R. Tacit coordination games, strategic uncertainty, and coordination failure. American Economic Review. 80:1990;234-248.
8. Van Huyck J., Battalio R., Beil R. Strategic uncertainty, equilibrium selection principles, and coordination failures in average opinion games. Quarterly Journal of Economics. 106:1991;885-911.