Iterated regret minimization: A new solution concept

IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence

Volumn , Issue , 2009, Pages 153-158

  Halpern, Joseph Y ^a   Pass, Rafael ^a  

^a Cornell University ^*  (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE;

BERTRAND COMPETITION; CENTIPEDE GAMES; GAME-THEORETIC; NASH BARGAINING; NASH EQUILIBRIA; QUALITATIVE BEHAVIOR; REGRET MINIMIZATION; SOLUTION CONCEPTS;

GAME THEORY;

EID: 77954091074     PISSN: 10450823     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

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