Truth -- Meaning -- Reality

Truth -- Meaning -- Reality

Volumn , Issue , 2010, Pages 1-352

  Horwich, Paul ^a  

^a NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Deflationism; Knowledge; Language; Meaning; Reality; Truth

Indexed keywords

EID: 77957806720     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199268900.001.0001     Document Type: Book

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