Epistemology without metaphysics

Philosophical Studies

Volumn 143, Issue 2, 2009, Pages 249-290

  Field, Hartry ^a  

^a NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Epistemic realism; Expressivism; Justification; Norms; Relativism; Truth

Indexed keywords

EID: 62749186283     PISSN: 00318116     EISSN: 15730883     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11098-009-9338-1     Document Type: Article

References (30)

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