From a Deflationary Point of View

From a Deflationary Point of View

Volumn , Issue , 2005, Pages 1-184

  Horwich, Paul ^a  

^a CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK   (United States)

Author keywords

Deflationary perspective; Meaning; Ought; Paul Horwich; Philosophy; Rationality; Realism; Scientific reasoning; Truth; Wittgenstein

Indexed keywords

EID: 79958372420     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/0199251266.001.0001     Document Type: Book

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