Reflections on Meaning

Reflections on Meaning

Volumn , Issue , 2006, Pages 1-248

  Horwich, Paul ^a  

^a CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK   (United States)

Author keywords

Chomsky; Kripke; Language; Meaning; Quine; Thought; True; Use; Vagueness; Wittgenstein

Indexed keywords

EID: 84921940308     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/019925124X.001.0001     Document Type: Book

References (141)

1. Blackburn, S. (1984). 'The Individual Strikes Back', Synthese 58: 281-301.
2. Blackburn, S. (1986). 'Advertisment for a Semantics for Psychology', Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10, edited by P. French, T. Uehling, and H. Wettstein (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press).
3. Block, N. (1994-1995). 'An Argument for Holism', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 95: 151-69.
4. Boghossian, P. (1989). 'The Rule Following Considerations', Mind XCVIII (392): 507-50.
5. Boghossian, P. (1996). 'Analyticity Reconsidered', Nous 30: 3.
6. Boghossian, P. (1997). 'Analyticity', in A Companion to the Philosophy of Language, edited by R. Hale and C. Wright (Oxford: Blackwell).
7. Boghossian, P. (2003). 'The Normativity of Content', Philosophical Issues, 13:1 (October) 33-45.
8. Boghossian, P. (2003a). 'How Are Objective Epistemic Reasons Possible', Philosophical Studies 106.
9. Boghossian, P. (2003b). 'Blind Reasoning', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, suppl. vol. 77, Issue 1, 225-48.
10. Brandom, R. (1994). Making It Explicit (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press).
11. Brandom, R. (1996). 'The Significance of Complex Numbers for Frege's Philosophy of Mathematics', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 293-315.
12. Brandom, R. (2000). Articulating Reasons, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.
13. Burge, T. (1979). 'Individualism and the Mental', Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4: 73-121.
14. Carey, S. (2006). The Origin of Concepts (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press).
15. Carey, S. and Spelke, E. S. (1994). 'Domain Specific Knowledge and Conceptual Change', in L. Hirschfeld and S. Gelman (eds.), Mapping the Mind: Domain Specificity in Cognition and Culture (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 169-200.
16. Carnap, R. (1928). Der Logische Aufbau der Welt (Berlin: Schlachtensee Weltkreis-Verlag).
17. Chalmers, D. (2002). 'The Components of Content' in D. Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
18. Chomsky, N. (1975). 'Quine's Empirical Assumptions', in Davidson and Hintikka (eds.), Words and Objections, Kluwer.
19. Chomsky, N. (1986). Knowledge of Language (New York: Praeger).
20. Chomsky, N. (1987). 'Reply to Review Discussion of Knowledge of Language', Mind and Language 2: 178-97.
21. Chomsky, N. (1990). 'On the Nature, Use and Acquisition of Language', W. Lycan (ed.), Mind and Cognition: A Reader, 627-46 (Oxford: Blackwell).
22. Chomsky, N. (1993). Language and Thought (Wakefield, R.I.: Moyer Bell).
23. Chomsky, N. (1999). 'Internalist Explorations', Festschrift for Burge, M. Hahn and B. Ramberg (eds.) (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press).
24. Chomsky, N. (2000). New Horizons in the Study of Language and Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
25. Crane, T. (1991). 'All the Difference in the World', Philosophical Quarterly 41: 1-25.
26. Crimmins, M., and Perry, J. (1989). 'The Prince and the Phone Booth: Reporting Puzzling Beliefs'. Journal of Philosophy 86: 685-711.
27. Davidson, D. (1967). 'Truth and Meaning', Synthese 17: 304-23.
28. Davidson, D. (1984). Truth and Interpretation (Oxford: Clarendon Press).
29. Devitt, M. (1996). Coming To Our Senses (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
30. Devitt, M. (2002). 'Meaning and Use', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LXV:1 (July) 106-21.
31. Devitt, M. and Sterelny, K. (1987). Language and Reality: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Language (Oxford: Basil Blackwell).
32. Donnellan, K. (1989). 'Belief and the Identity of Reference', in French, Uehling, and Wettstein (eds.), Midwest Studies in Philosophy 13, Contemporary Perspectives in the Philosophy of Language II (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press), 275-88.
33. Dretske, F. (1981). Knowledge and the Flow of Information (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press).
34. Dretske, F. (1986).'Misrepresentation', in Radu Bogan (ed.), Belief: Form, Context, and Function (New York: Oxford University Press).
35. Dummett, M. (1958). 'Truth', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society n.s. 59: 141-62.
36. Dummett, M. (1973). Frege: Philosophy of Language (London: Duckworth).
37. Dummett, M. (1978). Truth and Other Enigmas (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press).
38. Dummett, M. (1991). The Logical Basis of Metaphysics (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press).
39. Evans, G. (1973). 'The Causal Theory of Names', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, suppl. vol. 47: 187-208.
40. Field, H. (1973). 'Theory Change and the Indeterminacy of Reference', repr. in his Truth and the Absence of Fact (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
41. Field, H. (1977). 'Logic, Meaning and Conceptual Role', Journal of Philosophy 69: 379-409.
42. Field, H. (1981). 'Some Thoughts on Radical Indeterminacy', The Monist 81: 253-73.
43. Field, H. (2000). 'Indeterminacy, Degree of Belief, and Excluded Middle', Nous 34: 1-30.
44. Field, H. (2001). 'Meaning Attributions' in his Truth and the Absence of Fact.
45. Field, H. (2003). 'No Fact of the Matter', American Journal of Philosophy, December.
46. Fine, K. (1975). 'Vagueness, Truth, and Logic', Synthese 30: 265-300.
47. Fodor, J. (1975). The Language of Thought (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co.).
48. Fodor, J. (1982). 'Cognitive Science and the Twin-Earth Problem'. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 23: 98-118.
49. Fodor, J. (1987). Psychosemantics (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press).
50. Fodor, J. (2001). 'Language, Thought, and Compositionality', Mind and Language, 1-15.
51. Fodor, J. and Lepore, E. (1991). 'Why Meaning (Probably) Isn't Conceptual Role', Mind and Language 6: 4, 329-43.
52. Fodor, J. (1991). Holism (Oxford: Blackwell).
53. Fodor, J. (1996). 'The Pet Fish and The Red Herring: Why Concepts Arn't Prototypes', Cognition 58(2): 243-76.
54. Fodor, J. (2002). The Compositionality Papers (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
55. Frege, G. (1952). 'Concept and Object', Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege, P. Geach and M. Black (eds.), (Oxford: Blackwell) 42-55.
56. Frege, G. (1952). 'Function and Concept', Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege, 21-41.
57. Frege, G. (1952). 'On Sense and Reference', Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege, 56-78.
58. Gibbard, A. (1994). 'Meaning and Normativity', Philosophical Issues 5: Truth and Rationality, edited by E. Villanueva (Ascadero, Calif.: Ridgeview Publishing Company), 95-115.
59. Gibbard, A. (2002). 'Horwich on Meaning', unpublished manuscript.
60. Grice, P. (1957). 'Meaning', Philosophical Review 66: 377-88.
61. Grice, P. (1969). 'Utterer's Meaning and Intention', Philosophical Review 78.
62. Grice, P. (1989). Studies in the Way of Words (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press).
63. Gupta, A. (2003). 'Deflationism, the Problem of Representation, and Horwich's Use Theory of Meaning', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 67 (November) 654-66.
64. Hale, R. (1996/1967). 'Grundlagen $64', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society.
65. Hale, R. and Wright, C. (2000). 'Implicit Definition and the A priori', in P. Boghossian and C. Peacocke (eds.), New Essays on the A Priori (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
66. Harman, G. (1982). 'Conceptual Role Semantics'. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 28: 252-6.
67. Harman, G. (1987). '(Non-solipsistic) Conceptual Role Semantics', in E. Lepore (ed.), New Directions in Semantics (London: Academic Press).
68. Harman, G. (1993). 'Meaning Holism Defended' in Fodor and Lepore 1993a. Holism: A Consumer Update. Grazer Philosophische Studien 46 (Amsterdam: Rodopi, B.V., 163-71).
69. Higginbotham, J. (1999). 'A Perspective on Truth and Meaning', in The Philosophy of Donald Davidson, edited by Lewis Hahn (La Salle, Illinois: Open Court).
70. Horwich, P. G. (1995). 'Meaning, Use and Truth', Mind 104.414: 335-68.
71. Horwich, P. G. (1997a). 'Implicit Definition, Analytic Truth and Apriori Knowledge', Nous 31: 423-40.
72. Horwich, P. G. (1997b). 'The Composition of Meanings', Philosophical Review 106: 503-31
73. Horwich, P. G. (1997c). 'The Nature of Vagueness', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LVII: 4.
74. Horwich, P. G. (1998a). Meaning (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
75. Horwich, P. G. (1998b). Truth, 2nd edn. (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
76. Horwich, P. G. (1998c). 'Concept Constitution', Philosophical Issues 9, edited by E. Villanueva (Atascadero, Calif.: Ridgeview Publishing Company).
77. Horwich, P. G. (2000a). 'Stipulation, Meaning, and Apriority' in P. Boghossian and C. Peacocke (eds.), New Essays on the A Priori (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
78. Horwich, P. G. (2000b). 'Stephen Schiffer's Theory of Vagueness', Philosophical Issues, 10: Skepticism.
79. Horwich, P. G. (2006). 'The Value of Truth', Nous.
80. Jackson, F., and Pettit, P. (1993). 'Some Content is Narrow', in J. Heil and A. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
81. Jacob, P. (1997). What Minds Can Do (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
82. Katz, J. J. (2004). Sense, Reference, and Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
83. Kripke, S. (1980). Naming and Necessity (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press).
84. Kripke, S. (1982). Wittgenstein: On Rules and Private Language (Oxford: Blackwell).
85. Lance, M., and Hawthorne, J. (1997). The Grammar of Meaning: Normativity and Semantic Content (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
86. Larson, R., and Segal, G. (1995). Knowledge of Meaning (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press).
87. Lewis, D. (1970). 'How to Define Theoretical Terms', Journal of Philosophy, LVII: 427-66.
88. Loewer, B. (1993). 'The Value of Truth', in E. Villanueva (ed.), Philosophical Issues 4 (Atascadero, Calif.: Ridgeview Publishing Company).
89. Loewer, B. (1997). 'A Guide to Naturalizing Semantics', in B. Hale and C. Wright (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Language (Oxford: Blackwell).
90. Lycan, W. (1990). 'On Respecting Puzzles about Belief Ascriptions [A Reply to Devitt]', Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 71: 182-8.
91. McDowell, J. (1984). 'Wittgenstein on Following a Rule', Synthese 58(3): 325-63.
92. McDowell, J. (1994). Mind and World (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press).
93. McGinn, C. (1984). Wittgenstein on Meaning (Oxford: Blackwell).
94. Millikan, R. (1984). Language, Thought and Other Biological Categories (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press).
95. Montague, R. (1974). Formal Philosophy: Selected Papers of Richard Montague, edited and with an introduction by Richmond Thomason (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press).
96. Neale, S. (2003). Descriptions, 2nd edn. (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
97. Neale, S. (2004). 'This, That, and the Other', Anne Bezuidenhout and Marga Reimer (eds.), Descriptions and Beyond (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
98. Neander, K. (1995). 'Misrepresenting and Malfunctioning', Philosophical Studies 79: 109-41.
99. Papineau, D. (1987). Reality and Representation (Oxford: Blackwell).
100. Peacocke, C. (1992). A Study of Concepts (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press).
101. Peacocke, C. (1993). 'How Are A Priori Truths Possible?', European Journal of Philosophy, August.
102. Prior, A. (1960). 'The Runabout Inference Ticket', Analysis 21: 38-9.
103. Putnam, H. (1975). 'The Meaning of "Meaning" ', in his Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
104. Putnam, H. (1995a). 'On Truth' in his Words and Life, edited by J. Conant (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press).
105. Putnam, H.Putnam, H. (1995b). 'Does The Disquotational Theory of Truth Solve All Philosophical Problems?' in his Words and Life.
106. Quine, W. V. (1953). 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism', in his From a Logical Point of View (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press).
107. Quine, W. V. (1962). Word and Object (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press).
108. Quine, W. V. (1990). Pursuit of Truth (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press).
109. Ramsey, F. P. (1929). 'Theories'; repr. in his Foundations, ed. H. D. Mellor (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978).
110. Recanati, F. (2004). Literal Meaning (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
111. Rumfitt, I. (2000). 'Yes and No', Mind, vol. 109. 436.
112. Russell, B. (1927). The Analysis of Matter (London: Allen & Unwin).
113. Sainsbury, M. (2002). 'Two Ways to Smoke a Cigarette', Meaning and Representation, edited by E. Borg (Oxford: Blackwell).
114. Salmon, N. (1981). Reference and Essence (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press).
115. Salmon, N. (1986). Frege's Puzzle (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press).
116. Schiffer, S. (1972). Meaning (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
117. Schiffer, S. (1987). Remnants of Meaning (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press).
118. Schiffer, S. (2000a). 'Vagueness and Partial Belief', Philosophical Issues, 10: Skepticism, 220-57.
119. Schiffer, S. (2000b). 'Horwich on Meaning: Critical Study of Paul Horwich's Meaning', Philosophical Quarterly 50: 527-36.
120. Schiffer, S. (2002). 'A Normative Theory of Meaning', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65: 187-93.
121. Schiffer, S. (2003). The Things We Mean (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
122. Schlick, M. (1959). 'Positivism and Realism' in A.J. Ayer, Logical Positivism (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press).
123. Segal, G. (2000). A Slim Book about Narrow Content (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press).
124. Sellars, W. (1969). 'Language as Thought and as Communication', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 29: 506-27.
125. Smith, N., and Tsimpli, I. (1993). The Mind of a Savant (Oxford: Blackwell).
126. Spelke, E. S. (2003). 'What Makes Us Smart? Core Knowledge and Natural Language' in Language in Mind, edited by Dedre Gentner and Susan Goldin-Meadow (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press).
127. Sperber, D., and Wilson, D. (1995). Relevance (Oxford: Blackwell).
128. Stampe, D. W. (1977). 'Toward a Causal Theory of Linguistic Representation', Midwest Studies In Philosophy 2. edited by P. French, T. Uehling, and H. Wettstein (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press), 42-63.
129. Travis, C. (2001). Unshadowed Thought (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press).
130. Unger, P. (1979). 'There Are no Ordinary Things', Synthese, 117-54.
131. White, S. (1991). 'Narrow Content and Narrow Interpretation', in S. White (ed.), The Unity of the Self (Bradford: MIT Press).
132. Williams, B. (1996). 'Truth in Ethics', Ratio 8: 227-42 (special issue, Truth in Ethics, ed. B. Hooker).
133. Williamson, T. (1994). Vagueness (London: Routledge).
134. Williamson, T. (1997). 'Reply to Commentators', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LVII: 4.
135. Wittgenstein, L. (1953). Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
136. Wright, C. (1980). Frege's Conception of Numbers as Objects (Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press).
137. Wright, C. (1984). 'Kripke's Account of the Argument against Private Language', Journal of Philosophy, 759-78.
138. Wright, C. (1986). Realism, Meaning, and Truth (Oxford: Blackwell).
139. Wright, C. (1992). Truth and Objectivity (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press).
140. Wright, C. (1996). 'The Epistemic Conception of Vagueness', Southern Journal of Philosophy, suppl. vol. 33: 133-59.
141. Wright, C. (2002). Rails to Infinity (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press).