Offence-defence theory: Towards a definitive understanding

Chinese Journal of International Politics

Volumn 3, Issue 2, 2010, Pages 213-260

  Shiping, Tang ^a,b  

^a FUDAN UNIVERSITY   (China)

^b NANYANG TECHNOLOGICAL UNIVERSITY   (Singapore)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 77957281281     PISSN: 17508916     EISSN: 17508924     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/cjip/poq004     Document Type: Article

References (499)

1. George H. Quester, Offense and Defense in the International System (New York, N.Y.: John Wiley and Sons, 1977).
2. Robert Jervis "Cooperation under the security dilemma," World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2 (1978), pp. 167-214.
3. Jack Snyder, "Civil-Military Relations and the Cult of the Offensive, 1914 and 1984," International Security, Vol. 9, No. 1 (1984), pp. 108-146.
4. Stephen Van Evera, "The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War," International Security, Vol. 9, No. 1 (1984), pp. 58-107.
5. Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1999).
6. Charles L. Glaser and Chaim Kaufmann, "What Is the Offense-Defense Balance and How Can We Measure It?" International Security, Vol. 22, No. 4 (1998), pp. 44-82.
7. In this article, ODT means orthodox or standard ODT (defined in section 1 below). In the literature, the works of Jervis, Quester, and Van Evera are usually accepted as the foundational works of orthodox ODT.
8. See, for example, Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, 'Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity', International Organization, Vol. 44, No. 2 (1990), pp. 137-68.
9. James D. Fearon, 'Rationalist Explanations for War', International Organization, Vol. 49, No. 3 (1995), pp. 401-404.
10. Robert Gilpin, War and Changes in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 59-63.
11. Charles L. Glaser, 'Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-help', International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (1994), pp. 50-90.
12. Charles L. Glaser, 'When Are Arms Races Dangerous?' International Security, Vol. 28, No. 4 (2004), pp. 44-84.
13. Ted Hopf, 'Polarity, The Offense Defense Balance, and War', American Political Science Review, Vol. 85, No. 2 (1991), pp. 475-493.
14. Andrew Kydd, Trust and Mistrust in International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), pp. 31-33.
15. Peter Liberman, 'The Offense-defense Balance, Interdependence, and War', Security Studies, Vol. 9, No. 1 & 2, 1999-2000, pp. 59-91.
16. Evan Braden Montgomery, 'Breaking out of the Security Dilemma: Realism, Reassurance, and the Problem of Uncertainty', International Security, Vol. 31, No. 2 (2006), pp. 151-185.
17. Barry Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrines: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984).
18. Barry Posen, 'The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict', Survival, Vol. 35, No. 1 (1993), pp. 27-47.
19. Robert Powell, 'Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory', American Political Science Review, Vol. 85, No. 4 (1991), pp. 1303-1320.
20. William Rose, 'The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict: Some New Hypotheses', Security Studies, Vol. 9, No. 4 (2000), pp. 1-51.
21. Shiping Tang 'A Systemic Theory of the Security Environment', Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 27, No. 1 (2004), pp. 1-32.
22. For more complete lists of the works that rely on ODT, see Karen Ruth Adams, 'Attack and Conquer? International Anarchy and the Offense-Defense-Deterrence Balance', International Security, Vol. 28, No. 3 (2003/4), pp. 45-83; at pp. 45-7, footnotes 1-9.
23. Kier A. Lieber, War and the Engineers: The Primacy of Politics over Technology (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005), chapter 1.
24. Jeffery W. Taliaferro, 'Security Seeking under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited', International Security, Vol. 25, No. 3 (2000/01), pp. 128-161, at p. 135.
25. Kier A. Lieber, War and the Engineers, pp. 8-11.
26. Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin, 'The Promise of Institutionalist Theory', International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (1995), pp. 39-51, at p. 44.
27. Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 357-363.
28. Stephen Van Evera, however, still complains that ODT remains underappreciated.
29. Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War, p. 117.
30. This might be true among decision-makers, and for good reason (see below)
31. See, for example, Colin S. Gray, Weapons Don't Make War: Politics, Strategy, and Military Technology (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1993), esp. chapters 1-2.
32. Samuel P. Huntington, 'U.S. Defense Strategy: The Strategic Innovations of the Reagan Years', in Joseph Kruzel, ed., American Defense Annual, 1987-1988 (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1987), pp. 23-43, at pp. 35-7.
33. Jack S. Levy 'The Offensive/Defensive Balance of Military Technology: A Theoretical and Historical Analysis', International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 28, No. 2 (1984), pp. 219-38.
34. John Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), pp. 29-30.
35. Jonathan Shimshoni, 'Technology, Military Advantage, and World War I: A Case for Military Entrepreneurship', International Security, Vol. 15, No. 3 (1990/91), pp. 187-215.
36. For a recent feminist whack at ODT, see Lauren Wilcox, 'Gendering the Cult of the Offensive', Security Studies, Vol. 18, No. 2 (2009), pp. 214-40.
37. Richard K. Betts, 'Must War Find a Way? A Review Essay', International Security, Vol. 24, No. 2 (1999), pp. 166-198.
38. James W. Davis, Jr., 'Taking Offense at Offense-Defense Theory', International Security, Vol. 23, No. 3 (1998/99), pp. 179-182.
39. Bernard I. Finel, 'Taking Offense at Offense-Defense Theory', International Security, Vol. 23, No. 3, 1998/ 99, pp. 182-189.
40. James D. Fearon, 'The Offense-Defense Balance and War Since 1648', unpublished conference paper (Stanford University, 1997), accessed Oct. 2006.
41. Stacie E. Goddard, 'Taking Offense at Offense-Defense Theory', International Security, Vol. 23, No. 3 (1998/99), pp. 189-195.
42. Kier A. Lieber, 'Grasping the Technological Peace: The Offense-Defense Balance and International Security', International Security, Vol. 25, No. 1 (2000), pp. 71-104.
43. Kier A. Lieber, War and the Engineers.
44. Charles L. Glaser and Chaim Kaufmann, 'Correspondence: Taking Offense at Offense-Defense Theory', International Security, Vol. 23, No. 3 (1998/99), pp. 200-6.
45. Sean M. Lynn-Jones, 'Offense-Defense Theory and Its Critics', Security Studies, Vol. 4, No. 4 (1995), pp. 672-4.
46. Stephen Van Evera 'Correspondence: Taking Offense at Offense-defense Theory', International Security, Vol. 23, No. 3 (1998/99), pp. 195-200.
47. Stephen Van Evera claims that ODT is a 'master theory' and 'the most powerful and useful Realist theory on the causes of war'.
48. Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War, p. 117; emphasis added.
49. Karen Adams, 'Attack and Conquer?'; Stephen Biddle, 'Rebuilding the Foundation of Offense-Defense Theory', Journal of Politics, Vol. 63, No. 3 (2001), pp. 741-74.
50. Yoav Gortzak, Yoram Z. Hazfel, and Kevin Sweeney, 'Offense-Defense Theory: An Empirical Assessment', Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 49, No. 1 (2005), pp. 67-89.
51. Kier A. Lieber, 'Grasping the Technological Peace: The Offense-Defense Balance and International Security', International Security, Vol. 25, No. 1 (2000), pp. 71-104.
52. Kier A. Lieber, War and the Engineers. Biddle's work is both a critique of orthodox ODB and an attempt to offer an unorthodox formulation of ODB. I do not deal in depth here with unorthodox ODB.
53. For a summary of more recent debate on ODT, see Sean Lynn-Jones 'Does Offense-Defense Theory Have a Future?' http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/lys03/lys03.pdf (accessed on July 4, 2008).
54. The other critical component is geography. Ignoring it, however, does not jeopardize the arguments below.
55. For earlier discussions, see Charles Glaser, 'Realists ad Optimists'.
56. Andrew Kydd, Trust and Mistrust in International Relations.
57. Evan Montgomery, 'Breaking out of the Security Dilemma'.
58. Karen Adams, 'Attack and Conquer?' p. 46, footnote 5.
59. See for example, Karen Adams, 'Attack and Conquer'.
60. Yoav Gortzak et al., 'Offense-Defense Theory', pp. 67-9.
61. Kier Lieber, 'Grasping the Technological Peace', pp. 71-2.
62. Kier Lieber War and the Engineers, pp. 1-2.
63. Stephen Biddle, 'Rebuilding the Foundation', pp. 744-6.
64. Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War, 117, footnote 1.
65. Sean Lynn-Jones, 'Offense-Defense Theory'; 672-7.
66. Sean Lynn-Jones, 'Does Offense-Defense Theory Have a Future?' p. 8.
67. Charles Glaser and Chaim Kaufmann, 'What is Offense-Defense Balance and How Can We Measure It?' pp. 79-80.
68. Another divergent point is whether ODT is equivalent to the security dilemma theory. I address this point in section 'Implications'.
69. Glaser and Kaufmann, and Lynn-Jones came close to the definition advanced here.
70. See, Charles Glaser and Chaim Kaufmann, 'What Is the Offense-Defense Balance and How Can We Measure It?' pp. 47-48.
71. Sean Lynn-Jones, 'Offense-Defense Theory', pp. 665.
72. Sean Lynn-Jones, 'Does Offense-Defense Theory Have a Future?' p. 15, footnote 31.
73. The foundation of these two propositions, of course, came from Robert Jervis, 'Cooperation under the Security Dilemma', pp. 187-214.
74. I understand that 'level of analysis' in IR is often linked with Waltz's scheme. I retain this label because I have not been able to find one more suitable.
75. Plus, Waltz does not own 'level of analysis'. See, Kenneth A. Waltz, Man, the State, and War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959).
76. Douglas Porch, 'Military 'Culture' and the Fall of France in 1940', pp. 168-9.
77. Barry Posen, Sources of Military Doctrine, p. 7.
78. Jonathan Shimshoni, 'Technology, Military Advantage, and World War I', pp. 187-8.
79. Huntington develops a scheme that includes only four concepts (two each for each dimension): weapons and weapon technologies, military capabilities, military strategy, and political goals His 'political goals' is roughly equivalent to grand strategy here
80. Samuel Huntington, 'U.S. Defense Strategy', pp. 35-7.
81. I thank Taylor Fravel for this formulation
82. Samuel Huntington, 'U.S. Defense Strategy', p. 36.
83. Obviously, a state's military capability is not a purely technological outcome (see below)
84. John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton, 2001), chapter 4.
85. For realists, power is mostly material and it is material power that ultimately decides outcomes in international politics. But see section 'The Objective ODB'.
86. Douglas Porch, 'Military 'Culture' and the Fall of France in 1940: A Review Essay', International Security, Vol. 24, No. 4 (2000), pp. 157-80, at p. 179.
87. Jervis's military stance is close to military posture here. Robert Jervis, 'Cooperation under the Security Dilemma', p. 199.
88. Douglas Porch, 'Military 'Culture' and the Fall of France in 1940', p. 168.
89. Porch, however, denies that doctrine per se can be differentiated into offensive or defensive. My definition of military doctrine is close to the examples of military doctrines given by Posen.
90. See Barry Posen, Sources of Military Doctrine, pp. 14-15.
91. Glenn H. Snyder, Deterrence and Defense: Toward a Theory of National Security (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1961).
92. See also Barry Posen, Sources of Military Doctrine, pp. 7, 14-15.
93. Charles L. Glaser, 'Political Consequences of Military Strategy: Expanding and Refining the Spiral and Deterrence Models', World Politics, Vol. 44, No. 2 (1992), pp. 497-538.
94. Glaser seems to take military policy to mean both military posture and military strategy
95. See, for example, Barry Posen, Sources of Military Doctrines, p. 13.
96. Douglas Porch, 'Military Culture and the Fall of France in 1940', p. 168.
97. Robert J. Art, 'A Defensible Defense: America's Grand Strategy after the Cold War', International Security, Vol. 15, No. 4 (1991), pp. 5-53, at pp. 6-7.
98. Stephen Biddle, 'Rebuilding the Foundation of Offense-Defense Theory', p. 747, footnote 8.
99. Glaser and Kaufmann list three levels: strategic, operational, and tactical. See, Charles Glaser and Chaim Kaufmann, 'What is Offense-Defense Balance', pp. 54-5. I believe that Biddle's scheme is more fine-grained and sound.
100. Colin Gray, Weapons Don't Make War, p. 28; emphasis added.
101. Samuel Huntington, 'U.S. Defense Strategy', p. 37.
102. Elizabeth Kier, Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrines between the Wars (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996).
103. Douglas Porch, 'Military Culture and the Fall of France in 1940', pp. 168-9.
104. Barry Posen, Sources of Military Doctrine, p. 7. Posen provides several examples in pp. 14-15.
105. Jack Snyder, 'Limiting Offensive Conventional Forces: Soviet Proposals and Western Options', International Security, Vol. 12, No. 4 (1988), pp. 48-77.
106. Jonathan Shimshoni, 'Technology, Military Advantage, and World War I', p. 188, footnote 3.
107. For example, viewed in isolation, fortification and surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) are almost purely defensive whereas aircraft carriers are almost purely offensive
108. Robert Jervis, 'Cooperation under the Security Dilemma', p. 202.
109. Jack Levy, 'The Offensive/Defensive Balance of Military Technology', pp. 225-7.
110. Richard Betts, 'Must War Find a Way?' pp. 185-186.
111. Samuel Huntington, 'U.S. Defense Strategy', p. 36.
112. Sean Lynn-Jones, 'Offense-Defense Theory and Its Critics', pp. 674-7.
113. Jack Levy, 'Offensive/Defensive Balance of Military Technology', pp. 225-7.
114. States of course deploy different arsenals for different military operations. An arsenal for an offensive campaign and strategies will necessarily be different from an arsenal for defensive campaign and strategies. But this does not mean that individual weapons can be differentiated.
115. Robert Jervis, 'Cooperation under the Security Dilemma', pp. 202-3.
116. George Quester, Offense and Defense in the International System, p. 63.
117. The fundamental cause behind this difficulty of differentiating weapons has been evolution. Before our ancestors came to confront each other, they had to confront many powerful non-human predators. As such, our ancestors must accumulate some capabilities of killing even if they merely want to defend in order to survive. Thus, weapons, from its very beginning as tools of the early humans, have always been of the dual purposes of killing and avoiding being killed. Human beings' carnivorous nature adds another impetus for developing the skill to kill.
118. Robert O'Connell, Of Arms and Man: A History of War, Weapons, and Aggression (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 20-2.
119. Robert Jervis, 'Cooperation under the Security Dilemma', pp. 199-206.
120. David Goldfischer, The Best Defense: Policy Alternatives for US Nuclear Security from the 1950s to the 1990s (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), chapter 2.
121. Stephen Van Evera 'Correspondence: Taking Offense at Offense-defense Theory', pp. 195-6.
122. Charles Glaser, 'Political Consequences of Military Strategy'.
123. Charles Glaser, 'Realists as Optimists'.
124. Charles Glaser, 'When Are Arms Races Dangerous?'.
125. George Quester, Offense and Defense. Quester reiterates this notion in his new introduction to the new edition of his book.
126. George Quester, 'Introduction', in Offense and Defense in International System, pp. x-xv.
127. Stephen Biddle, 'Rebuilding the Foundation of Offense-Defense Theory', p. 769.
128. Robert Jervis 'Cooperation under the Security Dilemma', pp. 201-3.
129. Even if states state their military strategy, security strategy, and grand strategies in white papers, they never say that their strategies are offensive or aggressive. Although differentiation can be achieved at all four levels of the strategic component, the higher the level of a component, the more secretive it tends to be. By comparison, military postures-or at least certain components of a state's military posture (e.g. forward or non-forward troop deployment) can be easily observed or more readily spied upon than say, grand strategies and military strategies.
130. Barry Posen, Source of Military Doctrines, p. 16.
131. When the ultimate utility of differentiation is for gauging another state's intention or differentiating a malign state from a benign state (see below), military postures should be the correct focus of differentiation
132. For example, based on open sources, M. Taylor Fravel is able to conclude that China's military posture is largely defensive.
133. Taylor Fravel, 'Securing Borders: China's Doctrine and Force Structure for Frontier Defense', Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 30, No. 4/5 (2007), pp. 705-37.
134. The fact that military postures can only be differentiated relatively also means that differentiation is an essentially dyadic variable
135. Sean Lynn-Jones, 'Offense-Defense Theory and Its Critics', pp. 672-6, footnotes 27, 35, 41 and 44.
136. John Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence, pp. 25-7.
137. John Mearsheimer, Liddell Hart and the Weight of History (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), p. 36, 44, and 61.
138. John Mearsheimer, 'Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War', International Security, Vol. 15, No. 1 (1990), pp. 5-56, at p. 13, footnote 14.
139. Mearsheimer explicitly states that differentiation is only relevant at the nuclear level (see below)
140. Colin Gray, Weapons Don't Make War.
141. Samuel Huntington, 'U.S. Defense Strategy', pp. 36-7; emphasis added.
142. Kier Lieber, War and the Engineers, pp. 34-44.
143. Robert Jervis, 'Cooperation under the Security Dilemma', p. 201.
144. Defensive realists, of course, have long argued that military doctrines and other strategic components of a state's military can be differentiated into offensive and defensive types
145. Charles Glaser 1992.
146. Robert Jervis 1978.
147. Barry Posen 1984, pp. 13-15.
148. Samuel Huntington, 'U.S. Defense Strategy', pp. 35-7.
149. David Goldfischer, The Best Defense, p. 31.
150. Certain proponents of ODB have argued that differentiation is not necessary for measuring ODT. For my discussion on this point, see footnote 13 above.
151. I develop reassurance as a defensive realism theory of cooperation-building in Shiping Tang, A Theory of Security Strategy for Our Time: Defensive Realism (New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2010), chap. 5.
152. Signals, whether for resolve or for benign intentions, must be somewhat costly and carry some risk in order to convey true intentions or be considered as credible
153. Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966).
154. James Fearon, 'Signaling versus the Balance of Power and Interest', Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 38, No. 2 (1994), pp. 236-69.
155. Andrew Kydd, Trust and Mistrust in International Relations.
156. Shiping Tang, A Theory of Security Strategy, Chapter 5.
157. Shiping Tang, 'Fear in International Politics: Two Positions', International Studies Review, Vol. 10, No. 3 (2008), 451-70.
158. John Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics, pp. 32-6.
159. While many offensive realists have been less than explicit in their motives for denying the possibility of differentiation (David Goldfischer 1993, pp. 16, 22, 26-32), at least one of them-John Mearsheimer-has been explicit on this point.
160. John J. Mearsheimer, 'Interview', International Relations, Vol. 20, No. 1 (2006), pp. 123, 231-4.
161. Interestingly, Colin Gray, another offensive realist and a prominent critic of ODT, has not only explicitly argued that military postures and policies can be differentiated, but that defensive postures and policies can reassure other states (i.e. 'dampen foreign anxieties') and reduce the chance of inadvertent war (Colin Gray, Weapons Don't Make War (1993), p. 22).
162. Interestingly, some scholars who may be closer to defensive realism engage in this activity. See, for example, David M. Edelstein, 'Managing Uncertainty: Beliefs about Intentions and the Rise of Great Powers', Security Studies, Vol. 12, No. 1 (2002), pp. 38-40.
163. Kier Lieber, War and the Engineers, p. 5.
164. Evan Montgomery, 'Breaking out of the Security Dilemma', p. 153.
165. Robert Jervis, 'Cooperation under the Security Dilemma'.
166. Charles Glaser, 'Realists as Optimists'.
167. Evan Montgomery, 'Breaking out of the Security Dilemma'.
168. Andrew Kydd, Trust and Mistrust in International Relations, p. 183.
169. John Mearsheimer, 'Interview', pp. 123; 231-4.
170. Offensive realists have also waged another assault on the possibility of cooperation under anarchy, arguing that cooperation is difficult to achieve and sustain because of states' concern about relative gains from cooperation. I skip this issue because it is not directly relevant to the discussion here. Moreover, this is a false issue, as Randall Schweller points out.
171. Randall Schweller, 'Neorealism's Status Quo Bias: What Security Dilemma?' Security Studies, Vol. 5, No. 3 (1996), pp. 91-121, at pp. 109-10.
172. Even when military postures can be differentiated, signalling benign intention involves real risk. In fact, a signal of benign intention will not carry any credibility unless it incurs certain costs to the sender of the signal.
173. For details, see Shiping Tang, A Theory of Security Strategy, Chapter 5.
174. Certain structural realists have thus chosen to ignore these cases of successful cooperation. See, for example, David Edelstein, 'Managing Uncertainty', pp. 38-40.
175. Evan Montgomery, 'Breaking out of the Security Dilemma', p. 153.
176. The fact that these cases of cooperation were facilitated by a common threat does not invalidate the notion that costly signalling contributes to cooperation
177. I elaborate on these measures in Shiping Tang, A Theory of Security Strategy, Chapter 5.
178. Eric J. Labs, 'Beyond Victory: Offensive Realism and the Expansion of War Aims', Security Studies, Vol. 6, No. 4 (1997), pp. 1-49, at pp. 4-5, 11.
179. John Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics, pp. 2-3, 21.
180. I expose this implicit conclusion or assumption of offensive realism in Shiping Tang, 'Fear in International Politics'
181. Sean Lynn-Jones, 'Offense-Defense Theory and Its Critics', pp. 672-676, footnotes 24, 27, 35, 41, and 44.
182. Lynn-Jones might also have a selfish interest in doing so, as ignoring politics allows him to stick to his thesis that war is the continuation of technology, not politics. On this point, offensive realists know better. See the section on the ODB for details.
183. David Goldfischer, The Best Defense, pp. 16, 20.
184. See, for example, Colin Gray, Weapons Don't Make War, p. 64.
185. Samuel Huntington, 'U.S. Defense Strategy', p. 42.
186. Albert Wohlstetter, 'The Political and Military Aims of Offense and Defense Innovation', in Fred S. Hoffman, Albert Wohlstetter, and David S. Yost, eds., Swords and Shields (Lexington: D. C. Heath, 1987), pp. 5-6.
187. I thank Evan Montgomery for reminding me about the distinction between qualitative and quantitative arms control. Of course, even quantitative arms control may involve some kind of classification of weapons.
188. Robert Jervis, 'Cooperation under the Security Dilemma', pp. 199-201.
189. Charles Glaser, 'Political Consequences of Military Strategy'.
190. Charles Glaser, 'Realists as Optimists', pp. 64-7.
191. Stephen Van Evera Causes of War, pp. 190-192.
192. Colin Gray makes a similar point, but over-states it. He argues, 'you only get arms control when you don't actually need it'.
193. See Colin Gray, Houses of Cards: Why Arms Control Must Fail (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 1992).
194. In my A Theory of Security Strategy, Chapter 5, I argue in detail why some forms of arms control can be achieved when needed (i.e. it can facilitate cooperation).
195. Shiping Tang, A Theory of Security Strategy, Chapter 5.
196. Charles Glaser, 'Realists as Optimists', pp. 68-70.
197. Robert Jervis 'Cooperation under the Security Dilemma', pp. 199-206.
198. Andrew Kydd, 'Sheep in Sheep's Clothing', pp. 143-7.
199. Evan Montgomery, 'Breaking out of the Security Dilemma', p. 163.
200. Note, however, that the ex ante alliance pattern also influences states' strategies, and hence may in turn influence states' decisions on offence and defence
201. See Scott Sagan, '1914 Revisited'.
202. Richard Betts 'Must War Find a Way?' pp. 194-5.
203. See, for example, Karen Adams, 'Attack and Conquer?'.
204. Bernard Finel, 'Taking Offense'.
205. Stace Goddard, 'Taking Offense'.
206. Stephen Van Evera, 'Correspondence: Taking Offense at Offense-defense Theory'.
207. Karen Adams expands the ODB into offencedefence-deterrence balance, making the balance even more complex. Because the general logic here also applies to her formulation, I do not discuss offence-defence-deterrence balance separately.
208. See, for example, Richard Betts, 'Must War Find a Way?', p. 180, footnote 17.
209. Thomas Christensen and Jack Snyder, 'Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks'.
210. James Davis, 'Taking Offense', pp. 180-1.
211. James Fearon, 'The Offense-Defense Balance and War since 1648'.
212. Charles Glaser and Chaim Kaufmann, 'What Is the Offense-Defense Balance?'.
213. Yoav Gortzak et al, 'Offense-Defense Theory'.
214. Jack Levy, 'The Offensive/Defensive Balance of Military Technology'.
215. Sean Lynn-Jones, 'Offense-Defense Theory and Its Critics', pp. 666, 670-1, 679-82, footnote 15.
216. Robert Jervis 'Cooperation under the Security Dilemma', pp. 190-4.
217. Stephen Van Evera, 'Correspondence: Taking Offense at Offense-defense Theory'. Within the existing literature, only Biddle, Lieber and Tang have clearly grasped the different implications of the two versions of the balance.
218. Stephen Biddle 'Rebuilding the Foundation of Offense-Defense Theory', pp. 744-5.
219. Kier Lieber, 'Grasping the Technological Peace', pp. 73, 102-3.
220. Kier Lieber, War and the Engineers, pp. 3-4, 24.
221. Shiping Tang, 'A Systemic Theory of the Security Environment', pp. 7-8, 28-9.
222. Charles Glaser and Chaim Kaufmann label these two versions as 'narrow' and 'broad', whereas Lieber labels them as 'core' and 'broad'.
223. See Charles Glaser and Chaim Kaufmann, 'What Is the Offense-Defense Balance?'.
224. Kier Lieber, 'Grasping the Technological Peace'.
225. Kier Lieber, War and the Engineers.
226. Kier Lieber, 'Grasping the Technological Peace', pp. 76-7.
227. Sean Lynn-Jones, 'Offense-Defense Theory and Its Critics', p. 668.
228. This point, which should be obvious, is often missing from the existing discussion, or only implicitly spelled out
229. See, for example, James Fearon, 'The Offense-Defense Balance and War since 1648', p. 6.
230. Kier Lieber, 'Grasping the Technological Peace', p. 75.
231. James Fearon, 'The Offense-Defense Balance and War since 1648', pp. 7-8.
232. Stace Goddard, 'Taking Offense', pp. 192-4.
233. Kier Lieber, 'Grasping the Technological Peace', p. 75.
234. Indeed, without recognizing how demanding this optimality assumption is, Glaser and Kaufmann, both of whom are proponents of ODB, actually employ the optimality assumption to measure the objective balance, even though they favour a broad (i.e. technology-plus) approach.
235. See Charles Glaser and Chaim Kaufmann, 'What Is the Offense-Defense Balance?' p. 201.
236. Taylor Fravel raises the possibility that the human factor might have been assumed absent for the sake of theory-building by proponents of ODT. This defence is similar to Jack Snyder's overall defence of ODT, and thus ultimately untenable (see below).
237. Karen Adams also seeks to measure a technology-only version of the objective balance. I discuss her work in detail below.
238. Sean Lynn-Jones, 'Offense-Defense Theory and Its Critics', p. 665.
239. Kier Lieber, 'Grasping the Technological Peace', p. 74.
240. As Finel points out, taking territory is not and should not always be the goal of offences if the goal is to win a war
241. Bernard Finel, 'Taking Offense', pp. 184-5.
242. Lieber later changes his definition to 'the relative ease of attack and defense given prevailing conditions'. See Kier Lieber, War and the Engineers, p. 27. As this is even broader than his original definition, it is again not a technology-only definition.
243. Both Fearon and Lieber argue that when one state achieves a technological innovation, it represents a change in the balance of power between the state and its potential adversaries, not a change in ODB per se. While the first half of their assertion may not be true, the second half is.
244. James Fearon, 'The Offense-Defense Balance and War since 1648', p. 7.
245. Kier Lieber, 'Grasping the Technological Peace', p. 76.
246. John Keegan, A History of Warfare (London: Verson, 1993), pp. 320-2.
247. Sean Lynn-Jones, 'Offense-defense Theory and its Critics', p. 676.
248. Bernard Brodie, War and Politics (London: Longman, 1974), p. 325.
249. Kier Lieber, 'Grasping the Technological Peace', pp. 90-4.
250. Jack Snyder, 'Perceptions of the Security Dilemma in 1914', in Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Stein, eds., Psychology and Deterrence (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1985), pp. 159-60.
251. Jack Levy, 'The Offensive/Defensive Balance of Military Technology', pp. 230-4.
252. A new and more effective countermeasure against an existing technology is another form of innovation, and should hence again confer first-mover's advantage on the innovator.
253. See, for example, Charles Glaser and Chaim Kaufman, 'What is Offense-defense Balance?', pp. 62-6.
254. Stephen Van Evera, 'Correspondence: Taking Offense at Offense-defense Theory', pp. 195-6.
255. Kier Lieber, 'Grasping the Technological Peace', pp. 92-3.
256. Bernard Finel, 'Taking Offense', pp. 185-7.
257. Kier Lieber, 'Grasping the Technological Peace'.
258. Charles Glaser and Chaim Kaufmann, 'What Is the Offense-Defense Balance', p. 64. Measuring the technology-plus version of ODB will be more difficult than measuring the technology-only version of ODB. See below.
259. Nationalism may be another factor that confers distinctive advantage on defense, but nationalism is not technology
260. Lynn-Jones, Lieber, and Tang all favour the technology-only approach almost exclusively on the grounds of retaining its structural and parsimonious nature
261. Sean Lynn-Jones, 'Offense-defense Theory', p. 666, footnote 15.
262. Kier Lieber, 'Grasping Technological Peace', pp. 75-7.
263. Shiping Tang, 'A Systemic Theory of the Security Environment', pp. 7-8.
264. Earlier, Fearon and Levy also question the feasibility of a structural (i.e. system-wide) ODB. See James Fearon, 'The Offense-Defense Balance and War since 1648', pp. 12-13.
265. Jack Levy, 'The Offensive/Defensive Balance of Military Technology', p. 227.
266. See, for example, Charles Glaser and Chaim Kaufmann, 'What Is the Offense-Defense Balance?'.
267. Stephen Van Evera, 'Correspondence: Taking Offense at Offense-defense Theory', pp. 195-6.
268. Karen Adams, 'Attack and Conquer?'.
269. Charles Glaser and Chaim Kaufmann, 'What Is the Offense-Defense Balance', pp. 60-8.
270. Glaser and Kaufmann rightly exclude alliance behaviour and first-move advantages from their definition of the broader version of objective ODB
271. For a summary of the differences among proponents of ODT regarding the impact of mobility on offense or defence, see Kier Lieber, War and the Engineers, pp. 35-42.
272. Richard Betts, 'Must War Find a Way?' p. 186.
273. Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War, p. 118, footnote 2.
274. Stace Goddard, 'Taking Offense', p. 190.
275. See also James Fearon, 'The Offense-Defense Balance and War since 1648', pp. 7, 14, footnote 29.
276. Bernard Finel, 'Taking Offense', pp. 187-8.
277. Kier Lieber, 'Grasping the Technological Peace', pp. 75-7.
278. Richard Betts, 'Must War Find a Way?' pp. 185-90.
279. James Davis, 'Taking Offense at Offense-Defense Theory', p. 180.
280. Van Evera was not shy about his achievement: 'Offence-defence theory [which is really offence-defence balance] achieves simplicity, binding together a number of war causes into a single rubric
281. Many causes are reduced to one cause with many effects.' Stephen Van Evera Causes of War, p.190.
282. See also Stephen Van Evera, 'Correspondence', p. 196.
283. For Van Evera's critics, see Karen Adams, 'Attack and Conquer?', p. 50.
284. Richard Betts, 'Must War Find a Way?'.
285. James Davis, 'Taking Offense'.
286. Fearon, 'The Offense-Defense Balance and War since 1648', pp. 9-11.
287. Bernard Finel, 'Taking Offense'.
288. Stace E. Goddard, 'Taking Offense', pp. 189-95.
289. Stephen Biddle, 'Rebuilding the Foundation of Offense-Defense Theory'.
290. Charles Glaser and Chaim Kaufmann, 'What Is the Offense-Defense Balance?' pp. 48-51, 57-8.
291. Stephen Biddle, 'Rebuilding the Foundation of Offense-Defense Theory', p. 743.
292. Charles Glaser and Chaim Kaufmann, 'What Is the Offense-Defense Balance', p. 57.
293. See also Bernard Finel, 'Taking Offense', pp. 183-4.
294. Jack Levy 'The Offensive/Defensive Balance of Military Technology', pp. 226-7.
295. James Fearon, 'The Offense-Defense Balance and War since 1648', p. 31.
296. Kier Lieber, War and the Engineers.
297. Stephen Biddle, 'Rebuilding the Foundation of Offense-Defense Theory', p. 748.
298. Here, if the attacker can conquer the defender in one stroke, this result must be mostly due to the attacker's overwhelming power versus that of the defender, and not to offense advantage ex ante per se
299. Richard Betts, 'Must War Find a Way?' p. 173.
300. Stephen Biddle, 'Rebuilding the Foundation of Offense-Defense Theory', p. 748, footnote 9.
301. Kier Lieber, 'Grasping the Technological Peace'.
302. Kier Lieber, War and the Engineers.
303. Jack Snyder, 'Perceptions of the Security Dilemma in 1914', pp. 159-60.
304. See also Kier Lieber, 'Grasping the Technological Peace', pp. 90-6.
305. Kier Lieber, War and the Engineers, pp. 101-14.
306. Thomas A. Mahnken, 'Beyond Blitzkrieg: Allied Responses to Combined-Arms Armored Warfare during World War II', in Emily O. Goldman and Leslie C. Eliason, The Diffusion of Military Technology and Ideas (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), pp. 243-66.
307. Charles Glaser and Chaim Kaufmann 'What Is the Offense-Defense Balance', esp. pp. 72-80.
308. Stephen Biddle, 'Rebuilding the Foundation of Offense-Defense Theory', pp. 747-8.
309. Stephen Biddle, Military Power (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005).
310. Hence, Lawrence Freeman was right to assert that Biddle's Military Power offered a theory of battle, not a theory of war. Lawrence Freeman, 'A Theory of Battle or a Theory of War?' Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 28, No. 3 (2005), pp. 425-35.
311. See also Stephen Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005).
312. Stephen Biddle, 'Rebuilding the Foundation of Offense-Defense Theory', pp. 747-8.
313. Both Glaser and Kaufmann and Lynn-Jones fail to recognize the implication of adopting a net assessment approach to measuring ODB. See Sean Lynn-Jones, 'Does Offense-Defense Theory Have a Future?' esp. pp. 31-4.
314. Lawrence Freeman, 'A Theory of Battle of a Theory of War?'.
315. Stephen Biddle, Military Power.
316. Stephen Biddle, 'Rebuilding the Foundation of Offense-Defense Theory', pp. 747-9. This also explains why Biddle's model can only extremely static.
317. Jack Levy, 'The Offensive/Defensive Balance of Military Technology', p. 200.
318. Charles Glaser and Chaim Kaufmann 'Correspondence: Taking Offense at Offense-defense Theory', p. 200.
319. Finel, however, is too sweeping in calling all of ODT a 'conceptual misformation'. The ODT differentiation of military postures into offensive or defensive types is a valid tool for understanding international politics (see above). Apparently, Finel focuses exclusively on ODB rather than the whole ODT.
320. Bernard Finel, 'Taking Offense', p. 187.
321. Obviously, the subjective balance cannot be a structural variable
322. Sean Lynn-Jones, 'Offense-defense Theory and its Critics', p. 681, footnote 58, emphasis added.
323. It is important to note that a state may believe that an offensive security/military strategy or a defensive security/military strategy is more conducive to its security, but this belief is fundamentally different from the subjective ODB, and it is inherently tied to of the state's offensive/malign or defensive/benign intentions. I deal with this question in detail elsewhere.
324. Kier Lieber, War and the Engineers, p. 24.
325. Others have made the same point, although not explicitly and forcefully. Colin Gray, Weapons Don't Make War, p. 39.
326. Jonathan Shimshoni, 'Technology, Military Advantage, and World War I', pp. 197-201.
327. Jack Snyder, 'Perceptions of the Security Dilemma in 1914', pp. 158-60, 179.
328. Stphen Van Evera, Causes of War, pp. 185, 190-2.
329. Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War, p. 191.
330. Indeed, Van Evera promises to develop such a theory in the next project after Causes of War. See, Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War, pp. 255-8. Evera also coined the phrase 'the cult of the offensive'.
331. Stephen Van Evera, 'The Cult of the Offensive'.
332. Barry Posen, Sources of Military Doctrines.
333. Jack Snyder, 'Civil-Military Relations and the Cult of the Offensive', pp. 108-46.
334. Stephen Van Evera, 'The Cult of the Offensive'.
335. After all, most of human reasoning is motivated. See, Ziva Kunda, 'The Case for Motivated Reasoning', Psychological Bulletin, Vol. 108, No. 3 (1990), pp. 480-98.
336. Barry Posen, Sources of Military Doctrines, p. 69.
337. Of course, it is entirely possible that the state will then employ its belief in offense dominance to further justify its expansionist goals and strategies. As a result, the belief in offensive dominance and the urge to expand reinforce one other; a typical positive feedback. Likewise, a state's military and military-industrial complex will deploy the belief in offense dominance to further justify a big budget for the former and big (governmental) contracts for the latter.
338. On the second possibility, see, Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991).
339. Kier Lieber, War and the Engineers, pp. 100-1.
340. Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War, 123, 175-7.
341. Van Evera might have a case if he insists that recognition of offence advantage might play a role in explaining the timing of war. In fact, judging from the titles of two chapters in Van Evera's book (i.e. 'Jump the Gun' and 'Windows of Opportunity and Vulnerability'), Van Evera's discussion was more about the timing of war than its fundamental causes.
342. Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War, p. 117, footnote l, p. 191.
343. Sean Lynn-Jones, 'Offense-defense Theory and its Critics', p. 690.
344. Richard Betts, 'Must War Find a Way?' pp. 169, 176-7, 190.
345. Scott D. Sagan, '1914 Revisited', pp. 151-75.
346. The other possibility is that states are driven to aggression by the spiral or security dilemma. The debate on the viability of this possibility lies at the heart of the offensive realism versus defensive realism debate. I address the divergence between the two realisms in great detail in Shiping Tang, Fear in International Politics, and A Theory of Security Strategy, especially Chapters 1 and 4. Here, I merely emphasize that ODT has neglected the possibility that states believe in offensive dominance simply because they want to expand.
347. In his personal communication with the author, Jack Snyder offered another defence solely on the line of Milton Friedman's defence of neoclassical economics. Although ODB may not be real, it is a very useful fictional device for understanding war and peace. Such a defence will be rejected by most proponents of ODB, however, because they take ODB precisely as a device that captures something real for understanding war and peace. Moreover, Snyder's defence has already conceded a lot of territory. For a more detailed discussion on the epistemological issues involved in adopting rational choice approach in political science.
348. see Paul K. MacDonald, 'Useful Fiction or Miracle Maker: The Competing Epistemological Foundations of Rational Choice Theory', American Political Science Review, Vol. 97, No. 4 (2003), pp. 551-65.
349. Sean Lynn-Jones, 'Offense-defense Theory and its Critics'.
350. Glaser and Kaufman claim that Lynn-Jones addressed almost all the major criticisms against ODT. See Charles Glaser and Chaim Kaufmann, 'What Is the Offense-Defense Balance?' p. 45, footnote 5.
351. Charles Glaser and Chaim Kaufmann, 'Correspondence: Taking Offense at Offense-Defense Theory'.
352. Stephen Van Evera, 'Correspondence: Taking Offense at Offense-defense Theory'.
353. Labs, too, regards Lynn-Jones's defence of ODT as unconvincing, but does not elaborate. Eric Labs, 'Expanding War Aims', pp. 10-11, footnotes 28, 35.
354. Sean Lynn-Jones, 'Offense-defense Theory and its Critics', p. 675.
355. As Lieber notes, however, this is the most common definition among proponents of ODT. See Kier, War and the Engineers, p. 28, footnote 7.
356. Examples of similar definition include Glaser, 'Realists as Optimists', p. 612.
357. Charles Glaser and Chaim Kaufmann, 'What is Offense-defense Balance', p. 49.
358. Robert Jervis, 'Cooperation under the Security Dilemma', p. 188.
359. Sean Lynn-Jones, 'Offense-defense Theory and its Critics', p. 674; parenthesis original but italics mine.
360. Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire.
361. Michael Howard, 'Men against Fire: Expectations of War in 1914', International Security, Vol. 9, No. 1 (1984), pp. 41-57.
362. Stephen Van Evera, 'The Cult of the Offensive'.
363. Thomas Christensen and Jack Snyder, 'Chain-gangs and Passed Bucks'.
364. Richard Betts, 'Must War Find a Way?' p. 184.
365. James Fearon, 'The Offense-Defense Balance and War since 1648', pp. 2-3, 21.
366. Yoav Gortzak et al., 'Offense-defense Theory', pp. 70-1.
367. Indeed, Lynn-Jones put the two theses under two different subsections in his article
368. Sean Lynn-Jones, 'Offense-defense Theory and its Critics'.
369. These criticisms were raised by Colin Gray, Weapons Do not Make War, p. 39.
370. Samuel Huntington, 'U.S. Defense Strategy', p. 37.
371. Robert Jervis, 'Realism, Game Theory, and Cooperation', World Politics, Vol. 40, No. 4 (1988), pp. 317-49, at p. 344.
372. Robert O'Connell, Of Arms and Man.
373. Jonathan Shimshoin, 'Technology, Military Advantage, and World War I', pp. 197-201.
374. James Fearon, 'The Offense-Defense Balance and War since 1648', pp. 8-10.
375. Kier Lieber, War and the Engineers.
376. Jonathan Shimshoni, 'Technology, Military Advantage, and World War I'.
377. Fearon and Lieber's understanding is only half-way there because they still believe that states merely adopt existing technologies, rather than strive to invent technologies for strategic purposes
378. Stephen Van Evera, 'Correspondence: Taking Offense at Offense-defense Theory', p. 196.
379. Charles Glaser and Chaim Kaufmann. 'Correspondence: Taking Offense at Offense-Defense Theory', p. 200.
380. See the preceding discussion. See also Stephen Biddle, 'Rebuilding the Foundation of Offense-Defense Theory', pp. 741-74.
381. James Fearon, 'The Offense-Defense Balance and War since 1648', pp. 8-9, 12-13.
382. Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War, p. 118, footnote 2.
383. James Fearon, 'The Offense-Defense Balance and War since 1648', p. 9.
384. Karen Adams avoids this problem of being tautological by measuring ODB using pre-selected indicators of weapon technologies before a period of war and then uses the ODB to explain war and outcome of war. But her empirical testing suffers from other problems. See the discussion on Adams's work below.
385. Stephen Van Evera, 'Correspondence: Taking Offense at Offense-defense Theory', p. 196.
386. Stephen Van Evera Causes of War, p. 117, footnote 1.
387. Richard Betts, 'Must War Find a Way?' p. 187.
388. Charles Glaser and Chaim Kaufmann, 'What Is the Offense-Defense Balance?'.
389. Robert Jervis, 'Cooperation under the Security Dilemma.
390. George Quester, Offense and Defense in the International System.
391. Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War.
392. Here, I do not raise the logic problem that Van Evera employs WWI as both an inspiration for his theory and a testing case for his theory. See above.
393. Stephen Van Evera, 'The Cult of the Offensive'.
394. Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War', chapter. 7.
395. Stephen Van Evera, 'The Cult of the Offensive', p. 65.
396. Thus, German Chief of Staff Helmut Von Moltke's motto that 'the offence is the best defence' is identical to Mearsheimer's teaching that 'the best defence is a good offence'
397. Moltke quoted in Stephen Van Evera, 'The Cult of the Offensive'; p. 59.
398. John Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics, p. 36.
399. More importantly, social Darwinism and imperialism was upheld not just in Germany but almost every European capital
400. Stephen Van Evera, 'The Cult of the Offensive', pp. 62-3. This could only make WWI more likely.
401. Stephen Van Evera, 'The Cult of the Offensive', p. 65.
402. Kier A. Lieber, 'The New History of World War I and What It Means for International Relations Theory', International Security, Vol. 32, No. 2 (2007), pp. 155-91.
403. Jack Snyder challenges Lieber's conclusion on defensive realism but essentially concedes on the empirical battleground.
404. See Jack Snyder and Kier A. Lieber, 'Correspondence: Defensive Realism and the 'New' History of World War I', International Security, Vol. 33, No.1 (2008), pp. 174-85.
405. In Shiping Tang, A Theory of Security Strategy, Chapter 3.
406. Appendix 1, I contend that defensive realism remain unscathed even though, and precisely because, WWI was not caused by a security dilemma
407. Jin Xu, 'The Cult of the Offensive: The Collapse of a Theoretical Myth', Shijie Jingyi yu Zhengzhi [World Economics and Politics], No. 2 (Feb. 2010), pp. 83-100.
408. Kier Lieber, War and the Engineers.
409. Indeed, when responding to Mearsheimer and other offensive realists' criticism that weapons cannot be meaningfully differentiated into offensive or defensive weapons, Lynn-Jones defends ODB with a similar logic: 'ODT [he means ODB] does not depend on the idea that individual types of weapons be classified as either entirely defensive or entirely offensive'
410. See, Sean Lynn-Jones, 'Offense-defense Theory and Its Critics', p. 674; see also p. 663.
411. Karen Adams, 'Attack and Conquer?'.
412. Stephen Biddle, 'Rebuilding the Foundations of Offense-Defense Theory'.
413. James Fearon, 'The Offense-Defense Balance and War since 1648.
414. Yoav Gortzak et al., 'Offense-defense Theory'.
415. This result is also consistent with Biddle's thesis that 'progressive advances in technology over time increase the extremity of both offensive success and failure'
416. Stephen Biddle, 'Rebuilding the Foundations of Offense-Defense Theory', p. 758.
417. James Fearon, 'The Offense-Defense Balance and War since 1648', p. 39.
418. Christensen and Snyder concur with this interpretation. Thomas Christensen and Jack Snyder, 'Chained Gangs and Passed Bucks', p. 145.
419. Of course, this begs the question of how the objective balance changed from offence dominance to defence dominance in a single year (i.e. 1914)!
420. Karen Adams, 'Attack and Conquer?', pp. 48, 78-9.
421. Karen Adams, 'Attack and Conquer?', p. 50.
422. This definition is almost identical to Lieber's definition. See Kier Lieber, War and the Engineers, p. 27.
423. Karen Adams, 'Attack and Conquer?', pp. 50-2.
424. See also Stephen Biddle, 'Rebuilding the Foundations of Offense-Defense Theory', p. 747, footnote 7.
425. Since we are dealing with the non-nuclear era here, we can for now safely ignore the deterrence component within Adams's formulation
426. Karen Adams, 'Attack and Conquer?', p. 68, table 3.
427. James Fearon, 'The Offense-Defense Balance and War since 1648', p. 31.
428. Kier Lieber, War and the Engineers, p. 24.
429. Most IR students take deterrence as a specific form of deterrence, and 'in the nuclear context, deterrence by retaliation is the functional equivalent of defence'
430. Glaser, 'When Are Arms Races Dangerous?', p. 75.
431. See also Robert Jervis, 'Cooperation under the Security Dilemma', p. 198.
432. For dissension, see Karen Adams, 'Attack and Conquer'. For the original differentiation of deterrence by punishment versus deterrence by denial.
433. see Glenn H. Snyder, Deterrence and Defense (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961).
434. Bernard Brodie et al., The Ultimate Weapon (New York: Harcourt, Grace, 1946).
435. The connection between ODT and nuclear deterrence theory (and the Cold War) has been evident. For earlier discussions, see Richard Betts, 'Must War Find a Way?', pp. 176-82.
436. Kier Lieber, War and the Engineers, pp. 123-5.
437. The fact that ODT (and ODB in particular) did not come into force after the nuclear deterrence theory even though the original ideas of ODT can be traced back to the 1932 World Disarmament Conference also points to a connection between ODT and nuclear deterrence theory
438. On this aspect, see Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War, 118-19.
439. Before we go further, let us be clear what we mean by 'nuclear revolution'. The nuclear revolution is really the coming of MAD as reality and the total annihilation of humanity as a real possibility. Hence, the nuclear revolution is not purely about the coming of nuclear weapons alone; only the coming of nuclear weapons and ICBM together-and thus MAD-makes the nuclear revolution complete. It is only with ICBM that viable defence against devastating retaliatory strikes by one's opponent becomes impossible, MAD assured, and the nuclear revolution complete. It is thus at least imprecise and misleading to take the nuclear revolution as the coming of nuclear weapons alone. The nuclear revolution is more accurately labelled as 'the MAD revolution'. I retain the term 'nuclear revolution' because it has gained currency. I also retain the term 'nuclear weapons' when it comes to quotations from others. On the nuclear revolution.
440. see Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989).
441. Michael Mandelbaum, The Nuclear Revolution: International Politics before and after Hiroshima (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1981).
442. For dissensions, see Paul Nitze, as quoted in Gregg Herkem, Counsels of War (New York: Knoopf, 1985).
443. Colin S. Gray, 'Nuclear Strategy: The Case for a Theory of Victory', International Security, Vol. 4, No. 1 (1979), pp. 54-87.
444. For criticism of this 'conventionalization' of nuclear weapon, see Robert Jervis, The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984), pp. 56-63.
445. Robert Jervis, 'Cooperation under the Security Dilemma', p. 198.
446. Charles Glaser, 'When Are Arms Races Dangerous?' p. 75.
447. Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War, 162.
448. Karen Adams, 'Attach and Conquer', p. 54.
449. James Fearon, 'The Offense-Defense Balance and War since 1648', pp. 31-2.
450. John Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence, pp. 25-7.
451. John Mearsheimer, Liddell Hart and the Weight of History, pp. 36, 44 and 61.
452. John Mearsheimer, 'Back to the Future', p. 13, footnotes 14, 19-20.
453. Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War, pp. 185-92.
454. A general theory is undermined somewhat by exceptions, although not fatally if it can still cover most empirical facts (i.e. exceptions are few). This is not the case for ODB, however.
455. Kier Lieber, War and the Engineers, pp. 123-8.
456. VThe delivery system can be ICBM, MRBM, SRBM, depending on the geographical distance between the two states. Hence, the notion that nuclear weaponry is the ultimate defence weapon is at best imprecise (thus misleading). The correct notion is that MAD is a defensive weapon system.
457. In this sense, nuclear revolution understood as the coming of MAD is really a structural factor, and it does not pose any problem for Waltz's structural theory of international politics (i.e. neorealism) as Waltz and his critics thought it would be. The coming of nuclear monopoly and then MAD is a shift in the distribution of military capabilities, thus adequately captured by Waltz's understanding of structure. For a discussion on nuclear weaponry and Waltz's structural theory.
458. see Robert Powell, 'Anarchy in International Relations Theory: The Neorealist-Neoliberal Debate', International Organization, Vol. 48, No. 2 (1994), pp. 313-44, at pp. 324-5, and references cited there.
459. The literature on deterrence is vast. For good reviews, see Paul Huth, 'Deterrence and International Conflict: Empirical Findings and Theoretical Debates', Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 2 (1999), pp. 25-48.
460. Robert Jervis, 'Rational Deterrence Theory: Theory and Evidence', World Politics, Vol. 41, No. 2 (1989), pp. 183-207.
461. Robert Jervis, 'Deterrence Theory Revisited', World Politics, Vol. 31, No. 2 (1979), pp. 289-324.
462. For the pacifying effect of MAD, see Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution, esp. pp. 23-45.
463. Kenneth A. Waltz, 'Nuclear Myths and Political Realities', American Political Science Review, Vol. 84, No. 3 (1990), pp. 731-45.
464. For the role of nuclear weapon in the long peace during the Cold War, see John Lewis Gaddis, 'The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Postwar International System', International Security, Vol. 10, No. 4 (1986), pp. 99-142, at pp. 120-3.
465. Robert Jervis, 'The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution', pp. 23-45.
466. For counter-arguments, see John Mueller, Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1989).
467. Jeffery Taliaferro, 'Security Seeking under Anarchy', p. 135.
468. Kier Lieber, War and the Engineers, pp. 8-11.
469. Charles Glaser, 'Realists as Optimists', p. 61.
470. Charles Glaser and Chaim Kaufmann, 'What Is the Offense-Defense Balance?', p. 44.
471. See also, Kier Lieber, War and the Engineers, p. 24.
472. Robert Jervis, 'Cooperation under the Security Dilemma'.
473. Andrew Kydd, 'Game Theory and the Spiral Model', World Politics, Vol. 49, No. 2 (1997), pp. 371-400.
474. As Van Evera put it, 'security dilemma theory is a misnomer (for offense-defense theory)'
475. Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War, p. 117, footnote 1.
476. See also Richard Betts, 'Must War Find a way?' p. 177.
477. The second puzzle is perhaps less fundamental than the first puzzle
478. Shiping Tang, A Theory of Security Strategy, Chapter 5.
479. John Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics, pp. 32-6.
480. Shiping Tang, 'Fear in International Politics.'.
481. See also Robert Jervis, "Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate," International Security, vol. 24, 1 (Sept. 1999), pp. 42-63.
482. Robert Jervis, 'Cooperation under the Security Dilemma', pp. 199, 201.
483. Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading: Addision-Wesley, 1979), pp. 67, 165-70.
484. Thomas Christensen and Jack Snyder, 'Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks', pp. 149-50.
485. On closer examination, Christensen and Snyder's discussion itself reveals that political consideration, rather than subjective ODB (i.e. a technology-centric consideration), might be able to explain much of the alliance pattern in the two world wars. For instance, isn't it possible that alliance patterns in WWI were tight and major European states rushed to offence because European states were all aggressive and feared that taking action too late might jeopardize their share of the spoils of conquest? Moreover, Christensen and Snyder dismiss the possibility that ideological differences between France and the Soviet Union might have played a role in engineering the different alliance patterns of the two world wars. But they forget that although Czarist Russia forged a tight alliance with France, after the Bolshevik revolution Lenin immediately took the Soviet Union out of the war. Moreover, Stalin was a true believer in inter-imperialist contradictions, and would have been highly unlikely to fight Hitler if Hitler had not invaded the Soviet Union, even though Hitler had conquered France.
486. I paraphrase Sean Lynn-Jones here. Sean Lynn-Jones, 'Does Offense-Defense Theory Have a Future?'.
487. th parallel, and Israel made the decision to smash the Arabs and secure its existence long before they found the perfect opportunity to strike. Similarly, Lynn-Jones says that that the 1932-3 Geneva Disarmament Conference failed to reach an agreement on limiting offensive weapons 'because some countries wanted to retain their offensive capabilities and to prevent reduction in their arsenals'. Likewise, although Peter Liberman tried to bring ODB and strategic consideration together (i.e. economic autarky) when explaining Germany and Japanese expansionism, he ended up confirming that strategic considerations almost always triumph over ODB.
488. See, Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War, pp. 59-61, 68.
489. Sean Lynn-Jones, 'Offense-Defense Theory', pp. 676-7.
490. Peter Liberman, 'Offense-defense Balance'.
491. Jared Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel (New York: Norton, 1997).
492. Bernard Finel, 'Taking Offense', pp. 183-4.
493. John Keegan, A History of Warfare.
494. Kier Lieber, War and the Engineers.
495. Robert O'Connell, Of Arms and Men.
496. Bradley A. Thayer, Darwin and International Relations: On the Evolutionary Origins of War and Ethnic Conflict (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 2004), chapter. 4.
497. Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1992 (Malden: Blackwell, 1990).
498. Shiping Tang, A Theory of Security Strategy, Chapter 5.
499. Apparently, when differentiation of military postures becomes a component of a body of theories on reassurance toward cooperation, differentiation itself ceases to be an independent body of theories, and becomes a component of a broader body of theories