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2
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78649340938
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-
See Verdict Form at 5, Centocor Ortho Biotech, Inc. v. Abbott Labs., No. 2:07-CV-139 E. D. Tex. June 29, finding that over $1 billion in lost-profit damages and over $500 million in reasonable-royalty damages "would fairly and reasonably compensate" Centocor
-
See Verdict Form at 5, Centocor Ortho Biotech, Inc. v. Abbott Labs., No. 2:07-CV-139 (E. D. Tex. June 29, 2009) (finding that over $1 billion in lost-profit damages and over $500 million in reasonable-royalty damages "would fairly and reasonably compensate" Centocor).
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3
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547 U. S. 388 (2006).
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4
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The supreme court as "prime percolator": A prescription for appellate review of questions in patent law
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See, 697 & n. 242, observing disagreement among lower courts about when to apply a presumption of irreparable harm if an injunction is denied
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See John M. Golden, The Supreme Court as "Prime Percolator": A Prescription for Appellate Review of Questions in Patent Law, 56 UCLA L. REV. 657, 697 & n. 242 (2009) (observing disagreement among lower courts about when to apply a presumption of irreparable harm if an injunction is denied).
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1175-76, 1179-82, discussing circumstances favoring or disfavoring injunctive relief
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Thomas F. Cotter, Patent Holdup, Patent Remedies, and Antitrust Responses, 34 J. CORP. L. 51151, 1175-76, 1179-82 (2009) (discussing circumstances favoring or disfavoring injunctive relief);
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Cotter, T.F.1
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7
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54049104401
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Do patent holdup and royalty stacking lead to systematically excessive royalties?
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537, providing reasons "not to shift from injunctive relief to damages"
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Einer Elhauge, Do Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking Lead to Systematically Excessive Royalties?, 4 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 535, 537 (2008) (providing reasons "not to shift from injunctive relief to damages");
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J. Competition L. & Econ.
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Elhauge, E.1
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8
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The complements problem within standard setting: Assessing the evidence on royalty stacking
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174-75, criticizing proposals to limit injunctive relief
-
Damien Geradin et al., The Complements Problem Within Standard Setting: Assessing the Evidence on Royalty Stacking, 14 B. U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 144, 174-75 (2008) (criticizing proposals to limit injunctive relief);
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B. U. J. Sci. & Tech. L.
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Geradin, D.1
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9
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"Patent trolls" and patent remedies
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2148-49, suggesting that "courts could apply a rebuttable presumption of injunctive relief" while retaining an ability to stay or to deny injunctions to avoid "undue hardship"
-
John M. Golden, "Patent Trolls" and Patent Remedies, 85 TEXAS L. REV. 2111, 2148-49 (2007) (suggesting that "[c]ourts could apply a rebuttable presumption of injunctive relief" while retaining an ability to stay or to deny injunctions to avoid "undue hardship");
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Texas L. Rev.
, vol.85
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Golden, J.M.1
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10
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34547804732
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Patent holdup and royalty stacking
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2036, favoring restrictions on injunctions for patent holders that do not compete with an adjudged infringer or have not exclusively licensed the invention to a competitor
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Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEXAS L. REV. 1991, 2036 (2007) (favoring restrictions on injunctions for patent holders that do not compete with an adjudged infringer or have not exclusively licensed the invention to a competitor);
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Lemley, M.A.1
Shapiro, C.2
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Holdup, royalty stacking, and the presumption of injunctive relief for patent infringement: A reply to lemley and shapiro
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747, criticizing a proposal for more frequent stays of injunctive relief
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J. Gregory Sidak, Holdup, Royalty Stacking, and the Presumption of Injunctive Relief for Patent Infringement: A Reply to Lemley and Shapiro, 92 MINN. L. REV. 714, 747 (2008) (criticizing a proposal for more frequent stays of injunctive relief).
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Sidak, J.G.1
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See, e.g., Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 1042, S. D. Cal, sustaining a jury award of "approximately $358 million" in reasonable-royalty damages due to infringement by Microsoft Corporation
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See, e.g., Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1042 (S. D. Cal. 2008) (sustaining a jury award of "approximately $358 million" in reasonable-royalty damages due to infringement by Microsoft Corporation).
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F. Supp. 2d
, vol.580
, pp. 1016
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13
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78649376760
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Coalition for Patent Fairness includes information technology, semiconductor, computer, and financial-services companies such as Apple, Cisco Systems, Dell, Google, and HP. Coalition for Patent Fairness, Overview
-
The Coalition for Patent Fairness includes information technology, semiconductor, computer, and financial-services companies such as Apple, Cisco Systems, Dell, Google, and HP. Coalition for Patent Fairness, Overview, http://www.patentfairness.org/learn/about.
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-
-
-
14
-
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78649375596
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-
Coalition for 21st Century Patent Reform includes pharmaceutical, biotechnology, and chemical companies such as Merck, Genzyme, and DuPont; more traditional manufacturers such as 3M, General Electric, and Caterpillar; and entities such as PepsiCo, CheckFree, and the American Intellectual Property Law Association. Coalition for 21st Century Patent Reform, About Us
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The Coalition for 21st Century Patent Reform includes pharmaceutical, biotechnology, and chemical companies such as Merck, Genzyme, and DuPont; more traditional manufacturers such as 3M, General Electric, and Caterpillar; and entities such as PepsiCo, CheckFree, and the American Intellectual Property Law Association. Coalition for 21st Century Patent Reform, About Us, http://www.patentsmatter.com/about/coalition. php.
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69849110214
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Patent bill is bonanza to lobbyists
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See, Apr. 30, "In 15 months, two dueling business coalitions have spent $4.3 million lobbying on patent reform legislation...."
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See Robert Pear, Patent Bill Is Bonanza to Lobbyists, N. Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 2008, at C1 ("In 15 months, two dueling business coalitions have spent $4.3 million lobbying on [patent reform] legislation....").
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(2008)
N. Y. Times
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Pear, R.1
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16
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61349178991
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Patent damages reform and the shape of patent law
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See, 129, "Surprisingly..., a key pressure point... is found deep in the arcana of how damages are calculated...."
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See David W. Opderbeck, Patent Damages Reform and the Shape of Patent Law, 89 B. U. L. REV. 127, 129 (2009) ("Surprisingly..., a key pressure point... is found deep in the arcana of how damages are calculated....").
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Opderbeck, D.W.1
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78649376459
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See, e.g., id. at, discussing interests of large and small firms in advocating or opposing proposals for patent-damages reform
-
See, e.g., id. at 135-36 (discussing interests of large and small firms in advocating or opposing proposals for patent-damages reform).
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18
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69849087936
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Two views of innovation, colliding in washington
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See, observing that "Intel, Microsoft, I. B. M. and Apple... are looking for ways to limit the leverage of both small patent holders and patent 'trolls, ' or speculators who buy hundreds or thousands of patents" § 3, Jan. 13
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See John Markoff, Two Views of Innovation, Colliding in Washington, N. Y. TIMES, § 3, Jan. 13, 2008, at 3 (observing that "Intel, Microsoft, I. B. M. and Apple... are looking for ways to limit the leverage of both small patent holders and patent 'trolls, ' or speculators who buy hundreds or thousands of patents").
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(2008)
N. Y. Times
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Markoff, J.1
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19
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79851488824
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See, e.g., Smith Int'l, Inc. v. Hughes Tool Co., 1577-78 Fed. Cir, contending that, without access to injunctive relief, a "patent owner would lack much of the 'leverage, ' afforded by the right to exclude, to enjoy the full value of his invention in the market place"
-
See, e.g., Smith Int'l, Inc. v. Hughes Tool Co., 718 F.2d 1573, 1577-78 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (contending that, without access to injunctive relief, a "patent owner would lack much of the 'leverage, ' afforded by the right to exclude, to enjoy the full value of his invention in the market place");
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(1983)
F.2d
, vol.718
, pp. 1573
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-
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20
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0040198343
-
Of property rules, coase, and intellectual property
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see also, 2664, arguing that disputes over intellectual property rights tend to fit "criteria. for application of a property rule"
-
see also Robert P. Merges, Of Property Rules, Coase, and Intellectual Property, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2655, 2664 (1994) (arguing that disputes over intellectual property rights tend to fit "criteria... for application of a property rule").
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Brulotte v. Thys Co., 33, The lone dissenter from Justice Douglas's opinion for the Supreme Court, Justice Harlan, took an even broader view of legitimate patentee behavior
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Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U. S. 29, 33 (1965). The lone dissenter from Justice Douglas's opinion for the Supreme Court, Justice Harlan, took an even broader view of legitimate patentee behavior.
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22
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78649375881
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See id. at, Harlan, J., dissenting contesting the Court's conclusion that the respondent had "unlawfully misused its patent monopoly by contracting... for royalty payments based on use beyond the patent term"
-
See id. at 34 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (contesting the Court's conclusion that the respondent had "unlawfully misused its patent monopoly by contracting... for royalty payments based on use beyond the patent term").
-
-
-
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23
-
-
78649336344
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-
See, noting "a circularity in the definition of lost royalty" given that, under a pure damages regime, expected court-awarded damages determine both "the maximum that a potential licensee would pay" and "the minimum that a licensor would charge"
-
See SUZANNE SCOTCHMER, INNOVATION AND INCENTIVES 211 (2004) (noting "a circularity in the definition of lost royalty" given that, under a pure damages regime, expected court-awarded damages determine both "[t]he maximum that a potential licensee would pay" and "the minimum that a licensor would charge");
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(2004)
Suzanne Scotchmer, Innovation and Incentives
, pp. 211
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24
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The U. S. Patent system in transition: Policy innovation and the innovation process
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551-52, "In the absence of a right to an injunction, the outcome to a negotiation itself depends on the damages that the two parties believe the patentee could demand."
-
Adam B. Jaffe, The U. S. Patent System in Transition: Policy Innovation and the Innovation Process, 29 RES. POL'y 531, 551-52 (2000) ("[I]n the absence of a right to an injunction, the outcome to [a] negotiation itself depends on the damages that the two parties believe the patentee could demand.").
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Res. Pol'y
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Jaffe, A.B.1
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25
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78649344048
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See, describing the intellectual property laws as "a very elaborate government effort to correct market failure"
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See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND EXECUTION 228 (2005) (describing the intellectual property laws as "a very elaborate government effort to correct market failure").
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(2005)
The Antitrust Enterprise: Principle and Execution
, pp. 228
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Herbert, H.1
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26
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Theories of intellectual property
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See, in, Stephen R. Munzer ed., describing natural-law arguments for intellectual property
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See William Fisher, Theories of Intellectual Property, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 168, 170 (Stephen R. Munzer ed., 2001) (describing natural-law arguments for intellectual property).
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Fisher, W.1
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27
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Optimal remedies for patent infringement: A transactional model
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Cf, 1176, "The goal of remedies for patent infringement should be to provide incentives for efficient transactions to occur...."
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Cf. Paul J. Heald, Optimal Remedies for Patent Infringement: A Transactional Model, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 1165, 1176 (2008) ("The goal of remedies for patent infringement should be to provide incentives for efficient transactions to occur....").
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Heald, P.J.1
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See, &, 4th ed, "With the accession of James I..., patents became less an incentive for new arts and more a royal favor to be dispensed to well-placed courtiers."
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See ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 5 (4th ed. 2007) ("With the accession of James I..., patents became less an incentive for new arts and more a royal favor to be dispensed to well-placed courtiers.").
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Patent Law and Policy: Cases and Materials
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Robert, P.M.1
John, F.D.2
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29
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78649374726
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See, art. I, § 8, cl. 8 granting Congress the power "to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries"
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See U. S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (granting Congress the power "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries").
-
U. S. Const.
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30
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The upside of intellectual property's downside
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See, &, forthcoming 2010 manuscript at 68, on file at, arguing that intellectual property rights can be used to slow progress in "disfavored industries"
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See Christopher A. Cotropia & James Gibson, The Upside of Intellectual Property's Downside, 57 UCLA L. REV. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 68, on file at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1398845) (arguing that intellectual property rights can be used to slow progress in "disfavored industries").
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Cotropia, C.A.1
Gibson, J.2
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See, supra note 17, at, noting the utilitarian rationale for property rights
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See Fisher, supra note 17, at 169 (noting the utilitarian rationale for property rights).
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Fisher1
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32
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78649336636
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See id. at, describing intellectual property rights as a means to "create social and economic conditions conducive to creative intellectual activity"
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See id. at 171 (describing intellectual property rights as a means to "create social and economic conditions conducive to creative intellectual activity").
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33
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78649361420
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Id. at
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Id. at 172.
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34
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See, &, "Today it is acknowledged that analysis and evaluation of intellectual property law are appropriately conducted within an economic framework that seeks to align that law with the dictates of economic efficiency."
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See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 4 (2003) ("Today it is acknowledged that analysis and evaluation of intellectual property law are appropriately conducted within an economic framework that seeks to align that law with the dictates of economic efficiency.").
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The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property Law
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William, M.L.1
Richard, A.P.2
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35
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0004168823
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See, e.g., developing an approach to calculating optimal patent life based on maximizing "net surplus consumers' plus producers' surplus less resource cost "
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See, e.g., WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, INVENTION, GROWTH, AND WELFARE: A THEORETICAL TREATMENT OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 76 (1969) (developing an approach to calculating optimal patent life based on maximizing "net surplus (consumers' plus producers' surplus less resource cost) ").
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Invention, Growth, and Welfare: A Theoretical Treatment of Technological Change
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William, D.N.1
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36
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Spillovers
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See, &, 258, "Spillovers-uncompensated benefits that one person's activity provides to another-are everywhere."
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See Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257, 258 (2007) ("Spillovers-uncompensated benefits that one person's activity provides to another-are everywhere.");
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On the economic efficiency of using law to increase research and development: A critique of various tax, antitrust, intellectual property, and tort law rules and policy proposals
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72-73, observing that private values and costs often differ from overall social values and costs
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Richard S. Markovits, On the Economic Efficiency of Using Law to Increase Research and Development: A Critique of Various Tax, Antitrust, Intellectual Property, and Tort Law Rules and Policy Proposals, 39 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 63, 72-73 (2002) (observing that private values and costs often differ from overall social values and costs).
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Markovits, R.S.1
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38
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78649336935
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This seems especially true given that many proposed goals, such as promoting technological progress or stimulating creativity, appear to be distinct, but not orthogonal, to a goal of maximizing the long-term sum of consumer and producer welfare. In certain respects, the interests of various candidate goals are likely to be aligned, and aspects of analyses of how to promote those goals are likely to be at least qualitatively similar. Thus, learning how to promote a goal of economic efficiency is likely to provide insight on how to promote other interests
-
This seems especially true given that many proposed goals, such as promoting technological progress or stimulating creativity, appear to be distinct, but not orthogonal, to a goal of maximizing the long-term sum of consumer and producer welfare. In certain respects, the interests of various candidate goals are likely to be aligned, and aspects of analyses of how to promote those goals are likely to be at least qualitatively similar. Thus, learning how to promote a goal of economic efficiency is likely to provide insight on how to promote other interests.
-
-
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39
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78649379489
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See, e.g., 4th ed, "The incentive to invent theory suggests that a patent is granted to encourage invention. "
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See, e.g., F. SCOTT KIEFF ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 66 (4th ed. 2008) ("The incentive to invent theory suggests that a patent is granted to encourage invention. ");
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Principles of Patent Law: Cases and Materials
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Scott, F.K.1
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69849101442
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at 6, available at, hereinafter FTC Report "To preserve incentives to invent, patent policy protects inventors against. misappropriation. ". As used in this Article and at least roughly speaking, "invention" refers to the development of a new means for, or way of, doing things, and "innovation" refers to the process of turning an invention into something of relatively significant and immediate social use, such as a commercial product or a means for producing the same, ch 1
-
FED. TRADE COMM'N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY ch. 1, at 6 (2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf [hereinafter FTC Report] ("To preserve incentives to invent, patent policy protects inventors [against]... misappropriation. "). As used in this Article and at least roughly speaking, "invention" refers to the development of a new means for, or way of, doing things, and "innovation" refers to the process of turning an invention into something of relatively significant and immediate social use, such as a commercial product or a means for producing the same.
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Fed. Trade Comm'n, to Promote Innovation: The Proper Balance of Competition and Patent Law and Policy
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41
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Regulating by incentives: Myths, models, and micromarkets
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See, 540 n. 22, "Most commentators define innovation to be the initial commercial application of a technology or process, distinguishing innovation from invention the development of a new idea...."
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See Timothy F. Malloy, Regulating by Incentives: Myths, Models, and Micromarkets, 80 TEXAS L. REV. 531, 540 n. 22 (2002) ("Most commentators define innovation to be the initial commercial application of a technology or process, distinguishing innovation from invention (the development of a new idea)....").
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See, e.g., supra note 29, at, "Incentive to disclose suggests that a patent is granted to encourage an 'enabling disclosure'...."
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See, e.g., KIEFF ET AL., supra note 29, at 67 ("Incentive to disclose suggests that a patent is granted to encourage an 'enabling disclosure'....");
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Kieff1
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43
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-
78649364861
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-
supra note 29, ch. 1, "By requiring disclosure of the patented invention..., the patent system can encourage further innovations if inventors forego keeping their inventions as trade secrets...."
-
FTC REPORT, supra note 29, ch. 1, at 6 ("By requiring disclosure of the patented invention..., the patent system can encourage further innovations if inventors forego keeping their inventions as trade secrets....");
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FTC Report
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44
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78649376151
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supra note 5, at, describing "patent law's rights-for-disclosure bargain"
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Golden, supra note 5, at 2117 (describing "patent law's rights-for-disclosure bargain").
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Golden1
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45
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78649350652
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See, e.g., supra note 29, ch. 1, discussing "the 'notice function' of patents"
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See, e.g., FTC REPORT, supra note 29, ch. 1, at 28 (discussing "the 'notice function' of patents");
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46
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69849100963
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Construing patent claims according to their "interpretive community": A call for an attorney-plus-artisan perspective
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322, "Claims. are meant to provide notice of what a patent covers...."
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John M. Golden, Construing Patent Claims According to Their "Interpretive Community": A Call for an Attorney-Plus-Artisan Perspective, 21 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 321, 322 (2008) ("Claims... are meant to provide notice of what a patent covers....").
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78649353241
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See, e.g., supra note 29, at, describing the "so-called incentive to commercialize, incentive to invest, incentive to innovate, or prospect theory" of patent protection
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See, e.g., KIEFF ET AL., supra note 29, at 68 (describing the "so-called incentive to commercialize, incentive to invest, incentive to innovate, or prospect theory" of patent protection);
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Kieff1
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48
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-
78649337227
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supra note 29, ch. 1, "The patent system also can encourage further innovation by facilitating investment in the research, development, and marketing necessary to commercialize a product."
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FTC RVEPORT, supra note 29, ch. 1, at 6 ("The patent system also can encourage further innovation by facilitating investment in the research, development, and marketing necessary to commercialize a product.").
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FTC Rveport
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49
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78649383986
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See, e.g., observing that patent rights can affect the behavior of potential users of an invention "because some consumers... will not buy a patented good at a supracompetitive price"
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See, e.g., CRAIG ALLEN NARD, THE LAW OF PATENTS 28 (2008) (observing that patent rights can affect the behavior of potential users of an invention "because some consumers... will not buy [a patented good] at a supracompetitive price");
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The Law of Patents
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Craig, A.N.1
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supra note 29, ch. 2, noting that patents can impose social costs in the form of "higher prices or retarded follow-on innovation"
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FTC REPORT, supra note 29, ch. 2, at 8 (noting that patents can impose social costs in the form of "higher prices or retarded follow-on innovation");
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FTC Report
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51
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On the complex economics of patent scope
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843, "The notion of a patent's social costs should include its potential to reduce competition in the market for improvements to the patented technology."
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Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 843 (1990) ("[T]he notion of a patent's social costs should include its potential to reduce competition in the market for improvements to the patented technology.").
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See, &, describing "patent clearance" activity, in which a party seeks to determine whether a planned or existing course of action falls within the scope of another's valid patent rights
-
See JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 48 (2008) (describing "patent clearance" activity, in which a party seeks to determine whether a planned or existing course of action falls within the scope of another's valid patent rights).
-
(2008)
Patent Failure: How Judges, Bureaucrats, and Lawyers Put Innovators at Risk
, pp. 48
-
-
James, B.1
Michael, J.M.2
-
53
-
-
78649390103
-
-
See, supra note 29, at, observing that, in accordance with a prospect theory of patent rights, "parties will bargain toward an efficient result in which the firm that is best able to bring the patented subject matter to market will do so"
-
See KIEFF ET AL., supra note 29, at 69 (observing that, in accordance with a prospect theory of patent rights, "parties will bargain toward an efficient result in which the firm that is best able to bring the patented subject matter to market will do so").
-
-
-
Kieff1
-
54
-
-
0039865232
-
-
See, e.g., supra note 29, executive summary, at 18 expressing concern about a "collective action problem that may frustrate business challenges to questionable patents"
-
See, e.g., FTC REPORT, supra note 29, executive summary, at 18 (expressing concern about a "collective action problem [that] may frustrate business challenges to questionable patents").
-
FTC Report
-
-
-
55
-
-
78649356596
-
-
See, e.g., supra note 29, "Incentive to design around proudly offers the patent as forbidden turf, taunting competitors to circumvent its scope by inventing substitutes."
-
See, e.g., KIEFF ET AL., supra note 29, at 70 ("Incentive to design around proudly offers the patent as forbidden turf, taunting competitors to circumvent its scope by inventing substitutes.");
-
-
-
Kieff1
-
56
-
-
78649359057
-
-
supra note 29, ch. 1, "Patent disclosures may stimulate competition to design around a patent."
-
FTC REPORT, supra note 29, ch. 1, at 27 ("[P]atent disclosures may stimulate competition to design around a patent.").
-
FTC Report
, pp. 27
-
-
-
57
-
-
0042465009
-
Property rights and liability rules: The ex ante view of the cathedral
-
Cf, 632, finding that none of an array of potential rules provides optimal incentives for two parties because none "enables both parties to capture the full social benefits produced by their respective investments in harm reduction"
-
Cf. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Property Rights and Liability Rules: The Ex Ante View of the Cathedral, 100 MICH. L. REV. 601, 632 (2001) (finding that none of an array of potential rules provides optimal incentives for two parties because none "enable[s] both parties to capture the full social benefits produced by their respective investments in harm reduction").
-
(2001)
Mich. L. Rev.
, vol.100
, pp. 601
-
-
Bebchuk, L.A.1
-
58
-
-
0041529183
-
Legal restrictions on exploitation of the patent monopoly: An economic analysis
-
271
-
William F. Baxter, Legal Restrictions on Exploitation of the Patent Monopoly: An Economic Analysis, 76 YALE L. J. 267, 271 (1966).
-
(1966)
Yale L. J.
, vol.76
, pp. 267
-
-
Baxter, W.F.1
-
59
-
-
78649386000
-
-
To try to avoid terminological confusion, I use "independent creator", rather than "independent inventor." The latter term commonly describes an inventor who acts outside the employ of a substantial-sized business entity
-
To try to avoid terminological confusion, I use "independent creator", rather than "independent inventor." The latter term commonly describes an inventor who acts outside the employ of a substantial-sized business entity.
-
-
-
-
60
-
-
78649378810
-
-
See, § 154 a 1, describing "the right to exclude"
-
See 35 U. S. C. § 154 (a) (1) (2006) (describing "the right to exclude").
-
(2006)
U. S. C.
, vol.35
-
-
-
61
-
-
78649384288
-
-
See id. §, a 2 describing the current default patent term
-
See id. § 154 (a) (2) (describing the current default patent term).
-
-
-
-
62
-
-
70649109692
-
-
See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L. L. C., 395, Roberts, C. J., concurring "From at least the early 19th century, courts have granted injunctive relief upon a finding of infringement in the vast majority of patent cases."
-
See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L. L. C., 547 U. S. 388, 395 (2006) (Roberts, C. J., concurring) ("From at least the early 19th century, courts have granted injunctive relief upon a finding of infringement in the vast majority of patent cases.").
-
(2006)
U. S.
, vol.547
, pp. 388
-
-
-
63
-
-
78649344994
-
-
See, supra note 5, at, n. 166 discussing current approaches to issuing preliminary injunctions
-
See Golden, supra note 5, at 2156 n. 166 (discussing current approaches to issuing preliminary injunctions).
-
-
-
Golden1
-
64
-
-
78649375865
-
-
See, §, providing U. S. courts with "power to punish by fine or imprisonment... such contempt as 3 Disobedience or resistance to its lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command"
-
See 18 U. S. C. § 401 (2006) (providing U. S. courts with "power to punish by fine or imprisonment... such contempt [as] (3) Disobedience or resistance to its lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command").
-
(2006)
U. S. C.
, vol.18
, pp. 401
-
-
-
65
-
-
78649350651
-
-
See, § 2.8 2, 2d ed, observing that multiple courts have required disgorgement as a remedy for civil contempt
-
See 1 DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 2.8 (2), at 195 (2d ed. 1993) (observing that multiple courts have required disgorgement as a remedy for civil contempt);
-
(1993)
Dan B. Dobbs, Law of Remedies
, vol.1
, pp. 195
-
-
-
66
-
-
78649343475
-
Enforcement of injunctive orders and decrees in patent cases
-
305, observing that, "even though 'profits' of the infringer are not recoverable in the ordinary patent infringement action", it "appears settled that the complainant is entitled to the contemnor's profits from sales of any products made in violation of the injunction against infringement"
-
James C. Nemmers, Enforcement of Injunctive Orders and Decrees in Patent Cases, 7 IND. L. REV. 287, 305 (1973) (observing that, "even though 'profits' of the infringer are not recoverable in the ordinary patent infringement action", it "appears settled that the complainant is entitled to the contemnor's profits from sales of any products made in violation of the injunction against infringement");
-
(1973)
Ind. L. Rev.
, vol.7
, pp. 287
-
-
Nemmers, J.C.1
-
67
-
-
78649382765
-
-
see also Dow Chem. Co. v. Chem. Cleaning, Inc., 1214-15, 5th Cir, "In dealing with a civil contempt proceeding the district court was not bound by the provisions of Title 35, U. S. C., 284."
-
see also Dow Chem. Co. v. Chem. Cleaning, Inc., 434 F.2d 1212, 1214-15 (5th Cir. 1970) ("In dealing with a civil contempt proceeding the district court was not bound by the provisions of Title 35, U. S. C., 284.");
-
(1970)
F.2d
, vol.434
, pp. 1212
-
-
-
68
-
-
78649377343
-
-
*11 N. 3 E. D. Pa. Oct. 23, 2006
-
*11 n. 3 (E. D. Pa. Oct. 23, 2006) (agreeing that various cases "stand for the proposition that disgorgement of profits is a viable theory of recovery in contempt actions, particularly in the absence of proof of direct loss to the moving party");
-
(2006)
WL
, pp. 3053317
-
-
-
69
-
-
78649368187
-
-
Ga.-Pac. Corp. v. U. S. Plywood Corp., 534 S. D. N. Y, "It is arguable that it would be inimical to the sound administration of justice... to measure the patent owner's monetary recovery by any standard which permitted the infringer to retain profits that he had made while in contempt of court."
-
Ga.-Pac. Corp. v. U. S. Plywood Corp., 243 F. Supp. 500, 534 (S. D. N. Y. 1965) ("[I]t is arguable that it would be inimical to the sound administration of justice... to measure the patent owner's monetary recovery by any standard which permitted the infringer to retain profits that he had made while in contempt of court.").
-
(1965)
F. Supp.
, vol.243
, pp. 500
-
-
-
70
-
-
78649376138
-
-
See generally KSM Fastening Sys., Inc. v. H. A. Jones Co., 1524 n. 2 Fed. Cir, instructing readers to consult Nemmers, supra, "for analyses... of the different remedies available for civil contempt vis-à-vis those provided under the patent statute"
-
See generally KSM Fastening Sys., Inc. v. H. A. Jones Co., 776 F.2d 1522, 1524 n. 2 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (instructing readers to consult Nemmers, supra, "for analyses... of the different remedies available for civil contempt vis-à-vis those provided under the patent statute").
-
(1985)
F.2d
, vol.776
, pp. 1522
-
-
-
71
-
-
77956775449
-
-
§
-
35 U. S. C. § 284.
-
U. S. C.
, vol.35
, pp. 284
-
-
-
72
-
-
78649381262
-
-
Id
-
Id.
-
-
-
-
73
-
-
80053200193
-
Claiming copyleft in open source software: What if the free software foundation's general public license (gpl) had been patented?
-
Compare, "Patent law lacks statutory damages...."
-
Compare Greg R. Vetter, Claiming Copyleft in Open Source Software: What If the Free Software Foundation's General Public License (GPL) Had Been Patented?, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 279, 305 ("Patent law lacks statutory damages....")
-
(2008)
Mich. St. L. Rev.
, vol.279-305
-
-
Vetter, G.R.1
-
74
-
-
78649375007
-
-
with, § 1117 c, permitting a trademark owner to elect statutory damages in certain situations
-
with 15 U. S. C. § 1117 (c) (2006) (permitting a trademark owner to elect statutory damages in certain situations)
-
(2006)
U. S. C.
, vol.15
-
-
-
75
-
-
78649371315
-
-
id. § 1117 d same
-
id. § 1117 (d) (same)
-
-
-
-
76
-
-
77951285121
-
-
§, c 1, permitting a copyright owner to elect statutory damages
-
and 17 U. S. C. § 504 (c) (1) (2006) (permitting a copyright owner to elect statutory damages).
-
(2006)
U. S. C.
, vol.17
, pp. 504
-
-
-
77
-
-
78649297017
-
Let the games begin: Incentives to innovation in the new economy of intellectual property law
-
Compare, 323, discussing limitation of damages remedies as a result of amendment of the patent statute in 1946
-
Compare Amy L. Landers, Let the Games Begin: Incentives to Innovation in the New Economy of Intellectual Property Law, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 307, 323 (2006) (discussing limitation of damages remedies as a result of amendment of the patent statute in 1946)
-
(2006)
Santa Clara L. Rev.
, vol.46
, pp. 307
-
-
Landers, A.L.1
-
78
-
-
78649340320
-
-
with, § 1117 a, providing that, subject to various conditions, a trademark owner may recover "defendant's profits"
-
with 15 U. S. C. § 1117 (a) (providing that, subject to various conditions, a trademark owner may recover "defendant's profits")
-
U. S. C.
, vol.15
-
-
-
79
-
-
78649380681
-
-
§ 504 b, "The copyright owner is entitled to recover. any profits of the infringer that are attributable to the infringement...."
-
and 17 U. S. C. § 504 (b) ("The copyright owner is entitled to recover... any profits of the infringer that are attributable to the infringement....").
-
U. S. C.
, vol.17
-
-
-
80
-
-
78649352972
-
-
But cf, &, § 31.5.2, at, "Virtually all modern opinions hold that... to recover the defendant's profits, a trademark plaintiff must show that the defendant acted 'willfully' or 'in bad faith.'"
-
But cf. ROGER E. SCHECHTER & JOHN R. THOMAS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: THE LAW OF COPYRIGHTS, PATENTS AND TRADEMARKS § 31.5.2, at 768 (2003) ("Virtually all modern opinions hold that... to recover the defendant's profits, [a trademark] plaintiff must show that the defendant acted 'willfully' or 'in bad faith.'").
-
(2003)
Intellectual Property: The Law of Copyrights, Patents and Trademarks
, pp. 768
-
-
Roger, E.S.1
John, R.T.2
-
81
-
-
78649352961
-
-
See, &, supra note 50, § 9.1.2.2, noting a substantial- similarity requirement for copyright infringement
-
See SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 50, § 9.1.2.2, at 177 (noting a substantial-similarity requirement for copyright infringement);
-
-
-
Schechter1
Thomas2
-
82
-
-
78649383987
-
-
id. § 29.1.1, at, describing similarity between marks as the "first factor" in determining whether there is trademark infringement due to a likelihood of confusion
-
id. § 29.1.1, at 640 (describing similarity between marks as the "first factor" in determining whether there is trademark infringement due to a likelihood of confusion);
-
-
-
-
83
-
-
78649345386
-
-
id. §, discussing trademark dilution by blurring
-
id. § 30. 3 (discussing trademark dilution by blurring);
-
, vol.30
, pp. 3
-
-
-
84
-
-
78649389808
-
-
see also Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 881 9th Cir, describing trademark tarnishment
-
see also Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 189 F.3d 868, 881 (9th Cir. 1999) (describing trademark tarnishment).
-
(1999)
F.3d
, vol.189
, pp. 868
-
-
-
85
-
-
78649363983
-
-
See, supra note 31, "Claims-numbered clauses at the end of a patent-are meant to provide notice of what a patent covers...."
-
See Golden, supra note 31, at 322 ("Claims-numbered clauses at the end of a patent-are meant to provide notice of what a patent covers....").
-
-
-
Golden1
-
86
-
-
69849100079
-
The formal structure of patent law and the limits of enablement
-
See, 1169, "Modern patent claims define the scope of the inventor's rights by reciting properties; all things having those properties fall within the scope of a patent's claims."
-
See Jeffrey A. Lefstin, The Formal Structure of Patent Law and the Limits of Enablement, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 1141, 1169 (2008) ("Modern patent claims define the scope of the inventor's rights by reciting properties; all things having those properties fall within the scope of a patent's claims.").
-
(2008)
Berkeley Tech. L. J.
, vol.23
, pp. 1141
-
-
Lefstin, J.A.1
-
87
-
-
51849134005
-
-
See, describing how proof of copyright infringement requires evidence that the defendant "copied the plaintiff's copyrighted work, rather than created it independently"
-
See CRAIG ALLEN NARD ET AL., THE LAW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 446 (2006) (describing how proof of copyright infringement requires evidence that the defendant "copied the plaintiff's copyrighted work, rather than created it independently").
-
(2006)
The Law of Intellectual Property
, pp. 446
-
-
Craig, A.N.1
-
88
-
-
77956410222
-
-
Such exceptions include situations where 1 there was "good faith" commercial use of a business-method invention before the relevant patent's "effective filing date, ", §, b 1
-
Such exceptions include situations where (1) there was "good faith" commercial use of a business-method invention before the relevant patent's "effective filing date", 35 U. S. C. § 273 (b) (1) (2006);
-
(2006)
U. S. C.
, vol.35
, pp. 273
-
-
-
89
-
-
78649383668
-
-
and 2 where otherwise infringing activity was a "solely for uses reasonably related to the development and submission of information" for regulatory approval of "drugs or veterinary biological products, "
-
and (2) where otherwise infringing activity was (a) "solely for uses reasonably related to the development and submission of information" for regulatory approval of "drugs or veterinary biological products, "
-
-
-
-
90
-
-
78649365423
-
-
id. §, e 1, or b "performed for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly philosophical inquiry, "
-
id. § 271 (e) (1), or (b) "performed for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly philosophical inquiry, "
-
-
-
-
91
-
-
26244454716
-
-
Madey v. Duke Univ., 1362 Fed. Cir, internal quotation marks omitted
-
Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted).
-
(2002)
F.3d
, vol.307
, pp. 1351
-
-
-
92
-
-
84882432198
-
-
§, a
-
35 U. S. C. § 271 (a).
-
U. S. C.
, vol.35
, pp. 271
-
-
-
93
-
-
34250678122
-
Intellectual property as property: Delineating entitlements in information
-
See, 1811
-
See Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property as Property: Delineating Entitlements in Information, 116 YALE L. J. 1742, 1811 (2007)
-
(2007)
Yale L. J.
, vol.116
, pp. 1742
-
-
Smith, H.E.1
-
94
-
-
78649367341
-
-
contrasting U. S. patent law's general lack of explicit provision for compulsory licenses to U. S. copyright law's multiple explicit provisions. But when a patented invention has been "conceived or first actually reduced to practice in the performance of work under a funding agreement" with a federal agency, § 201 e, the Patent Act provides some capacity for the agency to impose a compulsory license
-
(contrasting U. S. patent law's general lack of explicit provision for compulsory licenses to U. S. copyright law's multiple explicit provisions). But when a patented invention has been "conceived or first actually reduced to practice in the performance of work under a funding agreement" with a federal agency, 35 U. S. C. § 201 (e), the Patent Act provides some capacity for the agency to impose a compulsory license.
-
U. S. C.
, vol.35
-
-
-
95
-
-
78649370418
-
-
Id. § 203 a
-
Id. § 203 (a).
-
-
-
-
96
-
-
69849090003
-
The case for registering patents and the law and economics of present patent-obtaining rules
-
But see, 71, arguing the potential benefits of a "registration model" for patents
-
But see F. Scott Kieff, The Case for Registering Patents and the Law and Economics of Present Patent-Obtaining Rules, 45 B. C. L. REV. 55, 71 (2003) (arguing the potential benefits of a "registration model" for patents).
-
(2003)
B. C. L. Rev.
, vol.45
, pp. 55
-
-
Kieff, F.S.1
-
97
-
-
78649357478
-
-
See, § 103 a, describing patent law's nonobviousness requirement
-
See 35 U. S. C. § 103 (a) (describing patent law's nonobviousness requirement).
-
U. S. C.
, vol.35
-
-
-
98
-
-
78649375880
-
-
See, &, supra note 50, § 3.1 describing copyright's originality requirement
-
See SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 50, § 3.1 (describing copyright's originality requirement).
-
-
-
Schechter1
Thomas2
-
99
-
-
77952760538
-
-
17, § 102 a
-
17 U. S. C. § 102 (a) (2006);
-
(2006)
U. S. C.
-
-
-
100
-
-
78649384911
-
-
see also, &, supra note 50, § 5.1, "Under the current statute, once a work is written down or otherwise fixed, federal protection attaches...."
-
see also SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 50, § 5.1, at 76 ("Under the current statute, once a work is written down or otherwise fixed, federal protection attaches....").
-
-
-
Schechter1
Thomas2
-
101
-
-
78649381869
-
-
supra note 50, § 26.1
-
SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 50, § 26.1, at 551.
-
-
-
Schechter1
Thomas2
-
102
-
-
84860308824
-
-
See, §, b, d, providing for federal trademark registration when an applicant "has a bona fide intention... to use a trademark in commerce" and later verifies the existence of such use
-
See 15 U. S. C. § 1051 (b), (d) (2006) (providing for federal trademark registration when an applicant "has a bona fide intention... to use a trademark in commerce" and later verifies the existence of such use).
-
(2006)
U. S. C.
, vol.15
, pp. 1051
-
-
-
103
-
-
78649366593
-
-
§
-
35 U. S. C. § 131.
-
U. S. C.
, vol.35
, pp. 131
-
-
-
104
-
-
78649382764
-
-
See id. §§, providing for ex parte and inter partes reexamination
-
See id. §§ 301-318 (providing for ex parte and inter partes reexamination).
-
-
-
-
105
-
-
78649367613
-
-
See id. §, listing invalidity and unenforceability as defenses in an infringement suit
-
See id. § 282 (listing invalidity and unenforceability as defenses in an infringement suit).
-
-
-
-
106
-
-
22144437353
-
Probabilistic patents
-
See, &, 76, "The risk that a patent will be declared invalid is substantial."
-
See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, 19 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 75, 76 (2005) ("The risk that a patent will be declared invalid is substantial.");
-
(2005)
J. Econ. Perspectives
, vol.19
, pp. 75
-
-
Lemley, M.A.1
Shapiro, C.2
-
107
-
-
78649337791
-
-
U. S. Patent & TRADEMARK OFFICE, JUNE 30, reporting that 73% of ex parte reexaminations completed from 1981 through June 2009 resulted in canceled or amended claims 2009
-
U. S. Patent & TRADEMARK OFFICE, EX PARTE REEXAMINATION FILING DATA-JUNE 30, 2009, at 2 (2009), http://www.uspto.gov/web/patents/documents/ex- parte.pdf (reporting that 73% of ex parte reexaminations completed from 1981 through June 2009 resulted in canceled or amended claims);
-
(2009)
Ex Parte Reexamination Filing Data
, pp. 2
-
-
-
108
-
-
78649344056
-
-
U. S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, JUNE 30, 2009, at, reporting that 95% of inter partes reexaminations completed from 1999 through June 2009 resulted in canceled, disclaimed, or amended claims
-
U. S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, INTER PARTES REEXAMINATION FILING DATA-JUNE 30, 2009, at 1 (2009), http://www.uspto.gov/web/patents/documents/ inter-partes.pdf (reporting that 95% of inter partes reexaminations completed from 1999 through June 2009 resulted in canceled, disclaimed, or amended claims).
-
(2009)
Inter Partes Reexamination Filing Data
, pp. 1
-
-
-
109
-
-
15744401532
-
Building a better bounty: Litigation-stage rewards for defeating patents
-
See, 681, discussing how patent law "helps to solve a free rider problem that would otherwise undercut an inventor's incentive to risk inventing"
-
See Joseph Scott Miller, Building a Better Bounty: Litigation-Stage Rewards for Defeating Patents, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 667, 681 (2004) (discussing how patent law "helps to solve a free rider problem that would otherwise undercut an inventor's incentive to risk inventing").
-
(2004)
Berkeley Tech. L. J.
, vol.19
, pp. 667
-
-
Miller, J.S.1
-
110
-
-
0000584479
-
Economic welfare and the allocation of resources for invention
-
See, in, 616-17, contending that free availability of information about a novel production process "insures optimal utilization of the information"
-
See Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in NAT'L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH, THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609, 616-17 (1962) (contending that free availability of information about a novel production process "insures optimal utilization of the information").
-
(1962)
Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, the Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity: Economic and Social Factors
, pp. 609
-
-
Arrow, K.J.1
-
111
-
-
78649338933
-
-
See id, "In a free enterprise economy, inventive activity is supported by using the invention to create property rights; precisely to the extent that it is successful, there is an underutilization of the information. "
-
See id. at 617 ("In a free enterprise economy, inventive activity is supported by using the invention to create property rights; precisely to the extent that it is successful, there is an underutilization of the information. ").
-
-
-
-
112
-
-
78649390749
-
-
See, supra note 39, describing how a patent "decreases the incentives of innovators other than the initial patentee to engage in further research"
-
See Baxter, supra note 39, at 270 (describing how a patent "decreases the incentives of innovators other than the initial patentee to engage in further research");
-
-
-
Baxter1
-
113
-
-
78649373884
-
-
supra note 33, observing that "property rights" in a pioneer invention will "greatly increase an improver's chances of becoming enmeshed in litigation"
-
Merges & Nelson, supra note 33, at 916 (observing that "property rights" in a pioneer invention will "greatly increase an improver's chances of becoming enmeshed in litigation").
-
-
-
Merges1
Nelson2
-
114
-
-
77951861297
-
A cost-benefit approach to patent obviousness
-
See, 73, observing that, under some circumstances, "patents may create such enormous incentives that research funds are diverted from other places where they could have been more socially efficiently invested"
-
See Tun-Jen Chiang, A Cost-Benefit Approach to Patent Obviousness, 82 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 39, 73 (2008) (observing that, under some circumstances, "patents may create such enormous incentives that research funds are diverted from other places where they could have been more socially efficiently invested").
-
(2008)
St. John's L. Rev.
, vol.82
, pp. 39
-
-
Chiang, T.1
-
115
-
-
78649360252
-
-
See U. S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, showing that at least 326, 508 utility-patent applications were filed in every year from 2001 through
-
See U. S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U. S. PATENT ACTIVITY: CALENDAR YEARS 1790 TO THE PRESENT 1 (2009), http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/ oeip/taf/h-counts.pdf (showing that at least 326, 508 utility-patent applications were filed in every year from 2001 through 2008).
-
(2008)
U. S. Patent Activity: Calendar Years 1790 to the Present
, pp. 1
-
-
-
116
-
-
78649356595
-
-
supra note 34, fig.6.1
-
BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 34, at 122 fig.6.1.
-
-
-
Bessen1
Meurer2
-
117
-
-
78649340030
-
-
See id, "A large number of property rights held by many different owners can make the clearance of rights for new investment costly."
-
See id. at 68 ("A large number of property rights held by many different owners can make the clearance of rights for new investment costly.");
-
-
-
-
118
-
-
78649385209
-
-
id, "The cost of clearance ratchets up even more when patents have fuzzy boundaries and when many patents are likely to be found invalid."
-
id. at 70 ("The cost of clearance ratchets up even more when patents have fuzzy boundaries and when many patents are likely to be found invalid.").
-
-
-
-
119
-
-
78649377622
-
-
See, &, supra note 5, describing potential effects of switching costs on licensing negotiations
-
See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 5, at 2000-05 (describing potential effects of switching costs on licensing negotiations);
-
-
-
Lemley1
Shapiro2
-
120
-
-
78649339151
-
Don't feed the trolls?
-
see also, Sept, 492-93, describing how timing can affect the cost of a patent license
-
see also John Johnson et al., Don't Feed the Trolls?, LES NOUVELLES, Sept. 2007, at 487, 492-93 (describing how timing can affect the cost of a patent license).
-
(2007)
Les Nouvelles
, pp. 487
-
-
Johnson, J.1
-
121
-
-
78649349478
-
-
See, &, supra note 5, contending that "the threat of an injunction can enable a patent holder to negotiate royalties far in excess of the patent holder's true economic contribution", thereby effectively generating "a tax on new products incorporating the patented technology"
-
See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 5, at 1993 (contending that "the threat of an injunction can enable a patent holder to negotiate royalties far in excess of the patent holder's true economic contribution", thereby effectively generating "a tax on new products incorporating the patented technology").
-
-
-
Lemley1
Shapiro2
-
122
-
-
78649355694
-
High technology entrepreneurs and the patent system: Results of the 2008 berkeley patent survey
-
See, forthcoming, manuscript at 45 fig.4, on file at, showing that 45.49% of respondents cited enforcement costs as a reason not to patent
-
See Stuart J. H. Graham et al., High Technology Entrepreneurs and the Patent System: Results of the 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 45 fig.4, on file at http://ssrn.com/ abstract=1429049) (showing that 45.49% of respondents cited enforcement costs as a reason not to patent).
-
(2009)
Berkeley Tech. L. J.
, vol.24
-
-
Graham, S.J.H.1
-
124
-
-
0006042562
-
Protecting their intellectual assets: Appropriability conditions and why U. S. Manufacturing firms patent (or not)
-
cf, available at, finding that survey results "suggest that the costs associated with patents, particularly their defense, disproportionately dissuade small firms from availing themselves of patent protection"
-
cf. Wesley M. Cohen et al., Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions and Why U. S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not) 25 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7552, 2000), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w7552 (finding that survey results "suggest that the costs associated with patents, particularly their defense, disproportionately dissuad[e] small firms from availing themselves of patent protection").
-
(2000)
Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7552
, vol.25
-
-
Cohen, W.M.1
-
125
-
-
78649385696
-
Roadblocks or building blocks
-
See, in, Bruce Berman ed., observing that "patentees cannot dial 911 for the local police". If a patentee brings a private suit and then wins an injunction against continued infringement, a U. S. Attorney could choose to litigate a criminal contempt proceeding for violation of that injunction, but if the U. S. Attorney declines to do so, the patentee will then have to prosecute the case "on behalf of the United States with the patentee's attorney appointed as a special prosecutor."
-
See Bruce Berman, Roadblocks or Building Blocks, in MAKING INNOVATION PAY: PEOPLE WHO TURN IP INTO SHAREHOLDER VALUE 3, 5 (Bruce Berman ed., 2006) (observing that "patentees cannot dial 911 for the local police"). If a patentee brings a private suit and then wins an injunction against continued infringement, a U. S. Attorney could choose to litigate a criminal contempt proceeding for violation of that injunction, but if the U. S. Attorney declines to do so, the patentee will then have to prosecute the case "on behalf of the United States with the [patentee's] attorney appointed as a special prosecutor."
-
(2006)
Making Innovation Pay: People Who Turn Ip Into Shareholder Value
, vol.3
, pp. 5
-
-
Berman, B.1
-
126
-
-
78649388032
-
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supra note 46
-
Nemmers, supra note 46, at 293-94.
-
-
-
Nemmers1
-
127
-
-
78649376758
-
Why do start-ups patent?
-
See, &, 1086 n. 101, observing that a credible threat of patent enforcement requires "the ability to detect infringement in the first instance, which may be very costly itself"
-
See Stuart J. H. Graham & Ted Sichelman, Why Do Start-Ups Patent?, BVERKELEY TECH. L. J. 1063, 1086 n. 101 (2008) (observing that a credible threat of patent enforcement requires "the ability to detect infringement in the first instance, which may be very costly itself").
-
(2008)
Bverkeley Tech. L. J.
, pp. 1063
-
-
Graham, S.J.H.1
Sichelman, T.2
-
128
-
-
78649368186
-
Ensuring royalty compliance in high-technology licensing
-
Cf, in, 179, Robert Goldscheider & Alan H. Gordon eds., noting a common problem that "electronic devices are so small, or the information is embedded so far within a product, that the evidence of infringement seems virtually impossible to obtain"
-
Cf. Arthur M. Nutter, Ensuring Royalty Compliance in High-Technology Licensing, in LICENSING BEST PRACTICES: STRATEGIC, TERRITORIAL, AND TECHNOLOGY ISSUES 179, 179 (Robert Goldscheider & Alan H. Gordon eds., 2006) (noting a common problem that "electronic devices are so small, or the information is embedded so far within a product, that the evidence of infringement seems virtually impossible to obtain");
-
(2006)
Licensing Best Practices: Strategic, Territorial, and Technology Issues
, pp. 179
-
-
Nutter, A.M.1
-
129
-
-
78649360251
-
Patent incentives in the semiconductor industry
-
Note, 148, reporting that "detecting infringement of integrated circuit patents is expensive and difficult"
-
Dan Callaway, Note, Patent Incentives in the Semiconductor Industry, 4 HASTINGS BUS. L. J. 135, 148 (2008) (reporting that "detecting infringement of integrated circuit patents is expensive and difficult").
-
(2008)
Hastings Bus. L. J.
, vol.4
, pp. 135
-
-
Callaway, D.1
-
130
-
-
78649386879
-
-
Cf, &, supra note 81, noting that detection of infringement can be particularly "costly" when a patent only covers "internal processes that are not discernable from commercial products"
-
Cf. Graham & Sichelman, supra note 81, at 1086 n. 101 (noting that detection of infringement can be particularly "costly" when a patent only covers "internal processes that are not discernable from commercial products").
-
, Issue.101
, pp. 1086
-
-
Graham1
Sichelman2
-
131
-
-
61349099440
-
How are patent cases resolved? An empirical examination of the adjudication and settlement of patent disputes
-
See, &, 288, "The average number of days to termination for cases with a final court ruling was 679 for 1995, 867 for 1997, and 780 for 2000...."
-
See Jay P. Kesan & Gwendolyn G. Ball, How Are Patent Cases Resolved? An Empirical Examination of the Adjudication and Settlement of Patent Disputes, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 237, 288 (2006) ("The average number of days to termination for cases with a final court ruling was 679 for 1995, 867 for 1997, and 780 for 2000....").
-
(2006)
Wash. U. L. Rev.
, vol.84
, pp. 237
-
-
Kesan, J.P.1
Ball, G.G.2
-
132
-
-
78649366010
-
-
See, reporting survey results indicating "median litigation costs" of $650, 000 for patent-infringement suits in which less than $1 million was at risk
-
See LAW PRACTICE MGMT. COMM., AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS'N, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 2009, at 29 (2009) (reporting survey results indicating "median litigation costs" of $650, 000 for patent-infringement suits in which less than $1 million was at risk).
-
(2009)
Law Practice Mgmt. Comm., Am. Intellectual Prop. Law Ass'n, Report of the Economic Survey 2009
, pp. 29
-
-
-
133
-
-
78649383669
-
-
Id
-
Id.
-
-
-
-
134
-
-
78649352675
-
Alternative dispute resolution in commercial intellectual property disputes
-
See, &, 1723, reporting that "many attorneys and firms balk at contingent-fee patent cases" and "individual plaintiffs often have a great deal of trouble finding representation on a contingent-fee basis"
-
See Scott H. Blackman & Rebecca M. McNeill, Alternative Dispute Resolution in Commercial Intellectual Property Disputes, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 1709, 1723 (1998) (reporting that "[m]any attorneys and firms balk at contingent-fee [patent] cases" and "individual plaintiffs often have a great deal of trouble finding representation on a contingent-fee basis").
-
(1998)
Am. U. L. Rev.
, vol.47
, pp. 1709
-
-
Blackman, S.H.1
McNeill, R.M.2
-
135
-
-
78649380399
-
A piece of the action
-
See, Nov, 47 "Most... large firms... either take an occasional, one-off case, or a small dose of work-usually less than 5 percent of billables-on a contingency basis."
-
See Carlyn Kolker, A Piece of the Action, LITIG. 2005: SUPPLEMENT TO AM. LAW. & CORP. COUNS., Nov. 2005, at 46, 47 ("Most... large firms... either tak[e] an occasional, one-off case, or a small dose of work-usually less than 5 percent of billables-on a contingency basis.").
-
(2005)
Litig. 2005: Supplement to Am. Law. & Corp. Couns.
, pp. 46
-
-
Kolker, C.1
-
136
-
-
78649336934
-
-
See id, reporting that Baker Botts can spend $100, 000 or more in investigating a patent case before deciding to take it on contingency
-
See id. at 52 (reporting that Baker Botts can spend $100, 000 or more in investigating a patent case before deciding to take it on contingency).
-
-
-
-
137
-
-
78649343485
-
More patent cases are being taken on contingency fee basis
-
See, Aug. 21, available at, reporting an attorney estimate "that recovery would have to be at least $15 million, and closer to $25 million, in order to justify taking a patent case on a contingent fee basis"
-
See Sylvia Hsieh, More Patent Cases Are Being Taken on Contingency Fee Basis, MINN. LAWYER, Aug. 21, 2006, available at http://www.minnlawyer.com/ article.cfm?recid=74431 (reporting an attorney estimate "that recovery would have to be at least $15 million, and closer to $25 million, in order to justify taking a patent case on a contingent fee basis").
-
(2006)
Minn. Lawyer
-
-
Hsieh, S.1
-
138
-
-
78649359624
-
-
See id, "More common than a straight contingent fee... is a hybrid or blended fee in which the law firm reduces its hourly rate in exchange for a percentage or bonus...."
-
See id. at 7 ("More common [than a straight contingent fee]... is a hybrid or blended fee in which the [law] firm reduces its hourly rate in exchange for a percentage or bonus....").
-
-
-
-
139
-
-
78649356594
-
-
Id, "Under a contingent fee arrangement, the company might agree to pay the expenses, which could amount to $1 million over four years...."
-
Id. at 5 ("Under a contingent fee arrangement, the company might agree to pay the expenses, which could amount to $1 million over four years....").
-
-
-
-
140
-
-
78649356882
-
-
See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text
-
See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
-
-
-
-
141
-
-
84929868257
-
-
See, &, "Inventing something new often requires a substantial investment of time, money, and other resources."
-
See ROGER D. BLAIR & THOMAS F. COTTER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL DIMENSIONS OF RIGHTS AND REMEDIES 14 (2005) ("Inventing something new often requires a substantial investment of time, money, and other resources.").
-
(2005)
Intellectual Property: Economic and Legal Dimensions of Rights and Remedies
, pp. 14
-
-
Roger, D.B.1
Thomas, F.C.2
-
142
-
-
78649376149
-
-
See, supra note 68, "If the invention is apparent from the inventor's eventual offering in the market, other firms, noting consumer demand, will... use the invention to provide a substitute good or service."
-
See Miller, supra note 68, at 682 ("If the invention is apparent from the inventor's eventual offering in the market, other firms, noting consumer demand, will... use the invention to provide a substitute good or service.").
-
-
-
Miller1
-
143
-
-
78649385999
-
-
See, &, supra note 94, describing how free riding can render an inventor "unable to recoup her sunk costs of invention"
-
See BLAIR & COTTER, supra note 94, at 14 (describing how free riding can render an inventor "unable to recoup her sunk costs of invention");
-
-
-
Blair1
Cotter2
-
144
-
-
78649367339
-
-
supra note 68, concluding that, with free riding, "soon, all who remain in the market will be selling at the competitive price dictated by the cost structure that the free riders face, which ignores the costs of inventing"
-
Miller, supra note 68, at 682 (concluding that, with free riding, "[s]oon, all who remain in the market will be selling at the competitive price dictated by the cost structure that the free riders face, which ignores the costs of inventing").
-
-
-
Miller1
-
145
-
-
0001563414
-
The nature and function of the patent system
-
276-78
-
Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J. L. & ECON. 265, 276-78 (1977).
-
(1977)
J. L. & Econ.
, vol.20
, pp. 265
-
-
Kitch, E.W.1
-
146
-
-
78649387113
-
-
See, &, supra note 33, concluding that historical evidence suggests that "control of subsequent developments by one party" with broad patent rights tends to impede efficient follow-on innovation
-
See Merges & Nelson, supra note 33, at 916 (concluding that
-
-
-
Merges1
Nelson2
-
147
-
-
2942520956
-
Rethinking the prospect theory of patents
-
See, 444, "The race to claim patent rights can become a race to diminish the patentee's rents by dedicating the invention to the public sooner."
-
See John F. Duffy, Rethinking the Prospect Theory of Patents, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 439, 444 (2004) ("[T]he race to claim patent rights [can] becom[e] a race to diminish the patentee's rents by dedicating the invention to the public sooner.").
-
(2004)
U. Chi. L. Rev.
, vol.71
, pp. 439
-
-
Duffy, J.F.1
-
148
-
-
69849110566
-
-
See, §, para. 1, setting forth patent law's basic disclosure requirements
-
See 35 U. S. C. § 112, para. 1 (2006) (setting forth patent law's basic disclosure requirements).
-
(2006)
U. S. C.
, vol.35
, pp. 112
-
-
-
149
-
-
78649377055
-
-
See, supra note 97, "Once a patent has been issued, other firms can learn of the innovative work of the patent holder and redirect their work so as not to duplicate work already done."
-
See Kitch, supra note 97, at 278 ("Once a patent has been issued, other firms can learn of the innovative work of the patent holder and redirect their work so as not to duplicate work already done.").
-
-
-
Kitch1
-
150
-
-
78649375879
-
-
See infra text accompanying notes 112-14
-
See infra text accompanying notes 112-14.
-
-
-
-
151
-
-
69849114377
-
A transaction costs theory of patent law
-
Cf, 494, noting that patents can help overcome hurdles to mutually beneficial exchanges
-
Cf. Paul J. Heald, A Transaction Costs Theory of Patent Law, 66 OHIO ST. L. J. 473, 494 (2005) (noting that patents can help overcome hurdles to mutually beneficial exchanges).
-
(2005)
Ohio St. L. J.
, vol.66
, pp. 473
-
-
Heald, P.J.1
-
152
-
-
84881815286
-
-
See, e.g., "Even industrial research and development, while market oriented, is in most industries not based on proprietary claims of exclusion...."
-
See, e.g., YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM 461 (2006) ("[E]ven industrial research and development, while market oriented, is in most industries not based on proprietary claims of exclusion....");
-
(2006)
The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms Markets and Freedom
, pp. 461
-
-
Yochai, B.1
-
153
-
-
78649384910
-
-
id, discussing "nonmarket motivations"
-
id. at 464 (discussing "nonmarket motivations");
-
-
-
-
154
-
-
0000075294
-
Appropriating the returns from industrial research and development
-
794-95, observing the apparent efficacy of secrecy, "lead time, learning curves, and sale or service efforts" as means of appropriating value
-
Richard C. Levin et al., Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research and Development, 3 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 783, 794-95 (1987) (observing the apparent efficacy of secrecy, "lead time, learning curves, and sale or service efforts" as means of appropriating value);
-
(1987)
Brookings Papers on Econ. Activity
, vol.3
, pp. 783
-
-
Levin, R.C.1
-
155
-
-
61349148630
-
Users as innovators: Implications for patent doctrine
-
477, describing "intention to use the invention" as a substantial "non-sale motivation for innovation"
-
Katherine J. Strandburg, Users as Innovators: Implications for Patent Doctrine, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 467, 477 (2008) (describing "intention to use the invention" as a substantial "non-sale motivation for innovation").
-
(2008)
U. Colo. L. Rev.
, vol.79
, pp. 467
-
-
Strandburg, K.J.1
-
156
-
-
78649364867
-
-
See, e.g., supra note 29, ch. 3, &, reporting that all members of an expert panel "believed that pharmaceutical innovation would decline markedly" without patents
-
See, e.g., FTC REPORT, supra note 29, ch. 3, at 11 & n. 48 (reporting that all members of an expert panel "believed that [pharmaceutical innovation] would decline markedly" without patents).
-
FTC Report
, Issue.48
, pp. 11
-
-
-
157
-
-
69549103909
-
-
See, e.g., &, describing patents' disclosure function as possessing "little explanatory value in a world where very few scientists get their technical information from patents"
-
See, e.g., DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN SOLVE IT 66 (2009) (describing patents' disclosure function as possessing "little explanatory value in a world where very few scientists get their technical information from patents").
-
(2009)
The Patent Crisis and how the Courts Can Solve It
, pp. 66
-
-
Dan, L.B.1
Mark, A.L.2
-
158
-
-
78649375309
-
-
See, supra note 79, at fig.6 showing that 24.3% of 1, 019 survey respondents identified disclosure concerns as the primary reason not to seek a patent
-
See Cohen et al., supra note 79, at fig.6 (showing that 24.3% of 1, 019 survey respondents identified disclosure concerns as the primary reason not to seek a patent).
-
-
-
Cohen1
-
159
-
-
78649350378
-
-
See id. at fig.5 showing that 46.7% of 1, 073 survey respondents identified disclosure concerns as a reason not to seek a patent
-
See id. at fig.5 (showing that 46.7% of 1, 073 survey respondents identified disclosure concerns as a reason not to seek a patent).
-
-
-
-
160
-
-
78649358790
-
-
See, supra note 78 manuscript at 10-11 defining "entrepreneurial companies" as "companies founded in the United States during the last 10 years"
-
See Graham et al., supra note 78 (manuscript at 10-11) (defining "entrepreneurial companies" as "companies founded in the United States during the last 10 years").
-
-
-
Graham1
-
161
-
-
78649351250
-
-
See id. manuscript at 48 discussing the response of 34% of biotechnology respondents and 32% of "venture-backed IT hardware firms"
-
See id. (manuscript at 48) (discussing the response of 34% of biotechnology respondents and 32% of "venture-backed IT hardware firms").
-
-
-
-
162
-
-
78649381266
-
-
See, supra note 79, "Between the 1983 Yale and 1994 Carnegie Mellon surveys, secrecy vaulted from being judged the least effective major mechanism to appropriate value from product innovations to being judged the most, along with lead time."
-
See Cohen et al., supra note 79, at 13 ("Between the [1983] Yale and [1994] Carnegie Mellon surveys, secrecy vaulted from being judged the least effective major mechanism [to appropriate value from product innovations] to being judged the most, along with lead time.").
-
-
-
Cohen1
-
163
-
-
78649360809
-
-
See generally, stating that fifteenth-century "engineers and inventors were... reluctant to publish their discoveries because they knew that others might steal their secrets and claim themselves as the inventor"
-
See generally WILLIAM EAMON, SCIENCE AND THE SECRETS OF NATURE: BOOKS OF SECRETS IN MEDIEVAL AND EARLY MODERN CULTURE 88 (1994) (stating that fifteenth-century "[e]ngineers and inventors were... reluctant to publish their discoveries because they knew that others might steal their secrets and claim themselves as the inventor").
-
(1994)
Science and the Secrets of Nature: Books of Secrets in Medieval and Early Modern Culture
, pp. 88
-
-
William, E.1
-
164
-
-
78649343483
-
-
See, "Before patents or copyrights, scientists frequently resorted to ciphers in order to conceal their discoveries from jealous rivals."
-
See ROSS KING, BRUNELLESCHI'S DOME: HOW A RENAISSANCE GENIUS REINVENTED ARCHITECTURE 24-25 (2000) ("Before patents or copyrights, scientists frequently resorted to ciphers in order to conceal their discoveries from jealous rivals.").
-
(2000)
Brunelleschi's Dome: How a Renaissance Genius Reinvented Architecture
, pp. 24-25
-
-
Ross, K.1
-
165
-
-
69849096023
-
Possession in patent law
-
Cf, 146, criticizing overemphasis of patents' "teaching function" but observing that patents can "encourage teachings via pre-patent disclosures and publications"
-
Cf. Timothy R. Holbrook, Possession in Patent Law, 59 SMU L. REV. 123, 146 (2006) (criticizing overemphasis of patents' "teaching function" but observing that patents can "encourage teachings via pre-patent disclosures and publications").
-
(2006)
Smu L. Rev.
, vol.59
, pp. 123
-
-
Holbrook, T.R.1
-
166
-
-
78649359958
-
-
supra note 50, § 24.2.1
-
SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 50, § 24.2.1, at 531.
-
-
-
Schechter1
Thomas2
-
167
-
-
0346762517
-
A new look at trade secret law: Doctrine in search of justification
-
See, 275, describing a "precaution/stealing game" in which firms invest in protecting or obtaining trade secrets
-
See Robert G. Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret Law: Doctrine in Search of Justification, 86 CAL. L. REV. 241, 275 (1998) (describing a "precaution/stealing game" in which firms invest in protecting or obtaining trade secrets).
-
(1998)
Cal. L. Rev.
, vol.86
, pp. 241
-
-
Bone, R.G.1
-
169
-
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15844389075
-
How do patent laws influence innovation? Evidence from nineteenth-century world fairs
-
see also, available at, "Inventors in countries without patent laws concentrated innovation in industries where secrecy was an effective alternative to patent grants."
-
see also Petra Moser, How Do Patent Laws Influence Innovation? Evidence from Nineteenth-Century World Fairs 39 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9909, 2003), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w9909 ("[I]nventors in countries without patent laws concentrated innovation in industries where secrecy was an effective alternative to patent grants.").
-
(2003)
Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9909
, vol.39
-
-
Moser, P.1
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170
-
-
78649336343
-
-
See, e.g., supra note 26, asserting that the government could, "in principle", do better than the patent system by "conducting research itself, giving heavy subsidies and tax credits to inventors, or buying inventions at their social value W "
-
See, e.g., NORDHAUS, supra note 26, at 82 (asserting that the government could, "in principle", do better than the patent system by "conducting research itself, giving heavy subsidies and tax credits to inventors, or buying inventions at their social value (W) ");
-
-
-
Nordhaus1
-
171
-
-
0035649475
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Rewards versus intellectual property rights
-
536, arguing for the desirability of a reward system "if the information that the government has about demand is sufficiently good"
-
Steven Shavell & Tanguy van Ypersele, Rewards Versus Intellectual Property Rights, 44 J. L. & ECON. 525, 536 (2001) (arguing for the desirability of a reward system "if the information that the government has about demand is sufficiently good").
-
(2001)
J. L. & Econ.
, vol.44
, pp. 525
-
-
Shavell, S.1
Van Ypersele, T.2
-
172
-
-
78649363204
-
-
note
-
See NORDHAUS, supra note 26, at 82 (concluding that alternatives to the patent system were unlikely to "be feasible given the difficulties involved in administering them"). The patent system might be perceived as having an unfair advantage in the comparison in the text because the government's general failure to assess the economic value of patent rights-at least under a remedies regime that relies heavily on injunctions-means that private parties, such as potential licensors, must often bear the burden of making such assessments. But for purposes of social optimality, this assignment might be a point of comparative advantage. Private parties concerned with a particular technology might naturally tend to have, or to have access to, more substantial information about the relevant technology and technological marketplace than a government agent. And leaving private parties to agree on patent rights' value could encourage the emergence of more efficient means for assigning rights and rewards than the government would itself develop, while also limiting opportunities for government-oriented rent-seeking.
-
-
-
-
173
-
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69849093619
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Coordination, property, and intellectual property: An unconventional approach to anticompetitive effects and downstream access
-
See, 346-54, arguing that patent rights enforced by injunctions facilitate private efforts at bargaining and coordination, and limit opportunities for government-oriented rent-seeking
-
See F. Scott Kieff, Coordination, Property, and Intellectual Property: An Unconventional Approach to Anticompetitive Effects and Downstream Access, 56 EMORY L. J. 327, 346-54 (2006) (arguing that patent rights enforced by injunctions facilitate private efforts at bargaining and coordination, and limit opportunities for government-oriented rent-seeking);
-
(2006)
Emory L. J.
, vol.56
, pp. 327
-
-
Kieff, F.S.1
-
174
-
-
1842815078
-
A new dynamism in the public domain
-
183-84, reporting "massive growth in private initiatives to expand the public domain"
-
Robert P. Merges, A New Dynamism in the Public Domain, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 183, 183-84 (2004) (reporting "massive growth in private initiatives to expand the public domain");
-
(2004)
U. Chi. L. Rev.
, vol.71
, pp. 183
-
-
Merges, R.P.1
-
175
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67849121031
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Are patents on interfaces impeding interoperability?
-
describing private commitments to royalty-free or reasonable-royalty licensing, patent pools, or cross-licensing. On the other hand, private solutions can also fall significantly short of the social ideal
-
Pamela Samuelson, Are Patents on Interfaces Impeding Interoperability?, 93 MINN. L. REV.1943, 2003-04 (2009) (describing private commitments to royalty-free or reasonable-royalty licensing, patent pools, or cross-licensing). On the other hand, private solutions can also fall significantly short of the social ideal.
-
(2009)
Minn. L. Rev.1943
, vol.93
, pp. 2003-2004
-
-
Samuelson, P.1
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176
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78649352971
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Do patent pools encourage innovation?
-
See, e.g., &, 4-6, Sept. 22, unpublished manuscript, on file at, reporting that the establishment of "the first patent pool in U. S. history, the Sewing Machine Combination", was followed by a slowdown in innovation
-
See, e.g., Ryan Lampe & Petra Moser, Do Patent Pools Encourage Innovation? Evidence from the 19th-Century Sewing Machine Industry 4-6 (Sept. 22, 2009) (unpublished manuscript, on file at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1308997) (reporting that the establishment of "the first patent pool in U. S. history, the Sewing Machine Combination", was followed by a slowdown in innovation).
-
(2009)
Evidence from the 19th-century Sewing Machine Industry
-
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Lampe, R.1
Moser, P.2
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177
-
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78649345003
-
-
See, supra note 29, executive summary, at 10 reporting estimates "that patent examiners have from 8 to 25 hours" to complete work on a single patent application
-
See FTC REPORT, supra note 29, executive summary, at 10 (reporting estimates "that patent examiners have from 8 to 25 hours" to complete work on a single patent application).
-
FTC Report
-
-
-
178
-
-
0037226804
-
Perfecting patent prizes
-
See, 209, discussing how patent buyouts and prizes might decrease litigation
-
See Michael Abramowicz, Perfecting Patent Prizes, 56 VAND. L. REV. 115, 209 (2003) (discussing how patent buyouts and prizes might decrease litigation).
-
(2003)
Vand. L. Rev.
, vol.56
, pp. 115
-
-
Abramowicz, M.1
-
179
-
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78649380978
-
-
See, supra note 15, observing that only "about 1% of all patents" are litigated
-
See Jaffe, supra note 15, at 548 (observing that only "about 1% of all patents" are litigated);
-
-
-
Jaffe1
-
180
-
-
4243124519
-
Rational ignorance at the patent office
-
1501, estimating that "at most only about two percent of all patents are ever litigated"
-
Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495, 1501 (2001) (estimating that "at most only about two percent of all patents are ever litigated").
-
(2001)
Nw. U. L. Rev.
, vol.95
, pp. 1495
-
-
Lemley, M.A.1
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181
-
-
78649372199
-
-
See, &, supra note 118, & n. 45 noting a likely "labor supplyrelated distortionary cost" from the need to finance a reward system but also noting the possibility of arranging financing to avoid that cost
-
See Shavell & van Ypersele, supra note 118, at 544 & n. 45 (noting a likely "labor supplyrelated distortionary cost" from the need to finance a reward system but also noting the possibility of arranging financing to avoid that cost).
-
-
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Shavell1
Van, Y.2
-
182
-
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78649354816
-
-
On the positive side, however, such distortive effects could cancel other negative distortions, supra note 121, or have "redistributive benefits, "
-
On the positive side, however, such distortive effects could cancel other negative distortions, Abramowicz, supra note 121, at 202, or have "redistributive benefits, "
-
-
-
Abramowicz1
-
183
-
-
78649389509
-
-
id
-
id. at 205.
-
-
-
-
184
-
-
78649342122
-
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supra note 15
-
SCOTCHMER, supra note 15, at 38.
-
Scotchmer
, pp. 38
-
-
-
185
-
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78649354538
-
-
See id, noting the need to foster "trust that an appropriate prize will be given"
-
See id. at 42 (noting the need to foster "trust that an appropriate prize will be given").
-
-
-
-
186
-
-
78649344055
-
-
See id, discussing the possibility of a risk premium for awards
-
See id. at 40 (discussing the possibility of a risk premium for awards).
-
-
-
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187
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77951140993
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Grant system leads cancer researchers to play it safe
-
June 28, describing the grant system for cancer-related research as having "become a sort of jobs program,... with the understanding that the focus will be on small projects unlikely to take significant steps toward curing cancer"
-
Gina Kolata, Grant System Leads Cancer Researchers to Play It Safe, N. Y. TIMES, June 28, 2009, at 1 (describing the grant system for cancer-related research as having "become a sort of jobs program,... with the understanding that the focus will be on small projects unlikely to take significant steps toward curing cancer").
-
(2009)
N. Y. Times
, pp. 1
-
-
Kolata, G.1
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188
-
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78649350963
-
-
See generally, Comm. Print, available at, noting witness testimony suggesting that, under then-existing approaches to funding research, "truly innovative research may be being stifled"
-
See generally H. CVOMM. ON SCI., 105TH CONG., UNLOCKING OUR FUTURE: TOWARD A NEW NATIONAL SCIENCE POLICY 19 (Comm. Print 1998), available at http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/house/science/cp105-b/science105b.pdf (noting witness testimony suggesting that, under then-existing approaches to funding research, "truly innovative research may be being stifled");
-
(1998)
H. Cvomm. on Sci., 105th Cong., Unlocking our Future: Toward a New National Science Policy
, pp. 19
-
-
-
189
-
-
0010519820
-
Peer review in awarding federal grants in the arts and sciences
-
40, reporting scientists' common view that, in distributing federal grants, "scientific peer review bodies" disfavor "'mavericks' who reject conventional assumptions and approaches"
-
Thomas O. McGarity, Peer Review in Awarding Federal Grants in the Arts and Sciences, 9 HIGH TECH. L. J. 1, 40 (1994) (reporting scientists' common view that, in distributing federal grants, "scientific peer review bodies" disfavor "'mavericks' who reject conventional assumptions and approaches").
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(1994)
High Tech. L. J.
, vol.9
, pp. 1
-
-
McGarity, T.O.1
-
190
-
-
78649388958
-
-
See, supra note 15, "The international arena tilts the balance toward privatization...."
-
See SCOTCHMER, supra note 15, at 346 ("The international arena tilts the balance toward privatization....").
-
-
-
Scotchmer1
-
192
-
-
0344794886
-
-
See, e.g., "The problem of patent policy is to strike a balance: enough protection to sustain a desired flow of innovations, but not superfluous protection in view of alternate incentives for innovation and the social burdens monopoly power imposes."
-
See, e.g., F. M. SCHERER, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF COMPULSORY PATENT LICENSING 84 (1977) ("The problem of patent policy is to strike a balance: enough protection to sustain a desired flow of innovations, but not superfluous protection in view of alternate incentives for innovation and the social burdens monopoly power imposes.").
-
(1977)
The Economic Effects of Compulsory Patent Licensing
, pp. 84
-
-
Scherer, F.M.1
-
193
-
-
78649343197
-
-
See supra note 42 and accompanying text
-
See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
-
-
-
-
194
-
-
22844452527
-
-
See Diamond v. Diehr, 185, "Excluded from... patent protection are laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas."
-
See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U. S. 175, 185 (1981) ("Excluded from... patent protection are laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas.");
-
(1981)
U. S.
, vol.450
, pp. 175
-
-
-
195
-
-
78649385687
-
-
re, Fed. Cir, en banc discussing matter excluded from patentability
-
In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 952 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc) (discussing matter excluded from patentability)
-
(2008)
F.3d 943
, vol.545
, pp. 952
-
-
Bilski1
-
196
-
-
77949823895
-
-
cert. granted sub. nom. Bilski v. Doll
-
cert. granted sub. nom. Bilski v. Doll, 129 S. Ct. 2735 (2009).
-
(2009)
S. Ct.
, vol.129
, pp. 2735
-
-
-
197
-
-
78649379466
-
-
§§
-
35 U. S. C. §§ 101-103 (2006).
-
(2006)
U. S. C.
, vol.35
, pp. 101-103
-
-
-
198
-
-
78649370127
-
-
Id. § 112, para. 1
-
Id. § 112, para. 1.
-
-
-
-
199
-
-
78649391906
-
-
Id. § 112, para. 2
-
Id. § 112, para. 2.
-
-
-
-
200
-
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78649345002
-
-
Id. § 131
-
Id. § 131.
-
-
-
-
201
-
-
78649357629
-
-
See id. §§ 301-307, providing for ex parte reexamination
-
See id. §§ 301-307 (providing for ex parte reexamination);
-
-
-
-
202
-
-
78649346914
-
-
id. §§, providing for inter partes reexamination
-
id. §§ 311-318 (providing for inter partes reexamination).
-
-
-
-
203
-
-
78649359056
-
-
See id. §, providing that unenforceability and invalidity are defenses to a charge of patent infringement
-
See id. § 282 (providing that unenforceability and invalidity are defenses to a charge of patent infringement).
-
-
-
-
204
-
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78649341510
-
-
Id. §, a - b
-
Id. § 41 (a) - (b).
-
-
-
-
205
-
-
78649360250
-
-
See supra note 50 and accompanying text
-
See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
-
-
-
-
206
-
-
78649374723
-
-
See, §, stating that courts "may grant injunctions in accordance with the principles of equity"
-
See 35 U. S. C. § 283 (stating that courts "may grant injunctions in accordance with the principles of equity");
-
U. S. C.
, vol.35
, pp. 283
-
-
-
207
-
-
70649109692
-
-
see also eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L. L. C., 394, "We hold only that the decision whether to grant or deny injunctive relief rests within the equitable discretion of the district courts, and that such discretion must be exercised consistent with traditional principles of equity...."
-
see also eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L. L. C., 547 U. S. 388, 394 (2006) ("We hold only that the decision whether to grant or deny injunctive relief rests within the equitable discretion of the district courts, and that such discretion must be exercised consistent with traditional principles of equity....").
-
(2006)
U. S.
, vol.547
, pp. 388
-
-
-
208
-
-
0001125142
-
Optimal patent length and breadth
-
See, e.g., &, 107, "Optimal patent policy consists of choosing the patent term and the flow rate of profits available to the patentee to maximize social welfare...."
-
See, e.g., Richard Gilbert & Carl Shapiro, Optimal Patent Length and Breadth, 21 RAND J. ECON. 106, 107 (1990) ("Optimal patent policy consists of choosing [the patent term] and [the flow rate of profits available to the patentee] to maximize social welfare....").
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(1990)
Rand J. Econ
, vol.21
, pp. 106
-
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Gilbert, R.1
Shapiro, C.2
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209
-
-
78649376468
-
-
See id, 111 describing "the optimal mix between patent length and breadth" as the mix that yields the maximal social welfare attainable when the present value for patentee profits equals or exceeds a required threshold value
-
See id. at 108, 111 (describing "[t]he optimal mix between [patent] length and breadth" as the mix that yields the maximal social welfare attainable when the present value for patentee profits equals or exceeds a required threshold value).
-
-
-
-
210
-
-
0003517281
-
-
See generally, &, defining "frustration" as "the inability of a model system to satisfy all of its bonds, usually because of topological constraints"
-
See generally P. M. CHAIKIN & T. C. LUBENSKY, PRINCIPLES OF CONDENSED MATTER PHYSICS 670 (1995) (defining "frustration" as "[t]he inability of a model system to satisfy all of its bonds, usually because of topological constraints").
-
(1995)
Principles of Condensed Matter Physics
, pp. 670
-
-
Chaikin, P.M.1
Lubensky, T.C.2
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211
-
-
78649341209
-
-
See supra notes 93-117 and accompanying text
-
See supra notes 93-117 and accompanying text.
-
-
-
-
212
-
-
78649386262
-
-
See supra note 31 and accompanying text
-
See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
-
-
-
-
213
-
-
78649342874
-
-
Cf. supra note 75 and accompanying text
-
Cf. supra note 75 and accompanying text.
-
-
-
-
214
-
-
78649373583
-
-
See supra notes 97-102 and accompanying text
-
See supra notes 97-102 and accompanying text.
-
-
-
-
215
-
-
78649348071
-
-
See Golden, supra note 5, observing that injunctions, or the threat of them, can encourage "settlement without further costly litigation"
-
See Golden, supra note 5, at 2140 (observing that injunctions, or the threat of them, can encourage "settlement without (further) costly litigation");
-
-
-
-
216
-
-
69849093618
-
On coordinating transactions in intellectual property: A response to smith's delineating entitlements in information
-
102, describing patent rights as driving "diverse actors to interact with each other and with the patentee"
-
F. Scott Kieff, On Coordinating Transactions in Intellectual Property: A Response to Smith's Delineating Entitlements in Information, 117 YALE L. J. POCKET PART 101, 102 (2007), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/images/pdfs/593.pdf (describing patent rights as driving "diverse actors to interact with each other and with the patentee").
-
(2007)
Yale L. J. Pocket Part
, vol.117
, pp. 101
-
-
Kieff, F.S.1
-
217
-
-
78649336933
-
-
Cf, supra note 104, "Strong protection of a key innovation may preclude competitors from making socially beneficial innovations."
-
Cf. Levin et al., supra note 104, at 788 ("[S]trong protection of a key innovation may preclude competitors from making socially beneficial innovations.").
-
-
-
Levin1
-
218
-
-
78649367050
-
-
Indeed, by inflating patent value, excessive patent remedies could also increase a patent holder's capacity to "bribe" another to drop any challenge in exchange for a share of the patent's value
-
Indeed, by inflating patent value, excessive patent remedies could also increase a patent holder's capacity to "bribe" another to drop any challenge in exchange for a share of the patent's value.
-
-
-
-
219
-
-
0041499036
-
Property rights theory and patent-antitrust: The role of compulsory licensing
-
See, 991, describing how a patent holder can "inhibit challenges through restrictive licensing practices aimed at bribing the most likely challengers"
-
See Martin J. Adelman, Property Rights Theory and Patent-Antitrust: The Role of Compulsory Licensing, 52 N. Y. U. L. REV. 977, 991 (1977) (describing how a patent holder can "inhibit challenges through restrictive licensing practices aimed at bribing the most likely challengers");
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(1977)
N. Y. U. L. Rev.
, vol.52
, pp. 977
-
-
Adelman, M.J.1
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220
-
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33751213872
-
Paying for delay: Pharmaceutical patent settlement as a regulatory design problem
-
1557, describing settlements in which a pharmaceutical "innovator pays a generic firm a large sum, the generic firm agrees to abstain from entry, and the parties agree to dismiss a patent suit"
-
C. Scott Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement as a Regulatory Design Problem, 81 N. Y. U. L. REV. 1553, 1557 (2006) (describing settlements in which a pharmaceutical "innovator pays [a] generic firm a large sum, the generic firm agrees to abstain from entry, and the parties agree to dismiss [a] patent suit").
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(2006)
N. Y. U. L. Rev.
, vol.81
, pp. 1553
-
-
Hemphill, C.S.1
-
221
-
-
78649353242
-
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See, supra note 68, "Invalid patents thus continue to cast shadows on the market, and firms waste resources avoiding these shadows or paying needless royalties as insurance for safe passage through them."
-
See Miller, supra note 68, at 674 ("Invalid patents thus continue to cast shadows on the market, and firms waste resources avoiding these shadows or paying needless royalties as insurance for safe passage through them.").
-
-
-
Miller1
-
222
-
-
43449114761
-
Schumpeterian profits in the american economy: Theory and measurement
-
available at
-
William D. Nordhaus, Schumpeterian Profits in the American Economy: Theory and Measurement 22 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 10433, 2004), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w10433.
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Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 10433
, vol.22
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Nordhaus, W.D.1
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223
-
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0004239155
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See, e.g., &, Pearson/Addison Wesley 4th ed. 2005, "If the inventor's return is less than society's, the inventor tends to underinvest...."
-
See, e.g., DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 536 (Pearson/Addison Wesley 4th ed. 2005) (1990) ("If the inventor's return is less than society's, the inventor tends to underinvest....");
-
(1990)
Modern Industrial Organization
, pp. 536
-
-
Dennis, W.C.1
Jeffrey, M.P.2
-
224
-
-
70549094980
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-
Mass. Inst. of Tech. 3d ed. 2000, "If the inventor cannot expect to appropriate all of the economic value of the invention, there will be underinvestment...."
-
W. KIP VISCUSI ET AL., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 800 (Mass. Inst. of Tech. 3d ed. 2000) (1991) ("If the inventor cannot expect to appropriate all of the economic value of the invention, there will be underinvestment....");
-
(1991)
Economics of Regulation and Antitrust
, pp. 800
-
-
Kip Viscusi, W.1
-
225
-
-
78649385200
-
-
*, from an innovation. "
-
*), from an innovation. ").
-
-
-
Shavell1
Van, Y.2
-
226
-
-
2642521751
-
-
See, e.g., "The revenue that the owner of any kind of resource... can earn by granting someone a license... is often substantially less than the total social benefits of the activity in question. "
-
See, e.g., WILLIAM W. FISHER III, PROMISES TO KEEP: TECHNOLOGY, LAW, AND THE FUTURE OF ENTERTAINMENT 163 (2004) ("The revenue that the owner of any kind of resource... can earn by granting someone a license... is often substantially less than the total social benefits of the activity in question. ");
-
(2004)
Promises to Keep: Technology, Law, and the Future of Entertainment
, pp. 163
-
-
William III, W.F.1
-
227
-
-
34547804732
-
Reply: Patent holdup and royalty stacking
-
2167, "The norm in a market economy is for private parties to capture only a portion of the social value of their output."
-
Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Reply: Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEXAS L. REV. 2163, 2167 (2007) ("[T]he norm in a market economy is for private parties to capture only a portion of the social value of their output.").
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(2007)
Texas L. Rev.
, vol.85
, pp. 2163
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-
Lemley, M.A.1
Shapiro, C.2
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228
-
-
76649121847
-
Tying, bundled discounts, and the death of the single monopoly profit theory
-
forthcoming Dec, manuscript at 45, on file at, discussing how the ability to "capture more than a certain fraction of total surplus" can trigger a socially wasteful patent race
-
Einer Elhauge, Tying, Bundled Discounts, and the Death of the Single Monopoly Profit Theory, 123 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming Dec. 2009), (manuscript at 45, on file at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1345239) (discussing how the ability to "capture more than a certain fraction of total surplus" can trigger a socially wasteful patent race).
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(2009)
Harv. L. Rev.
, vol.123
-
-
Elhauge, E.1
-
229
-
-
78649351519
-
-
See, supra note 27, noting that private and allocative costs of using a resource can diverge
-
See Markovits, supra note 27, at 73 (noting that private and allocative costs of using a resource can diverge).
-
-
-
Markovits1
-
230
-
-
78649340936
-
-
See, supra note 156 manuscript at 42-45 positing that shortening a patent term could limit a firm's return on an invention to a portion of the total social benefits of the invention
-
See Elhauge, supra note 156 (manuscript at 42-45) (positing that shortening a patent term could limit a firm's return on an invention to a portion of the total social benefits of the invention).
-
-
-
Elhauge1
-
231
-
-
78649344054
-
-
Einer Elhauge has suggested that patent-term adjustments are unlikely to ensure optimal appropriability. Id
-
Einer Elhauge has suggested that patent-term adjustments are unlikely to ensure optimal appropriability. Id.
-
-
-
-
232
-
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78649361716
-
-
See, e.g., supra note 26, "To determine the optimal life, the welfare function is maximized with respect to the life of the patent."
-
See, e.g., NORDHAUS, supra note 26, at 76 ("To determine the optimal life, the welfare function is maximized with respect to the life of the patent.");
-
-
-
Nordhaus1
-
233
-
-
78649369053
-
-
supra note 142, referencing "the conventional analysis of optimal patent length, based on the tradeoff between the incentives for innovation and the extent of static monopoly deadweight loss"
-
Gilbert & Shapiro, supra note 142, at 106 (referencing "the conventional analysis of optimal patent length, based on the tradeoff between the incentives for innovation and the extent of static monopoly deadweight loss");
-
-
-
Gilbert1
Shapiro2
-
234
-
-
78649358491
-
-
Comments and Discussion, 823, comments of Richard Gilbert reporting on "a very simple model of optimal patent life"
-
Comments and Discussion, 3 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 821, 823 (1987) (comments of Richard Gilbert) (reporting on "a very simple model of optimal patent life").
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(1987)
Brookings Papers on Econ. Activity
, vol.3
, pp. 821
-
-
-
235
-
-
69849112446
-
-
Given that the process of patent examination typically takes a few years, see, &, reporting that, in fiscal year 2008, the average pendency for issued or abandoned patents was over two years and eight months, today's standard default patent term, measuring twenty years from the filing of a patent application
-
Given that the process of patent examination typically takes a few years, see U. S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, FISCAL YEAR 2008, at 43 (2008) (reporting that, in fiscal year 2008, the average pendency for issued or abandoned patents was over two years and eight months), today's standard default patent term, measuring twenty years from the filing of a patent application
-
(2008)
Performance and Accountability Report, Fiscal Year 2008
, pp. 43
-
-
Patent, U.S.1
Trademark, O.2
-
236
-
-
78649362931
-
-
see supra note 42 and accompanying text, may be little more than a rough interpolation between the alternate limits of fourteen and twenty-one years after issuance that were imposed by England's early seventeenth-century Statute of Monopolies
-
see supra note 42 and accompanying text, may be little more than a rough interpolation between the alternate limits of fourteen and twenty-one years after issuance that were imposed by England's early seventeenth-century Statute of Monopolies.
-
-
-
-
237
-
-
84881878075
-
Invention and ritual: Notes on the interrelation of magic and intellectual property in preliterate societies
-
See, 1287 n. 110, discussing the patent term under the Statute of Monopolies
-
See Mark C. Suchman, Invention and Ritual: Notes on the Interrelation of Magic and Intellectual Property in Preliterate Societies, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1264, 1287 n. 110 (1989) (discussing the patent term under the Statute of Monopolies).
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(1989)
Colum. L. Rev.
, vol.89
, pp. 1264
-
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Suchman, M.C.1
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238
-
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78649346034
-
-
Both of these limits were integer multiples of the then traditional term of seven years for craft apprenticeship. Id
-
Both of these limits were integer multiples of the then traditional term of seven years for craft apprenticeship. Id.
-
-
-
-
239
-
-
78649340617
-
-
See, &, supra note 5, "We are concerned in this Article with situations in which a downstream firm produces a complex product that potentially or allegedly infringes many patents."
-
See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 5, at 1994 ("We are concerned in this Article with situations in which a downstream firm produces a complex product that potentially or allegedly infringes many patents.").
-
-
-
Lemley1
Shapiro2
-
240
-
-
78649382475
-
-
See, supra note 5, & n. 87 observing that two related works alternatively describe the β factor as reflecting bargaining skill and bargaining power, respectively. Compare Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 5, at 1997 describing their equivalent of β as representing "bargaining skill" emphasis omitted
-
See Golden, supra note 5, at 2137 & n. 87 (observing that two related works alternatively describe the β factor as reflecting bargaining skill and bargaining power, respectively). Compare Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 5, at 1997 (describing their equivalent of β as representing "[bargaining skill" (emphasis omitted))
-
-
-
Golden1
-
241
-
-
34648819468
-
-
with, Aug, unpublished manuscript, on file at, describing β as representing "bargaining power"
-
with Carl Shapiro, Injunctions, Hold-Up, and Patent Royalties 8 (Aug. 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file at http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/ shapiro/royalties.pdf) (describing β as representing "bargaining power").
-
(2006)
Injunctions, Hold-up, and Patent Royalties
, pp. 8
-
-
Shapiro, C.1
-
242
-
-
78649348596
-
-
See, &, supra note 5, 1996-2000 providing a formula of "θ × B × V " for "the benchmark royalty rate" above which rewards are excessive. In this Article, I use the Greek letters β and v in place of Lemley and Shapiro's B and V, respectively. Cf Shapiro, supra note 164, at 6, 8 using β and v in this way
-
See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 5, at 1999, 1996-2000 (providing a formula of "θ × B × V " for "the benchmark royalty rate" above which rewards are excessive). In this Article, I use the Greek letters β and v in place of Lemley and Shapiro's B and V, respectively. Cf Shapiro, supra note 164, at 6, 8 (using β and v in this way).
-
-
-
Lemley1
Shapiro2
-
243
-
-
53349089999
-
How strong are weak patents?
-
See, &, 1349, "We also establish an ex ante benchmark... equal to θv, where v is the per-unit value of the technology."
-
See Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, How Strong Are Weak Patents?, 98 AM. ECON. REV. 1347, 1349 (2008) ("We also establish an ex ante benchmark... equal to θv, where v is the per-unit value of the technology.");
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(2008)
Am. Econ. Rev.
, vol.98
, pp. 1347
-
-
Farrell, J.1
Shapiro, C.2
-
244
-
-
22144483296
-
Incentives to challenge and defend patents: Why litigation won't reliably fix patent office errors and why administrative patent review might help
-
* is an amount that "all would be prepared to pay" to use the invention, and q is "the probability of the relevant patent rights being upheld in a well argued symmetric trial"
-
* is an amount that "all would be prepared to pay" to use the invention, and q is "the probability of [the relevant patent rights] being upheld in a well argued symmetric trial");
-
(2004)
Berkeley Tech. L. J.
, vol.19
, pp. 943
-
-
Farrell, J.1
Merges, R.P.2
-
245
-
-
78649390111
-
-
cf, supra note 5, "Given certain premises, any royalty rate below vθ would underincentivize many socially desirable inventions."
-
cf Elhauge, supra note 5, at 541 ("[G]iven [certain] premises, any royalty rate below vθ would underincentivize many socially desirable inventions.").
-
-
-
Elhauge1
-
246
-
-
78649380678
-
-
Cf, supra note 5, "The patent holder does not receive any of the additional consumer surplus that results from its invention because v is set by the value of the invention to the marginal consumer...."
-
Cf Elhauge, supra note 5, at 543 ("The patent holder does not receive any of the additional consumer surplus that results from its invention because v is set by the value of the invention to the marginal consumer....").
-
-
-
Elhauge1
-
247
-
-
78649336632
-
-
See, "The social wealth attributable to a transaction is the sum of consumer surplus and producer profit from the transaction. "
-
See MARK SEIDENFELD, MICROECONOMIC PREDICATES TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 40 (1996) ("The social wealth attributable to a transaction is the sum of consumer surplus and producer profit from the transaction. ");
-
(1996)
Microeconomic Predicates to Law and Economics
, pp. 40
-
-
Mark, S.1
-
248
-
-
78649387107
-
-
discussing the consumer and producer surpluses achieved in a simple model of market equilibrium that ignores a producer's fixed costs
-
WOLFGANG WEIGEL, ECONOMICS OF THE LAW: A PRIMER 4-5 (2008) (discussing the consumer and producer surpluses achieved in a simple model of market equilibrium that ignores a producer's fixed costs).
-
(2008)
Economics of the Law: A Primer
, pp. 4-5
-
-
Wolfgang, W.1
-
249
-
-
78649390110
-
-
See generally, providing a similar diagram for a supply-and-demand equilibrium
-
See generally RICHARD A. IPPOLITO, ECONOMICS FOR LAWYERS 87 (2005) (providing a similar diagram for a supply-and-demand equilibrium).
-
(2005)
Economics for Lawyers
, pp. 87
-
-
Richard, A.I.1
-
250
-
-
77956715988
-
-
See Mars, Inc. v. Coin Acceptors, Inc., 1366 Fed. Cir, acknowledging that "lost profits is plainly one way to measure the amount of damages that will 'fully compensate' the patentee under 35 U. S. C. § 284"
-
See Mars, Inc. v. Coin Acceptors, Inc., 527 F.3d 1359, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (acknowledging that "lost profits is plainly one way to measure the amount of damages that will 'fully compensate' the patentee under [35 U. S. C.] § 284").
-
(2008)
F.3d
, vol.527
, pp. 1359
-
-
-
251
-
-
78649357477
-
-
This restrictive attribute of Lemley and Shapiro's vβθ benchmark may partly result from their assumption of a monopsonistic situation in which there is only one potential licensee
-
This restrictive attribute of Lemley and Shapiro's vβθ benchmark may partly result from their assumption of a monopsonistic situation in which there is only one potential licensee.
-
-
-
-
252
-
-
78649349186
-
-
Cf, &, supra note 5, acknowledging that their results might not generalize to situations involving "multiple downstream firms". But even assuming a monopsonistic licensee, the vβθ benchmark appears, under traditional principles of equity, to be incomplete and therefore legally inadequate
-
Cf Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 5, at 2008 (acknowledging that their results might not generalize to situations involving "multiple downstream firms"). But even assuming a monopsonistic licensee, the vβθ benchmark appears, under traditional principles of equity, to be incomplete and therefore legally inadequate.
-
-
-
Lemley1
Shapiro2
-
253
-
-
0039382157
-
-
See, stating "the rule that damages are inadequate unless they can be used to replace the specific thing that plaintiff lost" and explaining that "damages can be used in this way for only one category of losses: to replace fungible goods or routine services in an orderly market". Even in a monopsonistic situation, a patentee is generally free to choose not to license
-
See DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, THE DEATH OF THE IRREPARABLE INJURY RULE 4 (1991) (stating "the rule that damages are inadequate unless they can be used to replace the specific thing that plaintiff lost" and explaining that "[d]amages can be used in this way for only one category of losses: to replace fungible goods or routine services in an orderly market"). Even in a monopsonistic situation, a patentee is generally free to choose not to license
-
(1991)
The Death of the Irreparable Injury Rule
, pp. 4
-
-
Douglas, L.1
-
254
-
-
78649359621
-
-
see, § 271 d 4, providing that it is not patent misuse to "refuse to license or use any rights to the patent", or, alternatively, can use the terms of a negotiated license to guide the way in which an invention is exploited, thereby potentially ensuring exploitation of the invention in a way that, at least during the patent term, yields a larger value for v or a larger number of uses than the monopsonist would otherwise generate
-
see 35 U. S. C. § 271 (d) (4) (2006) (providing that it is not patent misuse to "refuse[] to license or use any rights to the patent"), or, alternatively, can use the terms of a negotiated license to guide the way in which an invention is exploited, thereby potentially ensuring exploitation of the invention in a way that, at least during the patent term, yields a larger value for v or a larger number of uses than the monopsonist would otherwise generate.
-
(2006)
U. S. C.
, vol.35
-
-
-
255
-
-
78649380110
-
-
Cf, supra note 119, noting that negotiation can produce "textured contracts with many terms, including price and. technical support, fieldof-use or territory limitations, grant-backs, cross-licenses, payment schedules, and most-favorednation provisions"
-
Cf Kieff, supra note 119, at 334 (noting that negotiation can produce "textured contracts with many terms, including price and... technical support, fieldof-use or territory limitations, grant-backs, cross-licenses, payment schedules, and most-favorednation provisions").
-
-
-
Kieff1
-
256
-
-
78649371590
-
-
See supra note 170
-
See supra note 170.
-
-
-
-
257
-
-
78649362928
-
-
See supra note 96 and accompanying text
-
See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
-
-
-
-
258
-
-
78649391042
-
Describing patents as real options
-
See generally, 1128, "A patent is like a real option, economists say, because it allows its owner to choose between exclusively commercializing the patented invention sometime during the patent term or foregoing commercialization altogether."
-
See generally Christopher A. Cotropia, Describing Patents as Real Options, 34 J. CORP. L. 1127, 1128 (2009) ("A patent is like a real option, economists say, because it allows its owner to choose between exclusively commercializing the patented invention sometime during the patent term or foregoing commercialization altogether.").
-
(2009)
J. Corp. L
, vol.34
, pp. 1127
-
-
Cotropia, C.A.1
-
259
-
-
78649357472
-
-
§ 707i, 2d ed, stating that patent value "is almost impossible to determine, apart from such an obvious case as an improved process that reduces everyone's production costs by, say, 10 percent"
-
3 PHILIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION § 707i, at 209 (2d ed. 2002) (stating that patent value "is almost impossible to determine, apart from such an obvious case as an improved process that reduces everyone's production costs by, say, 10 percent").
-
(2002)
Philip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law: An Analysis of Antitrust Principles and Their Application
, vol.3
, pp. 209
-
-
-
260
-
-
78649338341
-
-
Cf, supra note 130, observing that the value of various innovations "depends upon consumers' subjective judgments"
-
Cf. SCHERER, supra note 130, at 20 (observing that the value of various innovations "depends upon consumers' subjective judgments").
-
-
-
Scherer1
-
261
-
-
78649382759
-
-
supra note 15
-
SCOTCHMER, supra note 15, at 143.
-
-
-
Scotchmer1
-
262
-
-
78649373048
-
-
See, & tbl.8.1, describing the value of technology as frequently rising as the technology moves from early stages of development to commercial maturity
-
See WESTON ANSON, FUNDAMENTALS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY VALUATION: A PRIMER FOR IDENTIFYING AND DETERMINING VALUE 76 & tbl.8.1 (2005) (describing the value of technology as frequently rising as the technology moves from early stages of development to commercial maturity).
-
(2005)
Fundamentals of Intellectual Property Valuation: A Primer for Identifying and Determining Value
, pp. 76
-
-
Weston, A.1
-
263
-
-
78649390117
-
-
Id
-
Id.
-
-
-
-
264
-
-
78649391049
-
-
See supra note 163 and accompanying text
-
See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
-
-
-
-
265
-
-
78649380977
-
-
See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 5, at 2004 concluding that comparison of expected patentee compensation to the vβθ benchmark indicates that various patentees are "systematically overcompensated"
-
See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 5, at 2004 (concluding that comparison of expected patentee compensation to the vβθ benchmark indicates that various patentees are "systematically overcompensated") ;
-
-
-
-
266
-
-
78649348898
-
-
supra note 163, "For the purposes of performing welfare analysis and making policy recommendations, we compare the negotiated royalty rate. with a benchmark royalty rate of vβθ...."
-
Shapiro, supra note 163, at 9 ("For the purposes of performing welfare analysis and making policy recommendations, we compare the negotiated royalty rate... with a benchmark royalty rate [of vβθ....").
-
-
-
Shapiro1
-
267
-
-
78649342555
-
-
See, e.g., supra note 5
-
See, e.g., Elhauge, supra note 5, at 541-45;
-
-
-
Elhauge1
-
268
-
-
78649344683
-
-
supra note 5, both criticizing Lemley and Shapiro's use of the β factor
-
Golden, supra note 5, at 2137-38 (both criticizing Lemley and Shapiro's use of the β factor).
-
-
-
Golden1
-
269
-
-
0042361801
-
Limiting patentees' market power without reducing innovation incentives: The perverse benefits of uncertainty and non-injunctive remedies
-
See, &, 987, "The last bit of monopoly pricing produces large amounts of deadweight loss for a relatively small amount of patentee profit."
-
See Ian Ayres & Paul Klemperer, Limiting Patentees' Market Power Without Reducing Innovation Incentives: The Perverse Benefits of Uncertainty and Non-injunctive Remedies, 97 MICH. L. REV. 985, 987 (1999) ("The last bit of monopoly pricing produces large amounts of deadweight loss for a relatively small amount of patentee profit.").
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(1999)
Mich. L. Rev.
, vol.97
, pp. 985
-
-
Ayres, I.1
Klemperer, P.2
-
270
-
-
4544375290
-
-
But cf, stating that an early award of property rights or cooperative ventures by parties can reduce or eliminate waste from races
-
But cf STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 145 (2004) (stating that an early award of property rights or cooperative ventures by parties can reduce or eliminate waste from races);
-
(2004)
Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law
, pp. 145
-
-
Steven, S.1
-
271
-
-
78649382164
-
-
supra note 5, observing that whether wasteful patent races occur is context dependent
-
Elhauge, supra note 5, at 543-44 (observing that whether wasteful patent races occur is context dependent).
-
-
-
Elhauge1
-
272
-
-
78649378175
-
-
See, supra note 15, discussing difficulties in apportioning "overhead costs" and allocating costs of failed research efforts
-
See SCOTCHMER, supra note 15, at 40 (discussing difficulties in apportioning "[o]verhead costs" and allocating costs of failed research efforts).
-
-
-
Scotchmer1
-
273
-
-
78649354810
-
-
But cf. id, "For industrial inventions... the incentive system operates more at the level of ideas for innovations than at the level of lifestyle choices."
-
But cf. id. at 98 ("For industrial inventions... the incentive system operates more at the level of ideas for innovations than at the level of lifestyle choices.").
-
-
-
-
274
-
-
78649347219
-
-
See, supra note 155, acknowledging apparent difficulty in "determining the 'just' proportion between a person's efforts and the reward he or she reaps"
-
See FISHER, supra note 155, at 208 (acknowledging apparent difficulty in "determin[ing] the 'just' proportion between a person's efforts and the reward he or she reaps").
-
-
-
Fisher1
-
275
-
-
78649370723
-
Rethinking the role of clinical trial data in international intellectual property law: The case for a public goods approach
-
See, 6, "The relative strength of patents in the pharmaceutical sector is often justified by the need for consumers to cover the 'risk premium, ' that is, the losses accruing from failed pharmaceutical research projects... over and above the specific Research and Development 'R&D' costs associated with any given successful drug."
-
See Jerome H. Reichman, Rethinking the Role of Clinical Trial Data in International Intellectual Property Law: The Case for a Public Goods Approach, 13 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 6 (2009) ("The relative strength of patents in the pharmaceutical sector is often justified by the need for consumers to cover the 'risk premium, ' that is, the losses accruing from failed pharmaceutical research projects... over and above the specific Research and Development ('R&D') costs associated with any given successful drug.").
-
(2009)
Marq. Intell. Prop. L. Rev.
, vol.13
, pp. 1
-
-
Reichman, J.H.1
-
276
-
-
78649390116
-
-
See, supra note 15, suggesting that, when only a fraction of research efforts succeeds, the reward for successful efforts should equal or exceed an appropriate multiple of the successful and unsuccessful efforts' "average cost"
-
See SCOTCHMER, supra note 15, at 40 (suggesting that, when only a fraction of research efforts succeeds, the reward for successful efforts should equal or exceed an appropriate multiple of the successful and unsuccessful efforts' "average cost").
-
-
-
Scotchmer1
-
277
-
-
78649385694
-
-
See generally, supra note 26, observing that patent values appear to conform to a distribution for which "dispersion or risk increases as the number of research projects increases because the law of large numbers does not hold" emphasis omitted
-
See generally NORDHAUS, supra note 26, at 56 (observing that patent values appear to conform to a distribution for which "[d]ispersion or risk increases as the number of [research] projects increases because the law of large numbers does not hold" (emphasis omitted));
-
-
-
Nordhaus1
-
278
-
-
34547731364
-
Patent metrics: The mismeasure of innovation in the biotech patent debate
-
1708, "Economists' efforts have often been frustrated by the highly skewed. distribution of patent characteristics."
-
David E. Adelman & Kathryn L. DeAngelis, Patent Metrics: The Mismeasure of Innovation in the Biotech Patent Debate, 85 TEXAS L. REV. 1677, 1708 (2007) ("Economists' efforts have often been frustrated by the highly skewed... distribution of patent characteristics.");
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(2007)
Texas L. Rev.
, vol.85
, pp. 1677
-
-
Adelman, D.E.1
DeAngelis, K.L.2
-
279
-
-
0001093103
-
Technology policy for a world of skew-distributed outcomes
-
563, finding that innovation values are likely to follow a log-normal distribution for which "feasible portfolio strategies are likely to yield at best middling success"
-
F. M. Scherer & Dietmar Harhoff, Technology Policy for a World of Skew-Distributed Outcomes, 29 RES. POL'Y 559, 563 (2000) (finding that innovation values are likely to follow a log-normal distribution for which "feasible portfolio strategies are likely to yield at best middling success").
-
(2000)
Res. Pol'y
, vol.29
, pp. 559
-
-
Scherer, F.M.1
Harhoff, D.2
-
280
-
-
78649377898
-
-
Cf. Arrow, supra note 69, observing that "cost-plus contracts notoriously have their adverse allocative effects"
-
Cf. Arrow, supra note 69, at 614 (observing that "cost-plus contracts notoriously have their adverse allocative effects").
-
-
-
-
281
-
-
78649344682
-
-
Cf, supra note 16, "To the extent a firm receives a fair rate of return on both efficient and inefficient investments, it has no incentive to distinguish the two."
-
Cf. HOVENKAMP, supra note 16, at 241 ("To the extent [a] firm receives [a] fair rate of return on both efficient and inefficient investments, it has no incentive to distinguish the two.").
-
-
-
Hovenkamp1
-
282
-
-
0008377440
-
-
See, e.g., describing "key questions" raised by Joseph Schumpeter's views that research-and-development "efforts are more likely to be undertaken by large firms than by small ones", and that innovation will "be more aggressively pursued by monopolistic or oligopolistic firms than... by firms with little or no market power"
-
See, e.g., LYNNE PEPALL ET AL., INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION: CONTEMPORARY THEORY AND PRACTICE 585-86 (1999) (describing "key questions" raised by Joseph Schumpeter's views that research-and-development "efforts are more likely to be undertaken by large firms than by small ones", and that innovation will "be more aggressively pursued by monopolistic or oligopolistic firms than... by firms with little or no market power").
-
(1999)
Industrial Organization: Contemporary Theory and Practice
, pp. 585-586
-
-
Lynne, P.1
-
283
-
-
78649344678
-
-
supra note 69
-
Arrow, supra note 69, at 609.
-
-
-
Arrow1
-
284
-
-
78649380109
-
-
See id, showing that, at least under a substantial range of conditions, the inventor's royalties when licensing to a competitive market exceed a monopolist's gain from use of the invention
-
See id. at 620-21 (showing that, at least under a substantial range of conditions, the inventor's royalties when licensing to a competitive market exceed a monopolist's gain from use of the invention).
-
-
-
-
285
-
-
78649355394
-
-
See, supra note 192, describing the "replacement effect", whereby profits from a new innovation at least partly act only to substitute for, rather than to enhance, profits already available under a preexisting monopoly
-
See PEPALL ET AL., supra note 192, at 594 (describing the "replacement effect", whereby profits from a new innovation at least partly act only to substitute for, rather than to enhance, profits already available under a preexisting monopoly).
-
-
-
Pepall1
-
286
-
-
78649353548
-
-
See id, noting that Arrow's refutation of Schumpeter is incomplete because "Schumpeter's language... does not envision a world in which the monopolist is free from the threat of entry"
-
See id. at 595 (noting that Arrow's refutation of Schumpeter is incomplete because "Schumpeter's language... does not envision a world in which the monopolist is free from the threat of entry").
-
-
-
-
287
-
-
78649343480
-
-
See, &, supra note 154, describing how the "incentive to innovate to prevent entry... gives the monopoly a greater incentive to invent than a competitive firm". Analysis of oligopolistic markets that lie somewhere between competitive and monopolistic markets appears no easier
-
See CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 154, at 560 (describing how the "incentive to innovate to prevent entry... gives the monopoly a greater incentive to invent than a competitive firm"). Analysis of oligopolistic markets that lie somewhere between competitive and monopolistic markets appears no easier.
-
-
-
Carlton1
Perloff2
-
288
-
-
78649375013
-
-
See, e.g., &, 3d ed, "The Cournot and Bertrand models make dramatically different predictions about the quantities, prices, and profits that will arise under oligopolistic competition. "
-
See, e.g., DAVID A. BESANKO & RONALD R. BRAEUTIGAM, MICROECONOMICS 508 (3d ed. 2008) ("The Cournot and Bertrand models make dramatically different predictions about the quantities, prices, and profits that will arise under oligopolistic competition. ");
-
(2008)
Microeconomics
, pp. 508
-
-
David, A.B.1
Ronald, R.B.2
-
289
-
-
78649350373
-
-
supra note 192, describing different predictions for markets involving an initially specified number of identical Cournot competitors
-
PEPALL ET AL., supra note 192, at 597-98 (describing different predictions for markets involving an initially specified number of identical Cournot competitors).
-
-
-
Pepall1
-
291
-
-
0004007765
-
-
See, "A firm's licensing behavior depends, in important ways, on the presence and actions of other firms."
-
See ASHISH ARORA ET AL., MARKETS FOR TECHNOLOGY: THE ECONOMICS OF INNOVATION AND CORPORATE STRATEGY 282-83 (2001) ("[A] firm's licensing behavior depends, in important ways, on the presence and actions of other firms.").
-
(2001)
Markets for Technology: The Economics of Innovation and Corporate Strategy
, pp. 282-283
-
-
Ashish, A.1
-
292
-
-
78649345708
-
-
See infra text accompanying note 405
-
See infra text accompanying note 405.
-
-
-
-
293
-
-
78649369632
-
-
Cf, supra note 16, "The antitrust case law is filled with examples of practices that may very well be anticompetitive, but one can never be sure enough to risk the public cost of condemnation that might deter socially beneficial conduct."
-
Cf. HOVENKAMP, supra note 16, at 50 ("The antitrust case law is filled with examples of practices that may very well be anticompetitive, but one can never be sure enough to risk the public cost of condemnation that might deter socially beneficial conduct.").
-
-
-
Hovenkamp1
-
294
-
-
78649391048
-
-
See, &, supra note 154, "Licensing is likely and more profitable than not licensing when licensees have lower manufacturing costs than the inventor."
-
See CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 154, at 558 ("Licensing is likely (and more profitable than not licensing) when licensees have lower manufacturing costs than the inventor.").
-
-
-
Carlton1
Perloff2
-
295
-
-
70350099474
-
Patent licensing
-
See, in, 335, Robert J. Aumann & Sergiu Hart eds., finding that, under various circumstances, a patentee should seek to have a number of licensees equal to at least "one-half the number of potential licensees"
-
See Morton I. Kamien, Patent Licensing, in 1 HANDBOOK OF GAME THEORY WITH ECONOMIC APPLICATIONS 331, 335 (Robert J. Aumann & Sergiu Hart eds., 1992) (finding that, under various circumstances, a patentee should seek to have a number of licensees equal to at least "one-half the number of potential licensees").
-
(1992)
Handbook of Game Theory With Economic Applications
, vol.1
, pp. 331
-
-
Kamien, M.I.1
-
296
-
-
78649362315
-
Patent licensing: Concerted action by licensees
-
462
-
Ramon A. Klitzke, Patent Licensing: Concerted Action by Licensees, 13 DEL. J. CORP. L. 459, 462 (1988).
-
(1988)
Del. J. Corp. L
, vol.13
, pp. 459
-
-
Klitzke, R.A.1
-
297
-
-
0642307852
-
A pilot survey on the licensing of DNA inventions
-
442, 444
-
Michelle R. Henry et al., A Pilot Survey on the Licensing of DNA Inventions, 31 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 442, 442, 444 (2003).
-
(2003)
J. L. Med. & Ethics
, vol.31
, pp. 442
-
-
Henry, M.R.1
-
298
-
-
78649352359
-
-
See id, reporting that, with respect to DNA-sequence licenses, "companies reported an average of 27 percent to be exclusive...compared to 68 percent of those granted by nonprofits"
-
See id. at 444 (reporting that, with respect to DNA-sequence licenses, "companies reported an average of 27 percent to be exclusive...compared to 68 percent of those granted by nonprofits").
-
-
-
-
299
-
-
78649388620
-
-
Id
-
Id. at 448.
-
-
-
-
300
-
-
78649338345
-
-
Another potential explanation is that nonprofits are substantially less likely to patent inventions for which nonexclusive licensing is likely to be a desirable mode of exploitation. If true, this conjecture might also help explain survey results indicating that for-profit companies filed patent applications for 86% of their internal invention disclosures, whereas nonprofits filed patents for only 15% of theirs. Id
-
Another potential explanation is that nonprofits are substantially less likely to patent inventions for which nonexclusive licensing is likely to be a desirable mode of exploitation. If true, this conjecture might also help explain survey results indicating that for-profit companies filed patent applications for 86% of their internal invention disclosures, whereas nonprofits filed patents for only 15% of theirs. Id. at 443.
-
-
-
-
301
-
-
78649349476
-
-
See, supra note 203, concluding that profits for the licensor-the bargaining counterpart to licensees-"are less for royalty licensing than in auction or fixed fee licensing games unless the invention is drastic or the industry is perfectly competitive"
-
See Kamien, supra note 203, at 347 (concluding that profits for the licensor-the bargaining counterpart to licensees-"are less [for royalty licensing] than in auction or fixed fee licensing games unless the invention is drastic or the industry is perfectly competitive").
-
-
-
Kamien1
-
302
-
-
84919470640
-
Fees versus royalties and the private value of a patent
-
See, &, 481, "Both the patentee and consumers are worse off with the use of a royalty as compared with the use of a fee only."
-
See Morton I. Kamien & Yair Tauman, Fees Versus Royalties and the Private Value of a Patent, 101 Q. J. ECON. 471, 481 (1986) ("[B]oth the patentee and consumers are worse off with the use of a royalty as compared with the use of a fee only.");
-
(1986)
Q. J. Econ
, vol.101
, pp. 471
-
-
Kamien, M.I.1
Tauman, Y.2
-
303
-
-
78649356878
-
-
cf, supra note 15, 165, observing that royalties generally lead to higher prices whereas fixed fees act to distribute profit between patentees and licensees
-
cf. SCOTCHMER, supra note 15, at 162, 165 (observing that royalties generally lead to higher prices whereas fixed fees act to distribute profit between patentees and licensees).
-
-
-
Scotchmer1
-
304
-
-
70649109692
-
-
547 U. S. 388 (2006).
-
(2006)
U. S.
, vol.547
, pp. 388
-
-
-
305
-
-
78649390112
-
-
See Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., 622 E. D. Tex, imposing "ongoing royalty rates, as a percentage of wholesale vehicle price", for various vehicles
-
See Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., 609 F. Supp. 2d 620, 622 (E. D. Tex. 2009) (imposing "ongoing royalty rate[s], as a percentage of wholesale vehicle price", for various vehicles);
-
(2009)
F. Supp. 2d
, vol.609
, pp. 620
-
-
-
306
-
-
78649344051
-
-
*5, 2008, Boston Scientific Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, No. C 02-0790 SI, N. D. Cal. Nov. 25, reporting that the district court would "consider evidence on a reasonable rate for an ongoing royalty"
-
*5 (N. D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2008) (reporting that the district court would "consider evidence on a reasonable rate for an ongoing royalty");
-
(2008)
WL
, pp. 5054955
-
-
-
307
-
-
79951894048
-
-
*, 2006, Finisar Corp. v. DirecTV Group, No.
-
*4-5 (E. D. Tex. July 7, 2006) (ordering "an ongoing royalty of $1.60 per... set top box");
-
(2006)
U. S. Dist. Lexis 76380
, pp. 4-5
-
-
-
308
-
-
78649380111
-
-
cf. Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 1188 C. D. Cal, discussing the district court's prior provision for "an ongoing royalty, consisting of 6% of all revenues" internal quotations omitted
-
cf. Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 585 F. Supp. 2d 1187, 1188 (C. D. Cal. 2008) (discussing the district court's prior provision for "an ongoing royalty, consisting of 6% of all revenues" (internal quotations omitted)).
-
(2008)
F. Supp. 2d
, vol.585
, pp. 1187
-
-
-
309
-
-
0141685863
-
Game theory and the practice of bargaining
-
One of the great lessons from the study of game-theoretic models for bargaining is that "negotiation behavior and bargaining outcomes depend intimately on the posited rules and characteristics of the bargaining game.", in, 286, Kalyan Chatterjee & William F. Samuelson eds.
-
One of the great lessons from the study of game-theoretic models for bargaining is that "[n]egotiation behavior and bargaining outcomes depend intimately on the posited rules and characteristics of the bargaining game." Kalyan Chatterjee, Game Theory and the Practice of Bargaining, in GAME THEORY AND BUSINESS APPLICATIONS 273, 286 (Kalyan Chatterjee & William F. Samuelson eds., 2001).
-
(2001)
Game Theory and Business Applications
, pp. 273
-
-
Chatterjee, K.1
-
310
-
-
78649372194
-
-
See, supra note 203, "A royalty alleviates a licensee's fear of overpaying for a license and the patentee's of undercharging."
-
See Kamien, supra note 203, at 346 ("A royalty alleviates a licensee's fear of overpaying for a license and the patentee's of undercharging.").
-
-
-
Kamien1
-
311
-
-
34047185744
-
U. S./canadian licensing in 2003: Survey results
-
See, e.g., Dec, 147-48 reporting survey results indicating that provisions requiring milestone payments are routine. The structure of payment terms might often be correlated with the license's exclusivity or nonexclusivity
-
See, e.g., Richard Razgaitas, U. S./Canadian Licensing in 2003: Survey Results, LES NOUVELLES, Dec. 2004, at 139, 147-48 (reporting survey results indicating that provisions requiring milestone payments are routine). The structure of payment terms might often be correlated with the license's exclusivity or nonexclusivity.
-
(2004)
Les Nouvelles
, pp. 139
-
-
Razgaitas, R.1
-
312
-
-
78649338665
-
-
See, supra note 205, reporting survey results indicating that "nonexclusive licenses allow more leeway in negotiating financial terms including the amounts and timing of payments, and the taking of equity "
-
See Henry et al., supra note 205, at 444 (reporting survey results indicating that "nonexclusive licenses allow more leeway in negotiating financial terms (including the amounts and timing of payments, and the taking of equity) ").
-
-
-
Henry1
-
313
-
-
78649368181
-
-
See, supra note 214, reporting that the following percentages of respondents indicated that a particular type of term was routine in licenses given to others: 75% for field-of-use restrictions, 61% for exclusivity, 51% for nonexclusivity, 51% for time limitations, 49% for geographic restrictions, and 41% for grant-back provisions providing for transfer to the licensor of patent rights in licensee improvements
-
See Razgaitas, supra note 214, at 147 (reporting that the following percentages of respondents indicated that a particular type of term was routine in licenses given to others: 75% for field-of-use restrictions, 61% for exclusivity, 51% for nonexclusivity, 51% for time limitations, 49% for geographic restrictions, and 41% for grant-back provisions providing for transfer to the licensor of patent rights in licensee improvements);
-
-
-
Razgaitas1
-
314
-
-
78649341210
-
-
see also id, reporting that the following percentages of respondents indicated that a particular type of term was routine in licenses obtained from others: 79% for field-of-use restrictions, 62% for exclusivity, 55% for geographic restrictions, 48% for time limitations, 45% for grant-back provisions, and 38% for nonexclusivity
-
see also id. at 148 (reporting that the following percentages of respondents indicated that a particular type of term was routine in licenses obtained from others: 79% for field-of-use restrictions, 62% for exclusivity, 55% for geographic restrictions, 48% for time limitations, 45% for grant-back provisions, and 38% for nonexclusivity).
-
-
-
-
315
-
-
78649370720
-
-
Id
-
Id. at 144.
-
-
-
-
316
-
-
78649346611
-
-
supra note 209
-
Kamien & Tauman, supra note 209, at 478.
-
-
-
Kamien1
Tauman2
-
317
-
-
78649378481
-
-
Id
-
Id. at 477.
-
-
-
-
318
-
-
78649338659
-
-
supra note 192
-
PEPALL ET AL., supra note 192, at 590.
-
-
-
Pepall1
-
319
-
-
78649350661
-
-
See, &, supra note 154, observing that, in accordance with a standard supply-and-demand model, "the inventor captures all the gains to society of minor discoveries, but not of major discoveries"
-
See CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 154, at 558 (observing that, in accordance with a standard supply-and-demand model, "the inventor captures all the gains to society of minor discoveries, but not of major discoveries");
-
-
-
Carlton1
Perloff2
-
320
-
-
78649385207
-
-
see also, &, supra note 198, discussing a simple market model according to which the inventor of a wholly new product with no substitutes captures "only two-thirds of the total surplus" generated. There seems little reason, however, to pity the holder of a patent for a drastic invention. Such a patent holder is likely to be able to secure a greater fraction of total realized social surplus by choosing a price different from the standard monopoly price. The patent holder chooses not to do this because charging a lower price results in a larger producer surplus, albeit one that may be a smaller fraction of total social surplus
-
see also SCHERER & ROSS, supra note 198, at 622 (discussing a simple market model according to which the inventor of a wholly new product with no substitutes captures "only two-thirds of the total surplus" generated). There seems little reason, however, to pity the holder of a patent for a drastic invention. Such a patent holder is likely to be able to secure a greater fraction of total realized social surplus by choosing a price different from the standard monopoly price. The patent holder chooses not to do this because charging a lower price results in a larger producer surplus, albeit one that may be a smaller fraction of total social surplus.
-
-
-
Scherer1
Ross2
-
321
-
-
78649375306
-
-
See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text
-
See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
-
-
-
-
322
-
-
78649365721
-
-
See, supra note 130, observing that, if such competitive "imitation is swift and widespread, much more of the social gains from a technological advance will accrue to rivals and... consumers"
-
See SCHERER, supra note 130, at 20 (observing that, if such competitive "imitation is swift and widespread, much more of the social gains [from a technological advance] will accrue to rivals and... consumers");
-
-
-
Scherer1
-
323
-
-
78649375020
-
-
supra note 104, "For particular categories of innovation, at least two and as many as fourteen industries reported that patents actually reduced the costs or time required for duplication. "
-
Levin et al., supra note 104, at 810 ("For particular categories of innovation, at least two and as many as fourteen industries reported that patents actually reduced the costs or time required for duplication. ").
-
-
-
Levin1
-
324
-
-
78649361135
-
-
See, supra note 192, reporting an "absence of compelling evidence that either industrial structure or firm size materially affects the pace of technical advance"
-
See PEPALL ET AL., supra note 192, at 600 (reporting an "absence of compelling evidence that either industrial structure or firm size materially affects the pace of technical advance").
-
-
-
Pepall1
-
325
-
-
0004012772
-
-
But see, &, "Empirical research reveals that an intermediate market structure, one that is neither perfectly competitive nor perfectly monopolistic, is usually most conducive to technical advance."
-
But see MORTON I. KAMIEN & NANCY L. SCHWARTZ, MARKET STRUCTURE AND INNOVATION 3 (1982) ("Empirical research reveals that an intermediate market structure, one that is neither perfectly competitive nor perfectly monopolistic, is usually most conducive to technical advance.").
-
(1982)
Market Structure and Innovation
, pp. 3
-
-
Morton, I.K.1
Nancy, L.S.2
-
326
-
-
78649337225
-
-
See, supra note 199, discussing the "historically contingent" status of markets in technology from the nineteenth century to the present. Resulting difficulties in identifying optimal business models and market structures might account for the conclusion of some scholars "that innovation within an industry is likely to be best supported by a mix of firms distinguished by size, capabilities, specialization", and other characteristics
-
See ARORA ET AL., supra note 199, at 287 (discussing the "historically contingent" status of markets in technology from the nineteenth century to the present). Resulting difficulties in identifying optimal business models and market structures might account for the conclusion of some scholars "that innovation within an industry is likely to be best supported by a mix of firms distinguished by size, capabilities, specialization", and other characteristics.
-
-
-
Arora1
-
327
-
-
79955996690
-
Schumpeter's prophecy and individual incentives as a driver of innovation
-
Franco Malerba & Stefano Brusoni eds., A portfolio of business models might help compensate for uncertainty about how best to promote innovation
-
Wesley M. Cohen & Henry Sauermann, Schumpeter's Prophecy and Individual Incentives as a Driver of Innovation, in PERSPECTIVES ON INNOVATION 73, 94 (Franco Malerba & Stefano Brusoni eds., 2007). A portfolio of business models might help compensate for uncertainty about how best to promote innovation.
-
(2007)
Perspectives on Innovation
, vol.73
, pp. 94
-
-
Cohen, W.M.1
Sauermann, H.2
-
328
-
-
78649378806
-
-
See, e.g., supra note 104, finding, from a survey of publicly traded manufacturing firms, that there were only a "few industries in which patents were rated as more effective than other mechanisms" of appropriating value
-
See, e.g., Levin et al., supra note 104, at 801-02 (finding, from a survey of publicly traded manufacturing firms, that there were only a "few industries in which patents were rated as more effective than other mechanisms" of appropriating value).
-
-
-
Levin1
-
329
-
-
78649358787
-
-
See, e.g., hereinafter OECD REPORT "For small and midsize enterprises, patents can be a particularly important asset, enabling them to better secure their competitive position and access external financing."
-
See, e.g., ORGANISATION FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AS AN ECONOMIC ASSET: KEY ISSUES IN VALUATION AND EXPLOITATION: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES 7 (2005) [hereinafter OECD REPORT] ("For [small and midsize enterprises], patents can be a particularly important asset, enabling them to better secure their competitive position and access external financing.");
-
(2005)
Organisation for Econ. Co-operation and Dev., Intellectual Property as an Economic Asset: Key Issues in Valuation and Exploitation: Background and Issues
, pp. 7
-
-
-
330
-
-
33645618856
-
Biotechnology, technology policy, and patentability: Natural products and invention in the american system
-
168-69, describing how patents can act "as a sort of intermediate marketable product" for "cash-poor individuals or small firms"
-
John M. Golden, Biotechnology, Technology Policy, and Patentability: Natural Products and Invention in the American System, 50 EMORY L. J. 101, 168-69 (2001) (describing how patents can act "as a sort of intermediate marketable product" for "cash-poor individuals or small firms").
-
(2001)
Emory L. J.
, vol.50
, pp. 101
-
-
Golden, J.M.1
-
331
-
-
0004116242
-
-
But see, concluding that a survey provided "no evidence that patent protection was more likely to be deemed essential for innovations carried out by smaller firms"
-
But see EDWIN MANSFIELD ET AL., TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, PRODUCTIVITY, AND ECONOMIC POLICY 152 (1982) (concluding that a survey provided "no evidence that patent protection was more likely to be deemed essential for innovations carried out by smaller firms");
-
(1982)
Technology Transfer, Productivity, and Economic Policy
, pp. 152
-
-
Edwin, M.1
-
332
-
-
78649390115
-
-
supra note 78 manuscript at 32 reporting survey results indicating that "to effectively compete, startups tend to report that multiple methods of appropriability are useful; even though the clustering of and relative importance ascribed to these methods do not follow a common pattern"
-
Graham et al., supra note 78 (manuscript at 32) (reporting survey results indicating that "to effectively compete, startups tend to report that multiple methods of appropriability are useful; even though the clustering of and relative importance ascribed to these methods do not follow a common pattern").
-
-
-
Graham1
-
333
-
-
78649361715
-
-
See, &, supra note 106, concluding that evidence suggests "that small firms are more effective innovators and that they are disproportionately responsible for the most important innovations"
-
See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 106, at 41 (concluding that evidence suggests "that small firms are more effective innovators and that they are disproportionately responsible for the most important innovations");
-
-
-
Burk1
Lemley2
-
334
-
-
0003768768
-
-
contending that "small entrant firms" enjoy an advantage in "building the emerging markets for disruptive technologies"
-
CLAYTON M. CHRISTENSEN, THE INNOVATOR'S DILEMMA: WHEN NEW TECHNOLOGIES CAUSE GREAT FIRMS TO FAIL 228 (1997) (contending that "small entrant firms" enjoy an advantage in "build[ing] the emerging markets for disruptive technologies").
-
(1997)
The Innovator's Dilemma: When New Technologies Cause Great Firms to Fail
, pp. 228
-
-
Clayton, M.C.1
-
335
-
-
78649347218
-
-
See supra section III B 3
-
See supra section III (B) (3).
-
-
-
-
336
-
-
78649367045
-
-
E.g., U. S. Patent No. 5, 484, 719 col.1 ll.11-12 filed Nov. 23, 1993 issued Jan. 16, describing "the production of oral vaccines in edible transgenic plants"
-
E.g., U. S. Patent No. 5, 484, 719 col.1 ll.11-12 (filed Nov. 23, 1993) (issued Jan. 16, 1996) (describing "the production of oral vaccines in edible transgenic plants").
-
(1996)
-
-
-
337
-
-
78649345709
-
-
E.g., U. S. Patent No. 6, 346, 189 col.1 ll.6-9 filed Aug. 14, 1998 issued Feb. 12, describing "methods of fabricating carbon nanotube structures"
-
E.g., U. S. Patent No. 6, 346, 189 col.1 ll.6-9 (filed Aug. 14, 1998) (issued Feb. 12, 2002) (describing "methods of fabricating [carbon] nanotube structures").
-
(2002)
-
-
-
338
-
-
78649351513
-
-
E.g., U. S. Patent No. 5, 946, 673 col.3 ll.41-47 filed July 12, 1996 issued Aug. 31, describing "a computerized computation system"
-
E.g., U. S. Patent No. 5, 946, 673 col.3 ll.41-47 (filed July 12, 1996) (issued Aug. 31, 1999) (describing "a computerized computation system").
-
(1999)
-
-
-
339
-
-
78649356875
-
-
E.g., U. S. Patent No. 6, 640, 342 col.1 ll.5-8 filed Feb. 14, 2001 issued Nov. 4, describing "a garment that may function as a scarf or as a hat or as a hat and scarf combination"
-
E.g., U. S. Patent No. 6, 640, 342 col.1 ll.5-8 (filed Feb. 14, 2001) (issued Nov. 4, 2003) (describing "a garment that may function as a scarf or as a hat or as a hat and scarf combination").
-
(2003)
-
-
-
340
-
-
78649352360
-
-
E.g., U. S. Patent No. 5, 148, 624 col.1 ll.7-10 filed Apr. 10, 1991 issued Sept. 22, describing "an improved mousetrap"
-
E.g., U. S. Patent No. 5, 148, 624 col.1 ll.7-10 (filed Apr. 10, 1991) (issued Sept. 22, 1992) (describing "an improved mousetrap").
-
(1992)
-
-
-
341
-
-
0345547423
-
Policy levers in patent law
-
See, &, 1588, describing the technology specificity of research-and-development costs, the times required for development and deployment, the degree of corporate involvement or collaboration in innovation, and the appropriability of social returns
-
See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1588 (2003) (describing the technology specificity of research-and-development costs, the times required for development and deployment, the degree of corporate involvement or collaboration in innovation, and the appropriability of social returns).
-
(2003)
Va. L. Rev.
, vol.89
, pp. 1575
-
-
Burk, D.L.1
Lemley, M.A.2
-
342
-
-
78649386265
-
-
See supra notes 7-10 and accompanying text
-
See supra notes 7-10 and accompanying text.
-
-
-
-
343
-
-
78649337788
-
-
See, &, supra note 106, observing that "different industries put very different values on patents and the patent system"
-
See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 106, at 49 (observing that "different industries put very different values on patents and the patent system").
-
-
-
Burk1
Lemley2
-
344
-
-
78649380976
-
-
supra note 33
-
Merges & Nelson, supra note 33, at 880.
-
-
-
Merges1
Nelson2
-
345
-
-
78649386264
-
-
See, &, supra note 234, "Courts can, and should, apply the general rules of patent law with sensitivity to the characteristics of particular industries."
-
See Burk & Lemley, supra note 234, at 1641 ("Courts can, and should, apply the general rules of patent law with sensitivity to the characteristics of particular industries.").
-
-
-
Burk1
Lemley2
-
346
-
-
78649373880
-
-
See, supra note 79, concluding that survey results "indicate that a handful of industries are distinguished by greater reported patent effectiveness"
-
See Cohen et al., supra note 79, at 9 (concluding that survey results "indicat[e] that a handful of industries are distinguished by greater reported patent effectiveness");
-
-
-
Cohen1
-
347
-
-
78649385371
-
-
supra note 78 manuscript at 26 reporting "profound disparities in the likelihood, number, and original source of patents by the technology focus and industry" of entrepreneurial companies
-
Graham et al., supra note 78 (manuscript at 26) (reporting "profound disparities in the likelihood, number, and original source of patents by the technology focus and industry" of entrepreneurial companies);
-
-
-
Graham1
-
348
-
-
78649362317
-
-
supra note 104, finding that, according to survey responses, only for one of three clusters of industries "were product and process patents deemed effective" as a means for appropriating returns from research and development
-
Levin et al., supra note 104, at 801 (finding that, according to survey responses, only for one of three clusters of industries "were product and process patents deemed effective" as a means for appropriating returns from research and development).
-
-
-
Levin1
-
349
-
-
78649384577
-
-
But compare Comments and Discussion, supra note 160, comments of Zvi Griliches arguing that Levin et al.'s survey does "not seem to be able to pick out significant differences among industries"
-
But compare Comments and Discussion, supra note 160, at 828 (comments of Zvi Griliches) (arguing that Levin et al.'s survey does "not seem to be able to pick out significant differences among industries")
-
-
-
-
350
-
-
78649384578
-
-
with id, response of Levin defending the conclusion "that patents do not matter very much except in the chemical industries and in semiconductors"
-
with id. at 830 (response of Levin) (defending the conclusion "that patents do not matter very much except in the chemical industries and in semiconductors").
-
-
-
-
351
-
-
78649373304
-
-
See, supra note 104, finding "that patents raise imitation costs by 40 percentage points for both major and typical new drugs,... 30 points for major new chemical products and 25 points for typical chemical products", but only "7 to 15 percentage points for major products and 7 to 10 for typical products" relating to "semiconductors, computers, and communications"
-
See Levin et al., supra note 104, at 809-11 (finding "that patents raise imitation costs by 40 percentage points for both major and typical new drugs,... 30 points for major new chemical products and 25 points for typical chemical products", but only "7 to 15 percentage points for major products and 7 to 10 for typical products" relating to " semiconductors, computers, and communications").
-
-
-
Levin1
-
352
-
-
78649376469
-
-
supra note 130
-
SCHERER, supra note 130, at 53.
-
-
-
Scherer1
-
353
-
-
78649358487
-
-
supra note 34, tbl.5.3
-
BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 34, at 108 tbl.5.3.
-
-
-
Bessen1
Meurer2
-
354
-
-
78649352968
-
On the continuing misuse of event studies: The example of bessen and meurer
-
See, 54, concluding that capital-market event studies' tendency to reflect "overreaction to certain kinds of unexpected bad news... fatally undermines Bessen and Meurer's ultimate conclusion that patents have become a net disincentive for most industries"
-
See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., On the Continuing Misuse of Event Studies: The Example of Bessen and Meurer, 16 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 35, 54 (2008) (concluding that capital-market event studies' tendency to reflect "overreact[ion] to certain kinds of unexpected bad news... fatally undermine[s] Bessen and Meurer's ultimate conclusion that patents have become a net disincentive for most industries").
-
(2008)
J. Intell. Prop. L
, vol.16
, pp. 35
-
-
Lunney Jr., G.S.1
-
355
-
-
78649391043
-
-
See, &, supra note 34, "Thus we can safely conclude that during the late 1990s, the aggregate costs of patents exceeded the aggregate private benefits of patents for United States public firms outside the chemical and pharmaceutical industries."
-
See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 34, at 141 ("Thus we can safely conclude that during the late 1990s, the aggregate costs of patents exceeded the aggregate private benefits of patents for United States public firms outside the chemical and pharmaceutical industries.").
-
-
-
Bessen1
Meurer2
-
356
-
-
78649382760
-
-
See id, concluding that "the clear boundaries provided by patents on chemical structures and compositions explain the overall superior performance of the patent system in these industries". In other technology areas, such as software and semiconductor-chip manufacturing, the effectiveness of patent notice might be frustrated by either a lack of concrete and standardized terminology
-
See id. at 153 (concluding that "the clear boundaries provided by patents on chemical structures and compositions explain the overall superior performance of the patent system in these industries"). In other technology areas, such as software and semiconductor-chip manufacturing, the effectiveness of patent notice might be frustrated by either a lack of concrete and standardized terminology
-
-
-
-
357
-
-
78649360246
-
-
see id, blaming "the abstractness of software technology" for difficulty in "placing limits on abstract claims", or the sheer volume of patent claims that need to be reviewed
-
see id. at 201 (blaming "the abstractness of software technology" for difficulty in "plac[ing] limits on abstract claims"), or the sheer volume of patent claims that need to be reviewed.
-
-
-
-
358
-
-
78649351245
-
-
See id, "Clearance costs are affected by the number of prospective rights that must be checked for possible infringement."
-
See id. at 53 ("Clearance costs are affected by the number of prospective rights that must be checked for possible infringement.");
-
-
-
-
359
-
-
78649381568
-
-
cf, supra note 82, asserting that "there is virtually no new product or service in the high-tech industry that does not use hundreds, if not thousands, of inventions patented by other people or companies"
-
cf. Nutter, supra note 82, at 179 (asserting that "there is virtually no new product or service in the high-tech industry that does not use hundreds, if not thousands, of inventions patented by other people or companies").
-
-
-
Nutter1
-
360
-
-
84876410777
-
-
supra note 226
-
OECD REPORT, supra note 226, at 13-14.
-
Oecd Report
, pp. 13-14
-
-
-
361
-
-
0034405660
-
The structure of licensing contracts
-
112-13
-
Bharat N. Anand & Tarun Khanna, The Structure of Licensing Contracts, 48 J. INDUS. ECON. 103, 112-13 (2000).
-
(2000)
J. Indus. Econ.
, vol.48
, pp. 103
-
-
Anand, B.N.1
Khanna, T.2
-
362
-
-
79958714692
-
Enforcement of patent rights in the united states
-
152 tbl.1 Wesley M. Cohen & Stephen A. Merrill eds.
-
Jean O. Lanjouw & Mark Schankerman, Enforcement of Patent Rights in the United States, in PATENTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY 145, 152 tbl.1 (Wesley M. Cohen & Stephen A. Merrill eds., 2003).
-
(2003)
Patents in the Knowledge-based Economy
, vol.145
-
-
Lanjouw, J.O.1
Schankerman, M.2
-
363
-
-
78649392195
-
-
fig.1 Stanford Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 1407796, available at
-
John R. Allison et al., Extreme Value or Trolls on Top? The Characteristics of the Most-Litigated Patents 22-23 & fig.1 (Stanford Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 1407796, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1407796.
-
(2009)
Extreme Value or Trolls on Top? The Characteristics of the Most-litigated Patents
, pp. 22-23
-
-
Allison, J.R.1
-
364
-
-
0036486793
-
The growing complexity of the united states patent system
-
93
-
John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, The Growing Complexity of the United States Patent System, 82 B. U. L. Rev. 77, 93 (2002).
-
(2002)
B. U. L. Rev.
, vol.77-82
-
-
Allison, J.R.1
Lemley, M.A.2
-
365
-
-
78649389228
-
-
Id
-
Id. at 94.
-
-
-
-
366
-
-
69849094825
-
Is the patent office a rubber stamp?
-
187, 195
-
Mark A. Lemley & Bhaven Sampat, Is the Patent Office a Rubber Stamp?, 58 EMORY L. J. 181, 187, 195 (2008).
-
(2008)
Emory L. J.
, vol.58
, pp. 181
-
-
Lemley, M.A.1
Sampat, B.2
-
367
-
-
78649360249
-
-
Id, tbl.7
-
Id. at 195 tbl.7.
-
-
-
-
368
-
-
78649385997
-
-
supra note 247
-
Anand & Khanna, supra note 247, at 114.
-
-
-
Anand1
Khanna2
-
369
-
-
78649342875
-
-
See id, stating that "cross-licensings are much more commonly observed in Electronics 20%, where most of these deals concern semiconductor technologies"
-
See id. at 120 (stating that "cross-licensings are much more commonly observed in Electronics (20%), where most of these deals concern semiconductor technologies").
-
-
-
-
370
-
-
78649383992
-
-
See id, reporting that "37% of all contracts involved some form of exclusive rights", but the majority of all chemical-industry licenses included an exclusivity provision, whereas only 18% of computer-industry licenses and only 16% of electronics-industry licenses did so
-
See id. at 118 (reporting that "37% of all contracts involve[d] some form of exclusive rights", but the majority of all chemical-industry licenses included an exclusivity provision, whereas only 18% of computer-industry licenses and only 16% of electronics-industry licenses did so).
-
-
-
-
371
-
-
78649346911
-
-
See, supra note 214, suggesting that the healthcare industry's greater use of milestone payments may "reflect the longer time-to-market and perhaps also the ready demarcation of various regulatory stage approvals"
-
See Razgaitas, supra note 214, at 151 (suggesting that the healthcare industry's greater use of milestone payments may "reflect the longer time-to-market and perhaps also the ready demarcation of various [regulatory] stage approvals").
-
-
-
Razgaitas1
-
372
-
-
84876410777
-
-
supra note 226
-
OECD REPORT, supra note 226, at 20.
-
Oecd Report
, pp. 20
-
-
-
373
-
-
78649387420
-
-
See id. observing that "most patent licensing is based on private contracts that are subject to confidentiality agreements"
-
See id. (observing that "most patent licensing is based on private contracts that are subject to confidentiality agreements");
-
-
-
-
374
-
-
77955751378
-
How to make a patent market
-
257, stating that "the terms of patent licenses, including the price itself, will almost invariably be confidential"
-
Mark A. Lemley & Nathan Myhrvold, How to Make a Patent Market, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 257, 257 (2007) (stating that "the terms of [patent] licenses, including the price itself, will almost invariably be confidential").
-
(2007)
Hofstra L. Rev.
, vol.36
, pp. 257
-
-
Lemley, M.A.1
Myhrvold, N.2
-
375
-
-
84876410777
-
-
supra note 226
-
OECD REPORT, supra note 226, at 20.
-
Oecd Report
, pp. 20
-
-
-
376
-
-
78649375878
-
-
See, e.g., &, supra note 5, "We collected all the cases reported in Westlaw from 1982 through mid-2005 that actually awarded reasonable royalties to patentees."
-
See, e.g., Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 5, at 2030 ("We collected all the cases reported in Westlaw from 1982 through mid-2005 that actually awarded reasonable royalties to patentees.").
-
-
-
Lemley1
Shapiro2
-
377
-
-
78649370415
-
-
See, &, supra note 84, finding that about 80% of patent cases settle, 8% end through final rulings on a motion for summary judgment, 5% go to trial, and the remaining cases are disposed of through some form of nonmerit disposition
-
See Kesan & Ball, supra note 84, at 258-59 (finding that about 80% of patent cases settle, 8% end through final rulings on a motion for summary judgment, 5% go to trial, and the remaining cases are disposed of through some form of nonmerit disposition).
-
-
-
Kesan1
Ball2
-
378
-
-
78649375305
-
-
See, e.g., &, supra note 5, identifying no more than fifty-eight cases "from 1982 through mid-2005" in which a court "actually awarded reasonable royalties to patentees"
-
See, e.g., Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 5, at 2030 (identifying no more than fifty-eight cases "from 1982 through mid-2005" in which a court "actually awarded reasonable royalties to patentees").
-
-
-
Lemley1
Shapiro2
-
379
-
-
78649352674
-
-
See, supra note 5, observing that data drawn from court-ordered damage awards "seems likely to be unrepresentative of the vast universe of licensing agreements, or lack thereof"
-
See Golden, supra note 5, at 2146 (observing that data drawn from court-ordered damage awards "seems likely to be unrepresentative of the vast universe of licensing agreements, or lack thereof").
-
-
-
Golden1
-
380
-
-
78649356590
-
-
See, &, supra note 259, calling for "publication of patent assignment and license terms"
-
See Lemley & Myhrvold, supra note 259, at 258 (calling for "publication of patent assignment and license terms").
-
-
-
Lemley1
Myhrvold2
-
381
-
-
78649362020
-
Need for transparency of transaction details debated at ftc hearing on new ip markets
-
See, 703, describing Paul Ryan of Acacia Research Corporation as arguing that disclosure requirements would produce "fewer transactions". Confidentiality might be valuable to private parties if, for example, a publicly disclosed transfer of patent rights would send a strong signal regarding a party's otherwise secret business plans
-
See Tony Dutra, Need for Transparency of Transaction Details Debated at FTC Hearing on New IP Markets, 77 PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. 702, 703 (2009) (describing Paul Ryan of Acacia Research Corporation as arguing that disclosure requirements would produce "fewer transactions"). Confidentiality might be valuable to private parties if, for example, a publicly disclosed transfer of patent rights would send a strong signal regarding a party's otherwise secret business plans.
-
(2009)
Pat., Trademark & Copyright J.
, vol.77
, pp. 702
-
-
Dutra, T.1
-
382
-
-
78649377904
-
-
See id. recounting Ryan's argument that sale of a patent could signal a company's lack of continuing interest "in the associated business"
-
See id. (recounting Ryan's argument that sale of a patent could signal a company's lack of continuing interest "in the associated business").
-
-
-
-
383
-
-
78649343201
-
-
Cf. id. describing an argument by Mark Lemley of Stanford University that stock markets produce efficient outcomes "because everyone knows the price at which people are willing to sell and buy"
-
Cf. id. (describing an argument by Mark Lemley of Stanford University that stock markets produce efficient outcomes "because everyone knows the price at which people are willing to sell and buy").
-
-
-
-
384
-
-
78649359955
-
-
See supra Part III
-
See supra Part III;
-
-
-
-
385
-
-
78649345393
-
-
cf, unpublished manuscript, on file at, quoting Aristotle's assertion that the optimal level of clarity in discussion varies with the nature of the matter discussed, june 14
-
cf. Ofer Raban, The Fallacy of Legal Certainty: Why Vague Legal Standards May Be Better for Capitalism, Liberalism, and Democracy 16 (June 14, 2009) (unpublished manuscript, on file at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1419683) (quoting Aristotle's assertion that the optimal level of clarity in discussion varies with the nature of the matter discussed).
-
(2009)
The Fallacy of Legal Certainty: Why Vague Legal Standards may be Better for Capitalism, Liberalism, and Democracy 16
-
-
Raban, O.1
-
386
-
-
78649375594
-
-
See, supra note 16, "If the history of regulation is any guide, the more uncertainty there is about the best rule, the more room there is for interest group politics to interfere."
-
See HOVENKAMP, supra note 16, at 251 ("If the history of regulation is any guide, the more uncertainty there is about the best rule, the more room there is for interest group politics to interfere.");
-
-
-
Hovenkamp1
-
387
-
-
84868179603
-
-
Univ. of Iowa Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 09-16, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1377382, arguing that intellectual property laws are "much more susceptible to capture than the antitrust laws" because 1 intellectual property laws involve government intervention that "naturally invites special interest participation" and 2 there is often no generally accepted answer on how to fashion policy for intellectual property
-
Christina Bohannan & Herbert Hovenkamp, IP and Antitrust: Errands into the Wilderness 14-15 (Univ. of Iowa Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 09-16, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1377382 (arguing that intellectual property laws are "much more susceptible to capture than the antitrust laws" because (1) intellectual property laws involve government intervention that "naturally invites special interest participation" and (2) there is often no generally accepted answer on how to fashion policy for intellectual property).
-
(2009)
IP and Antitrust: Errands into the Wilderness
, pp. 14-15
-
-
Bohannan, C.1
Hovenkamp, H.2
-
388
-
-
78649336043
-
-
Michael Abramowicz has argued along similar lines in relation to proposals for patent prizes
-
Michael Abramowicz has argued along similar lines in relation to proposals for patent prizes.
-
-
-
-
389
-
-
78649347516
-
-
See, supra note 121, contending that, given the "many considerations relevant to dispensing prizes, many of which cannot be measured in an objective way", there is value in "flexibility"
-
See Abramowicz, supra note 121, at 122 (contending that, given the "many considerations relevant to dispensing prizes, many of which cannot be measured in an objective way", there is value in "flexibility").
-
-
-
Abramowicz1
-
390
-
-
69849102311
-
Institutions and indirectness in intellectual property
-
See, 2127-31, contending that traditional equitable approaches to relief in property cases featured strong pro-injunction presumptions counterbalanced by "safety valves" to account for concerns of "grossly disproportionate hardship", "detrimental reliance, and lack of notice"
-
See Henry E. Smith, Institutions and Indirectness in Intellectual Property, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 2083, 2127-31 (2009) (contending that traditional equitable approaches to relief in property cases featured strong pro-injunction presumptions counterbalanced by "safety valves" to account for concerns of "grossly disproportionate hardship", "detrimental reliance[,] and lack of notice");
-
(2009)
U. Pa. L. Rev.
, vol.157
, pp. 2083
-
-
Smith, H.E.1
-
391
-
-
78649373879
-
-
cf, 3d ed. Supp, "Undue hardship and collateral consequences for the public interest can both be reasons to withhold an injunction, but each is unusual."
-
cf. DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 58 (3d ed. Supp. 2008) ("Undue hardship and collateral consequences for the public interest can both be reasons to withhold an injunction, but each is unusual.").
-
(2008)
Modern American Remedies: Cases and Materials
, pp. 58
-
-
Douglas, L.1
-
392
-
-
78649347792
-
-
supra note 119
-
Kieff, supra note 119, at 347.
-
-
-
Kieff1
-
393
-
-
0004070522
-
-
See generally, & n. 1, describing the nature of a "cheapest or easiest cost avoider" in an accident context
-
See generally GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 135 & n. 1 (1970) (describing the nature of a "cheapest or easiest cost avoider" in an accident context).
-
(1970)
The Costs of Accidents
, pp. 135
-
-
Guido, C.1
-
394
-
-
70649109692
-
-
547 U. S. 388 (2006).
-
(2006)
U. S.
, vol.547
, pp. 388
-
-
-
395
-
-
78649355122
-
-
Id
-
Id. at 391
-
-
-
-
396
-
-
70649087705
-
-
quoting MercExchange, L. L. C. v. eBay, Inc., 1339, Fed. Cir
-
(quoting MercExchange, L. L. C. v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
-
(2005)
F.3d
, vol.401
, pp. 1323
-
-
-
397
-
-
70649109692
-
-
vacated
-
vacated, 547 U. S. 388 (2006)).
-
(2006)
U. S.
, vol.547
, pp. 388
-
-
-
398
-
-
78649351246
-
-
See id, rejecting the district court's apparent subscription to "expansive principles suggesting that injunctive relief could not issue in a broad swath of cases"
-
See id. at 393 (rejecting the district court's apparent subscription to "expansive principles suggesting that injunctive relief could not issue in a broad swath of cases").
-
-
-
-
399
-
-
78649342553
-
-
Id, Roberts, C. J., concurring
-
Id. at 395 (Roberts, C. J., concurring).
-
-
-
-
400
-
-
78649356876
-
-
See id, Kennedy, J., concurring describing circumstances that might justify doubting the wisdom of injunctive relief
-
See id. at 396-97 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (describing circumstances that might justify doubting the wisdom of injunctive relief).
-
-
-
-
401
-
-
78649372751
-
-
Id
-
Id. at 397.
-
-
-
-
402
-
-
78649362323
-
-
Such favoritism can come in the form of an absolute rule that makes certain patent remedies, such as injunctions, available only to those directly engaged in the production or distribution of goods or services. Alternatively, it could simply come in the form of a "thumb on the scale" in favor of such producers or distributors. Thus, the antidiscrimination principle is not a mere corollary of the nonabsolutism principle
-
Such favoritism can come in the form of an absolute rule that makes certain patent remedies, such as injunctions, available only to those directly engaged in the production or distribution of goods or services. Alternatively, it could simply come in the form of a "thumb on the scale" in favor of such producers or distributors. Thus, the antidiscrimination principle is not a mere corollary of the nonabsolutism principle.
-
-
-
-
403
-
-
0036299320
-
The role of the business model in capturing value from innovation: Evidence from xerox corporation's technology spin-off companies
-
Cf, &, 532-34, "The business model provides a coherent framework that takes technological characteristics and potentials as inputs, and converts them through customers and markets into economic outputs."
-
Cf. Henry Chesbrough & Richard S. Rosenbloom, The Role of the Business Model in Capturing Value from Innovation: Evidence from Xerox Corporation's Technology Spin-Off Companies, 11 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 529, 532-34 (2002) ("The business model provides a coherent framework that takes technological characteristics and potentials as inputs, and converts them through customers and markets into economic outputs.").
-
(2002)
Indus. & Corp. Change
, vol.11
, pp. 529
-
-
Chesbrough, H.1
Rosenbloom, R.S.2
-
404
-
-
46149088483
-
Intellectual property for market experimentation
-
Cf, &, 350, observing prevalent economic "agnosticism about industrial structure". Advantages of antidiscrimination with respect to business models have some analogy to advantages of Internet neutrality with respect to applications and information as a means to foster innovation
-
Cf. Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, Intellectual Property for Market Experimentation, 83 N. Y. U. L. REV. 337, 350 (2008) (observing prevalent economic "agnostic[ism] about industrial structure"). Advantages of antidiscrimination with respect to business models have some analogy to advantages of Internet neutrality with respect to applications and information as a means to foster innovation.
-
(2008)
N. Y. U. L. Rev.
, vol.83
, pp. 337
-
-
Abramowicz, M.1
Duffy, J.F.2
-
405
-
-
78649356006
-
-
Cf, observing that Internet neutrality "means that the network is open to adopting applications not originally foreseen" and without discrimination based on the provider
-
Cf. LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD 37 (2001) (observing that Internet neutrality "means that the network is open to adopting applications not originally foreseen" and without discrimination based on the provider).
-
(2001)
The Future of Ideas: The Fate of the Commons in a Connected World
, vol.37
-
-
Lawrence, L.1
-
406
-
-
78649377617
-
-
See generally About CSIRO, last updated Oct. 1
-
See generally About CSIRO, http://www.csiro.au/org/About-CSIRO.html (last updated Oct. 1, 2009).
-
(2009)
-
-
-
407
-
-
84894030141
-
-
See Commonwealth Scientific & Indus. Research Org. v. Buffalo Tech. Inc., 607 E. D. Tex, granting a permanent injunction in part because the patentee was one of a class of "research institutions" judged to have "produced enormous benefits to society"
-
See Commonwealth Scientific & Indus. Research Org. v. Buffalo Tech. Inc., 492 F. Supp. 2d 600, 607 (E. D. Tex. 2007) (granting a permanent injunction in part because the patentee was one of a class of "research institutions" judged to have "produced enormous benefits to society")
-
(2007)
F. Supp. 2d
, vol.492
, pp. 600
-
-
-
408
-
-
78649384908
-
-
vacated on other grounds, Fed. Cir
-
vacated on other grounds, 42 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
-
(2008)
F.3d
, vol.42
, pp. 1363
-
-
-
409
-
-
78649374440
-
-
See, &, supra note 106, "There is only one exception so far to this general rule that... nonpracticing entities don't get injunctions...."
-
See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 106, at 139 ("There is only one exception so far to this general rule that... nonpracticing entities don't [get injunctions]....").
-
-
-
Burk1
Lemley2
-
410
-
-
84863899633
-
-
See Commonwealth Scientific & Indus. Research Org. v. Buffalo Tech. Inc., 1386, Fed. Cir, "Because we are remanding... for further proceedings on... obviousness, we do not reach the question of whether the entry of a permanent injunction constituted an abuse of discretion. "
-
See Commonwealth Scientific & Indus. Research Org. v. Buffalo Tech. Inc., 542 F.3d 1363, 1386 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ("Because we are remanding... for further proceedings on... obviousness, we do not reach the question of whether the entry of a permanent injunction constituted an abuse of discretion. ").
-
(2008)
F.3d
, vol.542
, pp. 1363
-
-
-
411
-
-
78649382761
-
-
See, "CSIRO provided many examples of areas in important research and development activities where increased funding would permit its research and development work to be expanded and produce beneficial results...."
-
See CSIRO, 492 F. Supp. 2d at 604 ("CSIRO provided many examples of areas in important research and development activities where increased funding would permit its research and development work to be expanded and produce beneficial results....").
-
F. Supp. 2d
, vol.492
, pp. 604
-
-
Csiro1
-
412
-
-
78649381264
-
-
Id
-
Id. at 607.
-
-
-
-
413
-
-
78649361709
-
-
See, supra note 5, criticizing proposed rules for the denial of permanent injunctions that would categorically discriminate among patent holders based on their business models
-
See Golden, supra note 5, at 2147-48 (criticizing proposed rules for the denial of permanent injunctions that would categorically discriminate among patent holders based on their business models).
-
-
-
Golden1
-
414
-
-
78649344346
-
Reform of the patent laws: Forging legislation addressing disparate interests
-
See, 14, noting the Business Software Alliance's support for a proposal to make "it more difficult for non-market participants to obtain injunctions"
-
See William C. Rooklidge, Reform of the Patent Laws: Forging Legislation Addressing Disparate Interests, 88 J. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 9, 14 (2006) (noting the Business Software Alliance's support for a proposal to make "it more difficult for non-market participants to obtain injunctions");
-
(2006)
J. Patent & Trademark Off. Soc'y
, vol.88
, pp. 9
-
-
Rooklidge, W.C.1
-
415
-
-
78649385206
-
-
id, observing that a proposal to limit reasonable-royalty damages was included in a patent reform bill "in an effort to address the Business Software Alliance's concerns"
-
id. at 19 (observing that a proposal to limit reasonable-royalty damages was included in a patent reform bill "[i]n an effort to address [the Business Software Alliance's] concerns").
-
-
-
-
416
-
-
75149134020
-
Footsteps of the patent troll
-
note
-
See generally Jeremiah Chan & Matthew Fawcett, Footsteps of the Patent Troll, 10 INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 1, 6 (2005) (reporting advocacy of patent reform by the Information Technology Industry Council, "an elite group of thirty-two high-tech companies", and by the Business Software Alliance, both of which groups included Apple Inc., Cisco Systems, Inc., Hewlett-Packard Company, IBM Corporation, Intel Corporation, and Microsoft Corporation). Consistent with the likely self-interest of an established player who values lost-profit damages over reasonable-royalty damages, a 2009 House reform bill would explicitly exclude lost-profit remedies from statutory instructions apparently intended to limit reasonable-royalty damage awards. See Patent Reform Act of 2009, H. R. 1260, 111th Cong. § 5, at 29 (2009) ("The methods for calculating a reasonable royalty described [in preceding provisions] shall have no application to the calculation of an award of damages that does not necessitate the determination of a reasonable royalty as a basis for monetary relief sought by the claimant."). A markup version of the counterpart Senate bill lacks such a lost-profits exclusion and adopts a more uniformly inclusive approach to providing instructions for assessing damages.
-
(2005)
Intell. Prop. L. Bull
, vol.10
, pp. 1
-
-
Chan, J.1
Fawcett, M.2
-
417
-
-
78649350068
-
-
See Patent Reform Act of 2009, S, § 4, deleting language parallel to that in the House bill and substituting language that gives instructions for "the determination of damages" without restriction to a particular type of damages
-
See Patent Reform Act of 2009, S. 515, 111th Cong. § 4, at 28-30 (2009) (deleting language parallel to that in the House bill and substituting language that gives instructions for "the determination of damages" without restriction to a particular type of damages).
-
(2009)
111th Cong
, vol.515
, pp. 28-30
-
-
-
418
-
-
78649382469
-
-
Cf, supra note 5, observing that, "in addition to any incentives to demand excessive royalties that a patent owner might have, a participant in a downstream market would also have anticompetitive incentives to drive its rival out of the downstream market and take its profits"
-
Cf. Elhauge, supra note 5, at 560-61 (observing that, "in addition to any incentives to demand excessive royalties that [a] patent owner might have, [a participant in a downstream market] would also have anticompetitive incentives to drive its rival out of the downstream market and take its profits");
-
-
-
Elhauge1
-
419
-
-
78649377342
-
-
supra note 5, & n. 163 discussing potential use of patents as barriers to entry
-
Golden, supra note 5, at 2154 & n. 163 (discussing potential use of patents as barriers to entry).
-
-
-
Golden1
-
420
-
-
78649363508
-
-
antidiscrimination principle is thus less extreme than the position of economist Suzanne Scotchmer that, "as a reasonable policy objective, the licensor should be able to earn as much profit by licensing as by producing the product herself", and, to this end, "the terms allowed in a license should be rich enough to ensure profit neutrality with respect to how production is organized."
-
The antidiscrimination principle is thus less extreme than the position of economist Suzanne Scotchmer that, "[a]s a reasonable policy objective, the licensor should be able to earn as much profit by licensing as by producing the product herself", and, to this end, "[t]he terms allowed in a license should be rich enough to ensure profit neutrality with respect to how production is organized."
-
-
-
-
421
-
-
78649353845
-
-
supra note 15
-
SCOTCHMER, supra note 15, at 165.
-
-
-
Scotchmer1
-
422
-
-
69949182971
-
Lessons from the commercialization of the cohen-boyer patents: The stanford university licensing program
-
See, in, 1799 Anatole Krattiker et al. eds., discussing development of a "compromise consensus" that "Stanford should be able to patent recombinant DNA research but with nonexclusive licensing"
-
See Maryann P. Feldman et al., Lessons from the Commercialization of the Cohen-Boyer Patents: The Stanford University Licensing Program, in 2 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY MANAGEMENT IN HEALTH AND AGRICULTURAL INNOVATION: A HANDBOOK OF BEST PRACTICES 1797, 1799 (Anatole Krattiker et al. eds., 2007) (discussing development of a "compromise consensus" that "Stanford should be able to patent recombinant DNA research but with nonexclusive licensing");
-
(2007)
Intellectual Property Management in Health and Agricultural Innovation: A Handbook of Best Practices
, vol.2
, pp. 1797
-
-
Feldman, M.P.1
-
423
-
-
77954905145
-
Warf's stem cell patents and tensions between public and private sector approaches to research
-
forthcoming, manuscript at 10-13, on file with author discussing demand for nonexclusive licensing of WARF's stem-cell patents on less expensive and restrictive terms
-
John M. Golden, WARF's Stem Cell Patents and Tensions Between Public and Private Sector Approaches to Research, 38 J. L. MED. & ETHICS (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 10-13, on file with author) (discussing demand for nonexclusive licensing of WARF's stem-cell patents on less expensive and restrictive terms).
-
(2010)
J. L. Med. & Ethics
, vol.38
-
-
Golden, J.M.1
-
424
-
-
78649340317
-
-
See, &, supra note 5, advocating a general presumption of injunctive relief for a patent holder who competes with an infringer or "exclusively licenses" to someone who does, but not for a patent holder who is a nonexclusive licensor
-
See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 5, at 2036 (advocating a general presumption of injunctive relief for a patent holder who competes with an infringer or "exclusively licenses" to someone who does, but not for a patent holder who is a nonexclusive licensor).
-
-
-
Lemley1
Shapiro2
-
425
-
-
78649374161
-
-
See supra notes 203-04 and accompanying text
-
See supra notes 203-04 and accompanying text.
-
-
-
-
426
-
-
78649367048
-
-
See supra notes 193-95 and accompanying text
-
See supra notes 193-95 and accompanying text.
-
-
-
-
427
-
-
78649353553
-
Of trolls, davids, goliaths, and kings: Narratives and evidence in the litigation of high-tech patents
-
See, e.g., 1189, observing that "predation strategies appear to be more common in high-tech industries" and that "injunctions appear to provide a particularly potent weapon for carrying out predatory strategies"
-
See, e.g., Colleen V. Chien, Of Trolls, Davids, Goliaths, and Kings: Narratives and Evidence in the Litigation of High-Tech Patents, 87 N. C. L. Rev. 1157, 1189 (2009) (observing that "predation strategies appear to be more common in high-tech industries" and that "injunctions appear to provide a particularly potent weapon for carrying out predatory strategies");
-
(2009)
N. C. L. Rev.
, vol.87
, pp. 1157
-
-
Chien, C.V.1
-
428
-
-
78649367913
-
-
cf, supra note 79, expressing concern that, in "complex industries", patenting might act as "a vehicle for impeding entry and the innovation that often accompanies it"
-
cf. Cohen et al., supra note 79, at 29 (expressing concern that, in "complex industries", patenting might act as "a vehicle for impeding entry and the innovation that often accompanies it").
-
-
-
Cohen1
-
429
-
-
78649377341
-
-
definition of "patent troll"-a term seemingly latent with discriminatory intent-is itself a difficult and contentious matter
-
The definition of "patent troll"-a term seemingly latent with discriminatory intent-is itself a difficult and contentious matter.
-
-
-
-
430
-
-
78649346033
-
-
See, supra note 5, n. 7 observing that "a widely accepted definition of a patent troll has yet to be devised"
-
See Golden, supra note 5, at 2112 n. 7 (observing that "a widely accepted definition of a patent troll has yet to be devised");
-
-
-
Golden1
-
431
-
-
84860005800
-
Transaction costs and trolls: Strategic behavior by individual inventors, small firms and entrepreneurs in patent litigation
-
see also, &, Research Papers Series No. LE09-005, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1337166, "The exact definition of a 'troll' is controversial...."
-
see also Gwendolyn G. Ball & Jay P. Kesan, Transaction Costs and Trolls: Strategic Behavior by Individual Inventors, Small Firms and Entrepreneurs in Patent Litigation 6 (Ill. L. & Econ. Research Papers Series No. LE09-005, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1337166 ("The exact definition of a 'troll' is controversial....").
-
(2009)
Ill. L. & Econ.
, vol.6
-
-
Ball, G.G.1
Kesan, J.P.2
-
432
-
-
18144396191
-
Do patents facilitate financing in the software industry?
-
See, 1024, "Essentially, trolls are serving a function as intermediaries that specialize in litigation to exploit the value of patents that cannot be exploited effectively by those that have originally obtained them."
-
See Ronald J. Mann, Do Patents Facilitate Financing in the Software Industry?, 83 TEXAS L. REV. 961, 1024 (2005) ("Essentially, trolls are serving a function as intermediaries that specialize in litigation to exploit the value of patents that cannot be exploited effectively by those that have originally obtained them.").
-
(2005)
Texas L. Rev.
, vol.83
, pp. 961
-
-
Mann, R.J.1
-
433
-
-
78649390425
-
-
See, supra note 199, "Over the past ten to fifteen years, there has been a rapid growth in a variety of arrangements for the exchange of technologies or technological services...."
-
See ARORA ET AL., supra note 199, at 2 ("Over the past ten to fifteen years, there has been a rapid growth in a variety of arrangements for the exchange of technologies or technological services....");
-
-
-
Arora1
-
434
-
-
84876410777
-
-
supra note 226, "While large pharmaceutical firms maintain in-house research facilities, they are becoming more reliant on externally sourced compounds., and hence are licensing more technology from outside firms...."
-
OECD REPORT, supra note 226, at 15 ("While large pharmaceutical firms maintain in-house research facilities, they are becoming more reliant on externally sourced compounds..., and hence are licensing more technology from outside firms....");
-
Oecd Report
, pp. 15
-
-
-
435
-
-
78649386574
-
Pharmaceutical licensing during the revolution
-
216, Robert Goldscheider ed., reporting that biotechnology firms' worldwide share of private investment in developing new medications increased from 10% in 1980 to 50% in 2002
-
Thomas A. Picone, Pharmaceutical Licensing During the Revolution, in THE LESI GUIDE TO LICENSING BEST PRACTICES: STRATEGIC ISSUES AND CONTEMPORARY REALITIES 215, 216 (Robert Goldscheider ed., 2002) (reporting that biotechnology firms' worldwide share of private investment in developing new medications increased from 10% in 1980 to 50% in 2002);
-
(2002)
The Lesi Guide to Licensing Best Practices: Strategic Issues and Contemporary Realities
, pp. 215
-
-
Picone, T.A.1
-
436
-
-
74849096554
-
Under new management
-
cf. Apr. 4, 72 reporting that in the semiconductor industry, "more companies are specialising in design, and contracting out or quitting the making of chips"
-
cf. Under New Management, ECONOMIST, Apr. 4, 2009, at 71, 72 (reporting that in the semiconductor industry, "more companies are specialising in design, and contracting out or quitting the making of chips").
-
(2009)
Economist
, pp. 71
-
-
-
437
-
-
84876410777
-
-
See, supra note 226, "As innovation processes have become more open and firms have begun to source more of their technology needs from external sources, markets for technology have expanded, and with it the role of intermediaries."
-
See OECD REPORT, supra note 226, at 8 ("As innovation processes have become more open and firms have begun to source more of their technology needs from external sources, markets for technology have expanded, and with it the role of intermediaries.").
-
Oecd Report
, pp. 8
-
-
-
438
-
-
0346511083
-
Contracting into liability rules: Intellectual property rights and collective rights organizations
-
See, 1296, contending that "property rule entitlements drive intellectual property rights holders in high transaction industries into repeatplay bargaining" that fosters collective-rights organizations
-
See Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1293, 1296 (1996) (contending that "property rule entitlements drive [intellectual property rights] holders in high transaction industries into repeatplay bargaining" that fosters collective-rights organizations);
-
(1996)
Cal. L. Rev.
, vol.84
, pp. 1293
-
-
Merges, R.P.1
-
439
-
-
78649378173
-
-
cf, supra note 298, wondering whether patent licensing firms' apparently greater tendency, relative to other small firms, to settle suits against large firms results from the licensing firms' being "more sophisticated and hence better at negotiating settlements"
-
cf. Ball & Kesan, supra note 298, at 20 (wondering whether patent licensing firms' apparently greater tendency, relative to other small firms, to settle suits against large firms results from the licensing firms' being "more sophisticated and hence better at negotiating settlements").
-
-
-
Ball1
Kesan2
-
440
-
-
78649346032
-
-
Cf, Apr. 30, unpublished manuscript, on file at, "Patent trolls hide their intellectual property until an opportune time and then emerge to extract royalties."
-
Cf. Richard Schmalensee, Standard-Setting, Innovation Specialists, and Competition Policy 5 (Apr. 30, 2009) (unpublished manuscript, on file at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1219784) ("[P]atent trolls hide their intellectual property until an opportune time and then emerge to extract royalties.").
-
(2009)
Richard Schmalensee, Standard-setting, Innovation Specialists, and Competition Policy
, pp. 5
-
-
-
441
-
-
84876410777
-
-
Cf, supra note 226, acknowledging that patent trolls "may be difficult to distinguish from other firms that acquire sets of complementary patents in order to facilitate their exploitation and commercialization"
-
Cf. OECD REPORT, supra note 226, at 9 (acknowledging that patent trolls "may be difficult to distinguish from other firms that acquire sets of complementary patents in order to facilitate their exploitation and commercialization").
-
Oecd Report
, pp. 9
-
-
-
442
-
-
78649360248
-
-
See, supra note 5, n. 7 "The magnitude of what contemporary fashion terms the 'patent-troll problem' remains substantially unknown...."
-
See Golden, supra note 5, at 2112 n. 7 ("The magnitude of what contemporary fashion terms the 'patent-troll problem' remains substantially unknown....");
-
-
-
Golden1
-
443
-
-
34547440204
-
Blackberries and barnyards: Patent trolls and the perils of innovation
-
1810, "Like most fresh legal questions, the debate on patent trolls is long on passion and short on proof."
-
Gerard N. Magliocca, Blackberries and Barnyards: Patent Trolls and the Perils of Innovation, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1809, 1810 (2007) ("Like most fresh legal questions, the debate on patent trolls is long on passion and short on proof.").
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(2007)
Notre Dame L. Rev.
, vol.82
, pp. 1809
-
-
Magliocca, G.N.1
-
444
-
-
64949131419
-
Adjusting alienability
-
See, 1420
-
See Lee Anne Fennell, Adjusting Alienability, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1403, 1420 (2009);
-
(2009)
Harv. L. Rev.
, vol.122
, pp. 1403
-
-
Fennell, L.A.1
-
445
-
-
0001073135
-
The use of knowledge in society
-
cf, 522, criticizing "prejudice" against arbitrageurs
-
cf. F. A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519, 522 (1945) (criticizing "prejudice" against arbitrageurs);
-
(1945)
Am. Econ. Rev.
, vol.35
, pp. 519
-
-
Hayek, F.A.1
-
446
-
-
67649148824
-
The myth of the patent troll: An alternative view of the function of patent dealers in an idea economy
-
190, "Patent trolls provide liquidity, market clearing, and increased efficiency to patent markets."
-
James F. McDonough III, Comment, The Myth of the Patent Troll: An Alternative View of the Function of Patent Dealers in an Idea Economy, 56 EMORY L. J. 189, 190 (2006) ("Patent trolls provide liquidity, market clearing, and increased efficiency to patent markets....").
-
(2006)
Emory L. J.
, vol.56
, pp. 189
-
-
James III, F.M.1
Comment2
-
447
-
-
78649354533
-
-
See, §, 041fi, observing that the balance of hardships might favor the accused infringer when the patent holder and infringer are not direct competitors or "the injunction would idle a substantial manufacturing establishment"
-
See 7 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS: A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTABILITY, VALIDITY, AND INFRINGEMENT § 20. 04[1][f][i] (2008) (observing that the balance of hardships might favor the accused infringer when the patent holder and infringer are not direct competitors or "the injunction would idle a substantial manufacturing establishment").
-
(2008)
Chisum on Patents: A Treatise on the Law of Patentability, Validity, and Infringement
, vol.7
, pp. 20
-
-
Chisum, D.S.1
-
448
-
-
78649391638
-
-
See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text
-
See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
-
-
-
-
449
-
-
78649383997
-
-
supra note 104
-
BENKLER, supra note 104, at 50;
-
-
-
Benkler1
-
450
-
-
33645814048
-
Intellectual property, innovation, and decentralized decisions
-
cf, 123, observing a growing sense "that the most important economic effects of intellectual property may not be effects on price, but rather on industry structure"
-
cf. Tim Wu, Intellectual Property, Innovation, and Decentralized Decisions, 92 VA. L. REV. 123, 123 (2006) (observing a growing sense "that the most important economic effects of intellectual property may not be effects on price, but rather on industry structure").
-
(2006)
Va. L. Rev.
, vol.92
, pp. 123
-
-
Wu, T.1
-
451
-
-
78649382473
-
Building a better innovation system: Combining facially neutral patent standards with therapeutics regulation
-
See, 1039, contending that although "facially neutral standards often have disparate impact,... in the case of patents, the disparate impact is a feature, not a bug"
-
See Arti K. Rai, Building a Better Innovation System: Combining Facially Neutral Patent Standards with Therapeutics Regulation, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 1037, 1039 (2008) (contending that although "facially neutral standards often have disparate impact[,]... [i]n the case of patents, the disparate impact is a feature, not a bug").
-
(2008)
Hous. L. Rev.
, vol.45
, pp. 1037
-
-
Rai, A.K.1
-
452
-
-
78649375018
-
-
See supra subpart III B. In the business-management context, Clayton Christensen has similarly emphasized the need for "plans for learning and discovery", as opposed to mere "plans for execution", when "disruptive technologies" characterized by especially sharp problems of uncertainty are at issue, supra note 227
-
See supra subpart III (B). In the business-management context, Clayton Christensen has similarly emphasized the need for "plans for learning and discovery", as opposed to mere "plans for execution", when "disruptive technologies" characterized by especially sharp problems of uncertainty are at issue. CHRISTENSEN, supra note 227, at 143.
-
-
-
Christensen1
-
453
-
-
78649338663
-
-
Cf, supra note 16, observing that, in the antitrust context, "one of the costs of per se rules is that once they are created the courts lose much of their incentive to engage in an economic analysis of the challenged restraint"
-
Cf. HOVENKAMP, supra note 16, at 186 (observing that, in the antitrust context, "[o]ne of the costs of per se rules is that once they are created the courts lose much of their incentive to engage in an economic analysis of the challenged restraint");
-
-
-
Hovenkamp1
-
454
-
-
78649388619
-
-
supra note 121, describing how a flexible approach to awarding prizes can stimulate applicants to generate socially useful information
-
Abramowicz, supra note 121, at 222 (describing how a flexible approach to awarding prizes can stimulate applicants to generate socially useful information).
-
-
-
Abramowicz1
-
455
-
-
58149129708
-
Evidentiary standards and information acquisition in public law
-
Cf, 352, describing "a trade-off between the ex post effects of an evidentiary standard on a policy decision and the ex ante effects that the standard may have on an agent's incentive to gather information"
-
Cf. Matthew C. Stephenson, Evidentiary Standards and Information Acquisition in Public Law, 10 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 351, 352 (2008) (describing "a trade-off between the ex post effects of [an] evidentiary standard on [a] policy decision and the ex ante effects that the standard may have on [an] agent's incentive to gather information").
-
(2008)
Am. L. & Econ. Rev.
, vol.10
, pp. 351
-
-
Stephenson, M.C.1
-
456
-
-
78649383665
-
-
thinking here resonates with the approach to allocating burdens of proof and presumptions in the antitrust context, where, generally speaking, "plaintiffs must prove all elements of their claim", "but courts in fact assign burdens of proof in different ways depending on such factors as control of the evidence or the motives for producing it.", supra note 16
-
The thinking here resonates with the approach to allocating burdens of proof and presumptions in the antitrust context, where, generally speaking, "plaintiffs must prove all elements of their claim", "[b]ut courts in fact assign burdens of proof in different ways depending on such factors as control of the evidence or the motives for producing it." HOVENKAMP, supra note 16, at 145-46.
-
-
-
Hovenkamp1
-
457
-
-
78649343199
-
Communicating entitlements: Property and the internet
-
Cf, 423, "Distributing communication burdens to parties who already possess relevant knowledge or who can easily learn it fosters efficient communication. "
-
Cf. William Hubbard, Communicating Entitlements: Property and the Internet, 22 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 401, 423 (2004) ("Distributing communication burdens to parties who already possess relevant knowledge or who
-
(2004)
Yale L. & Pol'y Rev.
, vol.22
, pp. 401
-
-
Hubbard, W.1
-
458
-
-
0003599098
-
-
See, "Administrative costs cover all costs necessary to run the legal system. They include the costs that private parties must bear... to bring themselves into compliance with the legal rules, by finding out what the law is, how it applies to them, what they must do to comply, and how they must demonstrate compliance to a regulator."
-
See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 30-31 (1995) ("[A]dministrative costs cover all costs necessary to run the legal system. They include the costs that private parties must bear... to bring themselves into compliance with the legal rules, by finding out what the law is, how it applies to them, what they must do to comply, and how they must demonstrate compliance to a regulator.").
-
(1995)
Simple Rules for a Complex World
, pp. 30-31
-
-
Richard, A.E.1
-
459
-
-
78649390421
-
-
Cf, supra note 57, indicating a tradeoff between the "simple on/off signal" of exclusionary rights and "the benefits of tailoring and use by multiple parties" under a governance regime
-
Cf. Smith, supra note 57, at 1781 (indicating a tradeoff between the "simple on/off signal" of exclusionary rights and "the benefits of tailoring and use by multiple parties" under a governance regime).
-
-
-
Smith1
-
460
-
-
78649344680
-
-
See supra section III B 2
-
See supra section III (B) (2).
-
-
-
-
461
-
-
78649384582
-
-
See supra sections III B 3-4
-
See supra sections III (B) (3) - (4).
-
-
-
-
462
-
-
78649351515
-
-
Cf, &, supra note 19, using decision trees to illustrate how a variety of contingencies can affect the ex ante value of a research or development project
-
Cf. MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 19, at 696-99 (using decision trees to illustrate how a variety of contingencies can affect the ex ante value of a research or development project).
-
-
-
Merges1
Duffy2
-
463
-
-
78649357473
-
-
See supra note 38 and accompanying text
-
See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
-
-
-
-
464
-
-
78649375014
-
-
See, supra note 16, "Antitrust is a far humbler enterprise today than it was several decades ago."
-
See HOVENKAMP, supra note 16, at 7 ("Antitrust is a far humbler enterprise today than it was several decades ago.").
-
-
-
Hovenkamp1
-
465
-
-
78649336340
-
-
See id, discussing how the relative difficulty of designing satisfactory antitrust remedies can explain the "differential treatment of multilateral and unilateral conduct"
-
See id. at 110-11 (discussing how the relative difficulty of designing satisfactory antitrust remedies can explain the "differential treatment of multilateral and unilateral conduct").
-
-
-
-
466
-
-
78649336634
-
-
Friedrich Hayek famously argued generally for decentralization in economic affairs on the ground "that the economic problem of society is mainly one of rapid adaptation to changes in the particular circumstances of time and place", and thus "it would seem to follow that the ultimate decisions must be left to the people who are familiar with these circumstances.", supra note 306
-
Friedrich Hayek famously argued generally for decentralization in economic affairs on the ground "that the economic problem of society is mainly one of rapid adaptation to changes in the particular circumstances of time and place", and thus "it would seem to follow that the ultimate decisions must be left to the people who are familiar with these circumstances." Hayek, supra note 306, at 524.
-
-
-
Hayek1
-
467
-
-
36549090086
-
Common law constitutionalism and the limits of reason
-
See, 1490, describing how a "group's average competence can quickly become higher than the competence even of an expert individual"
-
See Adrian Vermeule, Common Law Constitutionalism and the Limits of Reason, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1482, 1490 (2007) (describing how a "group's average competence can quickly become higher than the competence even of an expert individual").
-
(2007)
Colum. L. Rev.
, vol.107
, pp. 1482
-
-
Vermeule, A.1
-
468
-
-
78649386573
-
-
Cf, supra note 4, indicating the desirability, in seeking socially optimal arrangements, of a capacity to explore a range of possible approaches
-
Cf. Golden, supra note 4, at 701 (indicating the desirability, in seeking socially optimal arrangements, of a capacity to explore a range of possible approaches).
-
-
-
Golden1
-
469
-
-
0003508076
-
-
See generally, embracing arguments that "for technological change to be effective and sustainable, the authorities must. decentralize" innovation
-
See generally JOEL MOKYR, THE LEVER OF RICHES: TECHNOLOGICAL CREATIVITY AND ECONOMIC PROGRESS 176 (1990) (embracing arguments that "for technological change to be effective and sustainable, the authorities must... decentralize" innovation).
-
(1990)
The Lever of Riches: Technological Creativity and Economic Progress
, pp. 176
-
-
Joel, M.1
-
470
-
-
70649109692
-
-
See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L. L. C., 394, "We hold only that the decision whether to grant or deny injunctive relief rests within the equitable discretion of the district courts, and that such discretion must be exercised consistent with traditional principles of equity...."
-
See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L. L. C., 547 U. S. 388, 394 (2006) ("We hold only that the decision whether to grant or deny injunctive relief rests within the equitable discretion of the district courts, and that such discretion must be exercised consistent with traditional principles of equity....").
-
(2006)
U. S.
, vol.547
, pp. 388
-
-
-
471
-
-
78649391636
-
-
Cf, supra note 39, "The primary advantage of a patent monopoly is that it eliminates the need for a governmental institution charged with the task of adopting and applying criteria by which the total amount of subsidy would be determined and by which that amount would be apportioned among individual inventors."
-
Cf. Baxter, supra note 39, at 273 ("The primary advantage of [a patent] monopoly is that it eliminates the need for a governmental institution charged with the task of adopting and applying criteria by which the total amount of subsidy would be determined and by which that amount would be apportioned among individual inventors.");
-
-
-
Baxter1
-
472
-
-
78649354391
-
-
supra note 57, "The injunction does not require costly valuation, and it provides robust protection in delegating to the owner the choice among uses."
-
Smith, supra note 57, at 1781 ("The injunction does not require costly valuation, and it provides robust protection in delegating to the owner the choice among uses.").
-
-
-
Smith1
-
473
-
-
78649351517
-
-
See supra note 119 and accompanying text
-
See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
-
-
-
-
474
-
-
45249104151
-
Property rules, liability rules, and uncertainty about property rights
-
1305-08
-
Stewart E. Sterk, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Uncertainty About Property Rights, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1285, 1305-08 (2008).
-
(2008)
Mich. L. Rev.
, vol.106
, pp. 1285
-
-
Sterk, S.E.1
-
475
-
-
78649372747
-
-
Id, concluding that "a liability-rule regime creates more than adequate private incentives for search" to assess legal rights
-
Id. at 1308 (concluding that "a liability-rule regime creates more than adequate private incentives for search" to assess legal rights);
-
-
-
-
476
-
-
70350438680
-
Intellectual liability
-
cf, 294, reporting that, where an antitrust consent decree "contained liability rule provisions for patents or copyrights... in only three out of fifty-two cases was the district court ever called on to set a rate"
-
cf. Daniel A. Crane, Intellectual Liability, 88 TEXAS L. REV. 253, 294 (2009) (reporting that, where an antitrust consent decree "contained liability rule provisions for patents or copyrights... [i]n only three out of fifty-two cases was the district court ever called on to set a rate").
-
(2009)
Texas L. Rev.
, vol.88
, pp. 253
-
-
Crane, D.A.1
-
477
-
-
78649362017
-
-
See, supra note 330, acknowledging a pure damages regime's high price: "loss of all protection for subjective value, together with increased need for judicial assessment of damages"
-
See Sterk, supra note 330, at 1313 (acknowledging a pure damages regime's high price: "loss of all protection for subjective value, together with increased need for judicial assessment of damages").
-
-
-
Sterk1
-
478
-
-
85050169518
-
An economic approach to legal procedure and judicial administration
-
See, 418, stating that a rational plaintiff will not settle for less than "the expected value of the litigation to him plus his settlement costs", and that a rational defendant will not accept a settlement requiring a payout of more than "the expected cost of the litigation to him..., minus his settlement costs"
-
See Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399, 418 (1973) (stating that a rational plaintiff will not settle for less than "the expected value of the litigation to him plus his settlement costs", and that a rational defendant will not accept a settlement requiring a payout of more than "the expected cost of the litigation to him..., minus his settlement costs");
-
(1973)
J. Legal Stud.
, vol.2
, pp. 399
-
-
Posner, R.A.1
-
479
-
-
78149304366
-
A price theory of legal bargaining: An inquiry into the selection of settlement and litigation under uncertainty
-
630-31, describing "the 'standard economic model'" for bargaining in the shadow of potential litigation
-
Robert J. Rhee, A Price Theory of Legal Bargaining: An Inquiry into the Selection of Settlement and Litigation Under Uncertainty, 56 EMORY L. J. 619, 630-31 (2006) (describing "the 'standard economic model'" for bargaining in the shadow of potential litigation).
-
(2006)
Emory L. J.
, vol.56
, pp. 619
-
-
Rhee, R.J.1
-
480
-
-
78649368448
-
-
See supra subpart II B
-
See supra subpart II (B).
-
-
-
-
481
-
-
78649389817
-
-
four options and the restriction of analysis to them together encode a variety of simplifying assumptions, such as assumptions that 1 both the patentee and potential user of a possibly infringing feature know of the potential use and its possible infringement; 2 both have identical information and assessments of relevant probabilities; 3 both must commit to a particular course of action at essentially one point in time prior to any use; and 4 both the parties are risk neutral. In reality, parties will frequently have incomplete and asymmetric information, lack risk neutrality, and be able to change course, such as by negotiating a settlement after commencing litigation
-
The four options and the restriction of analysis to them together encode a variety of simplifying assumptions, such as assumptions that (1) both the patentee and potential user of a possibly infringing feature know of the potential use and its possible infringement; (2) both have identical information and assessments of relevant probabilities; (3) both must commit to a particular course of action at essentially one point in time prior to any use; and (4) both the parties are risk neutral. In reality, parties will frequently have incomplete and asymmetric information, lack risk neutrality, and be able to change course, such as by negotiating a settlement after commencing litigation.
-
-
-
-
482
-
-
78649383993
-
-
Monetary values featured in the parties' calculi should be understood to be present values that reflect appropriate time discounting. The assumption of identical discount rates for the two parties simplifies the analysis by permitting use of a single present value for quantities, such as the licensing fee F and the expected court award D, that enter both parties' cost-benefit calculi
-
Monetary values featured in the parties' calculi should be understood to be present values that reflect appropriate time discounting. The assumption of identical discount rates for the two parties simplifies the analysis by permitting use of a single present value for quantities, such as the licensing fee F and the expected court award D, that enter both parties' cost-benefit calculi.
-
-
-
-
483
-
-
78649364255
-
-
Other outcomes could result, for example, if the patentee will gain strategic value in other negotiations by enforcing its rights in this case, or if the patentee can at least partially win a game of "chicken" in bargaining with the potential user, who also has reason to want to avoid litigation costs
-
Other outcomes could result, for example, if the patentee will gain strategic value in other negotiations by enforcing its rights in this case, or if the patentee can at least partially win a game of "chicken" in bargaining with the potential user, who also has reason to want to avoid litigation costs.
-
-
-
-
484
-
-
78649374162
-
-
possibility of infringement with effective impunity is not specific to a pure damages regime. By making enforcement not worth the effort, sufficiently high enforcement costs, which might include not only the cost of litigating but also the cost of discovering potential infringement, can make patent rights effectively worthless under essentially any plausible system of patent remedies
-
The possibility of infringement with effective impunity is not specific to a pure damages regime. By making enforcement not worth the effort, sufficiently high enforcement costs, which might include not only the cost of litigating but also the cost of discovering potential infringement, can make patent rights effectively worthless under essentially any plausible system of patent remedies.
-
-
-
-
485
-
-
78649355396
-
-
U/W ≤ 1 - θ
-
U/W ≤ (1 - θ).
-
-
-
-
486
-
-
78649380395
-
-
See Elhauge, supra note 5, using a model to show that, when "the option of bargaining" generally prevents negotiated royalties from exceeding actual patent value, "even balanced errors in ascertaining damages will mean that the average royalty rate will be below the average value" of patented inventions
-
See Elhauge, supra note 5, at 557-58 (using a model to show that, when "the option of bargaining" generally prevents negotiated royalties from exceeding actual patent value, "even balanced errors in ascertaining damages will mean that the average royalty rate will be below the average value" of patented inventions).
-
-
-
-
487
-
-
78649349181
-
-
See, supra note 302, concluding that "a liability rule in the intellectual property context will tend to act as a ceiling on valuation"
-
See Merges, supra note 302, at 1305 (concluding that "a liability rule in the intellectual property context will tend to act as a ceiling on valuation").
-
-
-
Merges1
-
488
-
-
21144468370
-
Rules versus standards: Economic analysis
-
See, e.g., 589-92, discussing the relative advantages and disadvantages of a "simple rule", a "complex standard", and a "complex rule"
-
See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L. J. 557, 589-92 (1992) (discussing the relative advantages and disadvantages of a "simple rule", a "complex standard", and a "complex rule");
-
(1992)
Duke L. J.
, vol.42
, pp. 557
-
-
Kaplow, L.1
-
489
-
-
71849112032
-
Problems with rules
-
956-57, describing a debate between those favoring "clear, abstract rules laid down in advance" and those favoring "law-making at the point of application through case-by-case decisions, narrowly tailored to the particulars of individual circumstances" emphasis omitted
-
Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CAL. L. REV. 953, 956-57 (1995) (describing a debate between those favoring "clear, abstract rules laid down in advance" and those favoring "law-making at the point of application through case-by-case decisions, narrowly tailored to the particulars of individual circumstances" (emphasis omitted)).
-
(1995)
Cal. L. Rev.
, vol.83
, pp. 953
-
-
Sunstein, C.R.1
-
490
-
-
78649359362
-
-
See, supra note 316, "Legal simplicity... reduces the costs necessary to achieve any agreed-upon end."
-
See EPSTEIN, supra note 316, at 30-31 ("[L]egal simplicity... reduces the costs necessary to achieve any agreed-upon end.");
-
-
-
Epstein1
-
491
-
-
78649354395
-
-
supra note 315, asserting that "a categorical rule approach" can lower administrative costs and "reduce the informational costs of learning who bears certain burdens"
-
Hubbard, supra note 315, at 414 (asserting that "a categorical rule approach" can lower administrative costs and "reduc[e] the informational costs of learning who bears certain burdens").
-
-
-
Hubbard1
-
492
-
-
0003793797
-
-
See, &, 2d ed, "Remedies prescribed by the public choice approach to avoid rent-seeking waste include i attenuating the role of government regulation, and ii avoiding the establishment of rent-creating government institutions...."
-
See NICHOLAS MERCURO & STEVEN G. MEDEMA, ECONOMICS AND THE LAW: FROM POSNER TO POSTMODERNISM AND BEYOND 204 (2d ed. 2006) ("[R]emedies prescribed by the public choice approach to avoid [rent-seeking] waste include (i) attenuating the role of government regulation, [and] (ii) avoiding the establishment of rent-creating government institutions....").
-
(2006)
Economics and the Law: From Posner to Postmodernism and Beyond
, pp. 204
-
-
Nicholas, M.1
Steven, G.M.2
-
493
-
-
78649353550
-
-
See, supra note 316, "The basic trade-off between administrative costs and improved incentives for private behavior is always with us."
-
See EPSTEIN, supra note 316, at 34 ("The basic trade-off between administrative costs and improved incentives for private behavior is always with us.").
-
-
-
Epstein1
-
494
-
-
78649336929
-
-
See supra text accompanying note 317
-
See supra text accompanying note 317.
-
-
-
-
495
-
-
78649382162
-
-
See, § 41 h 1, providing that various patent application, issuance, or maintenance fees "shall be reduced by 50 percent" for certain "small business concerns", "independent inventors", or "nonprofit organizations"
-
See 35 U. S. C. § 41 (h) (1) (2006) (providing that various patent application, issuance, or maintenance fees "shall be reduced by 50 percent" for certain "small business concern[s]", "independent inventor[s]", or "nonprofit organization[s]").
-
(2006)
U. S. C.
, vol.35
-
-
-
496
-
-
78649336044
-
-
See, § 1.27 b 1, providing that a "small entity... who has properly asserted entitlement to small entity status... will be accorded small entity status" and therefore be required only to pay "certain reduced patent fees"
-
See 37 C. F. R. § 1.27 (b) (1) (2008) (providing that a "small entity... who has properly asserted entitlement to small entity status... will be accorded small entity status" and therefore be required only to pay "certain reduced patent fees").
-
(2008)
C. F. R
, vol.37
-
-
-
497
-
-
27744461389
-
Pleadings and presumptions
-
Cf, 568, counseling that "the modern division of a case into claim and defense should not obscure the fact that we work within a system of presumptions"
-
Cf. Richard A. Epstein, Pleadings and Presumptions, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 556, 568 (1973) (counseling that "the modern division of a case into claim and defense should not obscure the fact that we work within a system of presumptions").
-
(1973)
U. Chi. L. Rev.
, vol.40
, pp. 556
-
-
Epstein, R.A.1
-
498
-
-
78649350371
-
-
No. 2:04-CV-211-DF, E. D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2006
-
No. 2:04-CV-211-DF, 2006 WL 2385139 (E. D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2006)
-
(2006)
WL
, pp. 2385139
-
-
-
499
-
-
84873693214
-
-
aff'd in part, vacated in part, Fed. Cir
-
aff'd in part, vacated in part, 504 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
-
(2007)
F.3d
, vol.504
, pp. 1293
-
-
-
500
-
-
78649379475
-
-
cert. denied
-
cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 2430 (2008)
-
(2008)
S. Ct
, vol.128
, pp. 2430
-
-
-
501
-
-
78649390112
-
-
remanded to, E. D. Tex
-
remanded to 609 F. Supp. 2d 620 (E. D. Tex. 2009).
-
(2009)
F. Supp. 2d
, vol.609
, pp. 620
-
-
-
502
-
-
78649354396
-
-
U. S. Dep't of Energy, How Hybrids Work
-
U. S. Dep't of Energy, How Hybrids Work, http://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/ hybrid tech.shtml.
-
-
-
-
503
-
-
78649352672
-
-
U. S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, HEV SALES BY MODEL, available at
-
U. S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, HEV SALES BY MODEL (2009), available at http://www.afdc. energy.gov/afdc/data/docs/hev-sales.xls.
-
(2009)
-
-
-
504
-
-
78649365416
-
-
Id
-
Id.
-
-
-
-
505
-
-
84909273103
-
Toyota makes a statement, and that sells
-
See, July 4, "The Prius has become, in a sense, the four-wheel equivalent of those popular rubber 'issue bracelets' in yellow and other colors-it shows the world that its owner cares."
-
See Micheline Maynard, Toyota Makes a Statement, and That Sells, N. Y. TIMES, July 4, 2007, at A1 ("The Prius has become, in a sense, the four-wheel equivalent of those popular rubber 'issue bracelets' in yellow and other colors-it shows the world that its owner cares.").
-
(2007)
N. Y. Times
-
-
Maynard, M.1
-
506
-
-
84873693214
-
-
Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., 1302 Fed. Cir
-
Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., 504 F.3d 1293, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
-
(2007)
F.3d
, vol.504
, pp. 1293
-
-
-
507
-
-
78649379475
-
-
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 3, Toyota Motor Corp. v. Paice LLC, No. 07-1120
-
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 3, Toyota Motor Corp. v. Paice LLC, 128 S. Ct. 2430 (2008) (No. 07-1120).
-
(2008)
S. Ct
, vol.128
, pp. 2430
-
-
-
508
-
-
78649361418
-
-
Id
-
Id. at 4.
-
-
-
-
509
-
-
78649389818
-
-
U. S. Patent No. 5, 343, 970 filed Sept. 21
-
U. S. Patent No. 5, 343, 970 (filed Sept. 21, 1992).
-
(1992)
-
-
-
510
-
-
78649373303
-
Hybrid engine inventor heads for um hall of fame
-
See, Oct. 27, discussing Paice's history
-
See Frank D. Roylance, Hybrid Engine Inventor Heads for UM Hall of Fame, BALT. SUN, Oct. 27, 2008, at 1A (discussing Paice's history).
-
(2008)
Balt. Sun
-
-
Roylance, F.D.1
-
511
-
-
78649372486
-
-
Press Release, A. James Clark Sch. of Engineering, Univ. of Md., Hybrid Engine Inventor to Be Recognized: Alex Severinsky 2008 Clark School Innovation Hall of Fame Inductee Oct. 27, available at, hereinafter Press Release
-
Press Release, A. James Clark Sch. of Engineering, Univ. of Md., Hybrid Engine Inventor to Be Recognized: Alex Severinsky 2008 Clark School Innovation Hall of Fame Inductee (Oct. 27, 2008), available at http://www.eng.umd.edu/ media/pressreleases/pr102208-severinsky.html [hereinafter Press Release].
-
(2008)
-
-
-
512
-
-
78649388953
-
-
Id
-
Id.
-
-
-
-
513
-
-
78649374724
-
-
Id
-
Id.
-
-
-
-
514
-
-
84873693214
-
-
Corrected Brief of Plaintiff-Cross Appellant at 6, Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., Fed. Cir, Nos. 2006-1610, 2006-1631 hereinafter Paice Brief reporting that the Abell Foundation had "invested over $19 million in Paice"
-
Corrected Brief of Plaintiff-Cross Appellant at 6, Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., 504 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Nos. 2006-1610, 2006-1631) [hereinafter Paice Brief] (reporting that the Abell Foundation had "invest[ed] over $19 million in Paice");
-
(2007)
F.3d
, vol.504
, pp. 1293
-
-
-
515
-
-
78649353840
-
-
see also, supra note, describing the Abell Foundation as "a key investor" interested in potential "environmental benefits" and local economic development
-
see also Roylance, supra note 359 (describing the Abell Foundation as "a key investor" interested in potential "environmental benefits" and local economic development).
-
-
-
Roylance1
-
516
-
-
78649348897
-
Hybrids pick up the paice: A new high-voltage hybrid drive system from paice corporation challenges traditional thinking
-
June 1, 14
-
Gerry Kobe, Hybrids Pick Up the Paice: A New High-Voltage Hybrid Drive System from Paice Corporation Challenges Traditional Thinking, AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRIES, June 1, 2002, at 14, 14;
-
(2002)
Automotive Industries
, pp. 14
-
-
Kobe, G.1
-
517
-
-
78649370134
-
Paice touts hyperdrive
-
see also, Dec. 1, LEXIS, News Library, BATTEV File identifying David Polletta as Paice's "vice president of engineering"
-
see also Paice Touts Hyperdrive, BATTERY & EV TECH., Dec. 1, 2001, LEXIS, News Library, BATTEV File (identifying David Polletta as Paice's "vice president of engineering").
-
(2001)
Battery & Ev Tech.
-
-
-
518
-
-
78649382161
-
Getting new technology into the marketplace: Hearing before the subcomm
-
See FreedomCar:, hereinafter Hearings statement of Robert J. Templin, Member, Board of Directors, Paice Corp. discussing the prior work experience of Ted Louckes, Paice's chief operating officer
-
See FreedomCar: Getting New Technology into the Marketplace: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Energy of the H. Comm. on Sci. & Tech., 107th Cong. 76 (2002) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Robert J. Templin, Member, Board of Directors, Paice Corp.) (discussing the prior work experience of Ted Louckes, Paice's chief operating officer).
-
(2002)
On Energy of the H. Comm. on Sci. & Tech. 107th Cong.
, pp. 76
-
-
-
519
-
-
78649364556
-
-
See id. describing Nathanael Adamson's position with Paice as executive vice president; Paice LLC-Management, describing Adamson's background as director of the Ford Product Development Group
-
See id. (describing Nathanael Adamson's position with Paice as executive vice president); Paice LLC-Management, http://www.paice.net/Management/tabid/54/ Default.aspx (describing Adamson's background as director of the Ford Product Development Group).
-
-
-
-
520
-
-
84889226874
-
-
supra note 365, statement of Robert J. Templin
-
Hearings, supra note 365, at 76 (statement of Robert J. Templin).
-
Hearings
, pp. 76
-
-
-
521
-
-
78649352965
-
-
supra note 364
-
Kobe, supra note 364, at 15;
-
-
-
Kobe1
-
522
-
-
78649365717
-
Hybrids for trucks? No, not trees or flowers... Power! (technically speaking)
-
see also, Feb. 1, available at, "A full-scale prototype has already been tested at Roush Industries...."
-
see also Paul Richards, Hybrids for Trucks? No, Not Trees or Flowers... Power! (Technically Speaking), COM. CARRIER J., Feb. 1, 2002, available at http://www.etrucker.com/apps/news/article.asp?id=1422210 ("[A] full-scale prototype has already been tested at Roush Industries....");
-
(2002)
Com. Carrier J.
-
-
Richards, P.1
-
523
-
-
78649370137
-
-
supra note 359 "In, Paice built a prototype."
-
Roylance, supra note 359 ("In 1999, Paice built a prototype....").
-
(1999)
-
-
Roylance1
-
524
-
-
78649346614
-
-
Paice Touts Hyperdrive, supra note 364
-
Paice Touts Hyperdrive, supra note 364.
-
-
-
-
525
-
-
78649357180
-
Highway hybrid: Both gas and electricity fuel prius; mileage reaches 52 miles a Gallon, Milwaukee J. Sentinel
-
See, Feb. 23, reporting that the Prius compact "arrived for the 2001 model year"
-
See Ann M. Job, Highway Hybrid: Both Gas and Electricity Fuel Prius; Mileage Reaches 52 Miles a Gallon, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Feb. 23, 2001, LEXIS, News Library, MILJNL File (reporting that the Prius compact "arrived for the 2001 model year").
-
(2001)
Lexis, News Library, Miljnl File
, vol.52
-
-
Job, A.M.1
-
526
-
-
78649336045
-
-
See Press Release, Paice Corp., Paice Hyperdrive Can Improve Fuel Economy of America's Vehicle Fleet by 50 Percent June 4, 2002, LEXIS, News Library, BWIRE File describing "a technical presentation presented to the 2002 Future Car Congress"; Press Release, Paice Corp., Paice Powertrain Boosts Performance, Fuel Economy for Light Trucks and SUVs Mar. 1, 2002, LEXIS, News Library, PRNEWS File describing a technical presentation to occur at the SAE World Congress in Detroit on March 4, 2002
-
See Press Release, Paice Corp., Paice Hyperdrive Can Improve Fuel Economy of America's Vehicle Fleet by 50 Percent (June 4, 2002), LEXIS, News Library, BWIRE File (describing "a technical presentation presented to the 2002 Future Car Congress"); Press Release, Paice Corp., Paice Powertrain Boosts Performance, Fuel Economy for Light Trucks and SUVs (Mar. 1, 2002), LEXIS, News Library, PRNEWS File (describing a technical presentation to occur at the SAE World Congress in Detroit on March 4, 2002);
-
-
-
-
527
-
-
78649379786
-
Hyperdrive powertrain unveiled for light trucks
-
Nov. 14, "Paice Corp.... unveiled a gasoline-electric hybrid powertrain system for light trucks at the SAE Truck & Bus Meeting and Exposition in Chicago this week."
-
Sean Kilcarr, Hyperdrive Powertrain Unveiled for Light Trucks, FLEETOWNER, Nov. 14, 2009, http://fleetowner.com/news/fleet-hyperdrive- powertrain-unveiled/index.html ("Paice Corp.... unveiled a gasoline-electric hybrid powertrain system for light trucks at the SAE Truck & Bus Meeting and Exposition in Chicago this week.").
-
(2009)
Fleetowner
-
-
Kilcarr, S.1
-
528
-
-
78649342118
-
Keeping paice with hybrid power
-
Dec, 32
-
Kami Buchholz, Keeping PAICE with Hybrid Power, AUTOMOTIVE ENGINEERING INT'L, Dec. 2001, at 32, 32.
-
(2001)
Automotive Engineering Int'l
, pp. 32
-
-
Buchholz, K.1
-
529
-
-
78649381265
-
Saviors or snake oil salesmen?
-
Nov. 30
-
Christopher A. Sawyer, Saviors or Snake Oil Salesmen?, AUTOMOTIVE DESIGN & PRODUCTION, Nov. 30, 2001, at 42.
-
(2001)
Automotive Design & Production
, pp. 42
-
-
Sawyer, C.A.1
-
530
-
-
78649386876
-
Powertrain benefits all vehicles
-
July 1, LEXIS, News Library, BATTEV File; Paice Touts Hyperdrive, supra note 364
-
Powertrain Benefits All Vehicles, BATTERY & EV TECH., July 1, 2002, LEXIS, News Library, BATTEV File; Paice Touts Hyperdrive, supra note 364.
-
(2002)
Battery & Ev Tech.
-
-
-
531
-
-
78649381865
-
-
E.g., supra note 364
-
E.g., Kobe, supra note 364, at 14;
-
-
-
Kobe1
-
532
-
-
78649354812
-
-
supra note 368
-
Richards, supra note 368, at 10.
-
-
-
Richards1
-
533
-
-
84889226874
-
-
supra note 365, statement of Robert J. Templin
-
Hearings, supra note 365, at 74 (statement of Robert J. Templin).
-
Hearings
, pp. 74
-
-
-
534
-
-
78649354392
-
-
See, supra note 372, describing "ongoing development activity" and Paice's plans to "design, produce, and market the Hyperdrive's computer-controller"
-
See Buchholz, supra note 372, at 33 (describing "[o]ngoing development activity" and Paice's plans to "design, produce, and market the [Hyperdrive's] computer-controller");
-
-
-
Buchholz1
-
535
-
-
78649358191
-
-
supra note 368, "The company is discussing production with original equipment manufacturers right now."
-
Richards, supra note 368, at 10 ("The company is discussing production with [original equipment manufacturers] right now.");
-
-
-
Richards1
-
536
-
-
78649388334
-
-
supra note 359 reporting that the University of Maryland's Technology Enterprise Institute "arranged meetings with potential investors, suppliers and federal agencies", including "Martin Marietta, General Electric, Westinghouse, Chrysler and General Motors", and that "Japanese carmakers were informed of the new technology"
-
Roylance, supra note 359 (reporting that the University of Maryland's Technology Enterprise Institute "arranged meetings with potential investors, suppliers and federal agencies", including "Martin Marietta, General Electric, Westinghouse, Chrysler and General Motors", and that "Japanese carmakers were informed of the new technology").
-
-
-
Roylance1
-
537
-
-
78649351516
-
-
See, supra note 364, "Skeptics line up ten-deep to challenge Paice's claim that the system is fully scaleable...."
-
See Kobe, supra note 364, at 16 ("Skeptics line up ten-deep to challenge Paice's claim that the system is fully scaleable....").
-
-
-
Kobe1
-
538
-
-
78649359050
-
-
*13, E. D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2006
-
*13 (E. D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2006).
-
(2006)
WL
, pp. 2385139
-
-
-
539
-
-
78649380974
-
-
See, supra note 359 "Executives worried that a high-voltage car would be dangerous."
-
See Roylance, supra note 359 ("[E]xecutives worried that a high-voltage car would be dangerous.");
-
-
-
Roylance1
-
540
-
-
84873693214
-
-
see also Brief for Defendants-Appellants at 9, Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., Fed. Cir, Nos. 2006-1610, 2006-1631 hereinafter Toyota Brief "A number of companies, including General Motors and Ford, declined to pursue Paice's design because of safety concerns about putting 500-volt batteries in automobiles."
-
see also Brief for Defendants-Appellants at 9, Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., 504 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Nos. 2006-1610, 2006-1631) [hereinafter Toyota Brief] ("A number of companies, including General Motors and Ford, declined to pursue Paice's design because of safety concerns about putting 500-volt batteries in automobiles.").
-
(2007)
F.3d
, vol.504
, pp. 1293
-
-
-
541
-
-
78649377900
-
-
See Paice Brief, supra note 363, describing three sets of communications between Paice and Toyota from 2000 to 2002, including one instance in which "Toyota agreed to meet with Paice in Japan, but canceled the meeting the evening before"
-
See Paice Brief, supra note 363, at 7 (describing three sets of communications between Paice and Toyota from 2000 to 2002, including one instance in which "Toyota agreed to meet with Paice in Japan, but canceled the meeting the evening before");
-
-
-
-
542
-
-
78649336930
-
-
see also Toyota Brief, supra note 380, describing Toyota's 2002 decision not to "comparatively evaluate the Toyota Prius design against Paice's different hybrid design"
-
see also Toyota Brief, supra note 380, at 11 (describing Toyota's 2002 decision not to "comparatively evaluate the Toyota Prius design against Paice's different hybrid design").
-
-
-
-
543
-
-
78649365420
-
-
Toyota Brief, supra note 380
-
Toyota Brief, supra note 380, at 10.
-
-
-
-
544
-
-
78649340615
-
-
See Press Release, supra note 360 "A staff engineer at Toyota later developed the same idea as Severinsky for hybrids."
-
See Press Release, supra note 360 ("A staff engineer at Toyota later developed the same idea as Severinsky for hybrids.").
-
-
-
-
545
-
-
78649340028
-
-
Paice Brief, supra note 363
-
Paice Brief, supra note 363, at 8.
-
-
-
-
546
-
-
78649370413
-
-
Paice
-
Paice, 504 F.3d at 1301-02.
-
F.3d
, vol.504
, pp. 1301-1302
-
-
-
547
-
-
78649337493
-
-
Id
-
Id. at 1302.
-
-
-
-
548
-
-
78649359050
-
-
*7-8, E. D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2006
-
*7-8 (E. D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2006).
-
(2006)
WL
, pp. 2385139
-
-
-
549
-
-
78649356589
-
-
*18
-
*18.
-
-
-
-
550
-
-
78649369050
-
-
Id
-
*19.
-
-
-
-
551
-
-
78649337223
-
-
Paice
-
Paice, 504 F.3d at 1315.
-
F.3d
, vol.504
, pp. 1315
-
-
-
552
-
-
78649390112
-
-
Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., 630 E. D. Tex
-
Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., 609 F. Supp. 2d 620, 630 (E. D. Tex. 2009).
-
(2009)
F. Supp. 2d
, vol.609
, pp. 620
-
-
-
553
-
-
78649391907
-
-
See id, reporting that "Paice's preferred licensing range" was "$100-$200"
-
See id. at 629 (reporting that "Paice's preferred licensing range" was "$100-$200").
-
-
-
-
554
-
-
78649358784
-
-
See id, concluding that the internal combustion engine was "only indirectly related to 'hybridness'"
-
See id. at 629-30 (concluding that the internal combustion engine was "only indirectly related to 'hybridness'").
-
-
-
-
555
-
-
78649384906
-
-
Id
-
Id. at 630.
-
-
-
-
556
-
-
78649380398
-
-
Id
-
Id.
-
-
-
-
557
-
-
78649386572
-
-
See infra subpart IV D
-
See infra subpart IV (D).
-
-
-
-
558
-
-
78649359050
-
-
*12 E. D. Tex. Aug. 16 2006
-
*12 (E. D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2006).
-
(2006)
WL
, pp. 2385139
-
-
-
559
-
-
78649361132
-
-
See id, concluding that Paice had "not demonstrated that it will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of an injunction"
-
*14 (concluding that Paice had "not demonstrated that it will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of an injunction").
-
-
-
-
560
-
-
78649359957
-
-
See supra notes 393-95 and accompanying text
-
See supra notes 393-95 and accompanying text.
-
-
-
-
561
-
-
78649364256
-
-
See, supra note 4, "A number of lower courts have in fact read the Supreme Court's eBay opinion as establishing an absolute bar against presumptions in favor of preliminary, as well as permanent, injunctions and have done so in copyright and trademark cases, as well as patent cases."
-
See Golden, supra note 4, at 697 ("A number of lower courts have in fact read the [Supreme] Court's [eBay] opinion as establishing an absolute bar against presumptions in favor of preliminary, as well as permanent, injunctions and have done so in copyright and trademark cases, as well as patent cases.").
-
-
-
Golden1
-
562
-
-
78649351248
-
-
See, e.g., Pfizer, Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 1381 Fed. Cir, "We have consistently held that a district court should presume that a patent owner will be irreparably harmed when, as here, a patent owner establishes a strong showing of likely infringement of a valid and enforceable patent."
-
See, e.g., Pfizer, Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 429 F.3d 1364, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ("We have consistently held that a district court should presume that a patent owner will be irreparably harmed when, as here, a patent owner establishes a strong showing of likely infringement of a valid and enforceable patent.");
-
(2005)
F.3d
, vol.429
, pp. 1364
-
-
-
563
-
-
78649352075
-
-
id, finding that, with respect to the balance of hardships, "an alleged infringer's loss of market share and customer relationships, without more, does not... overcome the loss of exclusivity experienced by a patent owner due to infringing conduct"; id. finding no abuse of discretion in a conclusion that the "public policy inherent in the patent laws" meant that the public interest did not favor denying an injunction internal quotation marks omitted
-
id. at 1382 (finding that, with respect to the balance of hardships, "an alleged infringer's loss of market share and customer relationships, without more, does not... overcome the loss of exclusivity experienced by a patent owner due to infringing conduct"); id. (finding no abuse of discretion in a conclusion that the "public policy inherent in the patent laws" meant that the public interest did not favor denying an injunction (internal quotation marks omitted)).
-
-
-
-
564
-
-
84886745072
-
-
See MercExchange, L. L. C. v. eBay, Inc., 711 E. D. Va, "The Federal Circuit has indicated that an injunction should issue once infringement has been established unless there is a sufficient reason for denying it." internal quotation marks omitted
-
See MercExchange, L. L. C. v. eBay, Inc., 275 F. Supp. 2d 695, 711 (E. D. Va. 2003) ("The Federal Circuit has indicated that an injunction should issue once infringement has been established unless there is a sufficient reason for denying it." (internal quotation marks omitted))
-
(2003)
F. Supp. 2d
, vol.275
, pp. 695
-
-
-
565
-
-
70649087705
-
-
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, vacated in part, Fed. Cir
-
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, vacated in part, 401 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
-
(2005)
F.3d
, vol.401
, pp. 1323
-
-
-
566
-
-
70649109692
-
-
vacated in part and remanded by
-
vacated in part and remanded by 547 U. S. 388 (2006);
-
(2006)
U. S.
, vol.547
, pp. 388
-
-
-
567
-
-
78649371312
-
-
id. "Courts have held that when, as here, 'validity and continuing infringement have been clearly established... immediate irreparable harm is presumed.'" quoting Odetics, Inc. v. Storage Tech. Corp., 794 E. D. Va
-
id. ("Courts have held that when, as here, 'validity and continuing infringement have been clearly established... immediate irreparable harm is presumed.'" (quoting Odetics, Inc. v. Storage Tech. Corp., 14 F. Supp. 2d 785, 794 (E. D. Va. 1998)));
-
(1998)
F. Supp. 2d
, vol.14
, pp. 785
-
-
-
568
-
-
78649368447
-
-
id, observing that "the norm" is that the public interest favors an injunction against continuing a course of adjudged infringement
-
id. at 713 (observing that "the norm" is that the public interest favors an injunction against continuing a course of adjudged infringement).
-
-
-
-
569
-
-
78649365419
-
-
Supreme Court stated the irreparable-harm inquiry as a question of whether the movant for a permanent injunction "has suffered an irreparable injury", but a number of lower courts appear to have recognized that the irreparable-harm inquiry should more properly include at least some forward-looking aspect. See, e.g., supra note 4
-
The Supreme Court stated the irreparable-harm inquiry as a question of whether the movant for a permanent injunction "has suffered an irreparable injury", but a number of lower courts appear to have recognized that the irreparable-harm inquiry should more properly include at least some forward-looking aspect. See, e.g., Golden, supra note 4, at 696
-
-
-
Golden1
-
570
-
-
79851472246
-
-
quoting the statement in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 1214 n. 18 C. D. Cal, that "a permanent injunction should not issue unless there is reason to believe that future infringements would constitute irreparable harm"
-
(quoting the statement in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 518 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1214 n. 18 (C. D. Cal. 2007), that "a permanent injunction should not issue unless there is reason to believe that future infringements would constitute irreparable harm").
-
(2007)
F. Supp. 2d
, vol.518
, pp. 1197
-
-
-
571
-
-
78649373879
-
-
See generally, 4th ed. forthcoming criticizing the Supreme Court's use of the past tense in describing a requirement of irreparable harm
-
See generally DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, Modern American Remedies: Cases and Materials (4th ed. forthcoming) (criticizing the Supreme Court's use of the past tense in describing a requirement of irreparable harm).
-
Modern American Remedies: Cases and Materials
-
-
Douglas, L.1
-
572
-
-
78649377620
-
-
See, supra note 4, characterizing the first two factors as "doubling up... on the irreparable harm factor"
-
See Golden, supra note 4, at 695 (characterizing the first two factors as "doubling up... on the irreparable harm factor").
-
-
-
Golden1
-
573
-
-
79851471269
-
-
EBay
-
EBay, 547 U. S. at 391.
-
U. S.
, vol.547
, pp. 391
-
-
-
574
-
-
84859828294
-
-
See, e.g., Tiber Labs., L. L. C. v. Hawthorn Pharm., Inc., 1380 N. D. Ga, "EBay does not leave room for a presumption of irreparable injury in patent cases, whether raised at the preliminary or permanent injunction phase."
-
See, e.g., Tiber Labs., L. L. C. v. Hawthorn Pharm., Inc., 527 F. Supp. 2d 1373, 1380 (N. D. Ga. 2007) ("[E]Bay does not leave room for a presumption of irreparable injury in patent cases, whether raised at the preliminary or permanent injunction phase.");
-
(2007)
F. Supp. 2d
, vol.527
, pp. 1373
-
-
-
575
-
-
78649377340
-
-
Torspo Hockey Int'l, Inc. v. Kor Hockey Ltd., 881 D. Minn, "EBay's logic forbids courts to categorically presume irreparable harm in the preliminary-injunction context, even if a patentee has established that it will likely succeed on the merits."
-
Torspo Hockey Int'l, Inc. v. Kor Hockey Ltd., 491 F. Supp. 2d 871, 881 (D. Minn. 2007) ("[E]Bay's logic forbids courts to categorically presume irreparable harm in the preliminary-injunction context, even if a patentee has established that it will likely succeed on the merits.").
-
(2007)
F. Supp. 2d
, vol.491
, pp. 871
-
-
-
576
-
-
78649366320
-
-
*3 Fed. Cir. Dec. 16, 2009 unpublished table decision finding that, in eBay, "the presumption of irreparable harm, based just on proof of infringement, was discarded", and "the burden is now on the patentee to demonstrate that its potential losses cannot be compensated by monetary damages"
-
*3 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 16, 2009) (unpublished table decision) (finding that, in eBay, "the presumption of irreparable harm, based just on proof of infringement, was discarded", and "[t]he burden is now on the patentee to demonstrate that its potential losses cannot be compensated by monetary damages").
-
(2009)
WL
, pp. 4878643
-
-
-
577
-
-
78649340616
-
-
See, supra note 4, suggesting that lower courts might be wrong to read eBay to forbid using presumptions in injunctive relief analysis
-
See Golden, supra note 4, at 697-98 (suggesting that lower courts might be wrong to read eBay to forbid using presumptions in injunctive relief analysis);
-
-
-
Golden1
-
578
-
-
78649362624
-
-
supra note 271, arguing that "eBay can be read as a call for a property-style approach" featuring significant "safety valves" rather than as a mandate for "compulsory licenses"
-
Smith, supra note 271, at 2127 (arguing that "eBay can be read as a call for [a] property-style approach" featuring significant "safety valve[s]" rather than as a mandate for "compulsory licenses").
-
-
-
Smith1
-
579
-
-
78649375876
-
-
See County Court v. Allen, 157, stating, in the context of a criminal case, that "the most common evidentiary device is the entirely permissive inference or presumption, which allows-but does not require-the trier of fact to infer the elemental fact from proof by the prosecutor of the basic one"
-
See County Court v. Allen, 442 U. S. 140, 157 (1979) (stating, in the context of a criminal case, that "[t]he most common evidentiary device is the entirely permissive inference or presumption, which allows-but does not require-the trier of fact to infer the elemental fact from proof by the prosecutor of the basic one");
-
(1979)
U. S.
, vol.442
, pp. 140
-
-
-
580
-
-
84888215259
-
-
cf. Francis v. Franklin, 314 n. 3, reserving the question of "whether a mandatory presumption that shifts only a burden of production to a criminal defendant is consistent with the Due Process Clause"
-
cf. Francis v. Franklin, 471 U. S. 307, 314 n. 3 (1985) (reserving the question of "whether a mandatory presumption that shifts only a burden of production to [a criminal] defendant is consistent with the Due Process Clause").
-
(1985)
U. S.
, vol.471
, pp. 307
-
-
-
581
-
-
78649368742
-
-
See supra text accompanying note 347
-
See supra text accompanying note 347.
-
-
-
-
582
-
-
78649383663
-
-
See, supra note 5, noting that, according to courts' traditional practice, "after a patent's validity had been upheld and its continued infringement had been proven, a permanent injunction would commonly issue as a matter of course"
-
See Golden, supra note 5, at 2122 (noting that, according to courts' traditional practice, "after a patent's validity had been upheld and its continued infringement had been proven, a permanent injunction would commonly issue as a matter of course").
-
-
-
Golden1
-
583
-
-
78649391045
-
-
See supra sections IV A 4-5
-
See supra sections IV (A) (4) - (5).
-
-
-
-
584
-
-
78649341507
-
-
See supra sections IV A 1-2
-
See supra sections IV (A) (1) - (2).
-
-
-
-
585
-
-
78649362625
-
-
Cf, supra note 271, "Certainly it makes no sense to require a plaintiff to 'demonstrate' all four elements of this test, implying that plaintiff must raise the issues of undue hardship and public interest and negate them in every case."
-
Cf. LAYCOCK, supra note 271, at 58 ("Certainly it makes no sense to require a plaintiff to 'demonstrate' all four elements of this test, implying that plaintiff must raise the issues of undue hardship and public interest and negate them in every case.").
-
-
-
Laycock1
-
586
-
-
78649366592
-
-
See, supra note 349, "The burden of proof need not follow the burden of allegation. "
-
See Epstein, supra note 349, at 580 ("[T]he burden of proof need not follow the burden of allegation. ").
-
-
-
Epstein1
-
587
-
-
78649365417
-
-
See supra text accompanying notes 332-34
-
See supra text accompanying notes 332-34.
-
-
-
-
588
-
-
78649391637
-
-
Cf, supra note 302, concluding that "the only way to get parties truly to bargain over the valuation of intellectual property rights is to make them into property rule entitlements"
-
Cf. Merges, supra note 302, at 1305-06 (concluding that "the only way to get parties truly to bargain over the valuation of intellectual property rights is to make them into property rule entitlements").
-
-
-
Merges1
-
589
-
-
78649391046
-
-
See, &, supra note 174, § 707i, observing "serious if not intractable problems in determining a 'reasonable' royalty rate"
-
See 3 Areeda & HOVENKAMP, supra note 174, § 707i, at 209 (observing "serious if not intractable problems in determining a 'reasonable' royalty rate").
-
, vol.3
, pp. 209
-
-
Areeda1
Hovenkamp2
-
590
-
-
78649376472
-
-
Cf, supra note 156, concluding that, with respect to administering and amending a regime of regulation for various sectors of the entertainment industry, "the courts lack the expertise, time, and information-gathering capacities to do the job responsibly"
-
Cf. FISHER, supra note 156, at 195 (concluding that, with respect to administering and amending a regime of regulation for various sectors of the entertainment industry, "the courts lack the expertise, time, and information-gathering capacities to do the job responsibly").
-
-
-
Fisher1
-
591
-
-
0346581482
-
Property rules versus liability rules: An economic analysis
-
See, e.g., &, 728, "We show that under the liability rule, the optimal magnitude of damages is average harm." emphasis omitted
-
See, e.g., Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis, 109 HARV. L. REV. 713, 728 (1996) ("We show that under the liability rule, the optimal magnitude of damages is average harm." (emphasis omitted));
-
(1996)
Harv. L. Rev.
, vol.109
, pp. 713
-
-
Kaplow, L.1
Shavell, S.2
-
592
-
-
78649389507
-
-
cf, &, supra note 155, "All that is required for reasonable royalties to play their role in guiding parties to a negotiated settlement in the shadow of litigation is that they be unbiased...."
-
cf. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 155, at 2172 ("[A]ll that is required for reasonable royalties to play their role in guiding parties to a negotiated settlement in the shadow of litigation is that they be unbiased....").
-
-
-
Lemley1
Shapiro2
-
593
-
-
78649377339
-
-
See supra text accompanying notes 332-34
-
See supra text accompanying notes 332-34;
-
-
-
-
594
-
-
54049128155
-
Revisiting injunctive relief: Interpreting ebay in high-tech industries with non-practicing patent holders
-
cf, 579, showing how negotiations in the wake of a court's determination of an ongoing royalty might only correct court errors if the royalty rate is set too high relative to actual value
-
cf. Vincenzo Denicolò et al., Revisiting Injunctive Relief: Interpreting eBay in High-Tech Industries with Non-practicing Patent Holders, 4 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 571, 579 (2008) (showing how negotiations in the wake of a court's determination of an ongoing royalty might only correct court errors if the royalty rate is set too high relative to actual value);
-
(2008)
J. Competition L. & Econ.
, vol.4
, pp. 571
-
-
Denicolò, V.1
-
595
-
-
78649365719
-
-
supra note 302, concluding that "a liability rule in the intellectual property context will tend to act as a ceiling on valuation"
-
Merges, supra note 302, at 1305 (concluding that "a liability rule in the intellectual property context will tend to act as a ceiling on valuation").
-
-
-
Merges1
-
596
-
-
77951869546
-
The insurance and management of intellectual property risks
-
Compare, &, 337-38, observing that "patent infringement 'abatement policies'" were "not yet widely available" and commonly provided coverage "only for the costs of an infringement suit"
-
Compare Melvin Simensky & Eric C. Osterberg, The Insurance and Management of Intellectual Property Risks, 17 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L. J. 321, 337-38 (1999) (observing that "patent infringement 'abatement policies'" were "not yet widely available" and commonly provided coverage "only for the costs of an infringement suit")
-
(1999)
Cardozo Arts & Ent. L. J.
, vol.17
, pp. 321
-
-
Simensky, M.1
Osterberg, E.C.2
-
597
-
-
78649368184
-
-
with, &, supra note 420, "We do not believe. that issues of risk-bearing are of much importance..., due to the widespread availability of insurance on reasonably competitive terms."
-
with Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 420, at 743 ("We do not believe... that issues of risk-bearing are of much importance..., due to the widespread availability of insurance on reasonably competitive terms.").
-
-
-
Kaplow1
Shavell2
-
598
-
-
78649378484
-
-
Reebok Int'l Ltd. v. J. Baker, Inc., 1556 Fed. Cir
-
Reebok Int'l Ltd. v. J. Baker, Inc., 32 F.3d 1552, 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1994);
-
(1994)
F.3d
, vol.32
, pp. 1552
-
-
-
599
-
-
78649372750
-
-
cf. Corning Glass Works v. U. S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 1567 Fed. Cir, "Upon a patentee's proof of continuing infringement of a valid enforceable patent, immediate irreparable harm is presumed in connection with a request to a district court for injunctive relief." internal quotation marks omitted
-
cf. Corning Glass Works v. U. S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 799 F.2d 1559, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1986) ("Upon a patentee's proof of continuing infringement of a valid enforceable patent, immediate irreparable harm is presumed in connection with a request to a district court for injunctive relief." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
-
(1986)
F.2d
, vol.799
, pp. 1559
-
-
-
600
-
-
78649371311
-
-
Cf, supra note 5, discussing the informational asymmetries between the patentee and potential infringers
-
Cf. Golden, supra note 5, at 2132-33 (discussing the informational asymmetries between the patentee and potential infringers).
-
-
-
Golden1
-
601
-
-
78649359050
-
-
*16 E. D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2006
-
*16 (E. D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2006).
-
(2006)
WL
, pp. 2385139
-
-
-
602
-
-
78649349474
-
-
See supra notes 403-05 and accompanying text
-
See supra notes 403-05 and accompanying text.
-
-
-
-
603
-
-
78649379478
-
-
Patent Reform Act of 2009, H. R, § 5
-
Patent Reform Act of 2009, H. R. 1260, 111th Cong. § 5 (2009).
-
(2009)
111th Cong
, vol.1260
-
-
-
604
-
-
78649341808
-
-
See Minks v. Polaris Indus., Inc., 1372 Fed. Cir, "A determination of the royalty stemming from a hypothetical negotiation is often made by assessing factors such as those set forth in Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U. S. Plywood Corp. "
-
See Minks v. Polaris Indus., Inc., 546 F.3d 1364, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ("A determination of the royalty stemming from a hypothetical negotiation is often made by assessing factors such as those set forth in Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U. S. Plywood Corp. "
-
(2008)
F.3d
, vol.546
, pp. 1364
-
-
-
605
-
-
84863928830
-
-
citing, 1120 S. D. N. Y
-
(citing 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S. D. N. Y. 1970)
-
(1970)
F. Supp.
, vol.318
, pp. 1116
-
-
-
606
-
-
77956771011
-
-
modified, 2d Cir
-
modified, 446 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1971)));
-
(1971)
F.2d
, vol.446
, pp. 295
-
-
-
607
-
-
84991725093
-
-
Ga.-Pac., listing as a factor "the portion of the realizable profit that should be credited to the invention as distinguished from" other potential sources of value
-
Ga.-Pac., 318 F. Supp. at 1120 (listing as a factor "[t]he portion of the realizable profit that should be credited to the invention as distinguished from" other potential sources of value).
-
F. Supp.
, vol.318
, pp. 1120
-
-
-
608
-
-
78649382471
-
-
See, &, available at, "Some believe that current damages standards have resulted in the systemic overcompensation of patent owners.... Others believe that current case law appropriately accounts for apportionment concerns."
-
See WENDY SCHACHT & JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., PATENT REFORM IN THE 111TH CONGRESS: INNOVATION ISSUES 21 (2009), available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R40481-20090409.pdf ("Some believe that current damages standards have resulted in the systemic overcompensation of patent owners.... Others believe that current case law appropriately accounts for apportionment concerns.").
-
(2009)
Cong. Research Serv., Patent Reform in the 111Th Congress: Innovation Issues
, pp. 21
-
-
Wendy, S.1
John, R.T.2
-
609
-
-
78649383340
-
-
See H. R. 1260 § 5 a "The court shall conduct an analysis to ensure that a reasonable royalty is applied only to the portion of the economic value of the infringing product or process properly attributable to the claimed invention's specific contribution over the prior art."
-
See H. R. 1260 § 5 (a) ("[T]he court shall conduct an analysis to ensure that a reasonable royalty is applied only to the portion of the economic value of the infringing product or process properly attributable to the claimed invention's specific contribution over the prior art.").
-
-
-
-
610
-
-
78649388617
-
-
But see, supra note 10, "Limiting damage awards to the economic value of the claimed invention over the prior art upsets the balance reflected in the subject matter, novelty, nonobviousness, and utility requirements for obtaining a patent."
-
But see Opderbeck, supra note 10, at 166 ("[L]imiting damage awards to the economic value of the claimed invention over the prior art upsets the balance reflected in the subject matter, novelty, [non]obviousness, and utility requirements for obtaining a patent.").
-
-
-
Opderbeck1
-
611
-
-
78649385205
-
-
See supra text accompanying notes 289-91
-
See supra text accompanying notes 289-91.
-
-
-
-
612
-
-
78649362018
-
-
H. R. 1260 § 5 a
-
H. R. 1260 § 5 (a).
-
-
-
-
613
-
-
78649359364
-
Patent reform should not leave innovation behind
-
See, 342, "University organizations generally agreed that past patent reform bills introduced an inflexible methodology for the calculation of damages."
-
See Carl E. Gulbrandsen et al., Patent Reform Should Not Leave Innovation Behind, 8 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 328, 342 (2009) ("University organizations generally agreed that [past patent reform] bills introduced an inflexible methodology for the calculation of damages.").
-
(2009)
J. Marshall Rev. Intell. Prop. L
, vol.8
, pp. 328
-
-
Gulbrandsen, C.E.1
-
614
-
-
78649345710
-
-
See supra subpart III B
-
See supra subpart III (B).
-
-
-
-
615
-
-
78649373046
-
-
See supra text accompanying note 399
-
See supra text accompanying note 399.
-
-
-
-
616
-
-
78649377619
-
-
supra note 5, suggesting that, in setting licensing fees, parties "might rely more heavily on heuristics and comparisons with other royalties than on a direct estimate of the value of the patent in comparison with alternatives"
-
Cotter, supra note 5, at 1186 (suggesting that, in setting licensing fees, parties "might rely more heavily on heuristics and comparisons with other royalties than on a direct estimate of the value of the patent in comparison with alternatives");
-
-
-
Cotter1
-
617
-
-
1642587169
-
Random walks, non-cooperative games, and the complex mathematics of patent pricing
-
1190, "Readers assuming an efficient market for patents may be surprised to learn of the prevalence of rule-of-thumb benchmarks used in the absence of accurate information about the licensing value of the patent itself."
-
F. Russell Denton & Paul J. Heald, Random Walks, Non-cooperative Games, and the Complex Mathematics of Patent Pricing, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 1175, 1190 (2003) ("Readers assuming an efficient market for patents may be surprised to learn of the prevalence of rule-of-thumb benchmarks used in the absence of accurate information about the licensing value of the patent itself.").
-
(2003)
Rutgers L. Rev.
, vol.55
, pp. 1175
-
-
Denton, F.R.1
Heald, P.J.2
-
618
-
-
78649378172
-
-
See Letter from, Chief Judge, U. S. Court of Appeals for the Fed. Circuit, to Patrick Leahy and Orrin G. Hatch, Senators, U. S. Senate May 3, 2007, available at, asserting that "adjudicating the economic value of the entire prior art, the asserted patent claims, and also all other features of the accused product or process... is a massive undertaking for which courts are ill-equipped"
-
See Letter from Paul R. Michel, Chief Judge, U. S. Court of Appeals for the Fed. Circuit, to Patrick Leahy and Orrin G. Hatch, Senators, U. S. Senate (May 3, 2007), available at http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2007/05/patent- reform-2-1.html (asserting that "adjudicat[ing] the economic value of the entire prior art, the asserted patent claims, and also all other features of the accused product or process... is a massive undertaking for which courts are ill-equipped");
-
-
-
Michel, P.R.1
-
619
-
-
78649361131
-
-
cf, &, supra note 437, rejecting an approach to valuing patents by determining "the degree of advantage over the next best available technology" because of the difficulty and likely arbitrariness of such determinations
-
cf. Denton & Heald, supra note 437, at 1208 (rejecting an approach to valuing patents by determining "the degree of advantage over the next best available technology" because of the difficulty and likely arbitrariness of such determinations).
-
-
-
Denton1
Heald2
-
620
-
-
78649372197
-
-
supra note 50
-
Landers, supra note 50, at 323.
-
-
-
Landers1
-
621
-
-
78649349182
-
-
See generally supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text noting the possibility of a disgorgement remedy for violation of an injunction against continued infringement
-
See generally supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text (noting the possibility of a disgorgement remedy for violation of an injunction against continued infringement).
-
-
-
-
622
-
-
78649351247
-
-
Such is already commonly the case for disgorgement under trademark and copyright law. See, &, supra note 94, observing that, under U. S. copyright and trademark law, "the plaintiff has the burden of proving the total profit earned by the infringer; at that point, the burden shifts to the defendant to prove how much of its total profit would have been earned absent the infringement"
-
Such is already commonly the case for disgorgement under trademark and copyright law. See BLAIR & COTTER, supra note 94, at 48 (observing that, under U. S. copyright and trademark law, "the plaintiff has the burden of proving the total profit earned by the infringer; at that point, the burden shifts to the defendant to prove how much of its total profit would have been earned absent the infringement");
-
-
-
Blair1
Cotter2
-
623
-
-
78649365418
-
-
see also, § 1117 a, "In assessing profits subject to disgorgement in a trademark suit the plaintiff shall be required to prove defendant's sales only; defendant must prove all elements of cost or deduction claimed."
-
see also 15 U. S. C. § 1117 (a) (2006) ("In assessing profits [subject to disgorgement in a trademark suit] the plaintiff shall be required to prove defendant's sales only; defendant must prove all elements of cost or deduction claimed.");
-
(2006)
U. S. C.
, vol.15
-
-
-
624
-
-
79956067233
-
-
§ 504 b, "In establishing the infringer's profits, the copyright owner is required to present proof only of the infringer's gross revenue, and the infringer is required to prove his or her deductible expenses and the elements of profit attributable to factors other than the copyrighted work."
-
U. S. C. § 504 (b) (2006) ("In establishing the infringer's profits, the copyright owner is required to present proof only of the infringer's gross revenue, and the infringer is required to prove his or her deductible expenses and the elements of profit attributable to factors other than the copyrighted work.").
-
(2006)
U. S. C.
, vol.17
-
-
-
625
-
-
78649367047
-
-
Patent Reform Act of 2009, S
-
Patent Reform Act of 2009, S. 515, 111th Cong. (2009).
-
(2009)
111th Cong
, vol.515
-
-
-
626
-
-
78649370999
-
-
Id. § 4
-
Id. § 4.
-
-
-
-
627
-
-
33744512160
-
Prior user rights
-
See, e.g., 95, "The appeal of prior user rights is especially great today...."
-
See, e.g., Carl Shapiro, Prior User Rights, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 92, 95 (2006) ("The appeal of prior user rights is especially great today....");
-
(2006)
Am. Econ. Rev.
, vol.96
, pp. 92
-
-
Shapiro, C.1
-
628
-
-
33845900231
-
Independent invention as a defense to patent infringement
-
479, arguing for "an independent invention defense" as a means for selective reduction of patent value
-
Samson Vermont, Independent Invention as a Defense to Patent Infringement, 105 MICH. L. REV. 475, 479 (2006) (arguing for "an independent invention defense" as a means for selective reduction of patent value);
-
(2006)
Mich. L. Rev.
, vol.105
, pp. 475
-
-
Vermont, S.1
-
629
-
-
78649375875
-
-
cf, supra note 57, observing "that if, in certain contexts, the problem of good-faith 'encroachment' became serious enough in patent law, a limited good-faith user defense with damages rather than injunctive remedies would be appropriate"
-
cf. Smith, supra note 57, at 1818 (observing "that if, in certain contexts, the problem of good-faith 'encroachment' became serious enough in patent law, a limited good-faith user defense with damages rather than injunctive remedies would be appropriate").
-
-
-
Smith1
-
631
-
-
78649384283
-
-
See, § 273 a 3, for purposes of the exemption, defining a "method" as "a method of doing or conducting business"
-
See 35 U. S. C. § 273 (a) (3) (2006) (for purposes of the exemption, defining a "method" as "a method of doing or conducting business");
-
(2006)
U. S. C.
, vol.35
-
-
-
632
-
-
78649387419
-
-
id. § 273 b 3 A "A person may not assert the defense under this section unless the invention for which the defense is asserted is for a method."
-
id. § 273 (b) (3) (A) ("A person may not assert the defense under this section unless the invention for which the defense is asserted is for a method.").
-
-
-
-
633
-
-
78649357626
-
-
Id. § 273 b 1
-
Id. § 273 (b) (1).
-
-
-
-
634
-
-
34250169852
-
Should patent infringement require proof of copying?
-
See, 1534, suggesting a prior-user right applying "only if the independent invention is made and commercialized sufficiently early..., such as before the patentee files its application"
-
See Mark A. Lemley, Should Patent Infringement Require Proof of Copying?, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1525, 1534 (2007) (suggesting a prior-user right applying "only if the independent invention is made and commercialized sufficiently early..., such as before the patentee files its application");
-
(2007)
Mich. L. Rev.
, vol.105
, pp. 1525
-
-
Lemley, M.A.1
-
635
-
-
78649339436
-
-
supra note 443, limiting a proposed independent-creator defense to situations in which a reinventor lacked actual or constructive notice of the invention's details. The Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property appears to limit the ability of the United States to provide prior-user or independent-creator rights that attach based on independent invention or initiation of use that occurs after an initial filing date
-
Vermont, supra note 443, at 485-87 (limiting a proposed independent-creator defense to situations in which a reinventor lacked actual or constructive notice of the invention's details). The Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property appears to limit the ability of the United States to provide prior-user or independent-creator rights that attach based on independent invention or initiation of use that occurs after an initial filing date.
-
-
-
Vermont1
-
636
-
-
78649358193
-
-
See, &, supra note 19, describing the Paris Convention as providing that, "in a country where 'intervening' third-party rights are granted prior to the filing of an application, no such rights shall accrue to
-
See MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 19, at 492 (describing the Paris Convention as providing that, "in a country where 'intervening' third-party rights are granted prior to the filing of an application, no such rights shall accrue to independent inventors who begin use of their independent inventions after the priority filing date but before the filing in the home country");
-
-
-
Merges1
Duffy2
-
637
-
-
77950143494
-
-
see also Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property art. 4 B, Sept. 28, 1979
-
see also Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property art. 4 (B), Sept. 28, 1979, 21 U. S. T. 1583
-
U. S. T
, vol.21
, pp. 1583
-
-
-
638
-
-
78649338078
-
-
providing that acts between an initial patent filing in a convention country and a filing within one year in another convention country "cannot give rise to any third-party right"
-
U. N. T. S. 305 (providing that acts between an initial patent filing in a convention country and a filing within one year in another convention country "cannot give rise to any third-party right").
-
U. N. T. S
, vol.828
, pp. 305
-
-
-
639
-
-
78649377337
-
-
See, supra note 443, arguing that prior-user rights tend to "reduce the rewards from patents precisely for those inventions with a high profit-to-cost ratio", "the inventions that the patent system is most likely to overreward"
-
See Shapiro, supra note 443, at 95 (arguing that prior-user rights tend to "reduce the rewards [from patents] precisely for those inventions with a high profit-to-cost ratio", "the inventions that the patent system is most likely to overreward");
-
-
-
Shapiro1
-
640
-
-
78649387753
-
-
supra note 443, arguing that a reinvention defense decreases deadweight loss and "rent dissipation", while tending to provide adequate rewards
-
Vermont, supra note 443, at 494-500 (arguing that a reinvention defense decreases deadweight loss and "rent dissipation", while tending to provide adequate rewards).
-
-
-
Vermont1
-
641
-
-
78649353552
-
-
See generally, supra note 15, "The threat of entry will only kill innovation if the cost of entry is low relative to the cost of innovation. "
-
See generally SCOTCHMER, supra note 15, at 115-16 ("The threat of entry will only kill innovation if the cost of entry is low relative to the cost of innovation. ").
-
-
-
Scotchmer1
-
642
-
-
78649374164
-
-
Cf, &, supra note 34, contending that software patents are "especially prone" to include "abstract or overly broad claims"
-
Cf. Bessen & MEURER, supra note 34, at 23 (contending that software patents are "especially prone" to include "abstract or overly broad claims");
-
-
-
Bessen1
Meurer2
-
643
-
-
77957076252
-
Patent holdouts in the standard-setting process
-
May, "In practice,. a firm cannot hope to reliably identify all previously undiscovered patents relevant to a given technical standard...."
-
Doug Lichtman, Patent Holdouts in the Standard-Setting Process, ACAD. ADVISORY COUNCIL BULL., May 2006, at 5, http://www.pff.org/issues-pubs/ip/ bulletins/bulletin1.3patent.pdf ("In practice,... a firm cannot hope to reliably identify all previously undiscovered patents relevant to a given technical standard....").
-
(2006)
Acad. Advisory Council Bull.
, pp. 5
-
-
Lichtman, D.1
-
644
-
-
78649355123
-
-
See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text
-
See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
-
-
-
-
645
-
-
78649346031
-
-
See supra note 445 and accompanying text
-
See supra note 445 and accompanying text.
-
-
-
-
646
-
-
78649383994
-
-
Cf, Patents, Property & Competition, unpublished manuscript, on file at, observing long-recognized concern with the administrability of a patent system "requiring proof of copying" for liability
-
Cf. Oskar Liivak, Patents, Property & Competition 27 (2009) (unpublished manuscript, on file at http://www.law.stanford.edu/display/images/ dynamic/events-media/Patents-Property-Competition-Liivak.pdf) (observing long-recognized concern with the administrability of a patent system "requiring proof of copying" for liability).
-
(2009)
, pp. 27
-
-
Liivak, O.1
-
647
-
-
78649360803
-
The future is now-the case for patent harmonization
-
See, 298, "The precise dates of conception and reduction to practice may be difficult to ascertain, even with detailed records."
-
See Robert W. Pritchard, The Future Is Now-The Case for Patent Harmonization, 20 N. C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 291, 298 (1995) ("[T]he precise dates of conception and reduction to practice may be difficult to ascertain, even with detailed records.").
-
(1995)
N. C. J. Int'l L. & Com. Reg.
, vol.20
, pp. 291
-
-
Pritchard, R.W.1
-
648
-
-
78649359053
-
-
See, §§ 102-103, making a claimed invention's date of invention crucial for questions of novelty and nonobviousness
-
See 35 U. S. C. §§ 102-103 (2006) (making a claimed invention's date of invention crucial for questions of novelty and nonobviousness).
-
(2006)
U. S. C.
, vol.35
-
-
-
649
-
-
78649347518
-
-
See id. § 102 g 1 providing that priority turns on whether, "before one person's invention... the invention was made by another inventor and not abandoned, suppressed, or concealed"
-
See id. § 102 (g) (1) (providing that priority turns on whether, "before [one] person's invention... the invention was made by [another] inventor and not abandoned, suppressed, or concealed").
-
-
-
-
650
-
-
78649336046
-
-
See id. § 271 a "Except as otherwise provided..., whoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States..., infringes the patent."
-
See id. § 271 (a) ("Except as otherwise provided..., whoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States..., infringes the patent.").
-
-
-
-
651
-
-
69849114403
-
Copying in patent law
-
This phenomenon partly explains my skepticism of efforts to equate an apparent lack of allegations of copying with the existence of truly independent creation. See, e.g., &, 1423, viewing the universe of patent infringers as divided into two categories, "unscrupulous copyists or independent developers"
-
This phenomenon partly explains my skepticism of efforts to equate an apparent lack of allegations of copying with the existence of truly independent creation. See, e.g., Christopher A. Cotropia & Mark A. Lemley, Copying in Patent Law, 87 N. C. L. REV. 1421, 1423 (2009) (viewing the universe of patent infringers as divided into two categories, "unscrupulous copyists or independent developers").
-
(2009)
N. C. L. Rev.
, vol.87
, pp. 1421
-
-
Cotropia, C.A.1
Lemley, M.A.2
-
652
-
-
78649380396
-
-
As the case of i4i Ltd. Partnership v. Microsoft Corp., No. 6:07CV113
-
As the case of i4i Ltd. Partnership v. Microsoft Corp., No. 6:07CV113, 2009 WL 2449024
-
(2009)
WL
, pp. 2449024
-
-
-
653
-
-
78649376755
-
-
E. D. Tex. Aug. 11, 2009, demonstrates, a patent holder might not allege "copying" even when it alleges willful infringement and provides evidence that an accused infringer 1 knew of the patent holder's patent; 2 had "intimate knowledge" of a product made by the patent holder that embodied the patented invention; and 3 had all of this knowledge before developing the infringing product. Compare Motion of i4i Limited Partnership and Infrastructures for Information Inc. for Entry of Judgment on the Jury Verdict and Request for Enhanced Damages and Attorneys' Fees at 2 n. 1, i4i, No. 6:07CV113 stating that "the parties agreed copying was not at issue in the case"
-
(E. D. Tex. Aug. 11, 2009), demonstrates, a patent holder might not allege "copying" even when it alleges willful infringement and provides evidence that an accused infringer (1) knew of the patent holder's patent; (2) had "intimate knowledge" of a product made by the patent holder that embodied the patented invention; and (3) had all of this knowledge before developing the infringing product. Compare Motion of i4i Limited Partnership and Infrastructures for Information Inc. for Entry of Judgment on the Jury Verdict and Request for Enhanced Damages and Attorneys' Fees at 2 n. 1, i4i, 2009 WL 2449024 (No. 6:07CV113) (stating that "the parties agreed [copying] was not at issue in the case")
-
(2009)
WL
, pp. 2449024
-
-
-
654
-
-
78649372487
-
-
with id, "Equipped with... intimate knowledge of i4i's patented product and having been notified of i4i's patent by number, Microsoft developed a product-a product that Microsoft stated would render i4i's product unnecessary and obsolete."
-
with id. at 7 ("Equipped with... intimate knowledge of i4i's patented product and having been notified of i4i's patent by number, Microsoft developed a product-a product that Microsoft stated would render i4i's product unnecessary and obsolete.").
-
-
-
-
655
-
-
78649343198
-
-
*22 observing that "i4i did not present evidence or argue that Microsoft deliberately copied the patented invention"
-
*22 (observing that "i4i did not present evidence (or argue) that Microsoft deliberately copied the patented invention").
-
(2009)
WL
, pp. 2449024
-
-
-
656
-
-
75649124509
-
Commercializing patents
-
forthcoming Jan, manuscript at 109, on file at, observing that "the dominant theories of patent law gloss over this crucial step"
-
Ted Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming Jan. 2010) (manuscript at 109, on file at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1395558) (observing that "the dominant theories of patent law gloss over this crucial step").
-
(2010)
Stan. L. Rev.
, vol.62
-
-
Sichelman, T.1
-
657
-
-
84892690366
-
-
340 U. S. 147 (1950).
-
(1950)
U. S.
, vol.340
, pp. 147
-
-
-
658
-
-
78649340318
-
-
Id
-
Id. at 149.
-
-
-
-
659
-
-
78649364865
-
-
See Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 637 6th Cir
-
See Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 179 F.2d 636, 637 (6th Cir. 1950)
-
(1950)
F.2d
, vol.179
, pp. 636
-
-
-
660
-
-
84892690366
-
-
reporting tests "showing that the stores which use this device have handled 30% more customers, taken in 30% more money than formerly, and thus greatly improved their efficiency", rev'd
-
(reporting tests "show[ing] that the stores which use this device have handled 30% more customers, taken in 30% more money than formerly, and thus greatly improved their efficiency"), rev'd, 340 U. S. 147 (1950).
-
(1950)
U. S.
, vol.340
, pp. 147
-
-
-
661
-
-
78649384907
-
-
Great A. & P. Court appears to have recognized that the most inventive aspect of the development before them was the "good idea" of bringing together various known devices "to save the time of customer and checker.", But the Court discounted this idea for the purpose of assessing patentability, observing that "scores of progressive ideas in business are not patentable."
-
The Great A. & P. Court appears to have recognized that the most inventive aspect of the development before them was the "good idea" of bringing together various known devices "to save the time of customer and checker." 340 U. S. at 153. But the Court discounted this idea for the purpose of assessing patentability, observing that "scores of progressive ideas in business are not patentable."
-
U. S.
, vol.340
, pp. 153
-
-
-
662
-
-
77949823895
-
-
Id. Even without explicitly reconsidering Great A. & P., the Court might revisit that aspect of its Great A. & P. reasoning in Bilski v. Doll
-
Id. Even without explicitly reconsidering Great A. & P., the Court might revisit that aspect of its Great A. & P. reasoning in Bilski v. Doll, 129 S. Ct. 2735 (2009).
-
(2009)
S. Ct
, vol.129
, pp. 2735
-
-
-
663
-
-
78649391908
-
-
narrowness of an independent-user exemption could also help limit a potential negative side effect of such an exemption, the possibility that the exemption's contribution to uncertainty about patent value could complicate processes of licensing and assignment. Compare, supra note 446, "It is much easier to sell a right of absolute exclusion...."
-
The narrowness of an independent-user exemption could also help limit a potential negative side effect of such an exemption, the possibility that the exemption's contribution to uncertainty about patent value could complicate processes of licensing and assignment. Compare Lemley, supra note 446, at 1531 ("It is much easier to sell a right of absolute exclusion....")
-
-
-
Lemley1
-
664
-
-
78649347793
-
-
supra note 57, asserting that "versions of an independent invention defense. would make rights more difficult to define and transfer"
-
and Smith, supra note 57, at 1810-11 (asserting that "versions of an independent invention defense... would make rights more difficult to define and transfer")
-
-
-
Smith1
-
665
-
-
34250221725
-
The angel is in the big picture: A response to lemley
-
with, 1539, "Under current law, sellers of patents already fall far short of being able to guarantee exclusivity."
-
with Samson Vermont, The Angel Is in the Big Picture: A Response to Lemley, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1537, 1539 (2007) ("Under current law, sellers of patents already fall far short of being able to guarantee exclusivity.").
-
(2007)
Mich. L. Rev.
, vol.105
, pp. 1537
-
-
Vermont, S.1
-
666
-
-
84856144772
-
-
See Shum v. Intel Corp., 1277 Fed. Cir, "Conception is the formation in the mind of the inventor, of a definite and permanent idea of the complete and operative invention, as it is hereafter to be applied in practice." internal quotation marks omitted
-
See Shum v. Intel Corp., 499 F.3d 1272, 1277 (Fed. Cir. 2007) ("Conception is the formation in the mind of the inventor, of a definite and permanent idea of the complete and operative invention, as it is hereafter to be applied in practice." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
-
(2007)
F.3d
, vol.499
, pp. 1272
-
-
-
667
-
-
78649376756
-
-
See supra note 445 and accompanying text
-
See supra note 445 and accompanying text.
-
-
-
-
668
-
-
78649379476
-
-
See Mazzari v. Rogan, 1005 Fed. Cir, "To establish an actual reduction to practice, an inventor must prove that he constructed his claimed invention and that it would work for its intended purpose."
-
See Mazzari v. Rogan, 323 F.3d 1000, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ("To establish an actual reduction to practice, an inventor must prove that he constructed his claimed invention and that it would work for its intended purpose.").
-
(2003)
F.3d
, vol.323
, pp. 1000
-
-
-
669
-
-
78649358194
-
-
See supra notes 443-46
-
See supra notes 443-46.
-
-
-
-
670
-
-
78649343773
-
-
See supra notes 358, 381-83
-
See supra notes 358, 381-83.
-
-
-
-
671
-
-
78649383664
-
-
Comments and Discussion, supra note 160, at 821 comments of Richard Gilbert warning against "picoeconomics"
-
Comments and Discussion, supra note 160, at 821 (comments of Richard Gilbert) (warning against "picoeconomics").
-
-
-
-
672
-
-
78649353551
-
-
See, supra note 271, "In many situations, narrow tailoring may optimize a system for present uses but contribute to difficulty in changing the system architecture, including."
-
See Smith, supra note 271, at 2113 ("In many situations, narrow tailoring may optimize a system for present uses but contribute to difficulty in changing the system architecture, including.").
-
-
-
Smith1
-
673
-
-
78649369051
-
-
See supra subpart IV A
-
See supra subpart IV (A).
-
-
-
-
674
-
-
78649360247
-
-
See supra subpart III B
-
See supra subpart III (B).
-
-
-
-
675
-
-
78649368446
-
-
Cf, supra note 129, describing the character "Help" as rescuing the protagonist from the Slough of Despond, "setting him upon sound ground, and bidding him go on his way"
-
Cf. BUNYAN, supra note 129, at 24 (describing the character "Help" as rescuing the protagonist from the Slough of Despond, "set[ting] him upon sound ground, and bid[ding] him go on his way").
-
-
-
Bunyan1
|