-
1
-
-
0034405660
-
The Structure of Licensing Contracts
-
Anand, Bharat N., and Taran Khanna. 2000. "The Structure of Licensing Contracts." Journal of Industrial Economics, 48(1): 103-35.
-
(2000)
Journal of Industrial Economics
, vol.48
, Issue.1
, pp. 103-135
-
-
Anand, B.N.1
Khanna, T.2
-
2
-
-
0038675202
-
Patents, Invalidity, and the Strategic Transmission of Enabling Information
-
Anton, James J., and Dennis A. Yao. 2003. "Patents, Invalidity, and the Strategic Transmission of Enabling Information." Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 12(2): 151-78.
-
(2003)
Journal of Economics and Management Strategy
, vol.12
, Issue.2
, pp. 151-178
-
-
Anton, J.J.1
Yao, D.A.2
-
3
-
-
0033450511
-
Licensing vs. Litigation: The Effect of the Legal System on Incentives to Innovate
-
Aoki, Reiko, and Jin-Li Hu. 1999. "Licensing vs. Litigation: The Effect of the Legal System on Incentives to Innovate." Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 8(1): 133-60.
-
(1999)
Journal of Economics and Management Strategy
, vol.8
, Issue.1
, pp. 133-160
-
-
Aoki, R.1
Hu, J.-L.2
-
4
-
-
84883928807
-
-
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press
-
Bessen, James, and Michael Meurer. 2008. Patent Failure: How Judges, Bureaucrats, and Lawyers Put Innovators at Risk. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
-
(2008)
Patent Failure: How Judges, Bureaucrats, and Lawyers Put Innovators at Risk
-
-
Bessen, J.1
Meurer, M.2
-
5
-
-
85077563618
-
Double-Sided Moral Hazard and the Nature of Share Contracts
-
Bhattacharyya, Sugato, and Francine Lafontaine. 1995. "Double-Sided Moral Hazard and the Nature of Share Contracts." RAND Journal of Economics, 26(4): 761-81.
-
(1995)
RAND Journal of Economics
, vol.26
, Issue.4
, pp. 761-781
-
-
Bhattacharyya, S.1
Lafontaine, F.2
-
6
-
-
53349128101
-
-
Bulow, Jeremy. The Gaming of Pharmaceutical Patents. 2004. In Innovation Policy and the Economy. 4, ed. Adam B. Jaffe, Scott Stern, and Josh Lerner, 145-87. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
-
Bulow, Jeremy. "The Gaming of Pharmaceutical Patents." 2004. In Innovation Policy and the Economy. Vol 4, ed. Adam B. Jaffe, Scott Stern, and Josh Lerner, 145-87. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
-
-
-
-
7
-
-
41749102675
-
The Rules of Standard-Setting Organizations: An Empirical Analysis
-
Chiao, Benjamin, Josh Lerner, and Jean Tirole. 2007. "The Rules of Standard-Setting Organizations: An Empirical Analysis." RAND Journal of Economics, 38(4): 905-30.
-
(2007)
RAND Journal of Economics
, vol.38
, Issue.4
, pp. 905-930
-
-
Chiao, B.1
Lerner, J.2
Tirole, J.3
-
8
-
-
0009938449
-
Patent Litigation as an Information-Transmission Mechanism
-
Choi, Jay Pil. 1998. "Patent Litigation as an Information-Transmission Mechanism." American Economic Review, 88(5): 1249-63.
-
(1998)
American Economic Review
, vol.88
, Issue.5
, pp. 1249-1263
-
-
Choi, J.P.1
-
9
-
-
53349157216
-
Patent Pools and Cross Licensing in the Shadow of
-
Patent Litigation. http://www.msu.edu/%7Echoijay/ Patent%20Pools-Choi.pdf
-
Choi, Jay Pil. 2002. "Patent Pools and Cross Licensing in the Shadow of Patent Litigation." http://www.msu.edu/%7Echoijay/ Patent%20Pools-Choi.pdf.
-
(2002)
-
-
Choi, J.P.1
-
10
-
-
77957311568
-
Live and Let Live: A Tale of Weak Patents
-
Choi, Jay Pil. 2005. "Live and Let Live: A Tale of Weak Patents." Journal of the European Economic Association, 3(2-3): 724-33.
-
(2005)
Journal of the European Economic Association
, vol.3
, Issue.2-3
, pp. 724-733
-
-
Choi, J.P.1
-
11
-
-
34547810233
-
Incentive to Challenge and Defend
-
Patents: Why Litigation Won't Reliably Fix Patent Office Errors and Why Administrative Patent Review Might Help. Berkeley Technology Law Journal, 192, 943-70
-
Farrell, Joseph, and Robert Merges. 2004. "Incentive to Challenge and Defend Patents: Why Litigation Won't Reliably Fix Patent Office Errors and Why Administrative Patent Review Might Help." Berkeley Technology Law Journal, 19(2): 943-70.
-
(2004)
-
-
Farrell, J.1
Merges, R.2
-
12
-
-
0000145649
-
Asset Ownership and Market Structure in Oligopoly
-
Farrell, Joseph, and Carl Shapiro. 1990. "Asset Ownership and Market Structure in Oligopoly." RAND Journal of Economics, 21(2): 275-92.
-
(1990)
RAND Journal of Economics
, vol.21
, Issue.2
, pp. 275-292
-
-
Farrell, J.1
Shapiro, C.2
-
16
-
-
0038159320
-
Anticompetitive Settlement of Intellectual Property Disputes
-
Hovenkamp, Herbert, Mark D. Janis, and Mark A. Lemley. 2003. "Anticompetitive Settlement of Intellectual Property Disputes." Minnesota Law Review, 87(6): 1719-66.
-
(2003)
Minnesota Law Review
, vol.87
, Issue.6
, pp. 1719-1766
-
-
Hovenkamp, H.1
Janis, M.D.2
Lemley, M.A.3
-
17
-
-
84925010240
-
-
Jaffe, Adam B, and Josh Lerner. 2004. Innovation and Its Discontents: How Our Broken Patent System Is Endangering Innovation and Progress, and What to Do About It. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press
-
Jaffe, Adam B., and Josh Lerner. 2004. Innovation and Its Discontents: How Our Broken Patent System Is Endangering Innovation and Progress, and What to Do About It. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
-
-
-
-
18
-
-
70350099474
-
Patent Licensing
-
ed. Robert J. Aumann and Sergiu Hart, Amsterdam: North-Holland
-
Kamien, Morton. 1992. "Patent Licensing." In Handbook of Game Theory and Economic Applications, ed. Robert J. Aumann and Sergiu Hart, 331-54. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
-
(1992)
Handbook of Game Theory and Economic Applications
, pp. 331-354
-
-
Kamien, M.1
-
19
-
-
75149163147
-
How to License Intangible Property
-
Katz, Michael L., and Carl Shapiro. 1986. "How to License Intangible Property." Quarterly Journal of Economics, 101(3): 567-89.
-
(1986)
Quarterly Journal of Economics
, vol.101
, Issue.3
, pp. 567-589
-
-
Katz, M.L.1
Shapiro, C.2
-
20
-
-
53349099764
-
-
Kesan, Jay P., and Gwendolyn G. Ball. 2006. How Are Patent Cases Resolved? An Empirical Analysis of the Adjudication and Settlement of Patent Disputes. Washington University Law Review, 84:237-312.
-
Kesan, Jay P., and Gwendolyn G. Ball. 2006. "How Are Patent Cases Resolved? An Empirical Analysis of the Adjudication and Settlement of Patent Disputes." Washington University Law Review, 84:237-312.
-
-
-
-
21
-
-
33847180786
-
Rational Ignorance at the
-
Patent Office. Northwestern University Law Review, 954, 1497-1532
-
Lemley, Mark. 2001. "Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office." Northwestern University Law Review, 95(4): 1497-1532.
-
(2001)
-
-
Lemley, M.1
-
23
-
-
20444497933
-
Subsidy in Licensing: Optimality and Welfare Implications
-
Liao, Chun-Hsiung, and Debapriya Sen. 2005. "Subsidy in Licensing: Optimality and Welfare Implications." Manchester School, 73(3): 281-99.
-
(2005)
Manchester School
, vol.73
, Issue.3
, pp. 281-299
-
-
Liao, C.-H.1
Sen, D.2
-
24
-
-
0001739788
-
Opportunism in Multilateral Vertical Contracting: Nondiscrimination, Exclusivity, and Uniformity
-
McAfee, R. Preston, and Marius Schwartz. 1994. "Opportunism in Multilateral Vertical Contracting: Nondiscrimination, Exclusivity, and Uniformity." American Economic Review, 84(1): 210-30.
-
(1994)
American Economic Review
, vol.84
, Issue.1
, pp. 210-230
-
-
McAfee, R.P.1
Schwartz, M.2
-
26
-
-
38049135204
-
The Settlement of
-
Patent Litigation. RAND Journal of Economics, 201, 77-91
-
Meurer, Michael J. 1989. "The Settlement of Patent Litigation." RAND Journal of Economics, 20(1): 77-91.
-
(1989)
-
-
Meurer, M.J.1
-
27
-
-
15744401532
-
Building a Better Bounty: Litigation-Stage Rewards for Defeating Patents
-
Miller, Joseph Scott. 2004. "Building a Better Bounty: Litigation-Stage Rewards for Defeating Patents." Berkeley Technology Law Journal, 19(2): 667-739.
-
(2004)
Berkeley Technology Law Journal
, vol.19
, Issue.2
, pp. 667-739
-
-
Miller, J.S.1
-
28
-
-
0346607100
-
-
Moore, Kimberly A. 2000. Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases: An Empirical Peek inside the Black Box. Michigan Law Review, 99(2): 365-409.
-
Moore, Kimberly A. 2000. "Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases: An Empirical Peek inside the Black Box." Michigan Law Review, 99(2): 365-409.
-
-
-
-
29
-
-
3142698913
-
-
National Academies of Science
-
National Academies of Science. 2004. A Patent System for the 21st Century, http://www.nap.edu/books/0309089107/html.
-
(2004)
A Patent System for the 21st Century
-
-
-
30
-
-
17044363611
-
Bilateral Control with Vertical Contracts
-
Rey, Patrick, and Thibaud Vergé. 2004. "Bilateral Control with Vertical Contracts." RAND Journal of Economics, 35(4): 728-46.
-
(2004)
RAND Journal of Economics
, vol.35
, Issue.4
, pp. 728-746
-
-
Rey, P.1
Vergé, T.2
-
31
-
-
0040003931
-
Contracting with Externalities
-
Segal, Ilya. 1999. "Contracting with Externalities." Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114(2): 337-88.
-
(1999)
Quarterly Journal of Economics
, vol.114
, Issue.2
, pp. 337-388
-
-
Segal, I.1
-
32
-
-
33947599098
-
General Licensing Schemes for a Cost-Reducing Innovation
-
Sen, Debapriya, and Yair Tauman. 2007. "General Licensing Schemes for a Cost-Reducing Innovation." Games and Economic Behavior, 59(1): 163-86.
-
(2007)
Games and Economic Behavior
, vol.59
, Issue.1
, pp. 163-186
-
-
Sen, D.1
Tauman, Y.2
-
33
-
-
0043246455
-
Antitrust Limits to
-
Patent Settlements. RAND Journal of Economics, 342, 391-411
-
Shapiro, Carl. 2003. "Antitrust Limits to Patent Settlements." RAND Journal of Economics, 34(2): 391-411.
-
(2003)
-
-
Shapiro, C.1
-
34
-
-
53349174079
-
-
Shapiro, Carl. 2006. Injunctions, Hold-Up, and Patent Royalties. http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/shap-iro/royalties.pdf.
-
Shapiro, Carl. 2006. "Injunctions, Hold-Up, and Patent Royalties." http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/shap-iro/royalties.pdf.
-
-
-
-
36
-
-
0001365641
-
The Economics of Product Patents
-
Waterson, Michael. 1990. "The Economics of Product Patents." American Economic Review, 80(4): 860-69.
-
(1990)
American Economic Review
, vol.80
, Issue.4
, pp. 860-869
-
-
Waterson, M.1
-
37
-
-
85071386618
-
Antitrust Policy toward Agreements That Settle
-
Patent Litigation. Antitrust Bulletin, 493, 655-98
-
Willig, Robert D., and John P. Bigelow. 2004. "Antitrust Policy toward Agreements That Settle Patent Litigation." Antitrust Bulletin, 49(3): 655-98.
-
(2004)
-
-
Willig, R.D.1
Bigelow, J.P.2
|