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Volumn 98, Issue 4, 2008, Pages 1347-1369

How strong are weak patents?

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EID: 53349089999     PISSN: 00028282     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1257/aer.98.4.1347     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (177)

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* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.