Firm reputation with hidden information

Economic Theory

Volumn 21, Issue 2-3, 2003, Pages 635-651

  Tadelis, Steven ^a  

^a STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Overlapping generations; Reputation as an asset; Trade of names

Indexed keywords

EID: 0038305726     PISSN: 09382259     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-002-0257-z     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (9)

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2. Aoyagi, M.: Reputation and entry deterrence under short-run ownership of a firm. Journal of Economic Theory 69, 411-430 (1996)
3. Fudenberg, D., Tirole, J.: Game theory. Cambridge: MIT Press 1991
4. Judd, K.: The law of large numbers with a continuum of iid random variables. Journal of Economic Theory 27, 245-252 (1985)
5. Kreps, D.: Corporate culture and economic theory. In: Alt, J., Shepsle, K. (eds.) Perspectives on positive political economy, pp. 90-143 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1990
6. Mailath, G., Samuelson, L.: Who wants a good reputation? Review of Economic Studies 68, 415-41 (2001)
7. Phelan, C.: Public trust and government betrayals. Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Research Department Staff Report 283 (2001)
8. Tadelis, S.: What's in a name? Reputation as a tradeable asset. American Economic Review 89, 548-63 (1999)
9. Tadelis, S.: The market for reputations as an incentive mechanism. Journal of Political Economy (forthcoming) (2002)