Centralization versus decentralization as a risk-return trade-off

Journal of Law and Economics

Volumn 53, Issue 2, 2010, Pages 359-378

  Arcuri, Alessandra ^a   Dari Mattiacci, Giuseppe ^b  

^a ERASMUS UNIVERSITY ROTTERDAM   (Netherlands)

^b UNIVERSITY OF AMSTERDAM   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 77956017663     PISSN: 00222186     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/599623     Document Type: Article

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