Regulatory co-opetition

Journal of International Economic Law

Volumn 3, Issue 2, 2000, Pages 235-255

  Esty, Daniel C ^a   Geradin, Damien ^b  

^a YALE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF LIÈGE   (Belgium)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0034379971     PISSN: 13693034     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/jiel/3.2.235     Document Type: Article

References (107)

1. See Richard B. Steward 'Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating State Implementation of National Environmental Policy', 86 Yale LJ 1196 (1977).
2. See Alan Dashwood, 'Hastening Slowly: The Communities' Path Towards Harmonization' in Helen Wallace, William Wallace, and Carole Webb (eds), Policy-Making in the European Communities 273 (1977).
3. See Damien Geradin, 'Trade and Environmental Protection in the Context of World Trade Rules: A View from the European Union', Eur Foreign Affairs Rev 33 (1997).
4. See Roberta Romano, 'Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle', 1 J L Econ & Organization 225 (1985) [hereinafter Romano, 'Law as a Product']; Wallace B. Oates and Robert M. Schwab, 'Economic Competition Among Jurisdictions: Efficiency Enhancing or Distortion Inducing', 35 J Pub Econ 333 (1988); Richard L. Revesz, 'Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the "Race to the Bottom" Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation', 67 NYU L Rev 1210 (1992) [hereinafter Revesz, 'Rehabilitating'].
5. See Roberta Romano, 'Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle', 1 J L Econ & Organization 225 (1985) [hereinafter Romano, 'Law as a Product']; Wallace B. Oates and Robert M. Schwab, 'Economic Competition Among Jurisdictions: Efficiency Enhancing or Distortion Inducing', 35 J Pub Econ 333 (1988); Richard L. Revesz, 'Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the "Race to the Bottom" Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation', 67 NYU L Rev 1210 (1992) [hereinafter Revesz, 'Rehabilitating'].
6. See Roberta Romano, 'Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle', 1 J L Econ & Organization 225 (1985) [hereinafter Romano, 'Law as a Product']; Wallace B. Oates and Robert M. Schwab, 'Economic Competition Among Jurisdictions: Efficiency Enhancing or Distortion Inducing', 35 J Pub Econ 333 (1988); Richard L. Revesz, 'Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the "Race to the Bottom" Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation', 67 NYU L Rev 1210 (1992) [hereinafter Revesz, 'Rehabilitating'].
7. The regulatory competition model has had a major impact on the federalism debate in the United States. The regulatory competition-based argument for decentralized governance has been applied by its proponents to regulatory areas as diverse as corporation, securities, antitrust, banking, environmental, and product safety law. See Ralph K. Winter, 'State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation', 6 J Legal Stud 25 (1977) (corporation); Romano, 'Law as a Product', above n 4 (corporation); Roberta Romano, 'Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation', 107 Yale LJ 2359 (1998) (securities); Frank H. Easterbrook, 'Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism', 26 J L & Econ 23 (1983) [hereinafter Easterbrook, 'Antitrust'] (antitrust); Henry N. Butler and Jonathan R. Macey, 'The Myth of Competition in the Dual Banking System', 73 Cornell L Rev 677 (1988) [hereinafter Butler and Macey, 'The Myth'] (banking); Revesz, 'Rehabilitating', above n 4 (environmental); David A. Rice, 'Product Quality Laws and the Economics of Federalism', 65 BU L Rev 1 (1985) (product safety). The regulatory competition model has also crossed the Atlantic and become a source of reference for those searching to define the scope of the obscure principle of 'subsidiarity'. See Roger Van den Bergh, 'The Subsidiarity Principle in European Economic Law: Some Insights from Law and Economics', 1 Maastricht J Eur & Comp L 337 (1994) [hereinafter Van den Bergh, 'Subsidiarity']; Michael Faure, 'Harmonisation of Environmental Law and Market Integration: Harmonising for the Wrong Reasons?', 6 Eur Env L Rev 169 (1998); Gerard Hertig, 'Imperfect Mutual Recognition for EC Financial Services', 14 Int'l Rev L & Econ 177 (1994). EU-based regulatory competition theorists argue that, contrary to the ambitious policy of regulatory harmonization that has been pursued for several decades by the European Commission, decentralized regulation should be the rule and centralization the exception. Regulatory competition theory has begun to penetrate academic discussions in the area of international law, as authors use this model to praise the virtues of regulatory heterogeneity in areas such as environmental law and international finance. See Joel P. Trachtman, 'International Regulatory Competition, Externalization and Jurisdiction', 34 Harv Int'l LJ 47 (1993) (international law); Alvin K. Klevorick, 'The Race to the Bottom in a Federal System: Lessons from the World of Trade Policy', 14 Yale L & Policy Rev 177 (1996) [hereinafter Klevorick, 'Lessons'] (environmental law); Steven J. Choi and Andrew T. Guzman, 'National Laws, International Money: Regulation in a Global Capital Market', 65 Fordham L Rev 1855 (1997) (international finance); Christopher B. Bernard, 'Towards an International Market in Mutual Funds', 36 Va J Int'l L 467 (1996) (international finance).
8. The regulatory competition model has had a major impact on the federalism debate in the United States. The regulatory competition-based argument for decentralized governance has been applied by its proponents to regulatory areas as diverse as corporation, securities, antitrust, banking, environmental, and product safety law. See Ralph K. Winter, 'State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation', 6 J Legal Stud 25 (1977) (corporation); Romano, 'Law as a Product', above n 4 (corporation); Roberta Romano, 'Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation', 107 Yale LJ 2359 (1998) (securities); Frank H. Easterbrook, 'Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism', 26 J L & Econ 23 (1983) [hereinafter Easterbrook, 'Antitrust'] (antitrust); Henry N. Butler and Jonathan R. Macey, 'The Myth of Competition in the Dual Banking System', 73 Cornell L Rev 677 (1988) [hereinafter Butler and Macey, 'The Myth'] (banking); Revesz, 'Rehabilitating', above n 4 (environmental); David A. Rice, 'Product Quality Laws and the Economics of Federalism', 65 BU L Rev 1 (1985) (product safety). The regulatory competition model has also crossed the Atlantic and become a source of reference for those searching to define the scope of the obscure principle of 'subsidiarity'. See Roger Van den Bergh, 'The Subsidiarity Principle in European Economic Law: Some Insights from Law and Economics', 1 Maastricht J Eur & Comp L 337 (1994) [hereinafter Van den Bergh, 'Subsidiarity']; Michael Faure, 'Harmonisation of Environmental Law and Market Integration: Harmonising for the Wrong Reasons?', 6 Eur Env L Rev 169 (1998); Gerard Hertig, 'Imperfect Mutual Recognition for EC Financial Services', 14 Int'l Rev L & Econ 177 (1994). EU-based regulatory competition theorists argue that, contrary to the ambitious policy of regulatory harmonization that has been pursued for several decades by the European Commission, decentralized regulation should be the rule and centralization the exception. Regulatory competition theory has begun to penetrate academic discussions in the area of international law, as authors use this model to praise the virtues of regulatory heterogeneity in areas such as environmental law and international finance. See Joel P. Trachtman, 'International Regulatory Competition, Externalization and Jurisdiction', 34 Harv Int'l LJ 47 (1993) (international law); Alvin K. Klevorick, 'The Race to the Bottom in a Federal System: Lessons from the World of Trade Policy', 14 Yale L & Policy Rev 177 (1996) [hereinafter Klevorick, 'Lessons'] (environmental law); Steven J. Choi and Andrew T. Guzman, 'National Laws, International Money: Regulation in a Global Capital Market', 65 Fordham L Rev 1855 (1997) (international finance); Christopher B. Bernard, 'Towards an International Market in Mutual Funds', 36 Va J Int'l L 467 (1996) (international finance).
9. The regulatory competition model has had a major impact on the federalism debate in the United States. The regulatory competition-based argument for decentralized governance has been applied by its proponents to regulatory areas as diverse as corporation, securities, antitrust, banking, environmental, and product safety law. See Ralph K. Winter, 'State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation', 6 J Legal Stud 25 (1977) (corporation); Romano, 'Law as a Product', above n 4 (corporation); Roberta Romano, 'Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation', 107 Yale LJ 2359 (1998) (securities); Frank H. Easterbrook, 'Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism', 26 J L & Econ 23 (1983) [hereinafter Easterbrook, 'Antitrust'] (antitrust); Henry N. Butler and Jonathan R. Macey, 'The Myth of Competition in the Dual Banking System', 73 Cornell L Rev 677 (1988) [hereinafter Butler and Macey, 'The Myth'] (banking); Revesz, 'Rehabilitating', above n 4 (environmental); David A. Rice, 'Product Quality Laws and the Economics of Federalism', 65 BU L Rev 1 (1985) (product safety). The regulatory competition model has also crossed the Atlantic and become a source of reference for those searching to define the scope of the obscure principle of 'subsidiarity'. See Roger Van den Bergh, 'The Subsidiarity Principle in European Economic Law: Some Insights from Law and Economics', 1 Maastricht J Eur & Comp L 337 (1994) [hereinafter Van den Bergh, 'Subsidiarity']; Michael Faure, 'Harmonisation of Environmental Law and Market Integration: Harmonising for the Wrong Reasons?', 6 Eur Env L Rev 169 (1998); Gerard Hertig, 'Imperfect Mutual Recognition for EC Financial Services', 14 Int'l Rev L & Econ 177 (1994). EU-based regulatory competition theorists argue that, contrary to the ambitious policy of regulatory harmonization that has been pursued for several decades by the European Commission, decentralized regulation should be the rule and centralization the exception. Regulatory competition theory has begun to penetrate academic discussions in the area of international law, as authors use this model to praise the virtues of regulatory heterogeneity in areas such as environmental law and international finance. See Joel P. Trachtman, 'International Regulatory Competition, Externalization and Jurisdiction', 34 Harv Int'l LJ 47 (1993) (international law); Alvin K. Klevorick, 'The Race to the Bottom in a Federal System: Lessons from the World of Trade Policy', 14 Yale L & Policy Rev 177 (1996) [hereinafter Klevorick, 'Lessons'] (environmental law); Steven J. Choi and Andrew T. Guzman, 'National Laws, International Money: Regulation in a Global Capital Market', 65 Fordham L Rev 1855 (1997) (international finance); Christopher B. Bernard, 'Towards an International Market in Mutual Funds', 36 Va J Int'l L 467 (1996) (international finance).
10. The regulatory competition model has had a major impact on the federalism debate in the United States. The regulatory competition-based argument for decentralized governance has been applied by its proponents to regulatory areas as diverse as corporation, securities, antitrust, banking, environmental, and product safety law. See Ralph K. Winter, 'State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation', 6 J Legal Stud 25 (1977) (corporation); Romano, 'Law as a Product', above n 4 (corporation); Roberta Romano, 'Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation', 107 Yale LJ 2359 (1998) (securities); Frank H. Easterbrook, 'Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism', 26 J L & Econ 23 (1983) [hereinafter Easterbrook, 'Antitrust'] (antitrust); Henry N. Butler and Jonathan R. Macey, 'The Myth of Competition in the Dual Banking System', 73 Cornell L Rev 677 (1988) [hereinafter Butler and Macey, 'The Myth'] (banking); Revesz, 'Rehabilitating', above n 4 (environmental); David A. Rice, 'Product Quality Laws and the Economics of Federalism', 65 BU L Rev 1 (1985) (product safety). The regulatory competition model has also crossed the Atlantic and become a source of reference for those searching to define the scope of the obscure principle of 'subsidiarity'. See Roger Van den Bergh, 'The Subsidiarity Principle in European Economic Law: Some Insights from Law and Economics', 1 Maastricht J Eur & Comp L 337 (1994) [hereinafter Van den Bergh, 'Subsidiarity']; Michael Faure, 'Harmonisation of Environmental Law and Market Integration: Harmonising for the Wrong Reasons?', 6 Eur Env L Rev 169 (1998); Gerard Hertig, 'Imperfect Mutual Recognition for EC Financial Services', 14 Int'l Rev L & Econ 177 (1994). EU-based regulatory competition theorists argue that, contrary to the ambitious policy of regulatory harmonization that has been pursued for several decades by the European Commission, decentralized regulation should be the rule and centralization the exception. Regulatory competition theory has begun to penetrate academic discussions in the area of international law, as authors use this model to praise the virtues of regulatory heterogeneity in areas such as environmental law and international finance. See Joel P. Trachtman, 'International Regulatory Competition, Externalization and Jurisdiction', 34 Harv Int'l LJ 47 (1993) (international law); Alvin K. Klevorick, 'The Race to the Bottom in a Federal System: Lessons from the World of Trade Policy', 14 Yale L & Policy Rev 177 (1996) [hereinafter Klevorick, 'Lessons'] (environmental law); Steven J. Choi and Andrew T. Guzman, 'National Laws, International Money: Regulation in a Global Capital Market', 65 Fordham L Rev 1855 (1997) (international finance); Christopher B. Bernard, 'Towards an International Market in Mutual Funds', 36 Va J Int'l L 467 (1996) (international finance).
11. The regulatory competition model has had a major impact on the federalism debate in the United States. The regulatory competition-based argument for decentralized governance has been applied by its proponents to regulatory areas as diverse as corporation, securities, antitrust, banking, environmental, and product safety law. See Ralph K. Winter, 'State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation', 6 J Legal Stud 25 (1977) (corporation); Romano, 'Law as a Product', above n 4 (corporation); Roberta Romano, 'Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation', 107 Yale LJ 2359 (1998) (securities); Frank H. Easterbrook, 'Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism', 26 J L & Econ 23 (1983) [hereinafter Easterbrook, 'Antitrust'] (antitrust); Henry N. Butler and Jonathan R. Macey, 'The Myth of Competition in the Dual Banking System', 73 Cornell L Rev 677 (1988) [hereinafter Butler and Macey, 'The Myth'] (banking); Revesz, 'Rehabilitating', above n 4 (environmental); David A. Rice, 'Product Quality Laws and the Economics of Federalism', 65 BU L Rev 1 (1985) (product safety). The regulatory competition model has also crossed the Atlantic and become a source of reference for those searching to define the scope of the obscure principle of 'subsidiarity'. See Roger Van den Bergh, 'The Subsidiarity Principle in European Economic Law: Some Insights from Law and Economics', 1 Maastricht J Eur & Comp L 337 (1994) [hereinafter Van den Bergh, 'Subsidiarity']; Michael Faure, 'Harmonisation of Environmental Law and Market Integration: Harmonising for the Wrong Reasons?', 6 Eur Env L Rev 169 (1998); Gerard Hertig, 'Imperfect Mutual Recognition for EC Financial Services', 14 Int'l Rev L & Econ 177 (1994). EU-based regulatory competition theorists argue that, contrary to the ambitious policy of regulatory harmonization that has been pursued for several decades by the European Commission, decentralized regulation should be the rule and centralization the exception. Regulatory competition theory has begun to penetrate academic discussions in the area of international law, as authors use this model to praise the virtues of regulatory heterogeneity in areas such as environmental law and international finance. See Joel P. Trachtman, 'International Regulatory Competition, Externalization and Jurisdiction', 34 Harv Int'l LJ 47 (1993) (international law); Alvin K. Klevorick, 'The Race to the Bottom in a Federal System: Lessons from the World of Trade Policy', 14 Yale L & Policy Rev 177 (1996) [hereinafter Klevorick, 'Lessons'] (environmental law); Steven J. Choi and Andrew T. Guzman, 'National Laws, International Money: Regulation in a Global Capital Market', 65 Fordham L Rev 1855 (1997) (international finance); Christopher B. Bernard, 'Towards an International Market in Mutual Funds', 36 Va J Int'l L 467 (1996) (international finance).
12. The regulatory competition model has had a major impact on the federalism debate in the United States. The regulatory competition-based argument for decentralized governance has been applied by its proponents to regulatory areas as diverse as corporation, securities, antitrust, banking, environmental, and product safety law. See Ralph K. Winter, 'State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation', 6 J Legal Stud 25 (1977) (corporation); Romano, 'Law as a Product', above n 4 (corporation); Roberta Romano, 'Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation', 107 Yale LJ 2359 (1998) (securities); Frank H. Easterbrook, 'Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism', 26 J L & Econ 23 (1983) [hereinafter Easterbrook, 'Antitrust'] (antitrust); Henry N. Butler and Jonathan R. Macey, 'The Myth of Competition in the Dual Banking System', 73 Cornell L Rev 677 (1988) [hereinafter Butler and Macey, 'The Myth'] (banking); Revesz, 'Rehabilitating', above n 4 (environmental); David A. Rice, 'Product Quality Laws and the Economics of Federalism', 65 BU L Rev 1 (1985) (product safety). The regulatory competition model has also crossed the Atlantic and become a source of reference for those searching to define the scope of the obscure principle of 'subsidiarity'. See Roger Van den Bergh, 'The Subsidiarity Principle in European Economic Law: Some Insights from Law and Economics', 1 Maastricht J Eur & Comp L 337 (1994) [hereinafter Van den Bergh, 'Subsidiarity']; Michael Faure, 'Harmonisation of Environmental Law and Market Integration: Harmonising for the Wrong Reasons?', 6 Eur Env L Rev 169 (1998); Gerard Hertig, 'Imperfect Mutual Recognition for EC Financial Services', 14 Int'l Rev L & Econ 177 (1994). EU-based regulatory competition theorists argue that, contrary to the ambitious policy of regulatory harmonization that has been pursued for several decades by the European Commission, decentralized regulation should be the rule and centralization the exception. Regulatory competition theory has begun to penetrate academic discussions in the area of international law, as authors use this model to praise the virtues of regulatory heterogeneity in areas such as environmental law and international finance. See Joel P. Trachtman, 'International Regulatory Competition, Externalization and Jurisdiction', 34 Harv Int'l LJ 47 (1993) (international law); Alvin K. Klevorick, 'The Race to the Bottom in a Federal System: Lessons from the World of Trade Policy', 14 Yale L & Policy Rev 177 (1996) [hereinafter Klevorick, 'Lessons'] (environmental law); Steven J. Choi and Andrew T. Guzman, 'National Laws, International Money: Regulation in a Global Capital Market', 65 Fordham L Rev 1855 (1997) (international finance); Christopher B. Bernard, 'Towards an International Market in Mutual Funds', 36 Va J Int'l L 467 (1996) (international finance).
13. The regulatory competition model has had a major impact on the federalism debate in the United States. The regulatory competition-based argument for decentralized governance has been applied by its proponents to regulatory areas as diverse as corporation, securities, antitrust, banking, environmental, and product safety law. See Ralph K. Winter, 'State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation', 6 J Legal Stud 25 (1977) (corporation); Romano, 'Law as a Product', above n 4 (corporation); Roberta Romano, 'Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation', 107 Yale LJ 2359 (1998) (securities); Frank H. Easterbrook, 'Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism', 26 J L & Econ 23 (1983) [hereinafter Easterbrook, 'Antitrust'] (antitrust); Henry N. Butler and Jonathan R. Macey, 'The Myth of Competition in the Dual Banking System', 73 Cornell L Rev 677 (1988) [hereinafter Butler and Macey, 'The Myth'] (banking); Revesz, 'Rehabilitating', above n 4 (environmental); David A. Rice, 'Product Quality Laws and the Economics of Federalism', 65 BU L Rev 1 (1985) (product safety). The regulatory competition model has also crossed the Atlantic and become a source of reference for those searching to define the scope of the obscure principle of 'subsidiarity'. See Roger Van den Bergh, 'The Subsidiarity Principle in European Economic Law: Some Insights from Law and Economics', 1 Maastricht J Eur & Comp L 337 (1994) [hereinafter Van den Bergh, 'Subsidiarity']; Michael Faure, 'Harmonisation of Environmental Law and Market Integration: Harmonising for the Wrong Reasons?', 6 Eur Env L Rev 169 (1998); Gerard Hertig, 'Imperfect Mutual Recognition for EC Financial Services', 14 Int'l Rev L & Econ 177 (1994). EU-based regulatory competition theorists argue that, contrary to the ambitious policy of regulatory harmonization that has been pursued for several decades by the European Commission, decentralized regulation should be the rule and centralization the exception. Regulatory competition theory has begun to penetrate academic discussions in the area of international law, as authors use this model to praise the virtues of regulatory heterogeneity in areas such as environmental law and international finance. See Joel P. Trachtman, 'International Regulatory Competition, Externalization and Jurisdiction', 34 Harv Int'l LJ 47 (1993) (international law); Alvin K. Klevorick, 'The Race to the Bottom in a Federal System: Lessons from the World of Trade Policy', 14 Yale L & Policy Rev 177 (1996) [hereinafter Klevorick, 'Lessons'] (environmental law); Steven J. Choi and Andrew T. Guzman, 'National Laws, International Money: Regulation in a Global Capital Market', 65 Fordham L Rev 1855 (1997) (international finance); Christopher B. Bernard, 'Towards an International Market in Mutual Funds', 36 Va J Int'l L 467 (1996) (international finance).
14. The regulatory competition model has had a major impact on the federalism debate in the United States. The regulatory competition-based argument for decentralized governance has been applied by its proponents to regulatory areas as diverse as corporation, securities, antitrust, banking, environmental, and product safety law. See Ralph K. Winter, 'State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation', 6 J Legal Stud 25 (1977) (corporation); Romano, 'Law as a Product', above n 4 (corporation); Roberta Romano, 'Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation', 107 Yale LJ 2359 (1998) (securities); Frank H. Easterbrook, 'Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism', 26 J L & Econ 23 (1983) [hereinafter Easterbrook, 'Antitrust'] (antitrust); Henry N. Butler and Jonathan R. Macey, 'The Myth of Competition in the Dual Banking System', 73 Cornell L Rev 677 (1988) [hereinafter Butler and Macey, 'The Myth'] (banking); Revesz, 'Rehabilitating', above n 4 (environmental); David A. Rice, 'Product Quality Laws and the Economics of Federalism', 65 BU L Rev 1 (1985) (product safety). The regulatory competition model has also crossed the Atlantic and become a source of reference for those searching to define the scope of the obscure principle of 'subsidiarity'. See Roger Van den Bergh, 'The Subsidiarity Principle in European Economic Law: Some Insights from Law and Economics', 1 Maastricht J Eur & Comp L 337 (1994) [hereinafter Van den Bergh, 'Subsidiarity']; Michael Faure, 'Harmonisation of Environmental Law and Market Integration: Harmonising for the Wrong Reasons?', 6 Eur Env L Rev 169 (1998); Gerard Hertig, 'Imperfect Mutual Recognition for EC Financial Services', 14 Int'l Rev L & Econ 177 (1994). EU-based regulatory competition theorists argue that, contrary to the ambitious policy of regulatory harmonization that has been pursued for several decades by the European Commission, decentralized regulation should be the rule and centralization the exception. Regulatory competition theory has begun to penetrate academic discussions in the area of international law, as authors use this model to praise the virtues of regulatory heterogeneity in areas such as environmental law and international finance. See Joel P. Trachtman, 'International Regulatory Competition, Externalization and Jurisdiction', 34 Harv Int'l LJ 47 (1993) (international law); Alvin K. Klevorick, 'The Race to the Bottom in a Federal System: Lessons from the World of Trade Policy', 14 Yale L & Policy Rev 177 (1996) [hereinafter Klevorick, 'Lessons'] (environmental law); Steven J. Choi and Andrew T. Guzman, 'National Laws, International Money: Regulation in a Global Capital Market', 65 Fordham L Rev 1855 (1997) (international finance); Christopher B. Bernard, 'Towards an International Market in Mutual Funds', 36 Va J Int'l L 467 (1996) (international finance).
15. The regulatory competition model has had a major impact on the federalism debate in the United States. The regulatory competition-based argument for decentralized governance has been applied by its proponents to regulatory areas as diverse as corporation, securities, antitrust, banking, environmental, and product safety law. See Ralph K. Winter, 'State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation', 6 J Legal Stud 25 (1977) (corporation); Romano, 'Law as a Product', above n 4 (corporation); Roberta Romano, 'Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation', 107 Yale LJ 2359 (1998) (securities); Frank H. Easterbrook, 'Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism', 26 J L & Econ 23 (1983) [hereinafter Easterbrook, 'Antitrust'] (antitrust); Henry N. Butler and Jonathan R. Macey, 'The Myth of Competition in the Dual Banking System', 73 Cornell L Rev 677 (1988) [hereinafter Butler and Macey, 'The Myth'] (banking); Revesz, 'Rehabilitating', above n 4 (environmental); David A. Rice, 'Product Quality Laws and the Economics of Federalism', 65 BU L Rev 1 (1985) (product safety). The regulatory competition model has also crossed the Atlantic and become a source of reference for those searching to define the scope of the obscure principle of 'subsidiarity'. See Roger Van den Bergh, 'The Subsidiarity Principle in European Economic Law: Some Insights from Law and Economics', 1 Maastricht J Eur & Comp L 337 (1994) [hereinafter Van den Bergh, 'Subsidiarity']; Michael Faure, 'Harmonisation of Environmental Law and Market Integration: Harmonising for the Wrong Reasons?', 6 Eur Env L Rev 169 (1998); Gerard Hertig, 'Imperfect Mutual Recognition for EC Financial Services', 14 Int'l Rev L & Econ 177 (1994). EU-based regulatory competition theorists argue that, contrary to the ambitious policy of regulatory harmonization that has been pursued for several decades by the European Commission, decentralized regulation should be the rule and centralization the exception. Regulatory competition theory has begun to penetrate academic discussions in the area of international law, as authors use this model to praise the virtues of regulatory heterogeneity in areas such as environmental law and international finance. See Joel P. Trachtman, 'International Regulatory Competition, Externalization and Jurisdiction', 34 Harv Int'l LJ 47 (1993) (international law); Alvin K. Klevorick, 'The Race to the Bottom in a Federal System: Lessons from the World of Trade Policy', 14 Yale L & Policy Rev 177 (1996) [hereinafter Klevorick, 'Lessons'] (environmental law); Steven J. Choi and Andrew T. Guzman, 'National Laws, International Money: Regulation in a Global Capital Market', 65 Fordham L Rev 1855 (1997) (international finance); Christopher B. Bernard, 'Towards an International Market in Mutual Funds', 36 Va J Int'l L 467 (1996) (international finance).
16. The regulatory competition model has had a major impact on the federalism debate in the United States. The regulatory competition-based argument for decentralized governance has been applied by its proponents to regulatory areas as diverse as corporation, securities, antitrust, banking, environmental, and product safety law. See Ralph K. Winter, 'State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation', 6 J Legal Stud 25 (1977) (corporation); Romano, 'Law as a Product', above n 4 (corporation); Roberta Romano, 'Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation', 107 Yale LJ 2359 (1998) (securities); Frank H. Easterbrook, 'Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism', 26 J L & Econ 23 (1983) [hereinafter Easterbrook, 'Antitrust'] (antitrust); Henry N. Butler and Jonathan R. Macey, 'The Myth of Competition in the Dual Banking System', 73 Cornell L Rev 677 (1988) [hereinafter Butler and Macey, 'The Myth'] (banking); Revesz, 'Rehabilitating', above n 4 (environmental); David A. Rice, 'Product Quality Laws and the Economics of Federalism', 65 BU L Rev 1 (1985) (product safety). The regulatory competition model has also crossed the Atlantic and become a source of reference for those searching to define the scope of the obscure principle of 'subsidiarity'. See Roger Van den Bergh, 'The Subsidiarity Principle in European Economic Law: Some Insights from Law and Economics', 1 Maastricht J Eur & Comp L 337 (1994) [hereinafter Van den Bergh, 'Subsidiarity']; Michael Faure, 'Harmonisation of Environmental Law and Market Integration: Harmonising for the Wrong Reasons?', 6 Eur Env L Rev 169 (1998); Gerard Hertig, 'Imperfect Mutual Recognition for EC Financial Services', 14 Int'l Rev L & Econ 177 (1994). EU-based regulatory competition theorists argue that, contrary to the ambitious policy of regulatory harmonization that has been pursued for several decades by the European Commission, decentralized regulation should be the rule and centralization the exception. Regulatory competition theory has begun to penetrate academic discussions in the area of international law, as authors use this model to praise the virtues of regulatory heterogeneity in areas such as environmental law and international finance. See Joel P. Trachtman, 'International Regulatory Competition, Externalization and Jurisdiction', 34 Harv Int'l LJ 47 (1993) (international law); Alvin K. Klevorick, 'The Race to the Bottom in a Federal System: Lessons from the World of Trade Policy', 14 Yale L & Policy Rev 177 (1996) [hereinafter Klevorick, 'Lessons'] (environmental law); Steven J. Choi and Andrew T. Guzman, 'National Laws, International Money: Regulation in a Global Capital Market', 65 Fordham L Rev 1855 (1997) (international finance); Christopher B. Bernard, 'Towards an International Market in Mutual Funds', 36 Va J Int'l L 467 (1996) (international finance).
17. The regulatory competition model has had a major impact on the federalism debate in the United States. The regulatory competition-based argument for decentralized governance has been applied by its proponents to regulatory areas as diverse as corporation, securities, antitrust, banking, environmental, and product safety law. See Ralph K. Winter, 'State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation', 6 J Legal Stud 25 (1977) (corporation); Romano, 'Law as a Product', above n 4 (corporation); Roberta Romano, 'Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation', 107 Yale LJ 2359 (1998) (securities); Frank H. Easterbrook, 'Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism', 26 J L & Econ 23 (1983) [hereinafter Easterbrook, 'Antitrust'] (antitrust); Henry N. Butler and Jonathan R. Macey, 'The Myth of Competition in the Dual Banking System', 73 Cornell L Rev 677 (1988) [hereinafter Butler and Macey, 'The Myth'] (banking); Revesz, 'Rehabilitating', above n 4 (environmental); David A. Rice, 'Product Quality Laws and the Economics of Federalism', 65 BU L Rev 1 (1985) (product safety). The regulatory competition model has also crossed the Atlantic and become a source of reference for those searching to define the scope of the obscure principle of 'subsidiarity'. See Roger Van den Bergh, 'The Subsidiarity Principle in European Economic Law: Some Insights from Law and Economics', 1 Maastricht J Eur & Comp L 337 (1994) [hereinafter Van den Bergh, 'Subsidiarity']; Michael Faure, 'Harmonisation of Environmental Law and Market Integration: Harmonising for the Wrong Reasons?', 6 Eur Env L Rev 169 (1998); Gerard Hertig, 'Imperfect Mutual Recognition for EC Financial Services', 14 Int'l Rev L & Econ 177 (1994). EU-based regulatory competition theorists argue that, contrary to the ambitious policy of regulatory harmonization that has been pursued for several decades by the European Commission, decentralized regulation should be the rule and centralization the exception. Regulatory competition theory has begun to penetrate academic discussions in the area of international law, as authors use this model to praise the virtues of regulatory heterogeneity in areas such as environmental law and international finance. See Joel P. Trachtman, 'International Regulatory Competition, Externalization and Jurisdiction', 34 Harv Int'l LJ 47 (1993) (international law); Alvin K. Klevorick, 'The Race to the Bottom in a Federal System: Lessons from the World of Trade Policy', 14 Yale L & Policy Rev 177 (1996) [hereinafter Klevorick, 'Lessons'] (environmental law); Steven J. Choi and Andrew T. Guzman, 'National Laws, International Money: Regulation in a Global Capital Market', 65 Fordham L Rev 1855 (1997) (international finance); Christopher B. Bernard, 'Towards an International Market in Mutual Funds', 36 Va J Int'l L 467 (1996) (international finance).
18. The regulatory competition model has had a major impact on the federalism debate in the United States. The regulatory competition-based argument for decentralized governance has been applied by its proponents to regulatory areas as diverse as corporation, securities, antitrust, banking, environmental, and product safety law. See Ralph K. Winter, 'State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation', 6 J Legal Stud 25 (1977) (corporation); Romano, 'Law as a Product', above n 4 (corporation); Roberta Romano, 'Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation', 107 Yale LJ 2359 (1998) (securities); Frank H. Easterbrook, 'Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism', 26 J L & Econ 23 (1983) [hereinafter Easterbrook, 'Antitrust'] (antitrust); Henry N. Butler and Jonathan R. Macey, 'The Myth of Competition in the Dual Banking System', 73 Cornell L Rev 677 (1988) [hereinafter Butler and Macey, 'The Myth'] (banking); Revesz, 'Rehabilitating', above n 4 (environmental); David A. Rice, 'Product Quality Laws and the Economics of Federalism', 65 BU L Rev 1 (1985) (product safety). The regulatory competition model has also crossed the Atlantic and become a source of reference for those searching to define the scope of the obscure principle of 'subsidiarity'. See Roger Van den Bergh, 'The Subsidiarity Principle in European Economic Law: Some Insights from Law and Economics', 1 Maastricht J Eur & Comp L 337 (1994) [hereinafter Van den Bergh, 'Subsidiarity']; Michael Faure, 'Harmonisation of Environmental Law and Market Integration: Harmonising for the Wrong Reasons?', 6 Eur Env L Rev 169 (1998); Gerard Hertig, 'Imperfect Mutual Recognition for EC Financial Services', 14 Int'l Rev L & Econ 177 (1994). EU-based regulatory competition theorists argue that, contrary to the ambitious policy of regulatory harmonization that has been pursued for several decades by the European Commission, decentralized regulation should be the rule and centralization the exception. Regulatory competition theory has begun to penetrate academic discussions in the area of international law, as authors use this model to praise the virtues of regulatory heterogeneity in areas such as environmental law and international finance. See Joel P. Trachtman, 'International Regulatory Competition, Externalization and Jurisdiction', 34 Harv Int'l LJ 47 (1993) (international law); Alvin K. Klevorick, 'The Race to the Bottom in a Federal System: Lessons from the World of Trade Policy', 14 Yale L & Policy Rev 177 (1996) [hereinafter Klevorick, 'Lessons'] (environmental law); Steven J. Choi and Andrew T. Guzman, 'National Laws, International Money: Regulation in a Global Capital Market', 65 Fordham L Rev 1855 (1997) (international finance); Christopher B. Bernard, 'Towards an International Market in Mutual Funds', 36 Va J Int'l L 467 (1996) (international finance).
19. The regulatory competition model has had a major impact on the federalism debate in the United States. The regulatory competition-based argument for decentralized governance has been applied by its proponents to regulatory areas as diverse as corporation, securities, antitrust, banking, environmental, and product safety law. See Ralph K. Winter, 'State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation', 6 J Legal Stud 25 (1977) (corporation); Romano, 'Law as a Product', above n 4 (corporation); Roberta Romano, 'Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation', 107 Yale LJ 2359 (1998) (securities); Frank H. Easterbrook, 'Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism', 26 J L & Econ 23 (1983) [hereinafter Easterbrook, 'Antitrust'] (antitrust); Henry N. Butler and Jonathan R. Macey, 'The Myth of Competition in the Dual Banking System', 73 Cornell L Rev 677 (1988) [hereinafter Butler and Macey, 'The Myth'] (banking); Revesz, 'Rehabilitating', above n 4 (environmental); David A. Rice, 'Product Quality Laws and the Economics of Federalism', 65 BU L Rev 1 (1985) (product safety). The regulatory competition model has also crossed the Atlantic and become a source of reference for those searching to define the scope of the obscure principle of 'subsidiarity'. See Roger Van den Bergh, 'The Subsidiarity Principle in European Economic Law: Some Insights from Law and Economics', 1 Maastricht J Eur & Comp L 337 (1994) [hereinafter Van den Bergh, 'Subsidiarity']; Michael Faure, 'Harmonisation of Environmental Law and Market Integration: Harmonising for the Wrong Reasons?', 6 Eur Env L Rev 169 (1998); Gerard Hertig, 'Imperfect Mutual Recognition for EC Financial Services', 14 Int'l Rev L & Econ 177 (1994). EU-based regulatory competition theorists argue that, contrary to the ambitious policy of regulatory harmonization that has been pursued for several decades by the European Commission, decentralized regulation should be the rule and centralization the exception. Regulatory competition theory has begun to penetrate academic discussions in the area of international law, as authors use this model to praise the virtues of regulatory heterogeneity in areas such as environmental law and international finance. See Joel P. Trachtman, 'International Regulatory Competition, Externalization and Jurisdiction', 34 Harv Int'l LJ 47 (1993) (international law); Alvin K. Klevorick, 'The Race to the Bottom in a Federal System: Lessons from the World of Trade Policy', 14 Yale L & Policy Rev 177 (1996) [hereinafter Klevorick, 'Lessons'] (environmental law); Steven J. Choi and Andrew T. Guzman, 'National Laws, International Money: Regulation in a Global Capital Market', 65 Fordham L Rev 1855 (1997) (international finance); Christopher B. Bernard, 'Towards an International Market in Mutual Funds', 36 Va J Int'l L 467 (1996) (international finance).
20. The regulatory competition model has had a major impact on the federalism debate in the United States. The regulatory competition-based argument for decentralized governance has been applied by its proponents to regulatory areas as diverse as corporation, securities, antitrust, banking, environmental, and product safety law. See Ralph K. Winter, 'State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation', 6 J Legal Stud 25 (1977) (corporation); Romano, 'Law as a Product', above n 4 (corporation); Roberta Romano, 'Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation', 107 Yale LJ 2359 (1998) (securities); Frank H. Easterbrook, 'Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism', 26 J L & Econ 23 (1983) [hereinafter Easterbrook, 'Antitrust'] (antitrust); Henry N. Butler and Jonathan R. Macey, 'The Myth of Competition in the Dual Banking System', 73 Cornell L Rev 677 (1988) [hereinafter Butler and Macey, 'The Myth'] (banking); Revesz, 'Rehabilitating', above n 4 (environmental); David A. Rice, 'Product Quality Laws and the Economics of Federalism', 65 BU L Rev 1 (1985) (product safety). The regulatory competition model has also crossed the Atlantic and become a source of reference for those searching to define the scope of the obscure principle of 'subsidiarity'. See Roger Van den Bergh, 'The Subsidiarity Principle in European Economic Law: Some Insights from Law and Economics', 1 Maastricht J Eur & Comp L 337 (1994) [hereinafter Van den Bergh, 'Subsidiarity']; Michael Faure, 'Harmonisation of Environmental Law and Market Integration: Harmonising for the Wrong Reasons?', 6 Eur Env L Rev 169 (1998); Gerard Hertig, 'Imperfect Mutual Recognition for EC Financial Services', 14 Int'l Rev L & Econ 177 (1994). EU-based regulatory competition theorists argue that, contrary to the ambitious policy of regulatory harmonization that has been pursued for several decades by the European Commission, decentralized regulation should be the rule and centralization the exception. Regulatory competition theory has begun to penetrate academic discussions in the area of international law, as authors use this model to praise the virtues of regulatory heterogeneity in areas such as environmental law and international finance. See Joel P. Trachtman, 'International Regulatory Competition, Externalization and Jurisdiction', 34 Harv Int'l LJ 47 (1993) (international law); Alvin K. Klevorick, 'The Race to the Bottom in a Federal System: Lessons from the World of Trade Policy', 14 Yale L & Policy Rev 177 (1996) [hereinafter Klevorick, 'Lessons'] (environmental law); Steven J. Choi and Andrew T. Guzman, 'National Laws, International Money: Regulation in a Global Capital Market', 65 Fordham L Rev 1855 (1997) (international finance); Christopher B. Bernard, 'Towards an International Market in Mutual Funds', 36 Va J Int'l L 467 (1996) (international finance).
21. Papers presented at Transatlantic Regulatory Cooperation Problems & Prospects in Light of International Experience & Domestic Legal Environments, Inaugural Conference of the European Legal Studies Center, Columbia Law School (16-17 April 1999).
22. We borrow the concept of 'co-opetition' from Adam Brandenburg and Barry Nalebuff's recent book of the same name. See Adam M. Brandenburg and Barry J. Nalebuff, Co-opetition (1996). The book explains that the optimal strategy for business is often a mix of competitive and cooperative actions.
23. See William W. Bratton and Joseph A. McCahery, 'The New Economics of Jurisdictional Competition: Devolutionary Federalism in a Second Best World', 86 Georgetown LJ 201 (1997).
24. See Daniel C. Esty, 'Non-Governmental Organizations at the World Trade Organization: Cooperation Competition, or Exclusion', 1 J Int'l Econ L 123 (1998) [hereinafter Esty, 'Cooperation'].
25. See Daniel C. Esty, 'Toward Optimal Environmental Governance', 74 NYU L Rev 1495 (1999) [hereinafter Esty, 'Optimal'].
26. See Charles Tiebout, 'A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures', 64 J Pol Econ 416 (1956).
27. See Joseph A. McCahery et al., International Regulatory Competition and Coordination - Perspectives on Economic Regulation in Europe and the United States (1996).
28. See Easterbrook, 'Antitrust', above n 5.
29. See Stephen G. Calabresi, 'A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers: In Defense of United States v. Lopez', 94 Mich L Rev 752 (1995).
30. See Matthew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll, and Barry R. Weingast, 'Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control', 3 J L Econ & Organization 243 (1987); Jerry L. Mashaw, Greed, Chaos, and Governance: Using Public Choice to Improve Public Law (1997).
31. See Matthew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll, and Barry R. Weingast, 'Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control', 3 J L Econ & Organization 243 (1987); Jerry L. Mashaw, Greed, Chaos, and Governance: Using Public Choice to Improve Public Law (1997).
32. If faithfully applied, the regulatory competition model would suggest that global free trade agreements are also unnecessary, since localities should adopt optimal trade policies on their own. Yet in the WTO arena, regulatory competition advocates recognize market failures of the kind discussed below. For a discussion of this apparent contradiction, see Daniel Farber, 'Symposium: The Allocation of Government Authority: Environmental Federalism in a Global Economy', 83 Va L Rev 1283 (1997).
33. See Revesz, 'Rehabilitating', above n 4.
34. See Esty, 'Optimal', above n 10.
35. See Arthur Pigou, The Economics of Welfare (1918).
36. See William J. Baumol and Wallace E. Oates, The Theory of Environmental Policy (1988).
37. See Richard B. Stewart, 'Environmental Law in the United States and the European Community: Spillovers, Cooperation, Rivalry, Institutions', 1992 U Chi Legal F 41 [hereinafter Stewart, 'Spillovers']; Wouter Wils, 'Subsidiarity and EC Environmental Policy: Taking People's Concerns Seriously', 6 J Env L 85 (1994).
38. See Richard B. Stewart, 'Environmental Law in the United States and the European Community: Spillovers, Cooperation, Rivalry, Institutions', 1992 U Chi Legal F 41 [hereinafter Stewart, 'Spillovers']; Wouter Wils, 'Subsidiarity and EC Environmental Policy: Taking People's Concerns Seriously', 6 J Env L 85 (1994).
39. See Owen Lomas, 'Environmental Protection, Economic Conflict and the European Community', 33 McGill LJ 506 (1988).
40. There is an ongoing debate, which we will not rehash here, about whether economic externalities are 'real' or merely pecuniary. Compare Revesz, 'Rehabilitating', above n 4 with Daniel C. Esty, 'Revitalizing Environmental Federalism' 95 Mich L Rev 570 (1996) [hereinafter Esty, Revitalizing].
41. There is an ongoing debate, which we will not rehash here, about whether economic externalities are 'real' or merely pecuniary. Compare Revesz, 'Rehabilitating', above n 4 with Daniel C. Esty, 'Revitalizing Environmental Federalism' 95 Mich L Rev 570 (1996) [hereinafter Esty, Revitalizing].
42. See Revesz, 'Rehabilitating', above n 4.
43. See Butler and Macey, 'The Myth', above n 5.
44. See Roberta Romano, 'The State Competition Debate in Corporate Law', 8 Cardozo L Rev 709 (1987).
45. See Esty, 'Optimal', above n 10.
46. See Van den Bergh, 'Subsidiarity', above n 5.
47. See David Charny, 'Competition Among Jurisdictions in Formulating Corporate Rules: An American Perspective on the "Race to the Bottom" in the European Communities', 32 Harv Int'l LJ 423 (1991).
48. See Helmut Kohl, 'Federalism and Corporate Law' in Ingolf Pernice (ed), Harmonization of Legislation in Federal Systems (1996) 129; Friedrich Kübler, 'Legislative Competition and Corporate Law Reform: Some Questions from a European Perspective' in Ingolf Pernice (ed), Harmonization of Legislation in Federal Systems (1996) 171.
49. See Helmut Kohl, 'Federalism and Corporate Law' in Ingolf Pernice (ed), Harmonization of Legislation in Federal Systems (1996) 129; Friedrich Kübler, 'Legislative Competition and Corporate Law Reform: Some Questions from a European Perspective' in Ingolf Pernice (ed), Harmonization of Legislation in Federal Systems (1996) 171.
50. Industry sectors where large economies of scale can be achieved (e.g. electricity production and transmission) are generally considered to be 'natural monopolies'. See Alfred Kahn, The Economics of Regulation (1970). Similarly, areas where important regulatory economies of scale can be achieved may be considered to be 'natural legal monopolies'.
51. See Esty, 'Revitalizing', above n 23.
52. See Alan O. Sykes, Product Standards for Internationally Integrated Goods and Markets (1995); Alan O. Sykes, 'The Limited Role of Regulatory Harmonization in International Goods and Services Markets', 2 J Int'l Econ L 49 (1999).
53. See Alan O. Sykes, Product Standards for Internationally Integrated Goods and Markets (1995); Alan O. Sykes, 'The Limited Role of Regulatory Harmonization in International Goods and Services Markets', 2 J Int'l Econ L 49 (1999).
54. Esty and Geradin explain that 'harmonization' need not imply absolutely uniform standards. Alternative forms of harmonization or regulatory 'convergence' may permit some degree of standardization without the concomitant efficiency losses that single standards that do not match local needs generate. See Daniel C. Esty and Damien Geradin, 'Environmental Protection and International Competitiveness: A Conceptual Framework', 32 J World Trade 5 (1998). Harmonization debates themselves often entail competition over whose standards should be adopted. And agreement on a common standard need not bring an end to regulatory competition. Many forms of harmonization are flexible and open enough to allow continued debate over and refinement of the standards selected. See also Piet Jan Slot, 'Harmonization', 21 Eur L Rev 378 (1996).
55. Esty and Geradin explain that 'harmonization' need not imply absolutely uniform standards. Alternative forms of harmonization or regulatory 'convergence' may permit some degree of standardization without the concomitant efficiency losses that single standards that do not match local needs generate. See Daniel C. Esty and Damien Geradin, 'Environmental Protection and International Competitiveness: A Conceptual Framework', 32 J World Trade 5 (1998). Harmonization debates themselves often entail competition over whose standards should be adopted. And agreement on a common standard need not bring an end to regulatory competition. Many forms of harmonization are flexible and open enough to allow continued debate over and refinement of the standards selected. See also Piet Jan Slot, 'Harmonization', 21 Eur L Rev 378 (1996).
56. See Revesz, 'Rehabilitating', above n 4.
57. See Esty, 'Revitalizing', above n 23.
58. See André Dua and Daniel C. Esty, Sustaining the Asia Pacific Miracle: Environmental Protection and Economic Integration (1997).
59. See Stewart, 'Spillovers', above n 21.
60. See Steve Charnovitz, 'Environmental and Labor Standards in Trade', 15 World Economy 335 (1992); Brian Langille, 'Eight Ways to Think About International Labour Standards', 31 J World Trade 27 (1997).
61. See Steve Charnovitz, 'Environmental and Labor Standards in Trade', 15 World Economy 335 (1992); Brian Langille, 'Eight Ways to Think About International Labour Standards', 31 J World Trade 27 (1997).
62. See, e.g., Revesz, 'Rehabilitating', above n 4.
63. See Patrick Low and Alexander Yeats, 'Do "Dirty" Industries Migrate?' Patrick Low (ed), International Trade and the Environment (1992) 89; Adam B. Jaffe et al., 'Environmental Regulation and International Competitiveness of U.S. Manufacturing: What Does the Evidence Tell Us?', 33 J Econ Literature 132 (1995); Klevorick, 'Lessons', above n 5.
64. See Patrick Low and Alexander Yeats, 'Do "Dirty" Industries Migrate?' Patrick Low (ed), International Trade and the Environment (1992) 89; Adam B. Jaffe et al., 'Environmental Regulation and International Competitiveness of U.S. Manufacturing: What Does the Evidence Tell Us?', 33 J Econ Literature 132 (1995); Klevorick, 'Lessons', above n 5.
65. See Patrick Low and Alexander Yeats, 'Do "Dirty" Industries Migrate?' Patrick Low (ed), International Trade and the Environment (1992) 89; Adam B. Jaffe et al., 'Environmental Regulation and International Competitiveness of U.S. Manufacturing: What Does the Evidence Tell Us?', 33 J Econ Literature 132 (1995); Klevorick, 'Lessons', above n 5.
66. See, for example, Lawrence Summers's (in)famous World Bank internal memorandum leaked to the press, explaining that it is economically efficient to encourage migration of dirty industries to less developed nations. See 'Let Them Eat Pollution', The Economist 66 (22 February 1992).
67. See Cees van Beers and Jeroen C. J. M. van den Bergh, 'An Empirical Multi-Country Analysis of the Impact of Environmental Regulations on Foreign Trade Flows', 50 Kyklos 29 (1997); Muthukumara Mani and David Wheeler, 'In Search of Pollution Havens? Dirty Industry in the World Economy, 1960-1995' in Per G. Fredriksson (ed), Trade, Global Policy, and the Environment (1999) 115.
68. See Cees van Beers and Jeroen C. J. M. van den Bergh, 'An Empirical Multi-Country Analysis of the Impact of Environmental Regulations on Foreign Trade Flows', 50 Kyklos 29 (1997); Muthukumara Mani and David Wheeler, 'In Search of Pollution Havens? Dirty Industry in the World Economy, 1960-1995' in Per G. Fredriksson (ed), Trade, Global Policy, and the Environment (1999) 115.
69. See Daniel C. Esty and Damien Geradin, 'Market Access, Competitiveness, and Harmonization: Environmental Protection in Regional Trade Agreements', 21 Harv Env L Rev 265 (1997) [hereinafter Esty and Geradin, 'Market Access'].
70. See Dani Rodrik, Has Globalization Gone Too Far? (1997).
71. See Esty, 'Optimal', above n 10.
72. See Robert E. Hudec, 'Thinking About the New Section 301: Beyond Good and Evil' in Jagdish Bhagwati and Hugh T. Patrick (eds), Aggressive Unilateralism: America's 301 Trade Policy and the World Trading System (1990) 113.
73. See Albert Breton, Competitive Governments: An Economic Theory of Politics and Public Finance (1996) [hereinafter Breton, Competitive Governments].
74. See 'France Imposes Emergency Bans on Phtalates in Baby Toys', Environment Watch 9 (16 July 1999).
75. See Esty, 'Cooperation', above n 9.
76. See Jody Freeman, 'Collaborative Government in the Administrative State', 45 UCLA L Rev 1 (1997).
77. See 'Toward a Dynamic Economy - Green Paper on the Development of the Common Market for Telecommunications Services and Equipment', European Commission COM(87) final (1987) 290.
78. See Richard B. Stewart, 'Environmental Regulation and International Competitiveness', 102 Yale LJ 2039 (1993). See also, Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. and Eric W. Orts, 'Environmental Contracts in the United States' (unpublished manuscript) (1999).
79. See Richard B. Stewart, 'Environmental Regulation and International Competitiveness', 102 Yale LJ 2039 (1993). See also, Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. and Eric W. Orts, 'Environmental Contracts in the United States' (unpublished manuscript) (1999).
80. See Horst G. Krenzler and Astrid Schomaker, 'A New Transatlantic Agenda', 1 Eur Foreign Affairs Rev 9 (1996).
81. See 'Regulatory Competition: Promoting Trade While Facilitating Consumer Protection', Joint Statement of US-EU Summit (5 December 1997) (on file with author).
82. See Douglas Melamed, 'Antitrust Enforcement in a Global Economy', 25th Annual Conference on International Antitrust Law and Policy, Fordham Corporate Law Institute (1998); Alex Schaub, 'International Co-operation in Antitrust Matters: Making the Point in the Wake of the Boeing/MDD Proceedings', Competition Policy Newsletter 1, 3 (1998) (on file with author).
83. See Douglas Melamed, 'Antitrust Enforcement in a Global Economy', 25th Annual Conference on International Antitrust Law and Policy, Fordham Corporate Law Institute (1998); Alex Schaub, 'International Co-operation in Antitrust Matters: Making the Point in the Wake of the Boeing/MDD Proceedings', Competition Policy Newsletter 1, 3 (1998) (on file with author).
84. See Hans Ullrich, 'TRIPS: Adequate Protection, Inadequate Trade, Adequate Competition Policy', 4 Pac Rim L & Policy J 153 (1995).
85. See Marco Bronckers and Pierre Larouche, 'Telecommunications Services and the World Trade Organization', 31 J World Trade 5 (1997).
86. See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, 'International Competition Rules for Governments and Private Business', 30 J World Trade 5 (1996); Aaditya Mattoo and Arvind Subramanian, 'Multilateral Rules on Competition Policy - A Possible Way Forward', 31 J World Trade 129 (1997).
87. See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, 'International Competition Rules for Governments and Private Business', 30 J World Trade 5 (1996); Aaditya Mattoo and Arvind Subramanian, 'Multilateral Rules on Competition Policy - A Possible Way Forward', 31 J World Trade 129 (1997).
88. See Steve Charnovitz, 'The Influence of International Labour Standards on the World Trading Regime: A Historical Overview', 126 Int'l Labor Rev 565 (1987).
89. See Daniel C. Esty, Greening the GATT: Trade, Environment, and the Future (1994) 178.
90. See Maury E. Bredahl and Kenneth W. Forsythe, 'Harmonizing Phyto-sanitary and Sanitary Regulations', 12 World Econ 189 (1989).
91. See R. J. Herring and Robert E. Litan, Financial Regulation in the Global Economy (1995).
92. See Esty and Geradin, 'Market Access', above n 44.
93. See Michael E. Kraft and Norman J. Vig, 'Environmental Policy from the Seventies to the Nineties: Continuity and Change' in Norman J. Vig and Michael E. Kraft (eds), Environmental Policy in the 1990s (1990).
94. See 'Environment Ministers to Revise EMAS, Eco-Label Program to Boost Participation', 22 Int'l Env Rptr 570 (1999).
95. See Richard Mott, 'Federal-State Relations in US Environmental Law: Lessons from the American Experience', European University Institute Working Paper, EPU, No 90/2 (1990).
96. See Damien Geradin, Trade and the Environment: A Comparative Study of EC and US Law (1997).
97. See Esty, 'Optimal', above n 10.
98. See Albert Breton, Competitive Governments, above n 48; Michael Trebilock and Robert Howse, 'Trade Liberalization and Regulatory Diversity Competitive Markets with Competitive Politics', 6 Eur J L & Econ 5 (1998).
99. See Albert Breton, Competitive Governments, above n 48; Michael Trebilock and Robert Howse, 'Trade Liberalization and Regulatory Diversity Competitive Markets with Competitive Politics', 6 Eur J L & Econ 5 (1998).
100. As pointed out by Ogus, competition may also take place between different court systems with overlapping jurisdictions. For instance, the struggle between the Chancery Courts and their Common Law rivals had a significant impact on the development of legal principles in the United Kingdom. See Anthony Ogus, 'Competition Between National Legal Systems: A Contribution of Economic Analysis to Comparative Law', 48 Intl & Comp LQ 405 (1999) [hereinafter Ogus, 'Competition'].
101. Laurence W. Gormley, Prohibiting Restrictions on Trade Within the EEC (1985).
102. To some extent, political parties competing for power can be compared to firms engaged in a competitive bidding for a monopolistic franchise power to provide a service, the competition serving to ensure that the firm offering the most efficient prices and services will be selected. See Ogus, 'Competition', above n 71.
103. See Esty, 'Cooperation', above n 9.
104. See Peta Firth, 'Thirty Firms Plan Pilot on Emissions Trading in Effort to Head off Proposed Energy Tax', 22 Int'l Env Rptr 580 (1999).
105. See Eckard Rehbinder, 'Environmental Agreements: A New Instrument of Environmental Policy', Jean Monnet Chair Paper, RSC 97/45 (1997) (on file with author).
106. See Paula Stern, 'The Transatlantic Business Dialogue: A New Model for Trade Expansion and Regulatory Harmonization' (1997) 〈http://www.tabd.org/resources/content/stern2.html〉.
107. Thanks to Professor Dan Farber for highlighting this concept.