Information aggregation and preference heterogeneity in committees

Theory and Decision

Volumn 69, Issue 1, 2010, Pages 97-118

  Schulte, Elisabeth ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MANNHEIM   (Germany)

Author keywords

Committee decisions; Information aggregation; Preference heterogeneity

Indexed keywords

BINARY DECISION; COMMITTEE DECISIONS; COMMITTEE MEMBERS; COMMON KNOWLEDGE; INFORMATION AGGREGATION; PREFERENCE HETEROGENEITY; VOTING GAME;

EID: 77955924313     PISSN: 00405833     EISSN: 15737187     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11238-008-9118-y     Document Type: Article

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