The bounds of representation A non-representationalist use of the resources of the model of extended cognition

Pragmatics and Cognition

Volumn 18, Issue 2, 2010, Pages 235-272

  Steiner, Pierre ^a  

^a UNIVERSITÉ DE TECHNOLOGIE DE COMPIÈGNE   (France)

Author keywords

Distributed cognition; Extended cognition; External representation; Mental representation; Representationalism

Indexed keywords

EID: 77955735200     PISSN: 09290907     EISSN: 15699943     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1075/pc.18.2.02ste     Document Type: Article

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