A payoff-based learning procedure and its application to traffic games

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 70, Issue 1, 2010, Pages 71-83

  Cominetti, Roberto ^a   Melo, Emerson ^b   Sorin, Sylvain ^c,d  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CHILE   (Chile)

^b CENTRAL BANK OF CHILE   (Chile)

^c SORBONNE UNIVERSITÉ   (France)

^d ECOLE POLYTECHNIQUE   (France)

Author keywords

Adaptive dynamics; Congestion games; Games; Learning; Stochastic algorithms

Indexed keywords

EID: 77955551570     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2008.11.012     Document Type: Article

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