An efficient and almost budget balanced cost sharing method

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 70, Issue 1, 2010, Pages 107-131

  Moulin, Hervé ^a  

^a RICE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 77955550340     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2008.09.028     Document Type: Article

References (40)

1. Aczel J. Lectures on Functional Equations and Their Applications 1966, Academic Press, New York.
2. Anshelevich, E., Dasgupta, A., Tardos, E., Wexler, T., 2004. Near-optimal network design with selfish agents. In: Proceedings of the 35th Annual ACM Symposium on the Theory of Computing.
3. Bevia, C., Corchon, L., 2007. Cooperative production and efficiency. Barcelona Economics Working Papers Series #305.
4. Billera L., Heath D., Raanan J. Internal telephone billing rates: A novel application of nonatomic game theory. Operations Res. 1978, 26:956-965.
5. Chen, Y., Zhang, J., 2005. Design of price mechanisms for network resource allocation via price of anarchy. Mimeo. New York University.
6. Corchon L., Puy S. Existence and Nash implementation of efficient sharing rules for a commonly owned technology. Soc. Choice Welfare 2002, 19:369-379.
7. Cres H., Moulin H. Commons with increasing marginal cost: Random priority versus average cost. Int. Econ. Rev. 2003, 44(3):1097-1115.
8. Demers A., Keshaw S., Shenker S. Analysis and simulation of a fair queuing algorithm. Internetworking Res. Experience 1990, 1:3-26.
9. Dimakis, A., Jain, R., Walrand, J., 2006. Mechanisms for efficient allocation in divisible capacity networks. In: Proceedings of the 45th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control. December.
10. Green J., Laffont J.J. Incentives in Public Decision Making 1979, North-Holland, Amsterdam.
11. Guo, M., Conitzer, V., 2007. Worst-case optimal redistribution of VCG payments. In: Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC). San Diego, USA, pp. 30-39.
12. Guo, M., Conitzer, V., 2008. Better redistribution with inefficient allocation. Mimeo. Duke University.
13. Johari R., Tsitsiklis J. Efficiency loss in a network resource allocation game. Math. Operations Res. 2004, 29(3):407-435.
14. Johari, R., Tsitsiklis, J., 2007. Efficiency of scalar parametrized mechanisms. Mimeo. Stanford and MIT.
15. Johari R., Mannor S., Tsitsiklis J. Efficiency loss in a network resource allocation game: The case of elastic supply. IEEE Trans. Automatic Control 2005, 50(11):1712-1724.
16. Juarez, R., 2007. Group strategyproof cost sharing: The role of indifferences. Mimeo. Rice University.
17. Juarez R. The worst absolute loss in the problem of the commons: Random priority vs. average cost. Econ. Theory 2008, 34(1):69-74.
18. Kelly F.P. Charging and rate control for elastic traffic. Europ. Trans. Telecommunications 1997, 8:33-37.
19. Koutsoupias, E., Papadimitriou, C., 1999. Worst case equilibria. In: Proceedings of the 16th Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science, pp. 404-413.
20. Kukushkin N. Best response dynamics in finite games with additive aggregation. Games Econ. Behav. 2004, 48:94-110.
21. Leroux J. Cooperative production with diminishing marginal returns: Interpreting fixed-path methods. Soc. Choice Welfare 2007, 29(1):35-54.
22. Maheswaran, R., Basar, T., 2004. Social welfare of selfish agents: Motivating efficiency for divisible resources. In: Proceedings of IEEE Conference on Decision and Control (CDC), pp. 1550-1555.
23. Maskin E. The theory of implementation in Nash equilibrium: A survey. Social Goals and Social Organization 1985, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, MA. L. Hurwicz, D. Schmeidler, H. Sonnenschein (Eds.).
24. Mehta, A., Roughgarden, T., Sundararajan, M., 2007. Beyond Moulin mechanisms. In: Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC). San Diego, USA.
25. Mitra M. Mechanism design in queueing problems. Econ. Theory 2001, 17:277-305.
26. Monderer D., Shapley L. Potential games. Games Econ. Behav. 1996, 14:124-143.
27. Monderer D., Shapley L. Fictitious play property for games with identical interests. J. Econ. Theory 1996, 68:258-265.
28. Moulin H. The price of anarchy of serial, average and incremental cost sharing. Econ. Theory 2008, 36:379-405.
29. Moulin, H., forthcoming. Efficient, strategy-proof, and almost budget balanced assignment. Mimeo (April 2007). Journal of Economic Theory.
30. Moulin H., Shenker S. Serial cost sharing. Econometrica 1992, 60:1009-1037.
31. Moulin H., Shenker S. Strategyproof sharing of submodular costs: Budget balance versus efficiency. Econ. Theory 2001, 18(3):511-533.
32. Rockafellar T. Convex Analysis 1970, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.
33. Roughgarden, T., 2002. The price of anarchy is independent of the network topology. In: STOC.
34. Roughgarden T. Selfish Routing and the Price of Anarchy 2005, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, USA.
35. Roughgarden T., Tardos E. How bad is selfish routing?. J. ACM 2002, 49(2):236-259.
36. Sanghavi, S., Hajek, B., 2004. Optimal allocation of a divisible good to strategic buyers. In: Proceedings of the 43d IEEE Conference on Decision and Control.
37. Tennenholtz, M., 2001. Rational competitive analysis. In: IJCAI-01.
38. Walker M. On the non-existence of dominant strategy mechanisms for making optimal public decisions. Econometrica 1980, 48:1521-1540.
39. Watts A. On the uniqueness of equilibrium in Cournot oligopoly and other games. Games Econ. Behav. 1996, 13:269-285.
40. Yang S., Hajek B. VCG-Kelly mechanisms for allocation of divisible goods: Adapting VCG mechanisms to one-dimensional signals. IEEE J. Selected Areas Communications 2007, 25(6):1-7. August.