Existence and Nash implementation of efficient sharing rules for a commonly owned technology

Social Choice and Welfare

Volumn 19, Issue 2, 2002, Pages 369-379

  Corchón, Luis C ^a   Socorro Puy, M ^b  

^a UNIVERSIDAD CARLOS III DE MADRID   (Spain)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MÁLAGA   (Spain)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036556949     PISSN: 01761714     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s003550100117     Document Type: Article

References (28)

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