Shareholder Voting and Directors' Remuneration Report Legislation: Say on Pay in the UK

Corporate Governance: An International Review

Volumn 18, Issue 4, 2010, Pages 296-312

  Conyon, Martin ^a   Sadler, Graham ^b  

^a IE BUSINESS SCHOOL   (Spain)

^b Faculty of Engineering and Computing   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Corporate Governance; Executive Pay; Shareholder Activism

Indexed keywords

EID: 77955127025     PISSN: 09648410     EISSN: 14678683     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8683.2010.00802.x     Document Type: Article

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