Epiphany in the Game of 21

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 75, Issue 2, 2010, Pages 132-143

  Dufwenberg, Martin ^a,b   Sundaram, Ramya ^c   Butler, David J ^d  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF GOTHENBURG   (Sweden)

^c GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^d UNIVERSITY OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA   (Australia)

Author keywords

Dominant strategies; Epiphany; Game theory; Learning; Mimicking; Reasoning

Indexed keywords

EID: 77954217598     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2010.03.025     Document Type: Article

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